Author name: CBCL

Diminishing Material Utility of IBC Towards One Primary Stakeholder

[By Kirti Gupta] The author is a student a Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. Introduction The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the Code) promises to deal with the mammoth task of stabilising the Indian economy in this era of peculiarly volatile market conditions. The Preamble of the Code, enumerates the objective which strives to reform the insolvency framework and aid the transition from debtor to creditor centric regime. While the Code attempts at stabilising the economy in the times of COVID-19, the author reasonably assumes that there remains a lacuna in the law, which could be detrimental to the stakeholders in the near future. The author has objectively circumscribed the scope of this article to probable disorientation expected to follow the  Gazette Notification dated 24-03-2020 [MCA Notification S.O. 1205 E] (notification). The notification by the virtue of the power vested with the Central Government, vide proviso to Section 4 of the Code, increased the threshold of the default amount to INR 1 crore from INR 1 lakh. The author opines that considering the crooked power dynamics that hovers around the company and its employee’s relationship, the increased threshold shall predominantly deny workmen/employees, a measure of recourse under the Code, thereby defeating the objective of the Code. Legislative Intent Behind the Position of Workmen/Employees Under the Code The Code attempts at reorganisation and insolvency resolution in a time-bound manner without digressing from defined rights of all stakeholders, which reasons the paramount intention behind the position of employee and workman in the resolution framework. It was understood, that in the event of a business failure leading to bankruptcy, the worst affected loft is the workman and employee. This proposition was highlighted in the Joint Committee on the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2015, where it was significantly observed that the workers are the nerve centre of the company and are affected adversely in the time of insolvency. Therefore, their outstanding dues are entitled to priority. It’s mandatory for the resolution plan to necessarily provide for protections to Operational Creditors (OC), which includes workmen and employees, for the speedy recovery of the due payments, significantly reflected in the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee report (the “BLRC Report”). It was highlighted in the BLRC Report, that the provisions for providing protection to the workmen and employees is with an intent to; ‘… empower the workmen and employees to initiate insolvency proceedings, settle their dues fast and move on to some other job instead of waiting for their dues for years together…’ Moreover, The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, elucidates that vulnerable groups such as workmen and employee shall be afforded special protection as a measure against business failure by acknowledging primacy of their rights, while discharging the debt under the insolvency laws. Legitimate Recourse for the Workman/Employee Under the Code Section 8 of the Code allows OC to deliver a demand notice to the corporate debtor (CD) on the occurrence of default, and further, on expiry of 10 days, where CD fails to satisfy the dues or notify of any dispute, OC can file an application to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under Section 9 of the Code. The application is made w.r.t Rule 6(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 (the Regulation), where the application is filed according to prescribed Form 5. It is imperative to note here, that Note to Form 5 provides, ‘Where workmen/employees are operational creditors, the application may be made either in an individual capacity or in a joint capacity by one of them who is duly authorized for the purpose.’ This implies that workmen and employees can file an application in their joint capacity. Diminishing Utility of the Code for Workman/Employee The predicament of the government in devising measures that secure economy and cater to the needs of instrumental stakeholders is understandable, however, it is equally imperative to not decide hastily, which could cause irreversible damage Au contraire. The author opines that an increase in threshold neglects one of the primary stakeholders, i.e. workmen/employees. Increasing the quantum to the maximum permitted limit by the Code, without any consideration for the influenced stakeholders is an inconsiderate and a rushed decision. This is evident by the quantum of average wage earned in this country, which is INR 7410 per month, according to the ILO Report. Thus, it makes it immensely challenging for an employee to initiate CIRP for the payment of his past dues after the increased threshold considering the average wage. Therefore, it is essential to address the question of filing an application conjointly under the regulation, otherwise it becomes nearly impossible to meet the prescribed threshold. In Uttam Galva Steels Limited v. DF Deutsche Forfait AG and Ors.[i] (Uttam Galva), NCLAT decided that application by OC cannot be filed jointly, because unlike Section 7, Section 8 and 9 do not provide for such provision. Moreover, it was held in Para 20, that it is impractical for more than one OC to file a joint petition due to the varied amount of default at different dates for each individual. Ascended by another NCLT judgment, Suresh Narayan Singh v. Tayo Rolls Limited[ii] (Tayo Rolls), provides that the Note in Form 5 is not in consonance with provision  Section 9 of the Code as it does not authorise a joint application or joint demand notice by the OC, and therefore, it was requested to be reconsidered by the appropriate authorities. However, this judgment was overruled by NCLAT[iii], where the application was allowed, nevertheless, it was stated in Para 6, that where an individual claim of OC is less than 1 lakh, it cannot be maintainable. Later, Supreme Court (SC) in J.K Jute Mills Mazdoor Morcha v. J.K Jute Mills Co. Ltd.[iv] (Jute Mills) took a slightly different stance w.r.t representational applications. The Bench decided, that a trade union represents its members who are workers and are owed debts by the employer. Thus, it is the authority which has been transferred from all the workmen to one,

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Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v State of Jharkhand: The Unsettling Doctrine of Clean Slate

