Author name: CBCL

The curious cases of L&T, Jet and Renuka Sugars & Indian regulators’ overbearing interference

[By Rohan Kohli] The author is a 5th year student of NLIU Bhopal and the Co-convenor of CBCL. The Indian corporate story that took off in the 1991 liberalisation reforms to its success today has had a great part to thank the paradigm shift in the Indian regulatory behaviour. From the License-Raj era protectionist and red-tape bureaucracy to today’s times where the regulators actively engage in consultations with stakeholders, the Indian regulator has morphed into a modern beast that has by and large kept in-tune with the changing times, even if a little belatedly. However, a slew of recent examples in the past few months has threatened to undo these years of liberal outlook that the regulators have developed at great pains. I will analyse three such recent examples playing the devil’s advocate to the regulators. Larsen & Toubro (L&T), which is currently in news for a hostile takeover bid by one of its subsidiary L&T Infotech in IT company Mindtree, was earlier also in news for a stunning derailment of its ambitious buyback attempt. L&T Board on 23 August 2018 approved a buyback proposal of 4.29% of its shares amounting to INR 9000 crore, the first in the company history. [1] The draft letter of offer was submitted to SEBI, which inexplicably took 102 days to reject this buyback proposal with the reason that the post-buyback debt-equity ratio would exceed 2:1. [2] This decision has taken the corporate world by surprise and been widely criticized by foreign and Indian media alike, the unanimous opinion being that the regulator erred in its opinion. The reason why this is being questioned is because neither section 68, Companies Act, 2013 nor SEBI Buyback Regulations make any mention of whether the consolidated group financials or the standalone financials of the entity be taken to calculate the ratio of secured and unsecured debts vis-à-vis paid-up capital and free reserves (which both mandate it to be maximum 2:1). SEBI took the former approach – where L&T Financials (one of the group companies), which has a debt-equity ratio of 6:1, brings the group’s debt-equity ratio to above 2:1 both pre and post-buyback – which is a very strict and literal interpretation and contrary and singularly opposite to its past practice. L&T has accordingly filed for a review of the decision instead of approaching SAT. If this does not fall through, L&T may have to go ahead with a special dividend to return money to its shareholders, which attracts significantly higher tax implications. The troubled aviation giant Jet Airways recently saw a resolution plan under the 12 February RBI Circular [3] with equity infusion for the lenders and exit of its promoters and other management (nominee of Etihad Airways) from the Board. [4] While it promises to be a close-knit fight now for the company once the bidding deadline are invited on 9 April as banks exit the company, [5] this entire process could have been pre-empted if not for the regulators’ hawkish and unyielding stance. When the first reports of Jet’s troubles began to emerge, it was Etihad who was expected to step in and assume the majority of the equity in Jet by increasing its 24% (at that time) stake. But SEBI’s move to deny open offer exemptions changed the story and finally pulled the plug on Etihad’s plans. SEBI declared that any exemptions from applicability of conditions for preferential issue and making a mandatory open offer under Takeover Code for corporate debt restructuring made other than under IBC, will only be given to banks and financial institutions. [6] This effectively removed Etihad’s option of seeking an open offer exemption by referring to SEBI under Regulation 11 of the Takeover Code. Further, SEBI also removed any exemptions pursuant to scheme of arrangement pursuant to order of competent authorityunder any law, removing Etihad’s option of seeking open offer exemption under Regulation 10 (1) (d) (iii). The latter seems to be a belated admission of SEBI’s earlier mistake to SpiceJet’s open offer exemption done under similar circumstances in 2015 that brought Ajay Singh in majority of the company. [7] SEBI’s present move makes it difficult for Etihad to even make a future bid for Jet Airways, since the FDI Policy allows for a maximum of 49% FDI under automatic route [8]. This would mean that Etihad cannot make an open offer for singlehandedly replacing the lenders (since 26% offer beyond the threshold of 24% would breach the 49% mark), and thus Etihad would have to make a joint bid with another Indian entity to keep them with in the 49% mark. If Etihad would still want to make an individual bid without attracting open offer obligations, they would have to structure the transaction as an internal corporate restructuring under Section 230, Companies Act which would mean seeking approval of NCLT and fulfilling the condition of a scheme of arrangement pursuant to order of Tribunal under Regulation 10 (1) (d) (iii). [9] All this process could have been pre-empted if not for SEBI’s outdated approach in this regard. This entire process of lenders’ having to take up equity, then opening up bids would not have been needed to be done in the first place if Etihad would have been allowed to increase its stake, saving substantial amount of time and legal and economic costs. However, we will see in the example below that another regulator may make it even more difficult for Etihad to do this. Renuka Sugars is another classic ongoing case that continues in the same vein of regulatory overreach as above. Shree Renuka Sugars was a company undergoing debt restructuring in 2018, in Wilmar Sugar Holdings increased its stake from 27.24% to 38.57% as part of the restructuring process and finally to 58.34% through an open offer. [10] Interestingly, this restructuring was done after the 12 February 2018 RBI Circular came into force, which mandates all accounts above INR 2000 crore (the present case falls under this bracket) and where restructuring may have been initiated under

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Related Party Transactions and Arm’s Length Transactions in Company Law: Surrounding Ambiguity and Unsettled Dust

