Author name: CBCL

Arbitrability of Disputes Involving Commercial Fraud: What Does the Modern Arbitration Regime Hold?

[By Arjun Sahni and Moksh Roy] The authors are third year students of Symbiosis Law School, Noida. Introduction The regime and system of international arbitration, including the procedure, applicable laws, inter alia, are ever changing. One such issue pertains to the element of arbitrability, that is, whether a particular subject matter is capable of being referred to arbitration or not. This problem arises even when there is an arbitration clause/agreement that specifically governs the dispute or the subject matter in question. Historically, disputes involving the elements and claims of bribery/corruption, antitrust/competition, intellectual property rights, employment and labour disputes et al. were considered to be non-arbitrable.[i] The idea behind this has been that such claims run contrary to the aspects of international as well as national public policy, and party-appointed private individuals do not have the power, competence, and right to render decisions with respect to such claims.[ii] However, exponential development in international and domestic arbitration jurisprudence has led to a drastic change in the fora of arbitrability as many jurisdictions have become pro-arbitration and consider that almost all disputes are capable of being referred to arbitration,[iii] including the ones which are tainted with the aspects of commercial fraud, corruption & bribery.[iv] To date, the law, in international and domestic legislation, is not entirely clear on even if claims involving expansive elements of corruption and bribery can be referred to arbitration and how such claims are to be arbitrated. What do we mean by commercial fraud? The UNCITRAL Guide on Recognizing and Preventing Commercial Fraud, 2013 defines it as an element of deceit having a serious economic dimension as a result of which there is a loss of value. Consequently, elements of corruption and bribery become integral to the aspect of commercial fraud. Corruption relates to the abuse of some entrusted power for private gain whereas bribery is the act of receiving preferential treatment, be it in the form of money, goods and/or services, in exchange for doing or abstaining from doing something which runs contrary to the settled law.[v] The position of these elements in law is that they attract penal provisions and are termed as criminal actions, be it in the international or domestic front. Arbitrators are individuals appointed by private parties for resolving disputes between themselves, whereas criminal acts are the actions against the state and public peace.[vi] States have in the past, been reluctant to let arbitrators decide such matters; however, that trend has undergone a change. Position of the New York Convention, 1958 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (the Model Law) Drawing on the Geneva Protocol, 1923, New York Convention’s Article II(1) provides that an international arbitration agreement shall only be valid if it “concerns a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration”. On the same lines, Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention puts forth that an arbitration award may not be recognized if “the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration”. On a bare reading of these provisions, it is not entirely clear what makes a dispute not capable of being settled by arbitration. If the parties agree on referring their differences to arbitration, virtually nothing can hold them back.[vii] The UNCITRAL Secretarial Guide on the New York Convention, 2016 puts forth that the definition and scope of the term “subject matter” is dependent upon its interpretation rendered by courts of different countries. The same goes for the wordings of Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention. The Supreme Court of the United States of America in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 1985 was faced with a similar problem and the bench was of the opinion that in the absence of a clear list of disputes that are non-arbitrable, the domestic laws which are applicable to the arbitration agreement or laws as determined by the conflict/choice of law rule will have to be taken into consideration and the issue of arbitrability will depend on those domestic laws. The Model Law does not contain a single provision that specifically relates to the aspect of arbitrability, thereby signifying that all the disputes are arbitrable and capable of being referred to arbitration.[viii] The arbitrability issue in the context of the Model Law is, similar to the position of the New York Convention, dependent on the domestic laws of a country. What do the national jurisdictions hold? In many arbitration friendly regimes, such as the United Kingdom and Singapore, the questions of arbitrability of disputes tainted with corruption & bribery rarely find a place.[ix] Similar to India’s position, the domestic legislation of these countries do not explicitly mention what kind of disputes can and cannot be submitted to arbitration. In the absence of the same, such a determination is on a case to case basis, subjectively, based on precedents and national court’s rulings. As far as the United Kingdom’s position goes, the infamous decision rendered by the House of Lords in the Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v. Privalov in 2007 made it crystal clear that even the disputes that are tainted with the elements of fraud are arbitrable. The Bench based its decision on the principle of separability, that an arbitration clause/agreement is separate and distinct from the contract in question, and in light of the same, even if the contract is tainted with the elements of fraud, the arbitration agreement will retain its full vigour and the constituted arbitral tribunal will have the requisite jurisdiction. The Court was of the opinion that such disputes can be subjected to arbitration unless and until the law clearly prescribes the contrary. India’s position on the subject still remains unclear. The Supreme Court decision rendered in Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. in 2011 laid down the first test to determine arbitrability of disputes. The bench opined that disputes involving the aspects of public policy, fraud and corruption give rise to the aspects of in rem rights (something that affects the world at large)

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Rights Issue of Fully Convertible Debentures: The Canning Industries Case