[By Akshita Totla and Nikunj Maheshwari] The authors are students at Institute of Law, Nirma University. Introduction The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IB Code) was enacted for the resolution of the corporate debtor so that it continues as a ‘going concern’[i]. The doctrine of clean slate is one of the means to achieve this objective of the revival of the corporate debtor. This doctrine states that post the approval of the resolution plan by the adjudicating authority, the resolution will be binding on all the stakeholders. Thereby, the acquirer will be protected from any undischarged claim against the corporate debtor prior to the completion of the resolution process and would begin the operation with a clean slate. The intent behind this doctrine is to incentivize the acquirer of the stressed company, and to provide scope for the revival of the corporate debtor. This doctrine in Indian laws finds its place under section 31and 32A of the IBC and has been further expanded and interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited Through Authorised Signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta[ii] (2019) (Essar Steel). Recently, in Ultra Tech Nathwada Cement v. Union of India[iii](2020) (Ultra Tech) the Rajasthan HC held that tax authorities cannot raise demands of pending tax dues from the resolution applicant subsequent to the approval of the resolution plan. However, the Jharkhand HC in the case of Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. The State of Jharkhand[iv](2020) (Electrosteel) has overturned the decision of Rajasthan HC with respect to the application of the doctrine of fresh slate in the case of pending tax dues. The juxtaposition of contrasting opinions of adjudicating authorities has created an anomaly as to the scope of the doctrine of clean-slate theory. This article seeks to analyze the decision of the Jharkhand HC vis-a-vis the treatment of disputed amounts post the culmination of CIRP in the light of settled precedents and legislation. Background In the case of Electrosteel, M/s Vedanta Ltd. emerged as a successful resolution applicant, and its application to take over the petitioner company was approved by the adjudicating authority. Albeit, the sums of money owed by the company to its creditors were paid in the required proportions, the dues outstanding with the VAT authorities (tax department) were not considered. As a sequitur, the tax department started sending garnishee orders to the banker of the petitioner company, to transfer a sum of money to the department, in lieu of the outstanding dues of the petitioner. The petitioner thus filed the writ petition to challenge these garnishee orders. The issue raised before the court was whether the approved resolution plan will be binding on the tax authorities. The Court noted that the petitioner tried to frivolously enrich itself, by not paying indirect tax amount to the department which it collected from its customers. The petitioner as required under section 13 of the Code didn’t make a public announcement for inviting the claims of creditors at the location of its registered office i.e. in the state of Jharkhand. For this reason, the Tax authority was unable to submit its claims and thus, it never became the party to the resolution plan. The Court further observed that since the 2019 amendment[v]was promulgated after the resolution plan was finalized, it will not have retrospective effect and thus the tax department will have a claim to get its dues recovered. [Note: The 2019 amendment Act amended section 31 to clarify that position that the approved resolution plan would be binding on all stakeholders including government and local authorities] Analysis of the Judgment Whether resolution plan will be binding on a party who was not involved in the resolution plan? The court interpreted Section 31(1) of the IB Code which states that approved resolution will be binding on “all stakeholders involved in the resolution process”[vi]and concluded that the resolution plan would be only binding on parties that participated in the resolution process.[vii] On the other hand, the Rajasthan High Court in Ultratech while deciding on the same question held that irrespective of the fact that the creditor or the government participated in the resolution process, once approved the plan would be binding on all stakeholders.[viii] The Supreme Court in the case of Swiss Ribbons v Union of India[ix](2019) was also of the same view that insolvency proceedings are proceedings in rem i.e. would be binding on the public at large.[x]The court in this case misinterpreted section 31 while imposing liability to pay on the petitioner as the resolution plan would have been binding on the tax authority irrespective of its involvement in the resolution process. Furthermore, the SC in the case of Essar Steel observed that “A successful resolution applicant cannot suddenly be faced with “undecided” claims after the resolution plan submitted by him has been accepted as this would amount to a hydra head popping”.[xi]This observation was made in the light of the fact that the acquirer would intend to have a fresh slate without any liabilities of the erstwhile management.[xii]Thus, the ratio of Electrosteel runs counter to the very objective of clean slate doctrine which is to prevent government or any other creditor to intrude in the resolution process. If this position of law is not settled by the SC in appeal, this judgment will have an adverse impact on the prospective applicant who would no longer be willing to acquire any financially distressed company. Whether indirect tax is operational debt? The Jharkhand HC while holding the state government as an operational creditor made a distinction between indirect and direct taxes. The court stated that indirect tax may not be considered as operational debt as the VAT in dispute has already been realized from the customers. Hence, it is not a direct debt of the petitioner company towards the state government so as to make it operational debt under section 5(21). The relevant part of Section 5(21) states that “debt in respect of the payment of dues arising under any law for the

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Apeejay Trust v. Aviva Life Insurance – FSPs and the IBC