[By Suvam Kumar & Harsha Menon ] The authors are Second and First-year students respectively, of NLU Jodhpur. Introduction: With the advent of globalization and boom in India’s economy, as ease of doing business has escalated to a great rank, it is very much imperative to have an efficient regime governing the corporate affairs. Keeping the abovementioned view in mind, the Companies Act, 2013 [“Act”] was enacted to ensure reliability and confidence in the corporate world. One such important concept which requires more importance is related party transactions. In the previous Act of 1956, this concept was not dealt specifically. However, with the increasing challenges in the field of corporate affairs, related party has been specifically dealt under Section 188 of the Act. However, the concept of related party transactions is still shrouded under ambiguity and nebulousness. The authors have tried to highlight the existing paradox and vagueness in the law related to related party transaction with the help of various judicial precedents. What is related party transactions: Before understanding related party transactions, we must know who is a related party. A related party means any person who is relative of the director or the key managerial personnel in a company.[i]Section 188 of the Act bars the related party transactions except when such transaction is made after taking consent from the Board of Directors or when the transaction is an arm’s length transaction.[ii]Section 188(1) of the Act specifies seven types of transactions which require prior approval of the Board of Directors.[iii]Among these, the transactions related to the appointment of related party to an office of profit has been always the most contentious and has raised several legal and practical issues with regard to the transparency in the company. Rationale: The director of a company has a fiduciary relationship with the company. Hence, it is important to examine whether there exists a conflict between the personal interests and the duty of a director. Hence, it is very much clear that the rationale behind having a provision like Section 188 is to prevent any conflict of interest in the functioning of the company. More often than not, the related party transactions are considered to be influenced by ulterior motives of profiting the persons who are involved in such transactions. Such transactions diminish the transparency and disclosures norms in the company and are against the spirit and objectives of the Companies Act. Exceptions to the related party transactions: It is pertinent to note that not all related party transactions are prohibited per se. There are two exceptions to it. Firstly, transactions where prior consent from the Board of Directors have been taken and the procedural requirement has been fulfilled.[iv]Secondly, transactions which are entered on an arm’s length basis.[v] Arm’s Length Transaction: An Unsolved Ambiguous Concept. Arm’s length transactions are those which are conducted between two related parties as if they were unrelated, so that there is no conflict of interest.[vi]A very little effort has been put to provide clarity as to what exactly arm’s length transactions mean. There is a serious dearth of the interpretation to the meaning of arm’s length transactions and there seems to be a contradiction in the provisions when they use related party and lack of conflict of interest at the same time. Such casus omissusopens the space for different interpretations.[vii]It can be interpreted as one forming strict procedural requirement given under Section 188. On the other hand, it can also be construed in a more liberal sense, by looking at the intent of the transaction and comparing it with the market conditions rather than stressing on the procedural requirement. However, there is no consistent application of any of abovementioned interpretation. Hence, there is a need of clarity regarding the criterion when a transaction despite being related does not cause conflict of interest. The Courts had met with several occasions to deal with the existing ambiguity but no satisfactory results have come out. Cases dealing with Arm’s Length Transactions: One of the very few cases which have tried to give some clarity regarding arm’s length transaction is Madhu Ashok Kapur v. Rana Kapoor.[viii]The Court was dealing with the issue of whether the reappointment of the Managing Director was a related party transaction or whether it was protected under arm’s length transaction. The Court was penchant for liberal interpretation of the arm’s length transaction and emphasized on the fairness of such transactions by comparing them with the market        value of such transaction. The Court held that the appointment was made at an arm’s length basis where it looked at the nature of prerequisites which the Managing Directors are ordinarily entitled to rather than emphasizing on the procedural requirements.[ix]Similar interpretation have been observed by the Apex Court in case of A.K. Roy v. Voltas Ltd.[x]However, there is still some unsettled dust surrounding the interpretations of arm’s length transactions which needs serious review and clarity. Conclusion: Considering the serious nature of the related party transactions and its exceptions, any kind of vagueness in its interpretation would lead to serious consequences in the regime of corporate affairs. It is the transparency which gives credibility to any company and boosts the client’s confidence in corporate world. Hence, an objective interpretation of the related party transactions is imperative. At the same time, the Courts have to be very cautious while interpreting the concept of related party transactions and abstain from the mechanical application of the same. As pointed out above, the Courts should be more inclined towards applying arm’s length transaction as a substantive rule rather than looking it as a procedural necessity. The Courts ought to look at the intent of the transactions rather than focusing on the procedural requirement of the transaction. A related party transaction can be related yet protected. For instance, appointment of a person on the basis of related party transaction can be termed as valid if such appointment is fair and objective as per the requirement of the market value of such transactions. Therefore, a transaction should not be declared

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Board of Control for Cricket in India [BCCI] to Athletic Federation of India [AFI]: An Evolving Jurisprudence on Sports-Competition Law