[Guest Post by Gaurav Pingle] The author is a practicing Company Secretary and runs his own CS firm, Gaurav Pingle & Associates, Pune. Background Section 23 of the Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”) relates to ‘public offer and private placement’. According to the said provision, a public company may issue securities to public through prospectus (i.e. Initial Public Offer/Further Public Offer) or through private placement[i] or through rights issue[ii] or bonus issue[iii]. In addition to this, a public company can also issue ESOPs or debentures[iv]. However, the question for interpretation arises when a public company issues securities and such issue falls under two or more provisions of the Act. The requirement of valuation is different for rights issue, private placement or public offer of securities. In addition to this, the Act read with the Companies (Share Capital and Debenture) Rules, 2014 has significantly enhanced the compliances, disclosures, documentation and reporting for such issue of securities. Section 42 of the Act, which relates to issue of shares on private placement basis was entirely substituted by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017[v]. However, irrespective of substitution, the underlying theme has not changed i.e. offer and issue of securities to certain investor(s) only i.e. ‘select group of persons’. In the recent case of Canning Industries Cochin Ltd. v. SEBI[vi], decided on 28 January 2020, Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”) has interpreted the provisions relating to private placement of securities. This article analyses Section 42 of the Act along with the said SAT judgment. Facts of the case Canning Industries Cochin Ltd. (“Company”), an unlisted public company (having 1,929 shareholders) passed a special resolution[vii] for issuing 1,92,900 unsecured Fully Convertible Debentures (“FCDs”) of Rs. 250/- each to its 1,929 shareholders at the rate of 100 FCDs, with no right to renounce the offer to any other person. The debentures were issued for a period of 5 years i.e. every FCD would be compulsorily converted into equity shares on maturity or earlier if the call option is exercised by the Company itself. However, the Company was able to raise funds only from 335 members. One disgruntled shareholder filed complaints before SEBI and NCLT alleging that the Company has made public issue of securities without complying with the provisions of the Act. The Company contended that the same was neither rights issue as issue was not made on a proportionate basis, nor was it private placement as no ‘select group of individuals’ were identified for the issue in question. It however claimed the issue to be made on preferential basis under Section 62(1)(c) of the Act. Issue for consideration Whether the said issue of FCDs would be deemed public issue under Section 42 of the Act? Observations of SEBI SEBI in its Order dated 18 March 2019[viii], observed that an offer to 335 persons is a ‘deemed public issue’ as it violates the provisions of Section 42(1) of the Act. SEBI also observed that the Company was required to comply with the relevant IPO related provisions and was required to make an application to one or more of the stock exchanges for listing, which the Company failed to comply. Observations of SAT On appeal, SAT observed that Section 42 of the Act is not applicable to the offer of FCDs as it is not ‘private placement’ of securities. SAT observed that ‘private placement’ means an offer to subscribe securities to a ‘select group of persons’ by a company. The term ‘select group of persons’ though not defined in the Act, indicates a specified number of persons limited to aggregate 200 in a financial year. It was observed that since the offer was made to 1929 shareholders, the offer of said FCDs cannot be termed as an offer to a ‘select group of persons’. SAT observed that “the expression ‘select group of persons’ is not a technical expression but has to be understood in its ordinary popular sense, namely, an offer made privately such as to friends and relatives or a selected set of customers distinguished from approaching the general public or to a section of the public by advertisement, circular or prospectus addressed to the public.” SAT further observed that restriction of subscription of shares to 200 persons or more is not applicable in the instant case as it is not a ‘private placement’. SAT also observed that section 62(1)(c) of the Act is not applicable as it is not a case of issuance of shares/securities on preferential basis. Analysis of SC Order in the Sahara case Before we analyse the said SAT order, let us refer to some important and relevant observations of Supreme Court (“SC”) in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation v. SEBI[ix]. In this case, an offer was made to public under the garb of private placement of securities[x]. SC observed that Section 73(1) of the Companies Act, 1956[xi] casts an obligation on every company intending to offer shares or debentures to the public to apply to recognised stock exchange for listing its securities. SC further observed that if an unlisted company expresses its intention, by conduct or otherwise, to offer its securities to the public by the issue of a prospectus, there arises a legal obligation on the company to make an application on a recognized stock exchange for listing. Even though the overall principle was laid down by SC under the Companies Act, 1956, it is still noted and referred by SEBI in many cases dealing with public issue of shares or securities, and stands valid under the provisions of Companies Act, 2013. Interestingly, provisions relating to private placement of securities have been introduced with an objective to avoid Sahara-like events in future i.e. offer to public under the garb of private placement of securities. Analysis of SAT Order FCDs were offered to 1,929 persons, however all the offerees were existing shareholders. Also, the right of renunciation was not part of the offer. Issue is whether such offer is rights offer or public offer or an offer that violates the provisions of

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Raising the IBC Threshold: Addressing the Needs of MSMEs and Home Buyers