[By Aman Sadiwala] The author is a student at National Law School of India University, Bengaluru Introduction The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) provides the insolvency resolution process for corporate persons in Part II. Section 3(7) of the IBC defines “corporate person” and specifically excludes any financial service provider (“FSP”) from its ambit. Section 3(8) defining “corporate debtor” qualifies this ‘corporate person’ as one who owes a debt to any person. Thus, it is evident that a ‘corporate debtor’ as envisaged under the IBC does not include an FSP. Section 4 of the IBC limits the applicability of Part II to corporate debtors, thereby excluding FSPs from its purview. Despite this apparent clarity in the position of law, the judgment of the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) in Apeejay Trust v. Aviva Life Insurance Co. India Ltd. (2019) has raised questions regarding the relation between the IBC and FSPs. Aviva Life Insurance (“Aviva”), the Corporate Debtor had debt arising from non-payment of license fees, car parking, maintenance charges and service tax. Apeejay Trust (“Apeejay”), the Operational Creditor filed the petition before the NCLT praying for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) of Aviva. Aviva argued that being an insurance company, it qualified as an FSP and did not fall within the scope of the IBC. The NCLT noted that the transaction between Apeejay and Aviva was not in the nature of financial services and concluded that Aviva did not qualify as an FSP in this transaction. The NCLT ruled in favour of Apeejay and initiated CIRP of Aviva. Section 3(17) of the IBC defines FSP as “a person engaged in the business of providing financial services in terms of authorisation issued or registration granted by a financial sector regulator”. Section 3(16) which defines “financial service” covers ‘contracts of insurance’ in sub-section (c). Section 3(18) which defines “financial sector regulator” includes the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India. While Aviva meets the definitional requirements relating to Sections 3(16) and 3(18), the question that arises is whether an FSP as defined in Section 3(17) looks at the nature of debt or the nature of the corporate person. In this piece, I argue that the NCLT erred in its consideration of the nature of debt when instead, it should have looked at the nature of the corporate person. I present a two-pronged argument to support my thesis: first, based on statutory interpretation of relevant provisions; and second, that the judgment is per incuriam and inconsistent with previous National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) judgments. Statutory Interpretation of Relevant Provisions First, the definition in Section 3(17) uses the phrase “person engaged in the business of”. To understand the scope of this definition, I rely on rules on statutory interpretation. The Literal Rule requires that words be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless it results in vagueness and ambiguity. Oxford Dictionary defines “business” as “a person’s regular occupation”. There is no indication in Section 3(17) that one needs to look specifically at the transaction in question and identify the nature of debt. The natural meaning of the definition looks at the recurring activity a corporate person is engaged in, thus being concerned with its general nature and not the specific nature of debt in that transaction. The Golden Rule is applied if the literal interpretation leads to absurdity or an injustice. It permits certain alterations to the original words after ascertaining the legislature’s intention. The Mischief Rule also carries out a purposive interpretation and requires a construction which suppresses mischief, while advancing the remedy in accordance with the true intent of the legislation drafters. While I argue that the Golden Rule and the Mischief Rule need not be looked at as the Literal Rule squarely applies, even if one was to rely on either of these rules, it would still follow that the nature of the corporate person needs to be looked at. FSPs were specifically excluded due to the adverse impact that an insolvency process of an FSP under the IBC would have on the economy as well as its numerous consumers. This was also recognized in the Report of the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission. Given that the rationale to exclude FSPs is based on their nature in general and their impact on the economy and its consumers, it is evident that the nature of the corporate person determines whether an entity is an FSP. Moreover, Section 227 of the IBC allows the Central Government to notify FSPs of their insolvency and liquidation proceedings and prescribe its manner. In light of this, the Central Government notified the  Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings of Financial Service Providers and Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2019. These Rules provide a different insolvency resolution process for FSPs compared to those for corporate debtors under the IBC. For instance, any creditor with a claim of at least INR 1,00,000 can institute CIRP against the corporate debtor under Section 4 of the IBC while only the appropriate regulator can initiate CIRP against the FSP under Rule 5(a)(i) of the aforementioned Rules. This stringent requirement under the Rules aligns with the legislative intent and is based on the nature of the corporate person. There exists no rationale for this different standard based on the nature of debt in the transaction. Inconsistency with Precedents Secondly, the NCLT failed to consider judgments of the NCLAT in Randhiraj Thakur v. M/s Jindal Saxena Financial Services Private Ltd. and anr. (2018) and HDFC Ltd. v. RHC Holding Private Ltd. (2019). Admittedly, in both these cases, the debts in the transactions were in the nature of ‘financial services’ and thus, the facts of those cases are not completely analogous to those in the Apeejay Trust case which has an operational debt. However, the analysis and ratio of the NCLAT in both these cases can be relied upon to show that the NCLAT looked at the nature of the corporate person and not the nature of debt. In

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Expanding the Umbrella of IPR Exemptions: A Critical Comment on Draft Competition Amendment Bill, 2020

