Author name: CBCL

Broadening Perspectives in the Age Of Digital Markets: The Need For a Renewed Approach

[By Srishti Suresh] The author is a student at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. Introduction In the context of digital platforms, the intricate and unique structure of two-sided models have confounded antitrust regulators’, in delineating the right approach of scrutiny to be adopted. Motivated to strike an optimum balance between excessive regulation and undervaluation of market effects, antitrust authorities have been rather skeptical in analyzing the complexity posed by such markets. In the Indian context, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) has often faltered in its approach in defining the “relevant” market. The right market definition assumes importance, as the legal bounds of a relevant market has a de facto fundamental consequence on the legal framework adopted by an antitrust regulator, in weighing the anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects. Understanding Two-Sided Market Platforms Two-sided markets are platforms, that serve two distinct groups of “customers” with interrelated cross demands. The interdependency between the two sides of the platform significantly reduces transaction costs that otherwise ensue, along with coordination costs.[i] Therefore, in a two-sided market platform, economic value and wealth creation cannot be created alone; economic value grows with the number of connections and options available across the two sides of the platform.[ii] Unless the two sides are ‘on board’, the platform entity cannot effectively thrive in a competitive market. For instance, Facebook connects retailers and advertisers with users, while payment apps such as Apple Pay and PayPal connect customers with merchants. These markets create value through such an interface. While this model appears seemingly innocuous, its complexity can be attributed to its indirect network effects. Indirect network effects are said to occur when the value created by one side of the platform, affects the value created on the other side of the market. The platform basically functions as a lucrative opportunity pool, catering to the needs of both groups of customers. In the case of digital platforms, with the help of advanced algorithms and filtering, companies are better equipped in ascertaining the immediate requirements of their customers. However, this advantageous network benefit also gives way to glaring asymmetric price structures.[iii] A two-sided market model differs from a traditional single-side one-group customer in this pricing aspect. A profit-maximizing two-sided model can choose to charge below marginal costs, or even a negative price for one side, while increasing the costs to the other side. Different groups can be charged different prices. Online networking platforms, search engines, dating websites, etc., offer free services to registered users, while charging higher fees to advertisers, merchants, and retailers. What attracts the supply side customers (despite higher costs) is the potential outreach to a large customer base. Defining the Relevant ‘Right’ Market Having mentioned the existence of two different sides to a platform, it is pertinent for regulators to recognize the same, while assessing the market power of the platform entity. In most cases investigating market dominance, merger inquiries, or assessment of entrenched market power, delineating the distinct markets actually involved is of fundamental importance. Market share is conventionally used as a proxy for market power.[iv] This holds true for single platforms. But this theory runs into difficulties when assessing two-sided platforms, where the pricing power and tactic used on each side depends on the degree of competition on both the sides. A true and informed market power determination relies on such a holistic assessment. However, authorities have adopted different approaches in understanding this market implication. India In Ashish Ahuja v. Snapdeal (2014), the CCI with reference to the retail market held, that “online and offline modes are just two different channels for the same product”. In All India Vendors’ Association v. Flipkart (2018), the Commission rejected the counsel’s request of defining two markets (B2C and B2B) and defined the market as “Services provided by online marketplace platforms for selling goods in India”. The two orders focus on the “product” approach. Regardless of the interdependence between different groups, as long as the two sides are transacting on the same product or service, it is deemed to be a “single” market. However, in Shri Vinod Kumar Gupta v. WhatsApp Inc., the CCI has drawn a distinction between online and offline modes of services offered by digital platforms. In light of their negative switching costs, multi-homing facilities, and lack of geographical barriers, the relevant market was defined as the “market for instant messaging services using consumer communication apps through smartphones”. As one can observe, there is a glaring inconsistency with the CCI’s approach in defining the relevant markets of two-sided platforms. The balancing of interests when a disparity of interests between the two sides arise, the CCI has offered no coherent reasoning in reaching its decisions. Moreover, under the Competition Act, 2002, Section 2(r) defines a relevant market as one that pertains either to the particular ‘product’ sold by an entity, or the specific geographical market in which an entity carries out its trade. Further, in defining the relevant market, the availability of substitutes and similar competitors plays a key role in influencing the regulator’s evaluation. However, this attenuated perspective of product and geographic definition remains oblivious to the network effects and interdependency between geographic and product markets that generally ensue in a digital two-sided platform. In platforms such as search engines and network-based payment applications, the customer outreach and motivations for participation, are not captured in the Section provided under the Act. For instance, in the recently approved Facebook/Jio Platforms acquisition, the interface between the telecommunication and social networking giant cannot be confined to a narrow product definition. The potential outreach and impact on different sectors and user groups, warrants a more thorough and delineated understanding of impacted markets. Only when these factors are considered, can the Commission define the “relevant” market and proceed to a market power assessment in the future. European Union The EC has recognized, that where more than one side exists to a market with interdependency and cross demands, certain additional questions arise. Most importantly, should the welfare of one side of users be aggregated

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The Blind Spot in Appellate Tribunal’s Jurisdiction Under the Competition Act, 2002