[By Urmil Shah] The author is a third year student of Auro University, Surat. Introduction The Ministry of Corporate Affairs on 24 March, 2020 raised the minimum threshold requirement for initiating a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) under Section 4 of the Insolvency Bankruptcy Code (“IBC” or “the Code”) from existing Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 1 crore by way of Notification S.O. 1205(E) as measure for combating the Covid-19 pandemic. Among other relations and exemptions to companies from routine disclosures and compliances announced by the Government in wake of the recent pandemic, the increase in threshold comes as controversial as the measure has the effect of spurring a conflict between Corporate Debtors (“CD”) and Financial Creditors (“FC”). A similar debate arose when the Central Government reduced the pecuniary jurisdiction of the commercial courts under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 3 lakhs in wake of making it more accessible to common people.[i] The effect was that it led to multifold increase in litigation in these courts which was earlier being settled or resolved through alternate modes of resolution. Similarly, the change of threshold requirement for determination of default and triggering insolvency for corporates in the IBC follows both affirmation and depression in itself. The Finance Minister mentioned that such a step is taken due to limited functioning of the MSME sector on account of pan-India lockdown and to avoid large-scale insolvencies as a result of financial distress to such small companies and MSMEs. Such a legislative reform is a welcome relief due to the virtual shutdown of the economy and suspension of business is bound to have domino-effect across contracts entered into between parties and trigger the force majeure clauses in the contracts resulting in either frustration or non-performance of such a contract. Resultantly, the Ministry of Finance announced that the pandemic can be treated as a natural calamity and the force majeure clauses maybe invoked as consequence when required. The critical question to be addressed is whether the change is temporary in nature on account of the pandemic or permanent as it may well be counter-productive to the interest of certain class of small yet significant creditors like MSMEs and home buyers and may defeat the purpose of safeguarding the interest of MSMEs. MSME Sector – A Bouncing Bouncer? The Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development  Act, 2005 (“MSMED Act”), although does not  provide for a specific mode for recovery on account of insolvency for the MSMEs but addresses the issue by alternative mode of resolution to delayed payments and offers a handsome rate of interest at 18% for such delay. The present notification in no way benefits the MSME sector as 97% of the sector operates as either proprietorship or partnership, the insolvency provisions for which have not been notified yet.[ii] Even the remaining 3% of the MSME sector which are companies, a majority of them are Operational Creditors (“OC”) [iii] themselves[iv] and have utilized the mechanism as a means to find resolution of their dues and not that of the defaulter, thereby going against the legislative intent behind enactment of the Code to have a resolution mechanism in place for insolvent businesses. MSME as creditors: Since the companies within the sector operate at a miniscule level with limited capital requirements, their offerings are not as huge as FCs of other sectors and accordingly the debt rendered by them will be classified as operational debt. The notification of increased threshold will have the effect of nullifying the benefit that these creditors earlier obtained as actionable claim against the default which would have previously been qualified to initiate CIRP as it is impractical to expect a single OC to have a claim as high as Rupees 1  crore,[v] considering the fact that OCs triggered almost 53% of the CIRPs for the quarter Oct-Dec, 2019.[vi] Such a reform goes against the spirit and letter of law as decided in the Swiss Robbins case[vii] to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interests of all the stakeholders. MSME as debtors: The amendment comes as knight in shining armor for the limited MSMEs who are CDs as it has been discoursed that the Code does not offer the most effective regime for the insolvency resolution of smaller CDs.[viii] It is in concurrence with the spirit envisaged by the Insolvency Law Reforms Committee that the sector is key driver of economic growth, entrepreneurship and financial inclusion in the country.[ix] The selected CDs of this sector will be benefitted for the time being from unnecessary and excessive insolvencies due to the increased threshold limit. Homebuyers – The Active Creditor Class? An important consideration for homebuyers is that the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (“RERA Act”), provides for refund of amount received for carrying out the project including compensation in case of withdrawal by the allottee and monthly interest for delay in possession by the promoter in case of non- withdrawal from the project. Considering this remedy for homebuyers, approaching the insolvency court is only a mode of forum shopping and liquidating happy-going businesses for a meagre sum of default, considering the quantum of claims received by NCLTs and NCLAT, the adjudicating authority and appellate mechanism envisaged under the Code. Since the formation of Code in 2016, homebuyers have been the most active creditor class and have triggered several amendments, including the Second Amendment Act, 2018 which declared them as FCs.[x] However the controversial IBC Amendment, 2019  which introduced a minimum threshold limit of 100 or 10% of allottees in a project or class of investors to approach the Adjudicating Authority for initiating CIRP, is challenged before the Supreme Court. The interest of homebuyers from standpoint of both legislature and judiciary is clear to place their benefit over and above the other creditor class. The present notification however is not likely to have a major implication considering their status under the Code, as the claim of 100 or 10% of the allottees can easily amount to 1 crore. The critical consideration however is that

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Covid-19 and Stock Market Crash: Should SEBI Ban Short-selling?