[By Ashna Chhabra and Anuja Chaudhury] The authors are students at ILS Law College, Pune Introduction The Ministry of Corporate Affairs published the Draft Competition Amendment Bill, 2020[i] on 12th February 2020 based on the recommendations of the Competition Law Review Committee (CLRC). One of the proposed changes is the insertion of S.4A which extends the Intellectual Property Rights (‘IPR’) exemption to abusive practices by dominant enterprises under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 (‘The Act’). Earlier, this exemption was restricted only to the anti-competitive agreements under Section 3(5) of the Act. The earlier provision granted a protection from Section 3 to agreements entered into by any person for restraining any infringement or imposing any reasonable conditions, imperative for the protection of IPRs. This provision conferred a protection to IP holders, specifically in licensing agreements; acting as a shield to uphold the proprietary rights of the holders and simultaneously promote inventions. It further provides that Section 3 will not act as a bar to the right of a person to undertake export of goods from India to a certain extent.   The newly inserted S.4A aims to extend the same exemption to abusive conduct by dominant entities done to protect their IPR. This article aims to analyse the proposed amendment extending the IPR exemption to dominant entities and to identify the prospective enforcement concerns arising from the same. Balancing ‘Rights’ under IP & ‘Abuse’ under Competition Law The regimes of IPR and competition law have always been considered antithetical to one another. While the former confers exclusive monopoly rights, the latter checks upon the unreasonable exercise and abuse of those rights. At the same time, their complementary objectives cannot be overlooked, since competition law and IP, in synergy, promote efficient competition and innovation. The extension of the IPR exemption to abuse of dominance (‘AOD’) cases will tip the equibalance between the two laws in the favour of the IPR regime. This will eventually induce an exponential rise in cases where dominant enterprises (such as patent or copyright holding entities) will attempt to objectively justify their abusive behaviour (such as imposing restrictive licensing or franchise clauses) under the guise of protecting their IPRs. As early as 1988, the European Union (‘EU’) Commission, in the case of AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd.[ii] decided that even an exercise of an IPR right by an enterprise will be considered abusive in the following circumstances: Existence of no other substitute for the product which has a specific, constant, and regular potential demand on the part of the consumers; Refusal to supply the information leading to the prevention of the creation of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand; No objective justification for such refusal; Reservation of the secondary/downstream market to themselves by excluding all the competition in the market. Although the proposed provision contemplates the above scenarios by not providing a blanket exemption, it runs the risk of becoming a template defence used by the entities to escape liability under Section 4 of the Act.[iii] It would result in enterprises in monopolistic markets indulging in practices such as the creation of a market-standard based on IPR licensing, excessive pricing, refusal to deal, refusal to license, or dominating the downstream market by refusing necessary information for entry, under the garb of ‘protection of IPR’. This necessitates the striking a fine balance between private proprietary rights and promotion of economic growth and competition. Peeking into the future: Prospective enforcement issues in AOD cases The extension of the IP defence to AOD cases is sure to raise several pertinent concerns and enforcement issues. Firstly, there remains ambiguity regarding the determination of the ‘relevant market’ which forms the very foundation of Section 4. In 2014, CCI in the Super Cassettes case,[iv] concluded the relevant product market by considering the SSNIP test instead of holding the entire IPR as the relevant market. However, for the purpose of Section 4A, in determining the establishment of a dominant position, there is a requirement of due consideration of whether the ‘relevant geographic market’ would be commensurate to the extent of the territorial protection granted to the IPR or the extent of usage of that IPR in the market. The clarification of the same will warrant an addition to the factors required to be satisfied for determining the ‘relevant market’ under Section 19(5) and (6), for example, if the relevant market will include products made from license or technology transfer of the IPR. Secondly, The threshold for proving AAEC is more flexible and has a broader scope under the relative ‘rule of reason’ approach adopted by CCI in AOD cases due to the presence of various objective justifications for the abusive practices. The extension of the exemption to Section 4 will provide an additional scope, broader to satisfy the ‘objective justifications’ for the abusive conduct by a dominant enterprise. Thirdly, the CCI has failed to provide an appropriate and succinct definition of what constitutes ‘reasonable conditions’ under Section 3(5). In 2017, CCI in the K Sera Sera case,[vi] concluded that exclusive agreements with distributors to prevent agreements with repeated IPR infringers constitute a ‘reasonable condition’. In 2015, CCI in the Shamsher Kataria case,[vii] provided two requirements to be satisfied for any entity to claim exemption under Section 3(5) namely: Whether the right which is put forward is correctly characterized as protecting an intellectual property; and Whether the requirements of the law granting the IPRs are being satisfied. While clarifying the first criteria, the CCI stated that the concept of protection of an IPR is qualified to be ‘necessary’ where, in the absence of the restrictive conditions; the IPR holder is unable to protect his IPR. However, the extension of the same to AOD cases will require a more variable and clear definition of what constitutes ‘reasonable conditions’ as the possibility of misuse of the provision is higher. The Bill also lacks an adequate mechanism to address the issues which can arise from the non-compulsion of provision Fair, Reasonable & Non-Discriminatory (FRAND)terms to

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Covid-19 Crisis and the Failing-firm Defense: Greater Responsibility on the CCI?

