Author name: CBCL

Sebi Rewrites Startup Playbook: Esops, Convertible Exits, Angel Funds

[By Ayushika Sinha] The author is a student of Symbiosis Law School, Pune. Introduction India’s IPO market in 2025 has shown remarkable resilience despite global uncertainties, with 108 IPO deals raising $4.6 billion in the first half of the year and a surge expected in the second half. A key factor is the trend of reverse flipping where startups are redomiciling their holding companies from overseas jurisdictions back to India. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) held its 210th board meeting on 18 June 2025, following the public consultation undertaken in March 2025 introduced changes to simplify the IPO path in India’s maturing capital markets. This article examines SEBI’s recent regulatory overhaul to accelerate startup listings and ease capital flows. It focuses on three areas, including ESOP retention for founders, OFS eligibility for converted securities and accreditation under the AIF regime. While the reforms strengthen India’s position as a global innovation hub, the article critically examines both the opportunities and challenges it poses. Catalyzing Innovation: SEBI’s Bold Steps Firstly, SEBI approved a proposal for founders to retain Employee Stock Options (“ESOPs”) even after being designated as promoters and the company becoming a listed entity. It addressed the ambiguity of ‘one year look back period’ surrounding the proposed amendment on March 20, 2025, clarifying that now for retaining ESOPs must be granted at least one year prior to the filing of Draft Red Herring Prospectus (“DRHP”). Secondly, it has clarified regulation regarding investors holding Compulsorily Convertible Securities (“CCS”) under an approved scheme. According to previous guidelines such investors were subject to wait for at least a year following the IPO before selling their equity in the OFS. With the revised norms, SEBI has now permitted equity shares arising from converted CCS to be included in the OFS. Additionally, certain non-promoters (AIFs, FV, insurance companies, etc) can contribute converted shares towards the Minimum Promoter Contribution (“MPC”). Thirdly, SEBI mandated accreditation of all investors in Angel Funds without the requirement of a minimum investment threshold and will be conducted by SEBI-recognized agencies based on their financial strength and risk appetite. Under the new framework, an investor must meet one criterion: annual income exceeding ₹2 crore, annual income above ₹1 crore and a  net worth exceeding ₹5 crore (including at least ₹2.5 crore in financial assets), or a net worth exceeding ₹7.5 crore (including at least ₹3.75 crore in financial assets), replacing the earlier qualification based on net tangible assets of ₹2 crore, experience-based eligibility and a minimum ₹25 lakh investment. Lastly, Accredited investors (AIs) will be treated as “Qualified Institutional Buyers” (QIBs) solely for investments in angel funds pursuant to consultation paper issued on February 21, 2025. This circumvents the 200-investor cap imposed under Section 42(2) of the Companies Act, 2013. Decoding the Reforms This development has been welcomed across the startup ecosystem as it resolves regulatory hurdles ensuring that provision including amendments allowing startup founders to retain ESOP post-IPO under the SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021, exemptions for equity converted from CCS from open offer requirement under Regulation 10(1)(d)(ii) of the SEBI Takeover Regulations and facilitation of accreditation of investors for participation under the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 to incentivize long-term commitment rather than short-term structuring From a market standpoint, the reform will accelerate the IPO pipeline by making the public listing process more founder and investor friendly and reducing key deterrents such as ESOP forfeitures, compliance of heavy cap tables, delayed exits due to OFS and CCS restrictions and accredition hurdles for early investors for domestic IPO for high growth startups. The regulatory shift modernizes capital markets and attracts more startups to Indian exchanges in the current increase of volume of startups preparing for IPOs in India, especially companies like PhonePe, Zepto and Pine Labs.. ESOP Retention: Previously, SEBI listing rules made no distinction between traditional promoters and startup founders barring both from holding ESOPs once made public. Under Rule 12 of the Companies (Share Capital and Debenture) Rules, 2014, and Regulation 2(1)(i) of SEBI (Shared Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021 promoters are not considered employees and thus cannot receive ESOPs, except in the case of startups within 10 years of incorporation. However, under Section 62(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013 and ICDR norms, founders are reclassified as promoters upon DRHP filing, As promoters they are no longer considered employees making them ineligible to hold ESOPs creating confusion and forcing them to forfeit ESOPs before an IPO.. This regulatory conflict hindered founders of startups because they often earned lower salaries depending upon ESOPs after equity dilution. This would happen across multiple fundraising rounds, especially in tech-driven startups. This forced many to rework their cap tables ahead of IPO just to maintain eligibility increasing complexity and uncertainty for deferred compensation. The recent approval aims to protect legitimate remuneration preventing regulatory misuse. The change enables founders to maintain their ESOPs post-listing aligning their incentives with the long-term performance of the company and remaining committed post-IPO. Although through new rules existing ESOPs can be retained, there are still no provisions for granting ESOPs post-IPO. Such limitation discourages long term incentives to promoters resulting in further dilution of their ownership with each new issuance. Approval of fresh ESOPs grants after listing would therefore provide greater protection and incentive for founders. Furthermore, critics also argue from a corporate governance standpoint that this can lead to double dipping wherein promoters already benefit from control, voting rights, Dual-class shares and often sweat equity (Section 54 of the Companies Act, 2013). This change will allow them to retain from employee-focused ESOPs creating conflict of interest. As it will enable promoters to extract disproportionate wealth at the expense of minority shareholders and prioritizing personal gains over company performance. For example, ESOPs could allow promoters profit from stock price appreciation driven by their strategic decisions along with their existing control potentially leading to self-benefitting actions such as inflating valuations or delaying exits to maximize ESOP gains. These may