[By Tanuj Agarwal] The author is a third year student of Institute of Law, Nirma University, Ahmedabad.  Introduction Covid-19 pandemic has raised serious apprehensions surrounding health and safety causing a lockdown in India.  The pandemic has caused a worldwide recession and has spooked investors’ sentiment. Prior to the coronavirus outbreak, Indian stock market was in full positive swing as Sensex and Nifty had reached their all-time intraday peak of 42,273.87 and 12,430.50 respectively in the month of January, 2020. Even after attaining such progress, Indian stock market is witnessing the most difficult period for the past few weeks. The stock market has observed lower circuit levels after 12 years on March 13, 2020. Afterwards, the equity index discerning a continuous downfall. On March 19, 2020, Sensex crashed below 27,000 and Nifty breached the level of 7,900, thereby attained their five-year closing low levels. Consequently, an approximate downfall of 37% is evident in both the equity indices within a period of just 2 months. The stock market has seen a considerable collapse due to high market volatility. This downfall has degraded the financial market and faded interest of investors and corporates. Thereby, the concern is whether such market downturn can be controlled by restricting short-selling. Short-Selling and its Impact on the Stock Market Short-selling means selling a stock which the seller does not own at the time of trade. It is a practice in which financial traders hold bets on specific shares that they expect a fall in price. A modest fee is paid to borrow some stock in the company to sell them. Further in case the market obliges, the financial trader will buy the shares at the lower price and book the profit. All classes of investors including retail and institutional investors are permitted to do short-selling. The mechanics of short-selling are such that it inflows supply of specific shares in the stock market. These are the shares which are not even owned by the supplier. Consequently, such a scenario creates an excessive supply in the stock market. Thereby, this excess supply leads to a decrement in the price of these shares to settle for an equilibrium with the demand in the market. The mechanism is at times also useful for real price discovery of overpriced share. However at the same time, excessive short selling may decrease the price more than the actual worth of the company, as apart from the business competence, the prices in stock market are highly determined by market forces.  Covid-19 and Short-Selling With the advent of Covid-19, there is shutdown of almost all cities in India. This raises serious business concerns and results in depression of various industries. Thereby, there is an apparent market expectation of fall in stock market too. In pursuance of such expectation, the market speculators are expected to do massive short-selling with a view to pocket profit in case of fall in price of shares. Consequently, the huge amount of shorting by big market players leads to decrease in price of shares in excess of what it naturally (through market forces) might have observed because of business downturn. The fall in price of shares because of business disgrace due to coronavirus is very much conceived, however the question is regarding the excessive decrease in price due to excessive short-selling. In view of corona-pandemic, market players would be very much tempted to capitalise the downfall of share price caused by business loss. Indian stock market has observed a huge short-selling in future segments of index such as Sensex, Nifty and Bank Nifty. During the last week, the net shorting in equity index reached 173,000 contracts. Moreover, foreign portfolio investors have also piloted enormous shorting in India. These investors have perceived Rs. 26.32 lakh crore of speculative volume in derivatives. Such a scenario of extreme shorting resulted in incessant fall in stock market. Ban on short-selling: A temporary yet effective solution The permanent solution to improve the market condition is to get rid of coronavirus which seems to be difficult considering the present set-up. However, effective steps are required to be taken to control the ongoing menace in the capital markets. As demonstrated that short-selling plays a vital role in downturn of equity index and leads to abnormal fall in share prices in such panic business conditions, ban on short-selling practice for the time being can be an effective solution to control the continuous drop in stock market. Short-selling market speculators worsen the general market scenario. Amid excessive panic triggered short-selling, the capitalisation on the reduction of a share value intensifies market fluctuations. Such stock market instability impersonated a serious threat to confidence of retail market players in India as shorting can surge price swings which lead to deterioration of financial markets. The ban on short-selling will help to restore steadiness in the distressed financial market. Notably, the ban can diminish the speculative hammering of the shares and consequently, to some extent, would aid in alleviating the market. Many countries such as Italy, Spain, France, and Belgium banned short-selling with a view to control the fall in their equity index. On the other hand, the U.S. has not suspended the practice of short-selling, even after observing huge market crash. The U.S. short-sellers have made a profit of $343.67 billion in a month, at the cost of public investment in such an ongoing darkened stock market. India should not adopt the U.S. approach which permits short-sellers to make profit by using excessive market volatility due to coronavirus pandemic. Increase in short-selling doesn’t indicate improvement in bearish market. This would be detrimental to public shareholders and may expose Indian stock market at risk, likewise of 2008 financial crisis. China has also wisely handled the corona-outbreak with respect to its volatility of stock exchange. China is miserably shaken by the colossal flood of cases of coronavirus, yet Shanghai Composite Index (SCE) has observed a deterioration of mere 2.53% since the first case was reported in the country. To stabilise the effect of such panic

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Privacy and Data Protection – Implications on Fintech in India

[By Shubham Jain] The author is a fourth year student of National Law University, Jodhpur. Introduction The issue of privacy and data protection was thrown into the limelight after the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy Judgement which recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right enshrined under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.[i] Instances like the AADHAR data leak,[ii] Cambridge Analytica and Facebook data breach;[iii] etc. raised concerns about data protection, existing infrastructure, and the current state of affairs pertaining to cross-broader trading of data. While the concerns regarding privacy were grabbing headlines, FinTech industry in the country was booming because of demonetization, and government’s push towards boosting e-payments in the country. The term FinTech is often defined as the “technologically enabled financial innovation that could result in new business models, applications, processes, or products with an associated material effect on financial markets and institutions and the provision of financial services”.[iv] The FinTech industry is aimed at bringing technological innovations to the banking and financial sector.[v] According to estimates, the digital payments industry in India is projected to reach USD 700 billion by 2022 in terms of the value of transactions.[vi] FICCI projects the global FinTech sector’s value at $45 billion by 2020, growing at a compound annual growth rate of 7.1%.[vii] Needless to say, the concerns regarding data protection affect the FinTech industry as well. Therefore it is important to ensure that the data of the consumers provided to the FinTech entities protected, while ensuring the industries growth. Data Protection and Privacy The Srikrishna Committee noted that the conception of privacy is based on society and culture which determines what may be construed as violation of privacy.[viii] It further noted that the data protection principles are founded in the trust of citizens over the entities governing it.[ix] The entities could be either the regulatory authorities; or the private corporations. In the US, these relations are dictated by the capitalistic principle of lassiez-faire; however, the courts have recognized the Right to Privacy, as indicated in their constitution.[x] The US has sector specific laws with regards to privacy and use of data by private entities.[xi] The citizen and corporate relations are based on free markets and merely regulating the data handling process;[xii] whereas the state has to follow stricter laws stemming from the principles of liberty.[xiii] The EU is leading the world in terms of regulations regarding data protection; especially with EU-General Data Protection Regulation, 2018 (“GDPR”).[xiv] The EU Approach to data protection is based on upholding human dignity and protecting privacy.[xv] It was further noted that the Srikrishna Committee noted that the Indian citizen-state relationship does not coincide with either US or EU. The Indian Constitution envisions state as a (i) facilitator of human progress as indicated through the DPSPs, and (ii) checks and balances to prevent misuse of power by the state as enshrined in the federal structure and three organs of the government.[xvi] Therefore, the Indian conception of privacy as a right seems to be exercise of autonomy within a limited sphere as prescribed by the regulators. The decisions of the regulators can checked through the judicial review in case of excessive measures or encroachment on rights of citizens. Fintech – Regulatory Regime In India, the arena of FinTech is regulated by several regulators like the RBI and SEBI for intermediaries in securities market, IRDA for insurance related regulations and TRAI for regulatory mechanisms related to telecom.[xvii] The FinTech companies often find themselves being governed by overlapping jurisdictions. The Working Committee Report remarks that FinTech entities are regulated within the framework of ‘payment systems’[xviii] and need the authorization by the RBI.[xix] The RBI has the power to issue directions to payment systems and systems participants;[xx] which may be invoked by the RBI to issue directions. The RBI regulates payment space under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 and the Payment and Settlement System Regulations, 2008. Further, RBI Also governs the functioning of peer-to-peer lending through the P2P Master Directions (published in Oct., 2017) which requires P2P NBFCs to register with RBI. Further, RBI recently recognized the need to strengthen the consumer confidence in digital payments and thus launched Ombudsman Scheme for Digital Transactions (OSDT) as a complaint redressal mechanism.[xxi] Regulating Privacy and Data Protection in Fintech Industry Transfer of personal data categorized as sensitive personal data is currently governed by the SPD Rules issues under Section 43A of the IT Act. In case of any negligence in implementing, and maintaining reasonable security practices to ensure protection of the sensitive personal data, the body corporate are held responsible, and are required to compensate for leak/loss of data.[xxii] Furthermore, the disclosure of information, knowingly and intentionally, without the consent of the person concerned and in breach of the lawful contract is punishable with up to 3 years of imprisonment and fine.[xxiii] The data protection, as of now, is merely governed by a contractual relationship between the parties.[xxiv] Terms of the contract are dictated by the service provider, and the users have very little or no say in the same. The provisions of the IT Act are not sufficient to ensure protection of the sensitive information and data of the consumers. Concerned the sector’s recent boom, RBI issued notifications mandating data protection and localization. It has also showed concerns about the security standards/measures, and has assumed unfettered access to the data.[xxv] RBI also recommended the need for exhaustive stand-alone legislation on data protection in order to ensure customer faith in the FinTech Industry and protect the citizens from exploitation of personal information.[xxvi] The Sectoral Regulators are already taking initiative to protect the data of the consumers.[xxvii] The Working Committee has recommended that the data must be classified based on extent of their sensitivity and risk of exposure associated with the same.[xxviii] The FinTech entities were to ensure that the data does not suffer from any “loss of confidentiality, loss of integrity, and loss of availability”, by implementing the safe transaction principles.[xxix] The RBI also suggested requirement of establishing a Network