[By Sajith Anjickal] The author is a student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore. Introduction Section 53A of the Competition Act, 2002 (‘Act’) deals with the scope of the Appellate Tribunal’s power to hear appeals against directions issued, decisions made, or orders passed by the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’). In terms of the powers of the CCI under Section 26, Section 53A(1)(a) allows appeals only under two circumstances: (i) Section 26(2) – when the CCI is of the opinion that no prima facie case exists and passes an order to close the matter; and (ii) Section 26(6) – when the Director-General (‘DG’) finds no contravention and the CCI, agreeing with the DG, passes an order to close the matter. Orders passed under other subsections of Section 26 are not appealable. Thus, no appeal shall lie in circumstances wherein: (i) the CCI, after forming an opinion that a prima facie case exists, directs an investigation under Section 26(1); (ii) the DG finds no contravention but the CCI disagrees with the DG and directs further investigation/inquiry under Section 26(7); and (iii) the DG finds contravention and the CCI directs further inquiry under Section 26(8). This scope of appeal under Section 53A(1)(a) was clarified by the Supreme Court in Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India (‘SAIL’). However, ambiguity still exists with respect to circumstances wherein the DG finds contravention but the CCI disagrees with the DG and closes the matter. The Act does not account for orders made in this regard. Consequently, there is no clarity as to whether the CCI’s decision to close a matter, despite a finding of contravention by the DG, is appealable. Should closure orders, passed after a finding of contravention by the DG, be appealable? In the SAIL case, while justifying the scope of appeal under Section 53A(1)(a), the Supreme Court distinguished between the nature of orders passed by the CCI under sub-sections (2) or (6) of Section 26 and other sub-sections of Section 26. The Court held that, unlike the orders under other sub-sections, orders under sub-section (2) or (6) of Section 26 are final as they put an end to the proceedings initiated upon receiving the information. Such closure of proceedings, in the opinion of the Court, causes determination of rights and affects a party (the informant), and thus the said party must have a right to appeal against the closure of the case. This observation of the Supreme Court lends support to the view that the CCI’s decision to close matters, despite a finding of contravention by the DG, must be appealable. Such decisions, by putting an end to proceedings, determine rights and affect the informant(s) and thus there is no reason as to why they should not be appealable. Nevertheless, given that the right to appeal is a statutory right, the problem of maintainability arises as there is no statutory backing for appealing these decisions. Approach of the Appellate Tribunal The manner in which the Appellate Tribunal has dealt with the problem of maintainability has been confusing. On one hand, in some cases, the Appellate Tribunal has gone on to admit appeals by either ignoring or evading the problem altogether. For instance, in In Re: Deputy Chief Materials Manager, Rail Coach Factory, Kapurthala and M/s Faiveley Transport India Ltd and Anr, the DG submitted a report finding contravention. The CCI, however, passed an order closing the case on the ground that the DG’s findings were inadequate to confirm the contravention. The informant appealed to the Appellate Tribunal, which admitted the appeal without going into the question of maintainability.[i] Given that the CCI, in closing the matter, disagreed with the DG’s finding of contravention, it is apparent that the closure order does not fall within sub-sections (2) or (6) of Section 26. Thus, the Appellate Tribunal’s decision to admit the appeal, without providing any justification for the same, is problematic. Another instance is the Appellate Tribunal’s treatment of the appeal against the order in In Re: Sunil Bansal & Ors and M/s Jaiprakash Associates Ltd & Ors. In this case, the DG filed a report finding no contravention but the CCI disagreed and directed further investigation under Section 26(7). Pursuant to this direction, the DG filed a supplementary report finding contravention. The CCI, however, closed the case by discarding the findings recorded by the DG in the supplementary report and accepting the conclusions recorded in the initial report. The informant appealed against this decision of the CCI. The Appellate Tribunal admitted the appeal by noting that as the CCI accepted the DG’s initial finding of no contravention, its closure order fell within the ambit of Section 26(6).[ii] In doing so, however, the Appellate Tribunal conveniently ignored the fact that, in closing the matter, the CCI effectively disagreed with the DG’s finding of contravention in the supplementary report. On considering the CCI’s disagreement with the finding of contravention in the DG’s supplementary report, it becomes clear that the CCI’s closure order cannot be categorised as one falling within Section 26(6). On the other hand, in a few cases, the Appellate Tribunal has acknowledged the limitations in its appellate jurisdiction and dismissed appeals. For instance, in In Re: Saurabh Tripathy and Great Eastern Energy Corporation Ltd, the DG filed a report finding contravention but the CCI disagreed and passed an order to close the case. The informant appealed to the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal, however, dismissed the appeal noting that the present scheme of the Act did not empower it to admit appeals against such orders. [iii] Need for Legislative Action It is evident that legislative action is required to settle the problem of maintainability of appeals against closure orders passed subsequent to a finding of contravention by DG. Unfortunately, the recently proposed Draft Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2020 (‘Bill’) falls short of completely resolving the problem. The Bill seeks to incorporate Section 26(9) by virtue of which the CCI, upon completion of the investigation or inquiry under Sections 26(7)

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Bilateral Investment Treaty Between India and Brazil: A Dispute Prevention Mechanism