[Pradyumna Yadav] The author is a 2nd year student of UPES, Dehradun. Introduction Sporting Regulatory Authorities or SRAs are established in India with a primary objective of controlling, promoting, regulating and selecting teams for their specific sports. Amongst all SRAs, the most prominent one is Board of Control for Cricket in India or BCCI, a society registered under Tamil Nadu Society Registration Act, 1975 and established for the purpose of administering the game of cricket in India. Surinder Singh Barmi v. Board of Control for Cricket in India[i]was the first Indian case wherein the Competition Commission of India or CCI was posed with question of interpreting the provisions of our anti-trust law with that to our sports industry, the chronology of cases[ii]brought forth to CCI post-Barmi adjudication developed a jurisprudence in parlance with global trends, especially to that of European Union [EU]. The question which was very important for the commission to answer in Barmi and succeeding case was with regard to applicability of Competition Act, 2002 to such authorities. If competition act is applicable to such bodies then what is the mechanism for determining relevant market of such regulatory bodies? It is imperative to state that Competition Act, 2002 aims to promote healthy competition in the economy rather than curbing monopolies, a legislative intent of it’s preceding legislation. The reason why SRAs are in dominance in India is because usually the International Sports Affiliation recognises one domestic SRA. So, dominance per se cannot be form of anti-competitive allegation, it is only through abuse of dominance an SRA can be brought under the net of our anti-trust law. Lastly if there is abuse of dominance by SRAs, it has to be carefully examined and construed in such cases whether such abuse of dominance was carried out while performing regulatory function or ‘economical’ function as interpreted under the Competition Act.  Guiding Principles Post-Surinder Singh Barmi, the law on the subject of sports and competition law has diversified, in order to evaluate the position of BCCI or any other SRAs in near future with current standpoint of law, the general principles can be summarised as follows: SRAs would fall within the ambit of ‘enterprises’ only if it exercises its function of facilitating its concerned sport. Facilitation for this purpose means organising, promoting and educating about the concerned sport through sporting tournaments or events. Profit or not-for-profit motive in conducting events holds no relevance. [This principle is derived from all Indian Cases in this context and MOTOE v. Elliniko Dimosio, [2008] C-49/07, (European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber)] While determining the relevant market of SRA, emphasises should be laid upon demand substitutability and ascertaining who is the relevant consumer, through the analysis of multitude relationship that regulator shares, for example, while granting of media rights by SRA to broadcasters, the broadcasters in this case forms the relevant consumer in media right market. [Barmi case just restricted itself to demand substitutability, whereas subsequently Dhanraj Pillay case propounded determination of relevant consumers through ‘principle of multitude relationships’] Dominance should be derived from the governing powers and objectives of the SRA, governing power is implied from its memorandum, bye-laws, rules and regulation, also laws from its affiliated international governing body. If the governing power is vested in such a way so as to cater SRA’s dominance in the relevant market, then SRA would have dominance in that relevant market. Abuse of dominance in relevant market would not amount to abuse when the restrictive condition (alleged anti-competitive conduct) is in consonance with the objectives of SRA and the effect arising from such condition is proportionate to the legitimate sporting interest, then condition so imposed by SRA cannot be termed as anti-competitive. If restrain is a necessary requirement for development of sports or preserving its integrity, then the same cannot be also classified as anti-competitive. International Affiliation Body would be also liable for any abuse of dominance on the part of SRAs if it has full knowledge and supported such abuse. [ Principle derived from Hockey India Federation and Chess Federation Case, due delay in propounding this principle ICC scouted free from its liability in Barmi’s case] Conclusion Apart from EU’s Competition Law, Competition Act, 2002 has borrowed it’s essence from U.S. Anti-Trust Law, interpretation of competition law and sporting industry in America initiated from the case of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,259 U.S. 200 (1922, Court of Appeals, Columbia), wherein court held that sports and anti-trust law are different, both of them cannot be construed together, thereby holding a sports exception in which competition regulator cannot scrutinise the activities in sporting industry. Efforts and diligence of commission needs to applauded for recognising the difference in Indian sports environment to that of America’s, this is the reason why CCI did not adopt the exception because regulatory and organising role is carried out one entity in India whereas in U.S., it is in the hands of private individuals or bodies. Ever since 1991, India has seen a surge in globalisation and commercialisation of every industry, it is only a matter of time that such surge is going change whole of dynamics of Indian sports industry as well the economy at large, there would challenging and new anti-trust issues in sports- competition law but given the way commission has evolved its take on these issues and developed a jurisprudence, it’s only a matter of time when India will surpass EU’s Sports-Competition Law. [i]Case No. 61 of 2010, (Competition Commission of India, 8/2/ 2013). [ii]Dhanraj Pillay & Others v. M/s Hockey India, Case No. 73 of 2011, (Competition Commission of India, 31/05/2013). Hemant Sharma & Others v. All India Chess Federation (AICF), Case No. 79 of 2011 (Competition Commission of India, 21/02/2018). Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports v. Athletics Federation of India, Reference Case No. 01 of 2015 (Competition Commission of India).

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The Unconventional ‘Reverse Piercing of Corporate Veil’: Applicability and Implications