Sebi Rewrites Startup Playbook: Esops, Convertible Exits, Angel Funds Read More »

From Offshore Shadows to Onshore Spotlight: Decoding RBI’s 2025 ETP Playbook

[By Ayushman Shrivastava] The author is a student of Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur Introduction In July 2025, the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) issued its Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Electronic Trading Platforms) Directions, 2025 (“2025 Master Directions”), replacing the 2018 framework and the earlier 2024 draft. At its heart, this latest framework signals a decisive pivot: steering ETP activity firmly onshore. The RBI’s rationale is twofold. First, by bringing more trading within domestic regulation, it seeks to enhance transparency, prevent market abuse and strengthen risk controls—goals first signalled in its 2017 Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies.           Some of the key procedural refinements include scrapping the two-stage in principle approval (a six‑to‑twelve‑month preliminary hurdle) and shifting applications to the RBI’s PRAVAAH portal. Yet beneath this aim for efficiency lies a more stringent regime at its core. Banks and primary dealers enjoy an exemption but still remain subject to the RBI’s discretionary mandates. While the regulator’s Alert List has expanded, due diligence has been strengthened through cross-agency information-sharing, and selective licensing is now established as a “will” rather than a “may”. That is to say, where previous drafts implied the RBI would be at liberty to exercise discretion in determining who would be authorized to carry on ETPs, the 2025 Master Directions leave no doubt that the RBI will be selective.  Code, Compliance, and Control: RBI’s Stepwise Redesign of ETP Norms (2017–2025) India’s journey to regulate Electronic Trading Platforms (ETPs) is not just a chronological evolution, but also a systematic tightening of regulatory precision and technological scrutiny.. Its origin lies in RBI’s 2017 Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies, where it identified the necessity for a strong ETP framework—designed to promote transparency, prevent settlement risk and contain market manipulation. This was followed by the Electronic Trading Platforms (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2018, which further categorised ETPs as any electronic system (other than recognised stock exchanges) to carry out transactions in “eligible instruments” such as government securities, money market instruments and forex derivatives. The 2018 guidelines mandated ETP operators to have strong audit trail mechanisms, ensure end-to-end encryption, achieve uptime and latency standards and keep data locally. However, partial exemptions were chiselled out for scheduled commercial banks, which were exempted from similar eligibility criteria. In response to the emergence of new grey zones – especially those involving offshore operators and algorithmic trading – the 2024 Draft Directions were introduced by the Central Bank. Furthermore, these directions also marked a departure from old practices. They prescribed model risk management practices, pre- and post-trade measures and even mandatory FATF-country integration for offshore ETPs. Quarterly detailed disclosures were also required, which included spikes in latency, market abuse and cyber-attacks. The recent 2025 Master Directions, however, go further, not through rule volume, but precision, emphasising targeted controls over broad prescriptions.The residency clause has now been removed, and it has also subtly shifted the definition of “entity” to include anyone, anywhere. Algorithmic trading is now subject to specific control layers: message throttling, price collars, execution slippage analysis and audit logs. The requirements of information security are no less strict-compulsory CISA or CERT-In empanelled IT audit, BC-DR drills, real-time SIEM logging and role-based access governance are now a necessity. Most importantly, perhaps, RBI now has the authority to tap into the intelligence of any Indian regulator, SEBI, FIU, or the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, as the case may be. This sneaky insertion of cross-regulatory due diligence reflects a regulatory environment that is no longer content with surface-level compliance-based regulation, but one that is based on systemic control and traceability. Digitising Control: RBI’s Authorisation Framework Enters a New Era The 2025 Master Directions are a paradigm shift in the manner in which the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) exercises its gatekeeping functions over Electronic Trading Platforms (ETPs), namely by digitising its procedures and by tightening its  discretionary thresholds. On one hand, the administrative streamlining is being presented positively on the surface; on the other hand, the regulatory position is more discriminatory and control-oriented. Among the most important procedural innovations, it is worth noting the shift of the entire authorisation process to the PRAVAAH portal. Unlike the traditional manual filing system mandated  under the 2018 guidelines and reiterated in the 2024 Draft Directions, PRAVAAH enables streamlined processing through real-time monitoring, automated data entry, and document standardisation standardised documentation. As a matter of commercial law, this reduces procedural opacity, while formalising the way RBI gathers data and audit trails. This gives the regulator systematic visibility into applicant behaviour and compliance preparedness. Just as important is the elimination of the “in-principle” approval process, which under the 2024 Draft was a soft filter with a six-month shelf life. The 2025 Directions subsume the two-step model into one full-fledged application. Although this might eliminate procedural exhaustion, it also requires the institutional world to be fully ready from the beginning. Significantly, the RBI has changed its stance from permissive to selective. The text of Section 9(b) of the 2025 Directions is that RBI “will be selective” in granting ETP authorisations, abandoning the discretionary “may” of the previous draft. This transition from optional discretion to mandatory selectivity has profound commercial implications. Legal entities including entities with pre-existing foreign approvals are now required to prove capital adequacy, operating resilience and strong systems of compliance attuned to Indian legal standards. In effect, RBI’s digitalisation drive is not merely administrative, but also structural. Authorisation is no longer just a compliance formality; it is a threshold test for market entry, tightly guarded by centralised, data-driven discretion. Jurisdictional Retrenchment: Phasing Out Offshore ETPs and Redrawing Boundaries One of the major policy changes that is evident in the 2025 Master Directions is the explicit removal of the extensive offshore ETP system proposed in the 2024 Draft Directions. The draft proposed a systematic form of regulatory regime on offshore platforms, which included incorporation in a jurisdiction identified by FATF, individual registration by RBI and prohibition on rupee derivatives trading. It also comprised the requirement of continuous monitoring, reporting

