A Framework Half-Built: Entry and Exit-Stage Deficits in the RBI’s 2026 Acquisition Financing Framework
[By Madhura Vedang] The author is a student of Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai. 1. Introduction The Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) for nearly 20 years maintained a clear and consistent stance: commercial banks should not finance corporate acquisitions. The reasoning behind this was simple, if a bank finances the acquisition of shares/control in another company, and subsequently the target encounters financial troubles, the bank is left holding collateral shares in a distressed target company. In such a circumstance, there may be a slim prospect of recovering the amount originally lent. The risk of potential erosion of depositors’ funds made acquisition financing an activity that the RBI kept well outside the scope of commercial banks. However, in February 2026, the RBI reversed its position through the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Credit Facilities) Amendment Directions, February 2026 which permitted Indian banks to finance corporate acquisitions up to 75% of the bank’s independently assessed acquisition value. Subsequently, the RBI issued a Revised Amendment in March 2026 (“2026 Framework”) that substantially changed this framework. The most notable change was redefining “Acquisition Financing” into a broader concept that focused on acquiring control through amalgamation or merger, rather than narrowing it to the mere acquisition of equity shares or Compulsorily Convertible Debentures (“CCDs”) as seen in the February 2026 Directions. Furthermore, the framework also introduced the option of refinancing existing debt of the target company, provided that the debt is integral to the acquisition finance. With these developments in mind, the question that this article seeks to answer is not whether this shift was necessary, but rather This article assesses the 2026 Framework against its own stated objective of integrating Acquisition Finance into a more structured, transparent and uniform framework, in contrast to its unregulated predecessor. The subsequent chapters seek to establish that the 2026 Framework contains certain structural tensions that warrant scrutiny. Specifically, Chapter 3.I and 3.II examine the absence of a minimum net profit threshold for eligible borrowers and the lack of enforcement mechanisms for the post-acquisition 3:1 Debt-to-Equity (“D:E”) ratio, and highlights the concerns and implications for the market. Meanwhile, Chapter 2 provides certain necessary commercial context to understand the backdrop and the policy intent with which this framework has been introduced. Lastly, Chapter 4 contends that, while the 2026 Framework represents a step forward, certain targeted amendments and regulatory clarifications remain necessary to ensure that the framework achieves its objectives without generating further ambiguities in the system. 2. The Regulatory Shadow: Acquisition Financing Before 2026 To evaluate the significance of the 2026 Framework, it is essential to understand the pre-existing landscape of acquisition financing in India. Contrary to what one would assume, Indian companies remained active acquirers throughout the RBI prohibitory period of bank-financed acquisitions. The 2015 RBI Master Circular on Loans and Advances limited bank financing to promoter contributions, Public Sector Undertaking disinvestments, share acquisitions as a strategic investment, and equity purchase financing in overseas joint ventures. However, Indian companies circumvented these restrictions by relying heavily on overseas Special Purpose Vehicles (“SPVs”), private credit funds, mezzanine debt from non-banking financial companies and offshore syndicate facilities for the purposes of corporate acquisitions. These instruments allowed Indian companies to bypass the RBI restrictions that applied only to domestic lending. The result of this was a situation in which the regulations prohibited something while the underlying commercial practice continued largely uninterrupted, though in a much more convoluted and less transparent manner. The widespread use of offshore SPVs and foreign syndicated facilities meant that a significant volume of acquisition financing was effectively happening outside of the RBI’s regulatory purview, leaving the banking sector open to significant exposure. For instance, in the offshore SPV model, if an acquisition failed, the credit losses would eventually hit Indian banks through indirect exposures, financial guarantees, and cross-default clauses, amplifying the very credit risk the RBI had sought to eliminate. From this perspective, the 2026 Framework represents an attempt to bring these activities into a more transparent regulatory framework. The substantive question that follows is whether the 2026 Framework’s design has introduced new complications as it attempts to solve the old ones. 3. Design Deficits in the 2026 Framework At first glance, the 2026 Framework appears reasonable. Clause 170I and Clause 170J provide for a maximum 75:25 funding split, with 25% being financed from the acquirer’s own funds and the rest from the bank, conditional on an independent assessment by the bank of the acquisition value. The 2026 Framework also stipulates a ₹500 crore net worth requirement under Clause 170G(i) and (ii) which reads: “If listed on a recognized stock exchange in India: (a) Minimum net worth of ₹500 crore; and (b) Net profit after taxes reported in each of the previous three consecutive financial years… & (ii) If unlisted: (a) Minimum net worth of ₹500 crore; (b) Net profit after taxes reported in each of the previous three consecutive financial years, and (c) an investment grade rating (BBB- or above) from a credit rating agency… ”. Additionally, Clause 170L mandates post-acquisition D:E ratio to not exceed 3:1 on a continuous basis. On paper, these requirements look well-thought-out, however a closer look at each of these conditions reveals certain gaps that raise concerns about whether the framework is actually as effective as it appears. I. Entry-Stage Deficit: The Open-Ended Profit Criterion under Clause 170G Clause 170G appears to be a standard provision that prescribes the eligibility criteria for a transaction. A company seeking acquisition financing would first have to meet the eligibility criteria of having a minimum net worth of ₹500 crore. This is coupled with the requirement of having earned a net profit in each of the three preceding financial years. Additionally, for unlisted companies, an investment-grade credit rating is required. For listed companies, no such rating is needed, presumably because the continuous disclosure obligations that listed companies are subject to are seen as a sufficient substitute for their creditworthiness. The more pressing concern, however, is the unspecified net profit threshold for the