[Jayesh Karnawat] The author is a 3rd year student of NLU, Jodhpur. Introduction The doctrine of piercing of corporate veil, whether forward or reverse, is an exception brought about to achieve the ends of justice and fairness. Corporates were given their status of separate entities to serve the ends of justice and not subvert them. However, the courts have time and again adopted the alter ego doctrine to prevent corporations from misusing this protection for deceptive practices. The separate legal existence of a corporation has to be protected for economic growth and when that form is abused by individuals to escape the existing liabilities, the court may resort to traditional or reverse piercing of the veil. Overview of the doctrine In the traditional piercing of corporate veil, a creditor of the corporation tries to hold the shareholder personally liable for the debts of the corporation whereas, in reverse piercing of corporate veil, the creditor of the shareholder of a corporation attempts to hold the corporation liable for the debts of the shareholders.[i]The doctrine of reverse piercing the corporate veil is very less established. Also, it has been rejected by several states at several instances.Reverse piercing has been widely used by the governments, most commonly to obtain payment of taxes owed by individuals. A classic example is G. M. Leasing Corporation v. US.[ii] As discussed in the case of Shamrock Oil & Gas v. Ethridge,[iii]the doctrine of reverse piercing of the corporate veil is based on the principle, “the mereabstraction of the corporate entity should never be allowed to bar out and pervert the real and obvious truth.” One of the classic examples is the case of W.G Platts Inc. v Platts,[iv]wherein the court allowed the plaintiff to reverse pierce the corporate veil by imposing the liability on the corporation to satisfy her debts as per the divorce decree. Requirements for the application of the doctrine For applying reverse piercing of corporate veil, generally four elements are considered, called the hybrid test, firstly the degree of identity between the shareholders and the corporation by considering alter ego doctrine, secondly, public policy being whether piercing will harm any other parties or not by using cost-benefit analysis and thirdly whether there was any fraudulent intention or not and lastly whether any other remedy can be sought if not, then the equitable doctrine can be invoked to promote justice. However the application of the doctrine is very subjective and depends upon facts and evidence of the case, no strait jacket formula can be used. Satisfying the Alter Ego doctrine The distinct legal entity of the corporation is ignored when it so dominated by an individual that it mainly transacts the dominator’s business rather than its own. In such case, the corporation will be called alter-ego of the individual. For maintaining an alter ego claim, it is not necessary to establish complete ownership and the test of “control” can be applied. Reverse piercing is appropriate in those limited instances where there is the existence of an alter ego relationship so that justice may be promoted. Injury to other innocent shareholders Equitable results mean that neither the innocent shareholders nor the corporate creditors should be prejudiced by allowing reverse piercing. The court in the case of Trossman v. Philipsborn,[v]held that to permit reverse piercing an insider must own all, or substantially all, of the stock. In Floyd v. Internal Revenue Service,[vi] the court refused to accept the theory of reverse veil-piercing for the reasons that there is the possibility of unfair prejudice to third parties, such as third-party shareholders. The problems associated with a reverse pierce are less serious where there is only a single shareholder because no other shareholders would be unfairly prejudiced. Courts have at times rejected the theory of reverse piercing of veil taking into consideration the interests of non-culpable shareholders as done in the case of Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transportation Co.[vii] This is because creditors who extended credit to the corporation in reliance on its assets would be left unprotected if those assets were sold off to satisfy a judgment un-related to the corporation. Fraudulent Purpose In the case of Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito America, Inc,[viii] the court declared that to apply the alter ego doctrine in ‘reverse’ it is necessary that the controlling party uses the controlled entity to hide assets or secretly runs a business in order to evade his/her pre-existing liability. Nevertheless, the application of this doctrine should not be the norm but only be used in certain specialized situations, wherein individuals take advantage of a corporation’s separate legal existence in order to carry out fraudulent activities. In the case of State v. Easton,[ix]the court opined that promotion of fraud is one of the major requirement of the doctrine of reverse piercing. It must be shown that the plaintiff used the corporation to evade a personal obligation, to perpetrate fraud or a crime. Non Applicability of the doctrine to voluntary creditors Several courts have criticized this doctrine as it allows or permits voluntary creditors of an individual, or corporation, to recover from another corporation. One classic example is the case of Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks[x]. Courts have added disdain for reverse piercing when the plaintiff is a voluntary, contractual creditor as opposed to an involuntary, tort creditor. The underlying principle is that voluntary creditors choose the parties with whom they deal, they can take precautions necessary to protect their interests and to permit reverse piercing would un-necessarily favour the creditor’s failure to take such precautions, at the expense of other creditors.[xi] Indian Scenario The doctrine of ‘reverse’ piercing is less prevalent in India, unlike the UK. The Indian courts demonstrated inordinate reluctance in bluntly accepting this jurisprudence. Slowly, the courts started to recognize the principle of alter-ego for the purpose of this doctrine. In the case of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Incorporation and Others[xii], while applying the doctrine of alter ego the court observed that the criminal intent/ mens rea of the individuals or group of persons who are the alter-ego of the

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India’s New E-Commerce Policy: Leveling the Playing Field for Online Retailers