[By Arush Mittal] The author is a student at Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. Introduction India inked the Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Treaty with Brazil on 25th January, 2020. This treaty is a Bilateral Investment Treaty (‘BIT’) between the two countries. The signing of this treaty gathered a lot of deliberation as it contains a unique clause that uses the concept of ‘dispute prevention’ instead of the commonly known ‘dispute resolution’. This is India’s 4th and Brazil’s 10th bilateral investment treaty since these countries procured the Model BIT. Through this article, I have tried to analyze the features of this BIT and what it holds for India. Tracing the History of Indian BIT Model India signed its first-ever BIT with the United Kingdom in 1994 that laid emphasis on foreign investment; this treaty served as a base for India to ink several other BITs. This led India to sign more than 80 BITs and ratify over 70 treaties from the period of 1994 to 2011. India was ecstatic with the signing of the BITs until the upheaval due to the White Industries case. The ICC Tribunal had awarded USD 4.08 million to the White Industries as compensation since it was found that India had violated its obligation to provide ‘effective means’ of asserting claims to the investor; this provision was entailed in the Most-Favoured Nation (‘MFN’) clause of the India-Australia BIT. After this catastrophe, India underwent a sea-change towards the investment treaties. India scrapped BITs with 53 countries and signed only one BIT from the period of 2011-2015, with UAE. The inception of a new Model BIT was brought forward by the government of India in 2016 that became effective from 2017. Features of the Treaty in Brief The India-Brazil BIT is symbolic for a variety of reasons. The treaty neglects the widely known ‘investor-state’ dispute settlement (‘ISDS’) and promotes ‘state-to-state’ dispute settlement (‘SSDS’) with the primary focus on dispute prevention. It is also a south-south agreement between two large and growing countries as the nations have committed to cooperate in the field of cybersecurity, oil and natural gas, health and traditional medicine, science and technology, etc. Unlike other investment agreements, this treaty confers that no compensation can be awarded by a tribunal. However, it gets its encouragement from the WTO dispute settlement mechanism where it allows the tribunal to interpret the BIT. This treaty sets aside arbitration and yields for the settlement of disputes in an ‘amicable manner’ that would mainly involve mediation. A principal feature of this treaty is that the foreign investor cannot file a claim against the country where investment takes place, instead, the state to which the investor belongs, files the claim. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Vs. State-State Dispute Settlement The ISDS has been subjected to extensive criticism in the contemporary times. Some of the main reasons include the unpredictable nature of the interpretation of the standards by which the conflicting awards are protected; and the restriction placed by the system on the States’ regulatory freedom. Countries such as South Africa, India, and Brazil have rethought their long-followed approach recently and have led to various policy innovations. For example, Brazil follows a model of “Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements” that does not mention the ISDS model in any sense. Neither the Australia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement nor the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (has adopted the SSDS) allows the ISDS model. The SSDS is an alternative for the ISDS. The way States provide diplomatic protection, in a similar manner, the SSDS model protects the private investor. If an investor believes that a host state has committed a breach of the investment obligations, it can ask its home state to file a case of his/her behalf. The States also have the power to prevent controversial claims; this helps to assuage the fear of developing countries towards expensive lawsuits, as the home states would have considerations other than mere gains of its corporation. The Southern African Development Community amended its Finance and Investment Protocol to include the SSDS instead of the ISDS; and the Australia-China FTA added the filter of SSDS. In the India-Brazil BIT, Brazil justifies its proposal for the SSDS on the ground that it intends to avoid disputes. According to Brazil, the ISDS model involves excessive litigation that puts a constraint on the sovereignty of a state and has a negative impact on the developing states. It also believes that ISDS has the potential of terminating the relationship between the state and the foreign investor; which could easily be prevented if the States resort to mediation. Indian model BIT shows a traditional approach in this regard as it follows the ISDS model (in a restrictive manner). The provision of the Indian model BIT bars the investors from litigating the disputes in ISDS, as the issues decided by the Indian courts cannot be subject to arbitration and the investors must exhaust all local remedies to access arbitration. A Dispute Prevention Mechanism The India-Brazil BIT varies from the Indian BIT model. The India-Brazil BIT model retains features from the models of both the countries, attaining more inspiration from the BIT model of Brazil as it leads to the settlement of investment disputes by using a distinctive approach. This approach focuses on ‘prevention’ of the disputes, rather than settlement. Article 13 of the BIT between India and Brazil establishes the creation of a joint committee that comprises officials from both the countries, and this committee supervises the execution of the treaty, resolving the disputes in an ‘amicable manner’. Article 14 of the BIT talks about the creation of an ombudsman in Brazil and India that would follow the recommendations of the joint committee and therefore address the differences in the dispute. Article 18 establishes the dispute prevention mechanism. If a case arises where the joint committee is impotent to prevent the dispute, the matter is then referred to as the state-to-state dispute settlement procedure. Article 19 is responsible for the state-to-state dispute settlement. Article 19.2 clearly says that

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Competition Act and Limitation Act: Time for NCLAT to Adjust Its Blurry Vision?