[By Shreya Chandhok] The author is a student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal Introduction The Covid-19 pandemic has pushed the global economy into a slump, leading to a shrinking economy with weakened growth. The increased uncertainty caused by the disruption in demand and supply chains is discouraging transactions, leading to companies filing for bankruptcy worldwide. Even though the government and the competition authorities are working towards providing relaxations to such undertakings, there remains a possibility of an increase in the number of Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) transactions, particularly rescue deals in the market. The better-positioned companies with sufficient financial resources will be tempted to seize a unique opportunity to acquire a struggling competitor. Even the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’) acknowledges that in times of financial crisis, it is natural for distressed companies to improve their condition by merging with a healthier competitor. In India, such acquisitions must comply with the requirements under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) which eventually depends on the resolution plan chalked out by the insolvency resolution professional. According to the proviso under Section 31(4) of the IBC, an applicant is supposed to take prior approval from the Competition Commission of India (CCI), before the approval of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) is obtained if the resolution plan has a provision for ‘combination’. Essentially, this acquisition becomes a part of combination under Section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002. To relax this long procedure of approvals, the CCI in 2019 amended its  ‘Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011’ (Combination Regulations)to legitimise a self-assessment channel, known as the ‘Green Channel Clearance’ for M&A filings. Under the green channel, mergers or acquisitions between unrelated parties that are not involved in similar businesses, horizontally or vertically will be deemed to be approved by an automatic system for speedy approval of combinations. Recently, the government promulgated an ordinance to suspend sections 7, 9, and 10 of IBC for a period of 6 months, which can be extended for a period of one year. This would imply that the merger requests reaching the CCI will not go through the severity of the IBC, to determine if the firm was actually under a financial distress. In pursuance of this, the CCI will likely be asked to assess M&A which might be anti-competitive but may nonetheless fall under the ‘failing firm defence’, permitting a failing firm to merge with a healthy competitor. Therefore, the question is, how will the CCI examine the ‘failing firms’ in the current scenario? This post attempts to find an answer to this question, firstly, by examining the application of ‘failing firm defence’ in India vis a vis other jurisdictions and secondly, by analysing CCI’s role in the upcoming merger requests. Failing-firm defence The failing firm defence provides a way to clear mergers in cases that would otherwise be characterised by significant anti-competitive effects. Before starting with the substantial discussion, it is important to distinguish between two concepts, the ‘failing firm’ and the ‘flailing firm’. ‘The failing firm’ is a firm that has exhausted all its options for survival and is on the brink of exiting the market, whereas the latter has simply become a weaker competitor. Therefore, there is a higher burden on the parties to prove that they are close to bankruptcy, rather than just weakened by the current economic situations, pertaining to the proposed merger. The European Union (‘EU’) for that matter, in the case of Kali und Salz, gave a three-fold test to determine the applicability of the failing-firm defence- (i) the failing firm would be forced out of the market if not taken over by another entity; (ii) this was the least anti-competitive measure; and (iii) the assets of the failing firm would leave the market in the absence of the said merger. Accordingly, to satisfy the first condition, the firms must establish their financial difficulties by showing denied access to requisite funds or failed attempts of restructuring. The second condition can be satisfied by showing that there are no alternative buyers available in the market, or that the acquisition by another company does not lead to a less-competitive result. Therefore, from a buyer’s perspective, between exploring alternative options and allowing a merger, the latter is the least anti-competitive resort available to the undertaking. To establish the third condition, it requires the notifying party to demonstrate that if the target company fails, its entire share would inevitably exit the market and/or its market share will go the competitor. The Aegean/Olympic II case in the EU deliberated on all these conditions and satisfied that if the merger was not allowed, Olympics’ market share would retire from the market, leading to a reduction in competition, and therefore allowing the merger was the least anti-competitive alternative available with the authorities. Following the same, recently, the Competition and Markets Authorities (CMA) in the United Kingdom, approved Amazon’s investment in Deliveroo, a British restaurant and grocery delivery platform that attained a significant share in the market, was likely to lose its share due to the Covid-19 pandemic if Amazon did not invest, eventually leading to a loss of competition in the market. In the United States, the US Department of Justice (‘department’) has been disinclined to compromise the standards of this defence, and is only helping the undertakings by expediting the review process. Nevertheless, the authorities are honouring the requests on a case to case basis, by giving due regard to the nature of the industry and their position in the society, when evaluating a merger request. Recently, the department allowed for an acquisition in the milk industry, following the unprecedented challenges they were facing. Therefore, in a nutshell, the authorities across the borders are trying to accommodate the requests of such undertakings, by evaluating their requests based on the current crisis. Even though India has not dealt with the failing firm directly, it is noteworthy to mention that the S.V.S. Raghavan

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Who appoints the Arbitrator of a Company?

[By Anchit Jain and Lovish Jain] Anchit is a student at ICFAI University, Dehradun and Lovish is a CS (Executive) Candidate. Prelude In the present era of increasing disputes mainly in the corporate sector and inextricable compliance requirements, alternate dispute resolution through arbitration is the new preference of the parties to settle the same, but on the contrary various judgments and rulings in past on the matter of corporate disputes and their resolution through arbitration didn’t prove to be of much utility as the very significant topic of ‘Appointment of Arbitrator in a Company’ and the procedure for the same is more into chaos these days. In the very article, authors powered their views on the unaddressed topic of ‘Appointment of Arbitrator in a Company’ and what are the implications of recent rulings of the court i.e. “how the board of directors specifically ‘managing director’, is not eligible to appoint an arbitrator in the company.” Authors endeavour to guide the issue and also provide a possible solution which encompasses the delegation of authority of arbitrator’s appointment and procedure to be followed for the same on the shoulders of ‘Appointing Authority’ or the other possible way is a route through ‘Institutional Arbitration’. Asymmetrical Arbitration Clause An Asymmetrical Arbitration Clause allows a party to single-handedly choose an arbitrator(s) for the resolution of a dispute.[i] This clause is aggressively disputed as the other party has no say in the abovementioned decision making. On the question of a party’s autonomy over the asymmetrical arbitration clause, the Delhi High Court in the case of Proddatur Cable TV Digi Services v. Citi Cable Network Limited[ii] held that a company is run by the ‘collective’ efforts of directors i.e. ‘Board of Directors’ (Board) and Board performs in the good faith of the company. Section 166[iii] prohibits a director’s involvement from a situation where he has a direct or an indirect interest that conflicts or possibly may conflict with the interest of the company. The Court said that it was natural that the Board will have an interest in the outcome of Arbitration, and thus, based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Perkins Eastman Architects DPC & Anr. v. HSCC (India) Ltd.[iv], Court restricted a person who has an interest in the outcome of a dispute and consequently held that the Managing Director must not have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator. If consideration is given to only one party on the matter of the appointment of an arbitrator, it may violate the soul of arbitration i.e. an arbitrator must be impartial and independent and both the parties should equally contribute in the appointment of an arbitrator. Impartiality and Independence The Supreme Court, in the case of Voestalpine Schienen GMBH v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited[v], ruled that impartiality and independence are the hallmarks of any arbitration proceedings. The judgment cites the 246th Law Commission’s Report[vi] in which the 57th paragraph states that party autonomy cannot be stretched to a point where it negates the very basic impartiality and independence of the adjudicators. In Voestalpine[vii], Supreme Court relied on the ‘Cour de Cassation, France’s judgment of 1972 in Consorts Ury’ which also reiterated that “An independent mind is indispensable in the exercise of judicial power, whatever that source of power may be, and it is one of the essential qualities of an arbitrator”. The current position draws a debate between two basic features of Arbitration- ‘Independence & Impartiality’ and ‘Party Autonomy’. This debate needs to end for the settlement of this conflict as it is a barrier in the Indian practice of Arbitration. What will be the procedure of appointing an arbitrator and who will effectuate it: An Inadequate Precedent The article now needs to enlighten the view on the act of appointment of the arbitrator, to which Perkins[viii] held that both parties nominating their respective arbitrator would balance the situation. This does not bring the concept of sole arbitrator to an end as the cases of Perkins[ix] and Proddatur[x] also ended with the Court appointing Judges as the replacement for the sole arbitrators. Balancing the power between both parties is the answer to ‘How’, and involvement of both the parties answers ‘Who’. In the Institutional arbitration method, arbitrators are provided by the institution. The situation is conciliated when both the parties opted for Institution and the arbitrators provided are impartial and independent. But when ad-hoc is the pattern, then the arbitrators have to be chosen by the parties. This is a stage where Proddatur’s[xi] judgment fails to provide an answer and instead creates a barrier, especially for a company that is a party in a dispute. Ineligible Board of Directors and Inapplicable Article of Association Proddatur[xii] held that a company is run by none other than the directors collectively. This excluded the collective decision of the Board from nominating an arbitrator because Section 166(4)[xiii] restricts a director’s participation in a situation that attracts his direct or indirect interest. Moreover, Perkins[xiv] relies on the principle of “Qui facit per alium facit per se” (what one does through another is done by oneself). Both these factors bar a company from nominating and appointing authority for nominating an arbitrator. Proddatur[xv] explicitly excludes the Board, the governing authority of the company, and forgets to clarify ‘who’ from a company can nominate an arbitrator. If a company’s Articles of Association (AOA) provides that a Board is allowed to appoint a sole arbitrator, then that specific clause of the AOA cannot be given effect because u/s 6[xvi] it overrides the provision of The Act.[xvii] One Possible Solution: Appointment of Appointing Authority The Act[xviii] provides that the parties can choose their procedure[xix] and if the parties fail to agree on the appointment of the: (i) Umpire,[xx] (ii) Sole arbitrator[xxi] or, (iii) Arbitrator as per the procedure,[xxii] then the Supreme Court or the High Court, as the case may be, can make the appointment. The Act also provides that the Court, on its behalf, can ask a graded institution to appoint the