[ Himanshu Shembekar ] The author is a 2nd year student of NLU, Odisha Introduction The Department of Industrial Promotion & Policy (DIPP) on 26thDecember, 2018 released a notification revising the policy on the Foreign Direct Investment in e-commerce. The new notification has shocked the big e-retailers like Amazon, Flipkart, etc. This notification has affected the way B2B business activities take place in the e-commerce industry. The new notification has taken effect from 1stFebruary, 2019. Through this post, the author intends to analyze the impact of the new notification of DIPP on the e- commerce industry in India. Provisions of the notification The DIPP has retained the policy of allowing 100% FDI in the E-commerce sector but it imposed new conditions on foreign-owned market places. The following are certain new and important set of rules: “An e-commerce entity cannot have complete control or exercise over the ownership or the control over the inventory. A vendor’s inventory shall be treated to be controlled by an e-commerce marketplace if more than 25% of its purchases are from the marketplace entity or its related companies.” “An entity having equity participation by any e-commerce entity or any of its related company or having control over its inventory by e-commerce market entity or related company, then it shall be not permitted to sell its product on platform run by such marketplace entity.” “E-commerce entity providing marketplace will not be allowed to directly or indirectly influence the sale price of goods and services. Provision of any service to any vendor on certain terms which are not available to other vendors in certain circumstances will be deemed to be unfair and discriminatory.” “E-commerce marketplace entity shall not mandate any seller to sell any product to sell any product exclusively on its platform only.” “The e-commerce companies have to furnish a certificate along with the report of a statutory auditor to the Reserve Bank of India to confirm the compliance of guidelines, by 30thSeptember, every year for the preceding fiscal year.”[i] Necessity for the changes These regulations have come up after the complaints which have been made by the small and medium Indian retailers, accusing the giant e-commerce companies for creating unfair marketplace, as these companies keep control over the inventory through affiliates and exclusive agreements.[ii] In addition to these complaints, the All India Online Vendors Association (AIOVA) had filed a petition to the Competition Commission of India (CCI), accusing that Amazon favored merchants  it partially owns such as the Cloudtail and Appario.[iii] It is a fact that Cloudtail India Pvt Ltd is the biggest retailer of Amazon. Prione Business, which is a joint venture between Amazon Inc. (48% stake) and Infosys co-founder N R Narayana Murthy’s Catamaran Advisors (51% stake), holds 99.99% of the shares of Cloudtail India.[iv] The other retailer is Appario Retail, which is a subsidiary of the Frontizo Business Services. Frontizo Business Services is a joint venture between Amazon India Ltd and Ashok Patni, the co-founder of Patni Computer Systems.Thus, it can be seen that how the big e-commerce companies through their subsidiary companies enter into such agreements which results in their capturing majority of the market share and adversely affecting other businesses. How new rule has impacted the big E-commerce companies? It is not surprising that the new regulations have brought all the big rivals in the e-commerce industry like Flipkart and Amazon together to fight against these new regulations which have threatened their business strategies. Due to the new rules, the e-commerce companies can get impacted in the following way- The affiliate sellers of the big e-commerce companies have to shift 75% of their business to other retailers, to ensure that affiliate sellers are able to continue with their business activity to provide goods and services. The big e-commerce companies have to bring in major changes in their equity structure so as to ensure that they are able to continue business with the sellers. As the big e-commerce companies cannot get the benefit of bulk purchases and selling their goods and services at low prices, this shall result in an end of big discount sales. The new rules also put an end to the flash sales in which the e- commerce companies can exclusively promote or sell their products on their platform. As the e-commerce companies are no longer able to buy majority of inventory through their affiliates, their costs shall increase. History of cases challenging E-commerce companies There have been many cases in which e-commerce companies have been accused of practicing non-competitive market practices. Few of the cases are as follows: Ashish Ahuja v. Snapdeal.com In this case, the complainant had accused Snapdeal and SanDisk of colluding with each other. Snapdeal had imposed a condition that to sell SanDisk products through online platform one must be authorized dealers i.e. must be recognized as an authorized dealer by Snapdeal as well as SanDisk, thus violating section 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 which provide for anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position.[v] The Commission after enquiry held that the condition that SanDisk products sold through online portals must be bought through authorized dealers is no way an abusive conduct. This decision was within the scope of the company to protect its sanctity of its distributive channel.[vi]It was considered as a normal practice of business. M/s Mohit Manglani & Others Versus M/S Flipkart Pvt Ltd In this case, the publisher of Chetan Bhagat’s new book ‘Half Girlfriend’, Rupa publication had entered into an exclusive sale agreement with Flipkart, thus granting Flipkart exclusive right to sell the book. It was claimed by the competitors that this led to unfair trade practices as the consumer is given no choice. Flipkart had the 100% market share for the product for which it had exclusive dealing rights, therefore leading to dominance. In this matter CCI stated that an arrangement between manufacturer and an e-portal did not create any barrier for the new entries. Rather, it stated that with the emergence of the new e- commerce companies,

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Case Analysis of Appeal Mechanism under Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code 2016

[ Rahul Kanoujia ]   The author is a 2nd year student of GNLU, Gandhinagar. Introduction: The most important feature of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016[i] (hereinafter referred to as “IBC”) is the time bound resolution process, which tries to make sure that the process of resolution and liquidation does not suffer the trauma of never ending litigation. Such time bound resolution has been made possible through the introduction of limitations under various provisions of the Code, such as those given under Section 61and Section 62. These limitations are going to be the primary focus of this article. Section 61 of IBC,provides that the Appellate authority for filing an appeal from final order of the National Company Law Tribunal shall be National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. Similarly, Section 62 of IBC provides that an appeal from the order of National Company Law Appellate Tribunal on a question of law shall lie before the Supreme Court. Such appeal shall be filed within a period of 90 days. [ii] The year 2018 saw a multitude of case laws directly addressing appeals, significantly developing the law. The following section deals with some of those cases and the issues that they address. Issues before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunals: Whether an appeal filed beyond the maximum prescribed period of 45 days under Section 61 of the Code is maintainable? In the matter of State Bank of India v. MBL Infrastructure Ltd.[iii]the NCLAT Delhi held that Section 61 clearly stipulates that an appeal has to be preferred within 30 days from the order of the adjudicating authority. A delay not exceeding 15 days can be condoned in filing the appeal if the appellant is able to satisfy the appellate authority that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period of 30 days. Thus, the maximum time frame for preferring an appeal is 45 days, which cannot be extended further on any ground whatsoever. Whether Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction to condone delay beyond 15 days apart from the 30 days for preferring an appeal, as prescribed under section 61(2) of the I&B Code? In the matter of Sunil Sharma v. Hex Technologiesand Industrial Services v. Electrosteel Steels,[iv]the NCLAT held that Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond 15 days apart from the 30 days for preferring an appeal, as prescribed under Section 61 (2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI)has the standing to challenge the findings of the adjudicating authority? In Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India v. Wig Associates,[v] the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (“IBBI”) challenged an interpretation accorded to Section 29(A) which allegedly resulted in approval of an ineligible resolution plan. The NCLAT Delhi held that under section 30(2), the resolution professional is duty bound to ensure that resolution plans are in conformity with the provisions prescribed thereunder. If the resolution plan submitted by an applicant is contrary to Section 29A, in view of Section 30 (2) (e) read with Section 30(3), the resolution professional should not have placed such resolution plan before the committee of creditors. In any case, if the legal interpretation accorded by the adjudicating authority contravenes the provisions of the Code, it is duty of the resolution professional to bring the same to the notice of the appellate authority by preferring an appeal. Further, it was also held that the IBBI does not have the locus standi to challenge a finding of an adjudicating authority under Section 61 of the Code. However, it is empowered under Section 196(g) to monitor the performance of the insolvency professionals and in appropriate cases, pass any direction as may be required for compliance of the provisions of the Code. Therefore, the appeal filed at the instance of the IBBI was dismissed. The tribunal however also clarified that the IBBI was at the liberty to inform the resolution professional to move an appeal under S.61. Scope of appellate jurisdiction of NCLAT vis-à-vis the power conferred on the central government under section 242 of the Code. In the matter of Principal Director General of Income Tax v. M/s. Spartek Ceramics Indiaand National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Cimmco Birla,[vi]The NCLAT held that the NCLAT is empowered to hear the appeal under the Companies Act, 2013, the Code and the Competition Act, 2003only. The central government by exercising the power under section 242 cannot empower the NCLAT to hear an appeal pursuant to a Notification which granted ninety days’ period to prefer an appeal under section 61(1). Grant of ninety days’ period was in clear violation of section 61(2) of the Code, which clearly prescribed a time limit of 45 days only. Thus, while the central government is empowered under section 242 to make any provision to remove the difficulty in giving effect to the provisions of the Code, the provision cannot be in violation of any of the substantive provisions of the Code. Distinction between the Companies Act, 2013 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 as regards the period of limitation for an appeal before the NCLAT. In the matter of Prowess International Private Limited v. Action Ispat & Power Private Limited, the NCLAT drew a distinction between the Companies Act, 2013 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 as regards the period of limitation for an appeal before the NCLAT. In an appeal preferred under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013, the period of limitation is counted from the date on which a copy of the order is made available by the tribunal pursuant to sub-section (3) of Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013. [vii] Under Section 61 of the Code, the appeal is required to be filed within thirty-days, means within thirty-days from the date of knowledge of the order against which appeal is preferred. Conclusion The above judgements provide much needed clarity with regard to the Appeal Mechanism under Section 61, that appeal is to be filed within thirty days. However, as per proviso