[By Bhabya Mahapatra] The author is a student at Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. Introduction Section 53A of the Competition Act, 2002 (“the Act”) provides for an appellate body, i.e. the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”), to hear matters against the orders of the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”). On the other hand, article 226 of the Constitution of India empowers the High Courts to entertain writ petitions as original or appellate bodies. Notably, the Act nowhere bars this power of the High Court. In fact, the Supreme Court in its latest judgement[i] has held that the power of the High Court under article 226 cannot be taken away or abridged by any contrary provision in a statute. However, the NCLAT on 20th May, 2020 in the case of Maj. Pankaj Rai v. Secretary, CCI[ii] has held that a litigant cannot approach any High Court to appeal against the orders of CCI when the Act specifically provides for a forum for that purpose. Although, the judgement has also shed light on the standard of review in condonation of delay in filing an appeal in competition matters, a subject that has been touched upon less as opposed to the standard of condonation of delay falling under the purview of the Limitation Act, 1963. This article will try to discuss on what grounds the NCLAT might have erred, in deciding the above-mentioned case. Background of the case The Informants had raised concerns under ss. 3 & 4 of the Act before the CCI against NIIT Limited, New Delhi, offering computer education/ training services. The Informants being the franchisees of the Opposite Party, i.e. NIIT (“OP”), alleged that the OP was abusing its dominant position through its franchise agreements and indulging in anti-competitive practices. The CCI therein, after taking all factors into consideration, reached the conclusion that the OP faced competition from similarly placed players in the market, and thereby it couldn’t be categorically concluded that the OP held a dominant position in the relevant market. Such observations were enough to rule in favour of the OP. Interestingly, the appellant Mr. Pankaj Rai opted to appeal against this order of the CCI through a writ petition before the High Court of Telangana, contesting that the order was obtained by fraud. Notably, this point was contested by the appellant on the ground that it was because of the intervention of the advocate for the Respondent, i.e. Mr. Vinod Dhall, who previously served as the Chairperson of the CCI, that an order in favour of the Respondent could be obtained, hence claiming that the order was fraudulently obtained. Noteworthy herein is that the High Court rejected the writ petition of the appellant holding that Mr. Rai should have approached the NCLAT instead of the High Court, on the basis that the Act provides for the remedy of appeal under s. 53A before the NCLAT. After a failed appeal before a Division Bench of the Telangana High Court, and retracting a review petition before the Supreme Court, the appellant after a period of 768 days (emphasis added) filed an appeal against the impugned order of CCI before the NCLAT. Judgement NCLAT referred to the case of Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India[iii] to shed light on the ratio that whenever a statutory remedy is available, the aggrieved party cannot be allowed to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court instead. Hence, in the view of NCLAT, the litigant should have approached NCLAT, as has been provided under the Act (s. 53A). It went on to rule that a litigant aggrieved by the order of CCI cannot be allowed to choose the remedies, under the pretext of the order being against the principles of natural justice. If such a course is allowed, it would lead to forum shopping. To understand the next part of the judgement, a reading of s. 53B(2) of the Act is required. It reads: “Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of sixty days… Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of sixty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.” 5 of the Limitation Act uses similar wordings: “..Any appeal or any application … may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” The NCLAT after considering this similarity, relied on the case of Geeta Kapoor v. Competition Commission of India[iv]  and held that if the ratio of the cases used in interpreting “sufficient cause” under s. 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 are also used to interpret “sufficient cause” under s. 53B(2) of the Act, the purpose of providing a different limitation period under the Act would be defeated, and hence by extension, the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 stand excluded in proceedings governed by the Competition Act, 2002. Based on the abovementioned points, NCLAT held that there was no “sufficient cause”, as provided under the proviso of s. 53B(2), for it to condone the delay of filing the appeal after the expiry of 60 days. Moreover, a delay of 768 days was also held to be unreasonable. Hence, the NCLAT conclusively decided that there existed no substantial grounds to admit the appeal beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Analysis of the judgement It is noteworthy herein that the two reasons attributed to the delay in filing the appeal under the NCLAT by the appellant were: (i) The geographical vicinity of the High Court of Telangana, as opposed to Delhi, as the appellant was a resident of Hyderabad; (ii) The claim of the order of CCI being obtained fraudulently, allowing the appellant to file a writ petition under any High Court. The author firmly believes that these two grounds could have been construed by the NCLAT to establish “sufficient cause” as

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The Interface Between IBC and Foreign Investment Instruments