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To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Use of TRESA in the Takeover Code, 2011

[By Urja Dhapre] The author is a second year student of Institute of Law, Nirma University, Gujarat. Introduction Recent trends in corporate control [i]have shown an increase in the use of unregulated Total Return Equity Swap Agreements (“TRESA”) to eschew disclosure norms while covertly building up stakes in listed companies. Regulators from around the globe are now recognizing the challenges in governance and market distortions that potentially arise from these agreements which may bestow hidden and morphable ownership in the shareholdings of a listed company. Effectively, TRESA gives the investor an upper hand in dropping a bombshell on the target company by launching a hostile takeover out of the blue. The effect of TRESA seems to be contrary to the objective behind the disclosure regulation which is not only to ensure transparency that “the target company is not taken by surprise”, but also to acquaint the shareholders of the target company about any potential change in control. This article highlights the approaches in different countries while dealing with TRESA and also visits the lacuna in Indian law pertaining to the disclosure regulation. The instrumentality of TRESA  These equity swaps are over the counter equity derivatives wherein one counter-party (“short party”) pays the other counter-party (“long party”) the total return of an underlying asset/shares including income that is generated from it along with the benefits in case the price of the asset appreciates over the life of the swap. In return, the long party is obligated to pay fixed floating payments and the amount by which the asset’s value has depreciated if its price reduces over the life of the swap. Effectively, the long party gains the economic exposure of the reference asset/shares without actually owning it. Similarly, hedge funds or Foreign Institutional Investors (“FIIs”) benefit from the avoidance of transactional costs associated with equity trades along with hedging their negative returns. These swaps can be either cash-settled, i.e., any value differences at the end of the relevant period of the swap are settled in cash or can be settled-in-kind, i.e., the short party has an obligation to transfer the reference asset to the long party upon termination of the arrangement. Treatment of TRESA in other jurisdictions Conventionally, market participants in the equity derivatives markets have not held TRESA as constituting a beneficial ownership in the underlying shares, since its aim is to merely decouple the voting control and the economic exposure in respect of the underlying shares. It is not an obligation but a market reality [ii]that the short party will further buy the reference shares as a hedge against its short position. Conversely, even if the holder of TRESA does not have any legal rights to acquire the shares or control the votes of the reference shares they are still able to influence the short party. This influence is witnessed by the long party’s ability to convert these underlying shares into actual shares by unwinding the swap. The regulators on either side of the Atlantic have approached disclosure norms very differently. Taking into account the global nature of the derivative market, a more uniform approach to disclosure of these instruments is highly desirable. In the past years, this decoupling has affected takeover battles and control of public companies in inter alia the U.S., the U.K., and New Zealand. The UK amended its Disclosure and Transparency Rules [amended (“DTR”) 5R] [iii]which triggers disclosure norms when an individual holds a financial instrument which renders an economic interest over the underlying shares. The new rules require that the holding of shares and relevant financial instruments be aggregated and disclosure be made when the aggregated holdings reach, exceed or fall below 3%, 4%, 5% and each 1% threshold thereafter up to 100% (amended DTR 5.1.2R).[iv]  Further, The U.S Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) stance on beneficial ownership was brought out by the US district court’s ruling in CSX Corporation v. The Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP [v],wherein the Southern District declined to take a firm stand on whether the cash-settled, total return swaps constitute beneficial ownership, as a general matter, under Rule 13(d)-3(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 1934, which “deems a person to be a beneficial owner if he uses any contract, arrangement, or device as part of a plan or scheme to evade the beneficial ownership reporting requirements.” Albeit, the court relied on a provision of that rule which attributes beneficial ownership of a security to any person who enters into an arrangement as part of a “plan or scheme to evade the reporting requirements of the disclosure norms”. The same was later re-affirmed by the circuit court of appeals.[vi] A diametrically opposite approach was followed in New Zealand as per the Ithaca (custodians) v. Perry Corporation’s[vii] case. The court here discussed in detail about the market reality of the short parties hedging their position which can bring the target company within the reach but not under the control of the long party. It held that such a reality does not constitute an agreement or understanding between the two parties and therefore, the long party will not come under the purview of disclosure norms. However, due to the paucity of evidence, the magnitude of this problem in New Zealand has not yet been raised, but the panel is still considering amendments in the present disclosure norms. TRESA in the Indian context  Under the Indian securities laws regime, disclosure norms are triggered under the helm of Regulation 29(1) [viii] of SEBI Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers, 2011 (“Takeover Code”). Regulation 29(1) of the Takeover Code requires the acquirer with an individual or combined shareholding with Persons Acting in Concert (“PAC”) of 5% or more in the target company to disclose these shareholdings. This regulation can be traced back to the Takeover Regulation Advisory Committee (“TRAC”) report [ix]which laid the foundation of the Takeover Code, 2011. The committee’s intent was to distinguish between the disclosure requirement of an individual holding and a group/concerted holding of any security or instrument that would entitle the acquirer to receive shares in