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Post-regulatory private sector employments and their corporate governance implications

[By Rohan Kohli] This Blog is part of a series of posts as a collaboration titled “KAIZEN” between the Centre for Business and Commercial Laws (CBCL), NLIU Bhopal and Law School Policy Review (LSPR). To view this blog on LSPR, please click here. Rohan Kohli is the Co-Convenor of CBCL and a 5th Year B.A. LL.B. Student at  NLIU, Bhopal. The corporate governance discourse in India today has moved rapidly, especially with contemporary developments in the form of Kotak Committee Report, [1] but still lags in several aspects vis-à-vis more mature financial jurisdictions. While our precocious model of economic development[2] has been instrumental in addressing governance issues such as equitable board composition,[3] or more recent niche issues such as separating key managerial positions,[4] there is still a glaring absence on understanding of certain nuanced issues. One such nuanced issue is the recent trend of regulators taking up post-retirement private sector employments. In the past year, there have been a constant influx of regulatory and government companies’ seniors in the corporate sector, from former SBI Chairman Arundhati Bhattacharya [5] to former SEBI Chairman U K Sinha.[6] In the more distant past, this trend was also visible in several instances – from ex – SBI senior management [7] to ex – RBI Governor.[8] The trend of their preferred destinations being corporate law firms also is extremely intriguing. Ordinarily such practices may seem in the usual course of events, there carry a number of ethically and morally problematic implications, the legal issue in which is insider trading. Indian laws on the subject [9] have been largely successful in preventing major embarrassment to the corporate sector in the recent times, due to a combination of reasons such as effective corporate compliance and harsh legal implications including financial and penal consequences.[10] Similarly, while the ethical implications of post-retirement political appointments such as Governors [11] is well recognised and even frowned upon in the mainstream media discourse, this does not translate into recognising similar examples in the corporate space. The official line that corporates take while appointing such ex-regulators is that they are sought for their decades of experience in the field, their unique insight developed due to such extensive experience and use these insights to leverage the corporate’s interests in the market. While these are valid considerations and their insights are valuable for any corporate, the devil is in the details. While the PIT Regulations provide a clear demarcation to using these insightsin the form of price-sensitive information, they do not provide an absolute bar to such appointments. In all probability the biggest selling factor of these ex-regulators provide is insight in what manner will regulatory authorities react and respond to contentious issues, be it approving or disallowing mergers, or macro-level policy inputs into future regulatory trends. At the same time, these ex-regulators also give firms opportunity to leverage their soft power, which in latent forms could be utilising their familiarity with current regulators (as in most cases the current regulator would be the ex-regulator’s junior and in most instances would have worked closely together till recent times), to more patent forms where firms use this familiarity to influence regulator’s decisions and engage in seriously problematic crony capitalism. The government currently has a policy of mandating a one-year long (in most institutions) cooling-off period during which they eschew any private appointments. However, as the above analogy shows this period hardly serves its purpose given their juniors or peers will be in their erstwhile jobs at the time they accept appointment in the private sector. Further, the current examples of Mrs. Bhattacharya, Mr. Sinha shown earlier that occurred as soon as their cooling-off period lapsed, reducing this into a mere formality. A solution to this is making the cooling-off period in sync with the term of the previous office (i.e. the cooling off period for SEBI Chairman will be 5 years, beginning from the day of retirement). This might serve as a reasonable control and ensure that by the time the ex-regulators assume private employment, their peers and juniors might no longer in office to negate chances of influencing the regulator’s actions. In more advanced markets such as USA, there is a greater mainstream understanding of the inter-corporate-regulator appointments, but that recognition does not necessarily translate into eschewing such practices. While India has seen examples of ex-regulators and government companies’ management taking up private employment, the former, i.e. corporate head taking up regulatory jobs is almost unheard of, until very recently.[12] USA has seen plenty of examples for each, from Alan Greenspan in the former[13] to Henry Paulson in the latter.[14] Their impact in deregulating the financial and banking sector has been so immense that its role in the sub-prime crisis was the subject of a widely acclaimed documentary – Inside Job. The US story in this regard also goes down to corporate-regulator appointments translating into impacting the entire discipline of economics at the world level, ably documented in Inside Joband in other media.[15] Given that our regulators are more hawkish than US and other jurisdictions, especially given ours is a developing economy, we are in a much better position to prevent such corporate governance issues at a very nascent stage itself. Apart from the solution regarding cooling-off period offered above, comprehensive conflict-disclosure compliances should prevent any major future situations that US had to go through. SEBI’s current conflict-disclosure model for public-company directorships has proved to be a successful model so far in capital markets, and can surely be extended to other markets and even post-regulatory appointments that is the subject of this blog. India is hardly at a stage that the US was in 2008, or is currently, with complex corporate governance issues such as detailed above. However, that does not mean that we negate those examples. Rectifying such issues will only happen after we start recognizing them. [1] Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, October 5, 2017. See, https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports/reports/oct-2017/report-of-the-committee-on-corporate-governance_36177.html. [2] Subramaniam, Arvind, “Of Counsel: The Challenges of the Modi – Jaitley Economy”, Penguin Viking, December 2018.