[By Palak Mohta] The author is a student at ILS Law College, Pune. One of the key determining factors of economic growth for a country is the inflow of foreign investments. Although, there are specialized boards and tranches to handle the intricacies of such foreign investments, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC or the Code) inevitably forms part of the play. This write-up discusses a recent order of NCLT which categorized compulsorily convertible debentures as ‘debt’. Additionally, it discusses the recently developed borrowing route for foreign investment- External Commercial Borrowings (ECBs) and analyses how IBC and ECB complement each other. The Case of Compulsorily Convertible Debentures A pertinent question that arises while taking into account whether a particular investment falls under the purview of IBC, is, whether such an investment is debt or equity. The air on whether foreign investments via FDI route are to be treated as debt or equity has been cleared by the NCLT. The NCLT, vide order dated, 31st January, 2020 has held the view that Fully and Compulsorily Convertible Debentures (FCCD) are to be construed as ‘debt’ if, at the time of application of Corporate Insolvency, such instrument is yet to reach maturity date. The order was passed while considering the application made by Financial Creditor, Ziasess Ventures Limited (Ziasess) in a principal matter of SGM Webtech Pvt. Ltd. v Boulevard Projects Pvt. Ltd. Initially, the Resolution Professional (RP) rejected Financial creditor’s claim on grounds that, as per provisions of FEMA, 1999 and allied regulations, the aforementioned instrument in question, falls under the ambit of ‘equity’ and not ‘debt’, thereby not affording Ziasess the status of a financial creditor. The decision of RP was challenged by Ziasess and appeal was filed before the NCLT (Principal Bench). The tribunal quashed the decision of RP on several grounds, inter alia, unconverted debentures to be considered as a debt instrument, there is no ambiguity as to the inclusion of debentures as ‘financial debt’ under section 5(8) definition and overriding effect of IBC over other laws and regulations such as the FEMA.[i] Overriding Effect of the IBC:  Section 238, IBC clearly states that the Code shall have an overriding effect on all other laws for the time being in force. This provision has stirred up many conflicting views on part of NCLT and Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI). It has time and again, come up for consideration, and been held that the Code shall have an overriding effect on SEBI Rules and Regulations as well.[ii] The Hon’ble Supreme Court has upheld the overriding effect of IBC, over the Income Tax Act,[iii] Tea Act, 1953[iv], etc. The rationale behind the same is certainly to ensure the smooth functioning of the IBC without any hindrances that may be caused due to inconsistencies between two laws. It must, therefore, be borne in mind that such an overriding effect only pertains to situations when there is any inconsistency between two applicable laws. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to observe the legal maxim, ‘leges posteriores priores contraries abrogant’ which implies that when the non-obstante clause forms part of both the special laws, such law which was enacted later, chronologically, shall override the former.[v] The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s final decision in the matter of SEBI v. Rohit Sehgal & Ors. is awaited, wherein the SEBI has preferred an appeal against NCLT and NCLAT order, authorizing overriding effect of IBC over SEBI.[vi] This decision might settle the tussle between IBC and SEBI. External Commercial Borrowings Foreign investment can be in various forms such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), commercial loans, official flows, etc. One other such route of international investment is via External Commercial Borrowings (ECB). It is governed by RBI under the Master Directions- External Commercial Borrowings, Trade Credits and Structured Obligations[vii] (Master Directions). While the key intricacies of such foreign investment inclines towards investment activities, this write-up aims to highlight its interplay with the IBC regime. Stressed Assets: A key aspect of the resolution process under the IBC is to secure a revival of the Corporate Debtor (CD). A resolution plan is laid out by resolution applicants and approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) as it suits their interests. In 2019, the RBI has afforded a new avenue for resolution applicants and the CoC. The RBI has rationalized ECB norms and permitted borrowing via approval route from approved foreign entities/lenders for repayment domestically availed rupee loans. On the precondition that if such borrowing is permitted by the Resolution Plan, an eligible corporate borrower can avail loan to repay and revive itself. Therefore, such debt instruments can not only be used to raise capital and finances by eligible Indian companies, but can also aid the process of bidding on stressed assets. The liberal approach of RBI in structuring regulations for ECBs provides a wide window for investment via the ECB route. It is noteworthy to mention that the eligible borrower has to comply with all the conditions of raising funds via the ECB framework i.e. Minimum Average Maturity Period (MAMP), all-in cost, end-uses, exchange rate, and other such provisions while raising funds as a CD as well. Additionally, oversea branches or subsidiaries of Indian banks do not constitute to be approved lenders for the purposes of this scheme. Investor as Financial Creditor: ECBs are loans sanctioned by approved lenders to eligible resident borrower entities. Such loans can be in the form of debentures, bonds, floating/fixed-rate notes, etc. and FCY or INR denominated. Section 5(8) of the Code, categorically recognizes loans and the aforementioned credit availing instruments as ‘financial debt’. Such classification secures the foreign entity, the right to file insolvency petition under section 7 as a financial creditor against the defaulting borrower. Moreover, the robust IBC regime has facilitated, to a great extent, ease of doing business in India.[viii] The time-bound resolution mechanism enables the disbursement of dues in a prompt manner, thereby ensuring a secured position to the creditors. It is pertinent to mention

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Hinged Upon Conjectures: A Meticulous Study of WhatsApp Leak Case

[By Lakshya Garg and Vimlendu Agarwal] The authors are students at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Background The social media platform is an all-pervading phenomenon[i] and despite of the developments that this platform has brought by providing easy access to the information it has still paved way for exploitation of the confidential information[ii]. This article, in pursuance of the objective to demystify the peculiarities in the Shruti Vishal Vora Case, is an attempt to discuss the SEBI’s Order No. Order/BD/NR/2020-21/7591-7592[iii]dated 29.04.2020 as it holds a lot of conjectures within itself. While pinning our hopes for a robust security law regime in conjunction with well-established data privacy laws the article constructively criticizes the Securities Appellate Tribunal’s (SAT) decision to penalize a person for releasing unpublished price sensitive information related to the financial result of a Company along with the challenges faced throughout the pronouncement. Factual Matrix The said case concerns itself with the circulation of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (hereinafter referred as “UPSI”) [regulation 2 (n) of SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015] through WhatsApp (group) Messages revealing sensitive information about big shot companies such as Ambuja Cement Ltd. Section 3 (1) of SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015[4]prohibits communication or procurement of unpublished price sensitive information, relating to a company or security listed or proposal to be listed, to any person including other insiders except where such communications is in furtherance of legitimate purpose, the performance of duties or discharge of legal obligations. The eccentricity lies in the fact that to scrutinize similarities with the 3rd financial quarter results 2016-17 and the propagated information- about 190 devices, records, etc. were seized. To one’s surprise, the derived information closely matched with the messages circulated in WhatsApp group chats (retrieved from Shruti Vora’s device). The said Notice argued the information to be “Heard On The Street” in its defense. However, as per SEBI the mentioned figures were too accurate to be considered as estimates and held that the numbers can’t be associated with any brokerage or internal research. Hence Shruti Vora and Neeraj Kumar Agarwal both were considered as insiders and were penalized with 15 Lakh rupees each under Section 15G, 12A (d) & 12A (e) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992[5]for possessing and communicating unpublished price-sensitive information. Lacunae In The Method Of Investigation The method used to declare someone guilty of “insider-trading”[6]was quite simple in this case. The investigation authority looked for the information that was circulated through the WhatsApp groups and then compared it to the final declaration made by the company. However, while following the said procedure, the investigation authority faulted in the following: Due to technological restrictions, it was unable to establish the source of the information, thereby solving a case while covered with a blindfold. It didn’t focus on the possibility that the accused might have not known the information to be UPSI, thereby making the whole case an ignorance of facts. It failed to establish the thought-process that the accused might have while circulating the information. If he/she believed it to be a genuine result of market study then the whole case becomes a formality. For instance, the Bata order[7]wherein the Adjudicating officer acknowledged the communication of UPSI ahead of their official announcements but ruled out the fact that being financial analyst, brokerage firms often keep a close trace on a wide range of determining factors and are repeatedly accurate in accomplishing close estimates and figures. HOS V UPSI: The “Heard On The Street” Mockery The major argument contended in these cases was basically an attempt to prove the information that was circulated is an unsubstantiated gossip that was forwarded as a rumor or a general approximation. It further argued that these kinds of speculations are common parlances that were majorly based on financial modeling, management guidance, meetings with the management, and the other global factors. Likewise, HOS being a global formula was applied by the entire trading and investor community in the instant case to plan trades. An analysis of SEBI orders in the recent cases, solves the enigma of the information belonging to the category of UPSI as it mentions: The information was available in a closed chain group instead of being available to the public at large The information was not a result of any market research or publicly available data. Moreover, the ignorance pleaded by the market professionals regarding the nature and materiality of information is ignorance of law. The suspicion should have aroused when the information available matched with the announced result and hence should have been duly reported. Scrutinizing The SEBI Orders The basic questions such as ‘who is an insider (Section 2 (1)(g) of SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015)’[9] or ‘what is UPSI’[11]: The subsequent announcements made should be the result of the leaked information. However, the inability to trace back the source is irrelevant in determining whether such information was UPSI. The evidence could not lead to the fact that the purported UPSI was a product of the field-based market information which is non-discriminately available in the public domain. The accused was a financially literate person who was well aware of the functioning of the securities market. Regardless of this, they were an instrument in the “chain of communication”. No alarm was raised by the accused, even when they found out that the circulated information matched the announced results accurately. When the SEBI applied the above facts to the settled legal positions, it found that accused were the insiders and the information was undoubtedly ‘UPSI’. In the end, the gist of the matter was the nature, possession, and a pattern of circulation of information. The Intricacy Of The Investigation: In various domains of law, we often observe an intersection between private rights of an individual and the decision making for the public interest at large[12] (in this case the investors). This creates a scenario where one cannot be achieved without disturbing the other. A similar encounter could be seen