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Ease of minority squeeze out: An analysis of the new squeeze out provisions

[By Anurag Shah and Vijay Nekkanti] The authors are students at Christ (Deemed to be University), School of Law Introduction The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), Government of India, has brought into effect the eagerly anticipated and much-required sub-sections (11) and (12) of Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013.[i] These provisions pertain to the takeover of a company via squeezing out the minority shareholders under a scheme of compromise/arrangement. While the whole Chapter XV of the Act pertaining to compromise, arrangements, and amalgamations were notified in the year 2016, it took MCA approximately 3 (three) years to notify these two sub-sections. To align these provisions with the company law MCA also had to make consequential revisions to the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 and the Companies (Compromises, Arrangements and Amalgamations) Rules, 2016. These revisions would streamline the procedure given under the new sub-sections. Squeeze out implies the compulsory acquisition of equity shares of a company from the minority shareholders of that company through fair cash compensation.[ii] Prior to this notification, it was done under Section 235. The method under Section 235 was enshrined to ensure that shareholders holding 90 percent or more shareholding in a company can acquire shares from minority shareholders during a takeover. The rationale behind such a provision was to ensure smooth takeovers of a company once the majority has consented to it. However, the minority shares should be bought at a fair value and this is what forms the crux of this method and the Courts have enumerated its importance time and again. In the case of Sandvik Asia Limited v. Bharat Kumar & Ors[iii], the Bombay High Court was of the view that if a fair price is being paid to the non-promoter shareholders, and at no point, the same is challenged; the Court should not withhold the sanction to the transaction. This shows the intent behind the method. Section 230(11) and (12) of the Companies Act, 2013 The provisions notified by MCA would now enable the majority shareholders holding 3/4th of the concerned company’s shares to make a takeover offer and to acquire all or a part of the shares. This can be done through an application before the NCLT. The term shares for the purpose of these provisions would include equity shares and securities that vest the holder with the power of exercising voting rights. The application for such an offer should be accompanied by a report disclosing the detailed valuation of the shares proposed to be acquired. Adding to this, the acquirer is also required to deposit a sum of not less than 50% of the total consideration for the offer into a separate bank account. The offer should ensure that fair value is being paid to the minority shareholders. The fair should be computed by taking into account the highest price paid by any person or group of persons for the acquisition of these shares during the last 12 months. Other factors such as the return on net worth, book value, and Earning per Share (EPS) should also be considered. Section 230(12) read with the amended NCLT rules provides for the raising of grievances by the minority shareholders in front of the NCLT which shall act as a quasi-judicial body for this whole procedure. These provisions provide for another formal route for the minority to squeeze out from a company. Earlier known routes were selective reduction under Section 66 of the Act and squeeze out under Section 235 and 236. However, these provisions have been introduced in consonance with the jurisprudence related to the issue of squeeze out of minority shareholders. Now it would be important to see the role NCLT would play in presiding over these transactions, given the view of the Court in the landmark case of Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd[iv], wherein it was stated that the Courts do not have the expertise, time or the means to sit over the wisdom of such a transaction, and the Court should only concern itself with the question as to whether the valuation report is demonstrated to be so unjust, unreasonable and unfair that it would lead to inequity or injustice to the minority shareholders. Analysis of the provisions from an acquirer’s perspective Analyzing from the acquirer’s perspective, unlike the erstwhile regime under Section 235 that mandated 90% of control so as make an offer to the dissenting shareholders or initiate squeeze out, under the current provisions a 3/4th majority would suffice to move such a resolution. On the face apparent, although this particular relaxation might seem to be very liberalistic, one needs to understand in the context of private companies that, under the erstwhile Sections 235 and 236 albeit having acquired 90% of the shareholding, many acquirers were confronted with problems allied with various restrictions imposed on the transfer of shares by the private companies through various instruments such as Pre-Emptive Rights, etc. Thus, although it is easier to reach the threshold of 75% to make an offer, one has to understand that the new provisions amidst the herculean restrictions imposed by private companies have only burdened the acquirers with an additional 15% of shareholders to surpass. Further, in the case of AIG (Mauritius) LLC v. Tata Tele Ventures[v], the Hon’ble Delhi High Court interpreted Section 395 of the Indian Companies Act of 1956 (corresponding to Section 235 of the 2013 Act) in a way that justice is meted out to the minority shareholders, and had inter alia held that: “90% majority must comprise of different and distinct persons and only in that event this will fall within the rationale of this section a justify the overriding of the interests of the dissentients……………. the offeror should be substantially different to the majority” Although this judgment had imported the ideals of Shareholder Democracy within the Indian corporate jurisprudence, when applied in toto to all kinds of companies, it had posed several anomalies for the closely-held private and unlisted companies. Thus, the current provisions by providing