From Offshore Shadows to Onshore Spotlight: Decoding RBI’s 2025 ETP Playbook Read More »

Prohibition as Policy: Corporate Fault-Lines in the Online Gaming Bill, 2025

[By Sahil Singh and Shivanshu Shivam]  The authors are students of Chanakya National Law University   Introduction The Online Gaming Bill 2025 is a significant change of approach in moving away from a supervisory approach toward a statutory one, where prohibition is the new normal. This Bill introduces, on the one hand, a promotion of the e-sports and social-gaming activities under Sections 3 and 4, whereas it promotes, on the other hand, a ban on online real-money gaming under Section 5, supported by the additional prohibition on advertising under Section 6 and fund-transfer prohibition under Section 7. This paradigm views enforcement not as a question of control over a sector but as the destruction of infrastructural access by banks and payments intermediaries, as well as app stores and ad networks. This regime contradicts the equilibrium that came into being in the year 2023, where the Information Technology Rules were to launch verification-registration of online games, which the GST Council had moved to reclassify to 28% of taxable actionable claims. That is a compromise of regulate-not-ban and de facto, and as a Bill, it will be superseded by ban-and-carve-out. The extraterritorial Section 1(2) extends such that services rendered abroad to a foreign jurisdiction are also included, meaning offshore structures are not a protection. It implies to boards and investors re-engineering governance, contracts, and technical stacks within narrow confines, with criminal accounts under Section 9. Regulatory Cartography and the Emerging Enforcement Landscape The entire enforcement of the Bill is modelled on a polycentric system of governance where power centres overlap in various directions. The central point in the matters laid is the Authority created under Section 8 and its ability to find the game is an online money game and to make binding directives to the operators, intermediaries, and platforms. The decision-making power to declare it as legal or prohibited is done using the power to classify. States can continue to apply the means of entry of public order and health to legislate to their liking, which Tamil Nadu has already done using its 2023 Act and 2025 Regulations, which mandate Aadhaar KYC, time caps, and advertising ban, as embraced in the recent pronouncement of the Madras High Court. The clause overrides Section 18 of the Bill and prioritises central law in case of any conflict, does not displace state capacity to govern in the area of its state plan, leading to simultaneous regulatory independence of uniformity. Another statutory choke point provisionally contained under Section 7 is the financial system, which prohibits banks, financial institutions, and even payment intermediaries from engaging in the processing of transactions in online money games. This brings the hitherto supervisory soft law to the criminal sanctionable rigid prohibition. Section 14 authorises the blocking of digital content that is related to banned games enforced by the Information Technology Act, 2000. Lastly, Sections 15 and 16 give the regime powers of investigation and those of the police, to permit searches, seizures, and even warrantless arrests. Enforcement is thus carried out along a continuum, consisting of administrative guidelines, infrastructural inhibitors through to criminal procedure. This turns compliance into a kind of regulatory intelligence, which demands real-time updating and board-level monitoring. Executive Accountability and the Expansion of Personal Liability in Corporate Governance The Bill codifies an attributive liability principle in corporate governance. Under Section 11(1), in the case of a company committing an offence, each person who is in charge of, and is also responsible to the company, is liable. Section 11(3) proceeds to make directors, managers, and officers personally guilty, except to exempt independent and non-executive directors who have no involvement in the decision-making process. The punishment of Section 9 is harsh; violations of Sections 5 or 7 are punishable with imprisonment up to three years and fines of up to 1 crore; the penalty is initially raised in case of a recurrence. Section 10 makes the offences cognizable and non-bailable, which makes directors and officers accessible to the coercive process. Most importantly, boards should demonstrate reasoned decision-making and risk-balancing, including legal guidance ahead of product releases, authorisation grids to block code pushes or payment integrations, board notes to document deliberations on the potential harmful impact on consumers, and incident-response procedures to ensure that evidence will not be deleted. Statutory fines and criminal fines are excluded, by default, under D&O insurance. Explicit coverage in regulatory inquiries, enhancements, and survival indemnities in employment contracts are crucial components of employment contracts, whose effectiveness is only effective when simplified by documented diligence. The jurisprudence of the state-level decisions supporting intrusive safeguards contains an unmistakable sign to the courts: they are lenient towards high burden compliance. Presumably, the corporate shield will consist not of rhetoric but of paperwork, immutable logs, deliberative records, and compliance artefacts against which that neglect is hard to assign. Commercial Choke Points in Payments, Platforms, and Digital Intermediation The Bill brings into action one principle of infrastructural enforcement, a principle of closing flows of money and information, instead of simply adjudicating. Section 7 proposes the legislation, a statutory disability of payment, that compels PSPs, aggregators, and banks to freeze or reject transactions regarding banned games. Any judicial review may leave the operators panicking about liquidity. This compels business bargaining of continuity covenants in PSP contracts, to pre-freeze caution, strata throttling, and reinstatement procedures. The conscription is also indirect to the platforms and intermediaries since Section 14 states that the information concerning the online money games can be blocked under the IT Act, 2000. When combined with Section 8(2)(a), which gives the Authority the right to classify any game, this gives rise to a scenario where an administrative classification can lead to app-store de-listings, ad network suspensions. Section 12 goes further still by authorising penalties or barring non-conformance with Authority directions, in effect weaponising the registration position. Also, the regulatory takedown protocols, cure windows, and escrowed settlements for any period under investigation must be included in a contract with PSPs, ad networks, and affiliates. The operators should ensure forensic-ready logs