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KMB v RBI: A Summary of a Decade Old Battle Over Ownership of Private Banks

[By Rohan Aneja] The author is a student at Rizvi Law College, Mumbai The Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) issued Guidelines for the entry of new banks in the Private Sector dated January 3, 2001 (“2001 Guidelines”) which required promoter contribution to be a minimum of 40% of the paid-up capital of the bank at any point of time with a 5 year lock-in period from the date of license; any excess of 40% had to be diluted within 1 year of commencing operations. The RBI revised the minimum promoter shareholding to 49% vide notification dated June 7, 2002. Pursuant to these guidelines, Kotak Mahindra Bank (“KMB”) was issued its license on February 6, 2003, with its promoter stake at 49%. Regulatory Dispute It is after this point that the RBI issue the Ownership and Governance Guidelines dated February 28, 2005, which capped the shareholding of any single / group of related entities to 10% of the paid-up capital and required any existing entity holding more than 10%. This was done to indicate a timetable for the reduction of the holding to the permissible level. KMB was asked to comply with the guidelines and it disputed the same on the grounds that it was contrary to the terms on which KMB’s license was granted. After several correspondences, KMB accepted RBI’s proposed timeline to reduce the promoter stake. Meanwhile, the RBI issued the revised Ownership and Governance Guidelines dated February 23, 2013 (“2013 Guidelines”) which provided that Promoter / Promoter Group will be permitted to set up a bank only through a wholly-owned Non-Operative Financial Holding Company (“NOFHC”). The restrictions on ownership were 40% of the total paid-up voting equity capital with a 5-year lock-in period, followed by a reduction of 20% within 10 years and 15% within 12 years from the commencement of operations. The RBI has also issued a Master Direction on Ownership in Private Sector Banks dated May 12, 2016, which permitted promoter/promoter group of all existing banks, shareholding in line with what has been permitted in 2013 Guidelines on licensing of universal banks, which is 15%. In 2016, KMB refused to comply with the above timeline since it merged with ING Vysya Bank, whereby its promoter shareholding reduced to 33.6%. Thus, the RBI extended the timeline to achieve a 30% reduction by June 30, 2017, 20% by December 31, 2018, and 15% by March 31, 2020. Issue of PNCPS On August 2, 2018, KMB, in an attempt to circumvent the RBI Guidelines, issued perpetual non-cumulative preference shares (“PNCPS”) worth INR 500 crore with a dividend of 8.10%, at which point its promoter shareholding which stood at 30% would be reduced to 19.7%.  The issue was pursuant to the Master Circular on Basel III Capital Regulations dated July 1, 2015, which classify PNCPS as Additional Tier 1 Capital that does not have any put options but does have a call option after 5 years with RBI approval. Thus, assuming the equity base remains the same after 5 years and KMB decided to use the call option, the promoter stake would revert to 30%. The purpose of diluting the promoter shareholding to 15% was to avoid concentration of control with the promoters and as such the issue of PNCPS did not meet the promoter holding dilution requirement. KMB argued that the shares were perpetual, non-convertible, non-redeemable preference shares which do not carry any voting rights and are non-cumulative, essentially a mid-way between debt and equity. Moreover, KMB obtained RBI permission to amend its Memorandum and Articles to issue the PNCPS. Legal Dispute and Settlement The RBI issued a Show Cause Notice (“SCN”) dated October 29, 2018, to KMB on the grounds that KMB has not submitted a proposed plan for reducing the promoter shareholding as per the timelines. KMB replied to the SCN vide letter dated November 2, 2018, stating that it is without jurisdiction and not maintainable in law. On December 10, 2018, KMB filed a Writ Petition against the RBI before the Bombay High Court challenging the SCN as well as the restrictions on promoter shareholding, contending that the terms on which the license was granted cannot be altered and any changes in the Guidelines run prospectively. KMB withdrew the Writ Petition on January 30, 2020. KMB and the RBI reached a settlement whereby the promoters voting rights will be capped at 20% of paid-up voting equity share capital until March 31, 2020, and at 15% from April 1, 2020, which aligns with the 2013 Guidelines as well as Section 12(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (“BR Act”). Further, promoter shareholding would be diluted to 26% within 6 months and promoters will not purchase any further paid-up voting equity shares till the percentage of promoters’ shareholding reaches 15% or such higher percentage as the RBI may then permit. On June 2, 2020, Uday Kotak sold 56 million shares held by him in KMB for INR 6,900 crore through a block deal which reduced his stake from 28.93% to 26.1%. This leaves a dilution of the excess 0.01% stake to comply with the settlement. Conclusion Although the issue of PNCPS was well within the bounds of the RBI Guidelines and Section 12(1)(ii)(b) of the BR Act, it violated their spirit as the promoter control over KMB would not be effectively reduced. In the SCN, the RBI could only challenge the issue of PNCPS without submitting the roadmap to RBI, and not the issue itself. If KMB succeeded before the Bombay High Court, the RBI would have likely challenged the circumvention of the Guidelines before the Supreme Court. Thus, the cap of 15% on promoter voting rights and the dilution of Uday Kotak’s stake to 26% was an acceptable compromise.