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IBC Ordinance, 2020 and the MSME Sector in India: Analysing the Implications

[By Poorna Poovamma K.M. and Abhishek Wadhawan] The authors are students at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar Introduction: A Conceptual Understanding The President promulgated The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020 (“Ordinance”) on June 05, 2020. The Ordinance has suspended Sections 7, 9 and 10 of The Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ( “Code”) to prevent the corporate bodies facing financial distress from being dragged by the creditors to insolvency proceedings for not being able to meet their financial obligations due to the spread of the COVID-19. In essence, the Ordinance has inserted Section 10A in the Code which provides for suspension of the Section 7, 9 and 10 of the Code for a period of six months (extendable by maximum one year). Further, no application for initiation of insolvency proceedings against any corporate persons for any default arising on or after March 25, 2020 shall be filed. The Ordinance has also inserted Section 66(3) to the Code that states that no application can be made to the Adjudicating Authority for directing the Director of the corporate debtor to contribute to the assets of the corporate debtor, if it comes under the ambit of Section 10A of the Ordinance. The period from March 25, 2020 till the suspension of the Code is often referred to as the ‘Disruption Period’ as all business and economic activities are disrupted due to the pandemic. This Disruption Period has hit the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (“MSMEs”) the hardest. To protect the MSMEs in these trying times, the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises revised the definitions of MSME through the Gazette Notification dated June 01, 2020 in order to ensure that more enterprises fall within the ambit of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 which provides various economic incentives to the MSMEs. Indeed, through the gamut of the Aatmanirbhar Bharat Package, the Government has introduced various incentives for MSMEs like approval of equity infusion of Rupees 50,000 crores from the Fund of Funds, Rupees three lakh crore of collateral free loans to the MSMEs for their operational needs among many others. With the suspension of Section 7, 9 and 10 of the Code, initiating insolvency proceedings against any corporate debtor will not be possible and hence the cases of wilful defaults by the corporates might exponentially rise. These increased wilful defaults by the corporate debtors will have a negative impact on the MSMEs majorly as they may face a shortage of cash flow leading to operational difficulties, given the fact that MSME sector enterprises form a major part of the operational creditors. Through this article, the author will try to analyse the potential impact of the Ordinance on the MSME sector of India. The Ordinance and the MSME Sector The promulgated Ordinance gives rise to a number of concerns for the MSME sector to ponder. A few concerns that arise are: The micro and small industries which make up a large part of the MSME sector have recently been accorded new definitions according to which maximum investment in a micro enterprise is rupees one crore and that for a small enterprise is rupees ten crore. Additionally, the Central Government recently acted on the powers conferred on it by way of the proviso to Section 4 of the Code, 2016 and increased the minimum amount of default with relation to the insolvency and liquidation of corporate debtors from rupees 1 lakh to 1 crore. As a result of this, MSME creditors, in reality would not be empowered to file for defaults lower than 1 crore and, considering their altered definitions, it would be next to impossible for the micro enterprises, and highly unlikely for small enterprises to file a claim for default. Issues in this regard that need clarification with respect to the blanket suspension of the Code are: Whether a MSME can file an insolvency petition against a corporate debtor for two separate claims that add up to a total of one crore, provided that the default occurred before the disruption period? Further, in case, a default is continuous in nature and the total value of default is more than rupees one crore, but the default for a part of this transaction occurs during the disruption period, can a creditor still initiate an insolvency proceeding for the default of the entire amount, or even a part thereof? Only an affirmative response by the Adjudicating Authority to these questions can ensure financial stability of the MSMEs. The Adjudicating Authority will definitely be in a dilemma as on one hand it would have the corporate debtors to be saved from insolvency proceedings and on the other hand, the financial soundness of the MSMEs, the wheels of the Indian economy will be at stake. Another concern arising with respect to MSMEs is the suspension of Section 9 of the Code, which provides for the initiationbtw of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) by an operational creditor. This concern is also fuelled by the fact that the Reserve Bank of India came out with a COVID-19 Regulatory Package whereby, a moratorium period of  6 months (till Aug. 31, 2020), for repayment of  loans provided by financial institutions has been provided to be availed by debtors in order to mitigate the disruption caused by the pandemic; operational creditors are not included in such capacity. It is to be noted that MSMEs have been considered to form a major part of operational creditors in the Indian economy. This, in all certainty, might lead to a high possibility of MSMEs not being able to invoke Section 9 of the Code even if the default reaches the minimum threshold of Rupees 1 crore that is prescribed, since Section 10A of the Ordinance has suspended initiation of CIRP during the disruption period. Furthermore, Section 10A in the Ordinance provides that “no application for insolvency can be filed for any default arising on or after 25th March 2020 for a period of six months or further extendable till

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WhatsApp Pay and Competition in India: A Cause for Concern?