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Weighing the Impact of Abolition of DDT in Annual Budget 2020: Impact and Implications

[By Ekta Jhanjhri] The author is a fourth year student at Institute of Law, Nirma University, Gujarat. Introduction Stimulating foreign equity investment in the Indian landscape has always been of prime importance to the Indian Government. Thus, the Hon’ble Finance Minister (“FM”) has proposed to abolish Dividend Distribution Tax (“DDT”) in the Budget Session for financial year 2020-21. In her budget speech, the Hon’ble FM has explained that the elimination of DDT is expected to increase the attractiveness of the Indian equity market, and provide relief to a large class of investors. The FM further claims that the measure is expected to result into revenue erosion of Rs.25000 crores. Though abolition of DDT has been extolled by the industry as well as from retail investors, the measure is viewed with suspicion by others. In this article, the author has attempted to put forth the industry concerns over payment of DDT and analyze the impact of elimination of DDT. Why DDT was in place and its evolution The concept of DDT was first introduced vide the Finance Act, 1997 through insertion of Section 115-O as a measure for easy tax collection and administration since it was difficult to track down the receipt of dividend income in the hands of thousands of shareholders. Thus, the then newly introduced provision mandated the domestic companies to pay DDT on dividend distributed, declared or paid by them.[i] Simultaneously, a new clause was added in the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) which excluded the dividend income from the ambit of total income.[ii] The upshot was exemption of dividend income in the hands of shareholders, except those whose aggregate dividend income in a year exceeded Rs. 10 lakhs.[iii]  Furthermore, it intended to deter domestic companies from employing their surplus into distribution of dividend, rather plough them back into lucrative business prospects. However, the incidence of taxability of dividend income was again shifted to shareholders when the DDT was scrapped vide Finance Act, 2002. Interestingly, DDT was re-instituted through the Finance Act, 2003 and had been in force until 31st March, 2020 at an exorbitant effective rate of approximately 20.56% including surcharge and cess, falling as liability of the concerned company. The ebb and flow of DDT has been a bone of contention within the corporate sector. Concerns raised by the industry The corporate sector has expressed deep dismay when it comes to the payment of DDT. Firstly, it has been asserted that the imposition of DDT results into double taxation in two facets. From the perspective of shareholders: DDT was contemplated as an evil eye by the investors whose aggregate income from dividend exceeded Rs.10 lakh per year. Such investors faced an additional tax rate of 10% on their dividend income. It is thus argued that when the domestic company has already been subjected to DDT u/s 115-O, imposition of additional tax u/s 115-BBDA on such investors amounts to double taxation. From the perspective of corporates: The levy of DDT is considered to be a hex by the corporates. Let us understand this with the help of an example. A company has earned a profit before tax of Rs.100 and company pays corporate tax @ 25%. This makes the profit after tax of the company as Rs.75. The company then declares Rs.50 as dividends. As per Section 115-O, a company declaring or paying dividend, is required to pay DDT @ 15% along with applicable surcharge and cess. As discussed above, with applicable cess and surcharge, the effective rate becomes 20.56%. Thus, the company foots the bill of Rs.10.28 as DDT to the Government. This way the income of the company is taxed twice i.e. in the form corporate tax and DDT. Secondly, it is also argued that DDT is a blanket levy regardless of the tax slab in which a particular retail investor files its return. For instance, dividend income of a retail investor having total income less than Rs.10 lakhs, is taxed at a flat rate of approximately 20%. Even though the levy is on domestic company, the ultimate sufferer are the shareholders as they lose something out of their kitty. Thirdly, the levy of DDT has proved to be a double whammy for foreign investors: As per Section 115-O, neither the domestic company nor the shareholders are entitled to claim credit of DDT already paid under the said provision. Consequently, a foreign investor who is subject to taxation in a different jurisdiction has tax liability under that said jurisdiction subject to the respective tax treaty India has with such jurisdiction. This acts as a stumbling block for foreign investor to channelize their fund into Indian territory as it makes their return on investment uncompetitive. Fourthly, foreign companies receiving dividend from an Indian subsidiary will be able to avail the benefit of tax treaties as the requirement of shelling out DDT has been removed from Section 115A of the Act. The said provision levies tax @20% on dividend income received by foreign companies. Impact of Abolition of DDT The measure has received heterogenous response from the industry. The natural corollary of the abolition implies that the dividend income will now fall within the purview of total income and is taxable as per the applicable tax slab rate. Firstly, this comes as big sigh of relief for the disgruntled retail investors whose total income from dividends does not exceed Rs.10 lakhs. Secondly, the move has also calmed down the exasperated foreign investor as it addresses their woes of double whammy. These majorly include investors who file their tax returns in jurisdictions with which India has favorable tax treaties. However, the Finance Bill, 2020 proposes to omit the proviso,[iv] which excludes payment of dividend to non-resident from the operation of Tax Deducted at Source (“TDS”).[v] The immediate impact of such omission is that payment of dividend to non-resident is made subject to TDS. Thirdly, the proposed measure would result into additional chunk of income with the corporates to invest in lucrative business prospects. This is seen