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Classification of Creditors: Constitutional Validity of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

[Medhashree Verma and Kavya Lalchandani] The authors are 3rd year students of National Law University Odisha, Cuttack.  Introduction  The long-standing dilemma regarding the constitutionality of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) has been finally settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. In Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr v. Union of India,[i]the court answered all the issues regarding the constitutionality of the IBC and stands as a perfect example of Judicial Deference to enter into the sphere of legislaturefor matters relating to the economy of the country which the legislature has the liberty to experiment with. Keeping in mind the background and the pre-existing state of laws regarding insolvency, the court observed that unification of law governing insolvency was necessary and a system of speedy disposal of insolvency matters and a fast resolution process was necessary to save the economy from rising Non-Performing Assets. The Court also referred to the BLRC report which stated that “In such an environment of legislative and judicial uncertainty, the outcomes on insolvency and bankruptcy are poor”. Thus, in order to expedite the process of insolvency resolution and to save the financially unstable companies as a going concern, the IBC was enacted. The court stated that “The Code is thus a beneficial legislation which puts the corporate debtor back on its feet, not being mere recovery legislation for creditors”. It dealt with the following pressing issues related to the IBC: Classification of creditors: Article 14 IBC happens to be the first insolvency legislation to have created a distinction between the creditors as operational creditors and financial creditors. The preferential treatment given to the financial creditors under the scheme of the Act to the extent of ignoring the interest of the operational creditors has been a topic of moot since the inception of the IBC. It was also contended that the classification between the two kinds of creditors is discriminatory as the debtors to the operational creditors are given a notice of demand under the provisions of the Act and are even entitled to raise a genuine dispute regarding the same while the debtors to the financial creditors are not entitled to the same. Moreover, vires of section 21 and 24 of IBC were also assailed on the ground that the operational creditors do not get a right to vote in the meetings of the committee of creditors. It was contended that there is no intelligible differentia in the classification of creditors and hence the same violates Article 14 of the Constitution. However, the Court rejected the arguments and held that the class of financial creditors is mostly limited to the banks and financial institutions who lend huge amounts to the corporate debtors. Their credit is usually secured, unlike the operational creditors who are unsecured and grant loans in small amounts. Also, the nature of lending is different between the financial and operational creditors. The financial creditors lend money to the enterprises for working capital or on term loan which helps the corporate debtor in initiating and running the business. On the other hand, operational creditors are related to lending and supply of goods and services. The court noted that the amount that is owed to the operational creditors is generally less and contracts entered into with the operational creditors do not have clauses relating to a specific repayment schedule. The court further observed that in the case of an operational creditor there is a larger possibility of existence of a genuine dispute and can use arbitration as a means of settling their dispute. In contrast, the financial debts lent by the financial creditors have authentic documentation maintained by the banks and the financial institutions and the defaults made can be easily verified. Furthermore, financial creditors are concerned with the financial health of the corporate debtor and are in a better position to restructure the loans and help the corporate debtor recuperate from the financial stress which the operational creditors do not and cannot do because of the nature of contract that they enter into with the corporate debtor. Thus, there exists an intelligible differentia in the classifications of the creditors which is directly related with the object of the act which is to preserve stressed entities as a going concern and implements fast resolution mechanisms for the corporate debtor. The court observed that vires of Section 21 and 24 of IBC cannot be assailed on the ground that the operational creditors do not get a right to vote in the meetings of the committee of creditors as no resolution plan is passed by the adjudicating authority without ensuring that roughly equal treatment is given to the operational creditors as well. It is to be ensured that the minimum payment is made to the operational creditors which should not be less than the liquidation value. Analysis: The reasoning that the court used to justify the preferential treatment given to the financial creditors over operational creditors fails to address the fact that in some legislations may incidentally affect the rights and welfare of a party which may not have been its may concern. In the present case, this anomalous situation circles the operational creditors as the primary focus of the legislation is to give control of the stressed company to the financial creditors. This can be explained throughthe matter of Bhushan Steel ltd[ii].,in which Larsen and Toubrochallenged the claims it was supposed to receive as the operational creditor to the Bhushan Steel. Bhushan Steel owed about nine hundred crores to Larsen and Toubro. Larsen and Toubro made a move to the NCLAT and pleaded that the committee of creditors (which consists only of the financial creditors) had satisfied most of its claims. But, on the other hand the dues of the operational creditors were not settled.  It further contended out of the total amount of the total amount of 12 billion that has been earmarked for the settlement of dues of the operational creditors, 10 billion must be given to Larsen and Toubro. The Tata