[By Naga Sai Srikar] The author is a student at Christ (Deemed to be University), School of Law Introduction The Unified Payments Interface (UPI) has been India’s greatest achievement in the digital payments sector so far. It is no secret that the demonetization of banknotes announced by the Union Government on 8th November, 2016 acted as a great catalyst in promoting digital payments across the country. While large Peer-to-Peer (P2P) wallet providers such as Paytm, Freecharge, and Mobikwik were compelled to introduce UPI to their existing infrastructure owing to scalability and ease of use, others such as Phonepe and Google Pay went on to build their payment services solely on the UPI platform. Seeing this as a great opportunity, Facebook Inc. owned messaging giant WhatsApp too joined the bandwagon and demonstrated its intent to foray into the digital payments market. On 16th February, 2018 the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) which spearheaded the UPI granted an in-principle approval for WhatsApp’s pilot project.[i] According to the consent, WhatsApp could roll out UPI for a limited userbase of 1 million and with a stipulated per transaction limit. However in July, 2018 a legal think tank named Centre for Accountability and Systemic Change (CASC) filed a PIL before the Hon’ble Supreme Court stating that WhatsApp had failed to comply with the data localization rules notified by the RBI thereby violating the privacy of citizens.[ii] WhatsApp’s reluctance to comply finally came to a hold when the Supreme Court ordered RBI and NPCI to submit reports of compliance thereafter which WhatsApp assured the Court that they would comply to the data localization rules before rolling out their full-fledged payments feature.[iii] The latest order explicitly mentions – “It is made clear that there will be no stay of the proceedings with respect to the application of respondent No.3 (i.e. WhatsApp) by the Government, which shall be processed in accordance with law”[iv] indicating NPCI and RBI to go ahead with its regulatory approvals if conditions are met. Subsequently, it has been reported that the Competition Commission of India (CCI) has been reviewing antitrust complaints against WhatsApp Pay.[v] Therefore, a question arises as to whether the CCI would now knock the doors of WhatsApp? The Abuse of Dominance Conundrum A. Relevant Product Market Before delving into the discussion regarding the possible abuse of WhatsApp’s dominant position, the relevant market has to ascertained. In the instant case, it must be noted that WhatsApp which is predominantly an instant messaging application would enter the Digital Payments Market (offering only UPI initially) by enabling the said feature on its existing application. Thereby, WhatsApp is said to utilize its already existing userbase to push its digital payments presence. Taking into account factors such as interchangeability, characteristics of the product or service, their prices, consumer preferences and intended use as provided under Section 2(t) and Section 19(7) of the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act), two markets emanate for discussion. Firstly, the ‘Instant Messaging Services’ market. Although the focus is on WhatsApp’s payment feature, yet it is opined that WhatsApp’s primary market, i.e. instant messaging, has to be assessed in the instant case as the UPI feature (popularly called as WhatsApp Pay) is being added as an extension to its existing application. The second market that is relevant here is that of ‘Digital Payment Systems’ offering UPI as a feature. B. WhatsApp’s Scale of Dominance In the Instant Messaging market, WhatsApp holds 33.37% of global market share with more that 2 billion active users.[vi] Of this mammoth subscriber base, 400 million users are from India making it the largest market for WhatsApp.[vii] A study indicates that WhatsApp is installed on 95% of Android Devices and 75% of the users use the app on a daily basis in India.[viii] The statistics above clearly indicates WhatsApp as the market-leader and in a position to dominate. As far as the Digital Payment Systems market offering UPI as a feature is concerned, a leading payment gateway provider’s report indicates that Google Pay holds a market share of over 61% followed by PhonePe and PayTM with shares of 24% and 6% respectively.[ix] In terms of number of users, Google Pay boasts of 67 million active monthly users[x] followed by PhonePe with 55 million users. With an average of 790 million UPI transaction per month[xi] (as per data for January, 2019 to September, 2019), the addition of UPI feature onto its messaging platform would enable WhatsApp with a 400 million subscriber base to instantaneously penetrate into the payments market. Even the slightest translation of instant messaging users to the UPI feature would dent the other players in the market. Therefore, factors such as position of strength, operations independent of competitive forces and effect on its competitors in the relevant market is opined to be satisfied in the instant case and thus falls squarely within the ambit of “dominant position” as explained under Section 4 of the Act. C. The Abuse of Dominant Position Charge It well known that a market-player’s dominant position is not per se prohibited under the Act. However, the abuse of a player’s dominant position is prohibited. Section 4(2)(e) of the Act expressly states that – There shall be an abuse of dominant position if an enterprise or a group “uses its dominant position in one relevant market to enter into, or protect, other relevant market.” In the instant case, WhatsApp’s dominant position in the Instant Messaging Services market is being utilized to enter the payment services market, clearly violating the said provision. Similarly, Section 4(2)(c) of the Act categorizes practices resulting in denial of market access in any manner as an abuse of dominant position. It is opined that WhatsApp’s integration of UPI into its existing app forms a market denial practice since the user is incentivized to utilize the UPI feature without having to download additional applications. The mere fact of WhatsApp’s mammoth subscriber base would create a large network effect thereby affecting the already existing players in the market. Although there is

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