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Google’s Unfair Trade Practices: A Cause for Action

[By Arjun Nayyar and Jayadeep Manchikalapudi]  The authors are students at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad and Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur, respectively. Setting the Context Recently, allegations over Google’s actions have brought it under the scrutiny of the Competition Commission of India.[i] With an appeal against a previous anti-trust order still pending in the Apex court, the internet giant has been flagged this time for promoting its payment app Google Pay unfairly through the Google Play Store.[ii] This method allegedly utilises search manipulation, a practice that Google has been accused of in the past.[iii]Such manipulation of search results enables Google’s vertical payment partner to appear predominantly when searching for payment apps from the GooglePlay Store. This is a textbook case of an enterprise leveraging dominance in one relevant market to enter into or protect its product in another relevant market; a practice that is expressly proscribed under Section 4(2) of the Competition Act of 2002.[iv]However, such instances of anti-trust complaints are not limited to Google, with accusations being leveled against other internet giants as well. Apple also faced a similar issue recently, when Spotify filed an official complaint with the European Union against the discriminatory pricing policy adopted by the company’s App Store between Apple music and other music streaming services.[v] Both Apple and Google essentially have a dual role as a platform: They distribute their own apps (such as Apple Music and Youtube) on their app stores (App Store and Google Play Store respectively); and They provide a platform for apps where third-party app developers offer their products and services directly to users. Most of the complaints deal with the abuse of this dual role, whereby the powerful enterprises attempt to leverage their dominant position in an upstream market (here, the platform) via favoring their downstream division (the apps). This is done at the cost of the competitors in said downstream market, using pre-existing affluence in one market to bolster the success in another. For a complaint dealing with the abuse of dominance, the establishment of three things is necessary, which are: Proving the market is a relevant one(comprising of relevant product); The enterprise occupies a dominant position (using factors mentioned under Section19(4) of the Competition Act)[vi]; and The conduct amounts to an abuse of said dominant position. Relevant Market The test for determining the relevance of a market is elucidated in Section 2(r) of the Competition Act[vii] and is based on the products and/or services, along with the location at which these are provided. In the present complaint against Google, the appropriate relevant market would be the market for app stores for android mobile operating systems. This was established in the matter of Umar Javeed v. Google LLC,[viii] through which the Competition Commission of India listed a number of different app stores available for Google Android devices. These include the Play Store, the Amazon AppStore, Samsung’s Galaxy Apps store, Aptoide, the Opera Software ASA’s Mobile Store, and the Yandex Store. The Commission concluded that these different app stores for Google Android devices (“Google Android app stores”) belong to the same product market. Dominant Position While different app stores do exist in the market for android mobile operating systems, Google is the distinguished leader. The Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM)conducted a market study of mobile app stores, with the twofold goal of understanding how app developers get their products in app stores, and the influence which these stores have on the selection of apps for the users.[ix]It concluded that the Apple App Store and Google Play Store have their “app-ecosystems” closed by design, leaving virtually no feasible app stores as alternatives within either of these ecosystems. This was reiterated by the EU Anti-trust regulator, stating Google clearly is a dominant player with over 90% of market share in a high entry barrier market.[x] Abusive Conduct If a firm holds a dominant position, it has a special responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not impair genuine and undistorted competition in the common market. This was established as a standard in the EU as early as 1983,[xi] and was extended by the Competition Commission of India to include online platforms and digital markets in Fast Track Call Cab Pvt Ltd v. ANI Technologies Pvt Ltd.[xii] Assuming the alleged conduct of Google to be true, a question arises as to whether the act of promoting its own app over others amounts to abuse under the Act. The answer lies in the regulatory stance adopted by the Competition Commission of India. The emphasis under section 4(1) of the Act[xiii] is on “abuse”, though the word itself has not been defined under the Act, with the legislature wisely choosing to leave it open to be interpreted on a case-to-case basis. Having said this, the Government of India in 1999 constituted a high-level committee led by Mr. SVS Raghavan to suggest changes to Competition Law framework in the country in order to bring it at par with the advanced international standard. In its report, the committee elaborated on the meaning of “abuse”, stating that “discriminatory behaviour and any other exercise of market power leading to the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition would obviously be included in the definition of abuse”.[xiv] In the present complaint, Google’s conduct of using its platform to promote its own payment app over others duly qualifies as discriminatory behaviour, thus falling under the definition of abuse under the Competition Act. The Lack of Possible Defences As per accepted EU law,[xv] there is no threshold for the purpose of determining abuse of a dominant position, as the mere misuse of the same is not justified. Moreover, the only defence available under the Competition Actis to prove the abuse by other market players, which is not the case in the present complaint. Also, the dominant enterprise in the first market need not possess a dominant market position in the second market. The Competition Act does not necessitate a high degree of associational link between the market in which a dominant