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Depositing A Post-Dated Cheque During Moratorium

[ Vatsal Patel ]   The author is a 3rd year student of Nirma University. Introduction The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as“Act”) augmented by its 2018 Amendment Act[1](hereinafter referred to as“Amended Act”) has received wide-spread positive response from different sides of corporate sector.[2]The bringing in of the Act resulted in immediate shifting form a debtor-in-control regime to a creditor-in-control regime and is buttressed by a stipulated time period of 180/270 days for the completion process which is adhered to strictly by the National Company Law Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as“NCLTs”) all across the country. The moratorium period stipulated under Sec. 14 is one of the prominent feature of this act which restricts the continuation of the mentioned proceedings against the corporate debtor in case of an admission and subsequently, commencement of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (hereinafter referred to as“CIRP”). Moreover, it has already been established that the moratorium does not apply to all proceedings in light of the NCLAT judgement in the case of Canara Bankv. Decan Chronicle Holding,[3]which noted the absence of the word “all” in Section 14 of the Act. The moratorium as prescribed for by Sec. 14, inter-alia, provides for prohibiting: “…(1)(c). any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its propertyincluding any action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002” It would be pertinent to note that by virtue of Section 3(31) of the Act, a “security interest” would include a claim to property. Moreover, the term “property” as defined under Sec. 3(27) would include money. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration in this article is whether a cheque, more specifically, a post-dated cheque, the date of beginning of which falls within the stipulated moratorium period could be deposited during the moratorium period or would it be against the moratorium? In terms of an Example – Consider that A (Operational Creditor) contracted with  B (Corporate Debtor) on 01.01.2019 for the supply of goods/services. For the same, cheques were issued by B to A dated 02.07.19 (first cheque), 02.07.20, 02.07.21 and 02.07.22. All these cheques were delivered on 01.01.2019 to the Operational Creditor. Subsequently, CIRP was initiated against the Corporate Debtor and moratorium was granted between 01.07.19 to 01.10.19. Therefore, the question that arises is whether A can encash the first cheque in the instant case? The answer to the aforementioned question could be related to the proposition of law which governs the date of payment of a cheque i.e. if the date of payment by cheque is the date on which the cheque is delivered then the payment has already happened and therefore, there is no bar to encashment via cheque and vice-versa. Supreme Court On Delivery Of Cheque The First Casethat comes for consideration is CIT, Bombayv. Ogale Glass Works Ltd.,[4] wherein the Supreme Court while dealing with a cheque which was not subsequently dishonoured held that the cheque would be considered to be payed on the date of its delivery. However, had the cheque been dishonoured, the same would not be the case. In the words of Supreme Court: “…The position, therefore, is that in one view of the matter there was, in the circumstances of this case, an implied agreement under which the cheques were accepted unconditionally as payment and on another view, even if the cheques were taken conditionally, the cheques not having been dishonoured but having been cashed, the payment related back to the dates of the receipt of the cheques and in law the dates of payments were the dates of the delivery of the cheques.”[5] The same position of law was supported by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Saraswathyv. P.S.S. Somasundaram Chettiar.[6] The Second Casethat comes for consideration is the case of Jiwanlal Achariyav. Rameshwarlal Agarwalla,[7]wherein themajority of the three-judge bench of the Supreme Court distinguished between a conditional and an unconditional payment while dealing with Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908. It was held that an ordinary cheque amounted to an unconditional payment if the cheque was subsequently honoured.[8]However, the court also considered a post-dated cheque to be a conditional payment for which the date of payment would not be the date of delivery but the date on which it was dated to begin. The case also distinguished from Ogale’sCase,[9]by stating that the issue before that court was not specifically in relation to a post-dated cheque and as such the court was not bound by that case. However, it is pertinent to note that the minority opinion by Justice R. S. Bachawat did not distinguish Ogale’scase from the instant case and as such held that Ogale’scase applied even to a post-dated cheque.[10]Thus, according to the minority opinion, even payment by a post-dated cheque related back to the date of delivery of the cheque in terms of payment. One would expect that the courts would rely on the aforementioned two cases for the payment in terms of delivery all types of cheque i.e. ante-dated, date of the delivery and post-dated. However, the Supreme Court has deviated from its established position of law. The Third Casethat arises for our consideration is the recent case of Director of Income Tax, New Delhiv. Raunaq Education Foundation,[11]wherein the Supreme Court dealt with an issue pertaining to a cheque which was delivered on 31.03.2002 and dated 22.04.2002. The court herein again relied on Ogale’s Case.[12]However, in doing so it did not distinguish between an ordinary cheque and a post-dated cheque and the payment of a post-dated cheque was also considered to be completed on the date of the delivery of the cheque. Conclusion Thus, on perusal of the aforementioned judgements it can be distinctly observed that the position of law in terms of the ordinary cheques is clear i.e. the date of delivery of cheque is the date of payment via cheque if the cheque is subsequently honoured. However, as far as post-dated cheques are concerned,

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