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Ishrat Ali v. Cosmos Cooperative Bank: A Missed Opportunity by NCLAT to Advance the Jurisprudence of IBC, SARFAESI and Limitation Act

[By Ankit Tripathi] The author is an associate at Law Chambers of J. Sai Deepak. Recently, in the case of Ishrat Ali v. Cosmos Cooperative Bank Ltd. &Anr[i], the five judge bench of National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”), departed from an earlier view taken by the three judge bench and held that action taken by a financial institution under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act is not a proceeding before a court of law or a tribunal. Therefore, such proceeding shall not be taken into consideration for excluding the time period under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. The reasons for the decision or departure were not detailed by NCLAT. Through the blog post, the author will look into the background and history of the concomitant cases for an effective criticism of this judgment at hand. Background The three member bench of NCLAT in Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Cooperative Bank Ltd and Ors.[ii], held that if the financial creditor has instituted a bona fide application under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, then in such case, while computing the limitation period for filing Section 7 application under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”); as per Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 the time which has been exhausted in the above proceedings shall be excluded since it would be held as if the financial creditor has been carrying another civil proceedings with due diligence. The three member bench of the NCLAT headed by then Chairperson during the proceedings of Ishrat Ali v. Cosmos Cooperative Bank Ltd. & Another doubted the correctness of the above judgment and thus referred the said judgment to a larger Bench of five judges to decide and settle the issue. Analysis As a matter of fact, the NCLAT was called upon to adjudicate upon the following three questions of law: Whether the action taken by a financial institution under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act is a proceeding before a court of law or before a Tribunal? If any application is filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (“DRT”) against such action in terms of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, whether it can be held to be a proceeding moved before a wrong forum for computing the period of limitation under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act? Whether the SARFAESI and DRT proceedings extend the period of limitation for filing the Section 7 and 9 applications under IBC? In the course of the present adjudication where the case involved certain interesting and contentious points pertaining to interplay of the SARFAESI Act, Limitation Act, and IBC, the tribunal had the opportunity to settle the law on the above legal issues. Considering the fact that it was reference bench of five judges, NCLAT had an added duty towards a more careful disposal of the reference with a proper reasoned order. A careful reading of the judgment provides that though NCLAT has conclusively and authoritatively answered the issues, it failed to provide reasoning for the same. Though the judgment cites and relies upon various other judgments of the Supreme Court, it has failed to inherently provide the application of those cases to the facts of the case at hand and answer the questions accordingly. In a way, the judgment does not create any new jurisprudence which it could have. Given that this was one of the most-awaited judgments of the NCLAT on the possible ambiguities arising due to overlap between the three statutes, it should have considered that reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion for producing clarity in an order and without the same, it becomes lifeless.[iii] The apex court has held in plethora of cases that absence of reasons renders the order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum.[iv] NCLAT relied upon the case of Jignesh Shah and Anr, v. Union of India and Anr[v] to hold that a suit for recovery based upon a cause of action that is within limitation cannot in any manner impact the separate and independent remedy of a winding-up proceeding. A close-up as well as aerial view of the findings of the NCLAT will highlight the fact that it has nothing new to support the above reference questions or add to existing jurisprudence. While nothing stops the court from relying upon any cases lest it should help in finding the conflict in the reference itself. In the latter part of the judgment, the tribunal laid down the bare provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. Soon after reproducing the abovestated relevant sections, the tribunal blatantly held that the action taken by a financial institution under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act is not a proceeding before a Court of Law and did not bother to substantiate this finding with a reason. To the contrary, it is clear that that there is no provision in IBC which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application submitted under Section 7 or 9 of IBC. It is understood that the tribunal has relied upon cases like Jignesh Shah and Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave, but the tribunal should have been careful to the facts of the specific cases and should not apply the ratio blatantly to record a judgment. The facts in the above cited cases were different from the case in question, thus requiring a different contextual interpretation which the tribunal clearly failed to do. Whether SARFAESI proceedings constitute ‘Civil Proceeding’? The Hon’ble Supreme Court via its judgment in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay & Anr. v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas,[vi] held that a ‘civil proceeding’ is one in which a person seeks to enforce by appropriate relief the alleged infringement of his civil rights against another person, and if the claim is proved would result in the declaration express or implied of the right claimed and relief sought. The term “civil proceedings” as defined by the Apex Court includes all those proceedings in which a party contends a civil right