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Break Fee Agreements in M&A: Regulatory Challenges

[By Aniket Singh and Pranav Mihir Kandada] The authors are students at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. Introduction In M&A transactions, a “break fee” agreement is an arrangement between the target company and the potential acquirer. In this arrangement, the target company promises to pay a certain fee to the potential acquirer in case the offer from the acquirer does not go through for any given reason. Such agreements are often looked upon favorably as beneficial deal-protection devices.  However, the quantum of the break fee is regulated in several jurisdictions through varying approaches. This article seeks to explain the concerns associated with break fee arrangements and examine how various jurisdictions regulate it. Uses and Concerns For target companies and stockholders, a break fee arrangement can induce competition between the bidders. By assuring potential acquirers that they will be compensated for various costs undertaken prior to effectuating a transaction (identification and assessment of the target, fees for due diligence, etc.), a break fee would encourage bidders to spend on such assessments and make better bids. As potential acquirers are now assured of compensation for their efforts, more of them can enter the fray thereby increasing competition and providing better options to the shareholders. In this manner, break fees facilitate M&A transactions. However, break fees are deal protection devices that invariably function by preferring one bidder over the other. Although a break fee’s impact on the net asset base of the company is negligible, it could potentially wipe out the annual revenue of the target. This would make the target less attractive to subsequent bidders. Hence, a high break fee could serve to reduce competition. Further, a high break fee amount could constrain shareholder choices. Shareholders are coerced when they are forced to vote for transactions backed by the management. A vote would be structurally coercive when the directors “have created a situation where a vote may be said to be in avoidance of a detriment created by the structure of the transaction … rather than a free choice to accept or reject the proposition voted on.” When a high break fee amount assured by the management is disclosed to the shareholders, the shareholders get to know the exact cost to be borne if the merger does not go through. Voting against such a proposition becomes unviable and costly for the shareholder. Thus, a higher break fee empowers the company’s management to influence voting. Despite this influence, it is contentious whether a break fee arrangement is structurally coercive. In Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court stated that mere knowledge that voting against the merger would result in activation of the fee does not by itself constitute shareholder coercion. Further, the arrangement would not be coercive, as the shareholders would only vote against the merger in favour of a better price from another bidder. In the Indian context, however, this reasoning may not be applicable given the minority shareholders who would remain in the company with diminished value due to activation of the break fee. How US Deals With Break Fees A characteristic feature of the shareholding in US is its dispersed nature. Due to this feature, the board and management act as agents for the shareholders and are empowered to take various decisions, which determine the outcome of an offer. They have to make these decisions in light of the interest of the company and owe duties of care and loyalty to the shareholders. The Delaware jurisdiction has especially favoured the exercise of such powers by the management. Further regulation has also been developed in such a manner. The various standards of review in the US should not be readily applied in other jurisdictions because the nature shareholding in many jurisdictions is concentrated and not dispersed (e.g., the jurisdictions of India, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and China). These jurisdictions have adopted the rule of Board Neutrality, which finds its origin in the UK. The Board Neutrality Rule makes the shareholders and not the management of the primary decision-makers regarding an offer. The management has little to no leeway to enter into deal protection devices once an offer is made. Only with prior approval of the shareholders, can the management undertake any such act. A judgment rule, which is predicated on management’s freedom and power to take decisions without shareholder approval, would hardly make sense in these jurisdictions. How the UK and Most Asian Countries deal with Break Fee The UK in furtherance of its board neutrality rule provides for a de minimis limit to deal with break fees. A de minimis limit is the standard percentage value of transaction value against which all break fees are adjudged (1% in the case of UK). Apart from the UK, de minimis limits are now an accepted standard in jurisdictions of Australia, Hong Kong, etc. However, de minimis limits have multiple issues. Firstly, they favor rigidity and certainty over flexibility. Even though certainty leads to a more predictable market, flexibility allows managers to structure the fee to custom-fit the specific conditions their companies face.  Secondly, given the dual nature of break fees as inductive as well as anti-competitive, the quantitative standard of a de minimis limit would not be ideal to distinguish and adjudge the permissibility of such arrangement. These concerns have been raised in multiple jurisdictions. The Australian Business Community has argued that a target might have to go beyond a de minimis limit considering the various specific circumstances an enterprise might face. The reason for not using a de minimis limit in the US was held to be along the same lines. The Delaware Chancery Court in In re IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation held that a break fee arrangement must be judged by evaluation of the entire agreement and the terms of negotiation that brought it about. Regulation in Asia Importing de minimis limits to Asia would be contrary to the purpose for which they were introduced in the UK.  The de minimis limit is part of the larger

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