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Recognition of Solvent Proceedings: Dilemma in International Insolvency Law

[By Daksh Aggarwal] The author is a second year student of Campus Law Centre, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. Prefatory The unification of markets and interconnected commercial transactions has necessitated significant need for common law governing business deals. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model law on Cross-Border Insolvency (“Model Law”), adopted in 1997, is designed to harmonise insolvency laws of various jurisdictions of the world and is internationally accepted as a unified restructuring framework by a number of states, including sophisticated economies. The Model Law is applied when the assets of the Corporate Debtor (“CD”) are located in foreign states or where the creditors of the CD reside in states other than the jurisdiction, in which the main insolvency proceedings are taking place against the CD. The major objective of the Model Law is to promote cooperation and coordination between courts and other competent authorities in cross-border parallel insolvency proceedings. The Model Law was substantially implemented in the United Kingdom through the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (“CBIR”). The CBIR, in consonance with Chapter III of the Model Law, intends to provide for the coordination of a British insolvency proceeding and foreign proceedings concerned with the same debtor. Recently, in Michael carter v. Roy Bailey and Keiran Hutchison (as foreign representatives of Sturgeon Central Asia Balanced Fund Ltd) (“Sturgeon Central Asia Case”), the Hon’ble England and Wales High Court (“Court”) interpreted the stated purpose and object of the Model Law and opined that solvent proceedings do not fall within the category of ‘foreign proceedings’ as defined under the CBIR. Apparently, the judgment contrasts with the approach adopted by the United States court which implemented the Model Law and recognised Australian solvent liquidation proceeding under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code. The English court deviated from the well settled international judicial dictum and demonstrated divergence of the United Kingdom and the US on abstruse question of law dealing with cross-border recognition of solvent proceeding as a foreign proceeding. In this blog piece, the author aims to dissect the ‘legally unsound reasoning’ of the UK judgment and its troublesome interpretation of the international insolvency law. Legal scrutiny of the judgment The baffling conundrum that the Court in the Sturgeon Central Asia Case faced was whether a just and equitable winding-up of a solvent company would fall within the scope of a ‘foreign proceeding’ for the purposes of the Model Law and the CBIR. According to Article 2(a) of the Model Law, ‘foreign proceeding’ refers to a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign State pursuant to a law relating to insolvency, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.[i] It must be noted that the Model Law is set out in Schedule 1 to the CBIR and hence the same definition of ‘foreign proceedings’ substantially applies to Great Britain. The perspicuous explanation to Article 2(a) insists that the entity would fall under the said article of the Model Law only if the debtor is insolvent or in severe financial distress.[ii] The true meaning and connotation of ‘foreign proceeding’ has been interpreted by various judicial pronouncements. In In Re Stanford International Bank Ltd Case [2010] Bus LR 1270, the English and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) categorically held that the winding-up of a company on the just and equitable grounds includes insolvency in conventional terms. The court, while considering the liquidation of an Antiguan corporation, also opined that the ultimate purpose of the law governing the process of recognition of ‘solvent proceedings’ as ‘foreign proceedings’ is liquidation. The court also observed that the liquidation of a solvent entity incorporated with the objective to carry on international trade or business on just and equitable grounds would be termed as a foreign proceeding. An even wider interpretation was adopted by the US Court in In Re Betcorp Ltd (2009) 400 BR 266. The court, impliedly, held that even solvent companies could fall within the scope of ‘financial distress companies’. The court also elucidated that the voluntary liquidation of an Australian company under the Australian Corporation Act was a collective proceeding, in that it considered the rights and obligations of all creditors and hence recognised the collective proceeding as a ‘foreign main proceeding’.[iii] However, the Court in the Sturgeon Central Asia Case conflicted with the aforementioned precedents and restricted the scope of foreign proceedings. The Court explicitly held that since Sturgeon (Bermudan incorporated investment corporation) was not insolvent or in financial distress, the solvent liquidation of the company cannot be identified under the wide umbrella of ‘foreign proceedings’ as per the Model Law and the CBIR. The Court, indubitably, employed the purposive approach and narrowed the purview of previously existing “universal rule of recognizing voluntary insolvency proceedings as foreign proceedings”. In May 2019, Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Falk assessed the application made by the liquidators of Sturgeon Central Asia Balanced Fund Ltd and held that recognition of proceedings as foreign proceedings was intended to be made available in circumstances where the insolvency of an entity has not yet been established. However, in January 2020, the Hon’ble Insolvent and Companies Court (“ICC”) Judge Briggs overruled the judgment delivered by Mrs Justice Falk and concluded that the voluntary solvent proceeding which does not aim to restructure the financial affairs of an entity, but is more focused in dissolving the legal status of the concerned entity cannot be recognized as a foreign proceeding for the purpose of Article 2 of the Model Law. The Hon’ble ICC judge passed the judgment without mulling over severe legal consequences. The UK courts now also shoulder responsibility for defining an ambiguous term- ‘financial distress’ or its threshold. The judgment delivered by the Hon’ble ICC Judge raises an essential question of whether the English courts would take up an inquisitorial legal system and investigate into the insolvency of companies when considering future applications for recognition of foreign proceedings to draw a visible line between ‘financial distress’ and ‘solvent liquidation’. The judgment brings up a perplexing problem of law in

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