Prohibition as Policy: Corporate Fault-Lines in the Online Gaming Bill, 2025 Read More »

Due Process in Indian Antitrust Law: A Reform Long Overdue

[By Samyak Deshpande and Vedika Kulkarni] The authors are students of Maharashtra National Law University Mumbai   Introduction Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (SC), in  CCI v Schott Glass India, upheld the decision of the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT), dismissing the appeal filed by the Competition Commission of India (CCI). The Court held that the Director General’s (DG) report was lacking in evidentiary value. To be specific, it was the denial of cross-examination to the affected parties under Section 36 of the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act), a significant procedural lapse putting into question the DG’s entire findings. This shows how such procedural lapses can affect CCI’s decisions’ validity, urging an analysis of the procedure for Indian competition law enforcement. In 2015, the COMPAT had strongly opined that “the time has come for the Commission to lay down guidelines for conducting the investigation/inquiry in consonance with the rules of natural justice.” This came in the Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufacturers’ Association and Others, where the Chairperson of the CCI signed the order without physically attending hearings. The remark pushed for transparency and consistency in the procedure. Yet, nearly a decade later, CCI has issued no formal procedural rules or regulations in this regard. This article highlights the procedural failures of CCI through such cases and analyses the impact of procedural lapses and inconsistent adjudications on businesses. Further it argues that there is an urgent need to implement an enforceable mechanism for procedural fairness within the framework of CCI. The article first outlines the due process requirements under Indian competition law and their role in ensuring fairness. It then analyses key procedural deficiencies, including denial of cross-examination, reliance on incomplete evidence, and delays in adjudication. Thereafter, it subsequently assesses the financial and reputational impact of such lapses on businesses and investor confidence. The discussion concludes by examining international best practices and recommendations, and proposing reforms to embed enforceable due process safeguards within CCI’s framework. Understanding the Due Process Under the CCI (General) Regulations, 2009 (Regulations), the investigation process begins when the CCI forms a prima facie opinion under Regulation 16 of a possible contravention and directs the DG under Regulation 18 to investigate, who then collects evidence and prepares a report for the CCI. Upon receipt of the DG’s report, the CCI may under Regulation 20 invite objections or suggestions from the concerned parties and, if deemed necessary, may direct further investigation. Thereafter, the CCI considers all submissions and evidence on record before passing a final order. The parties are generally afforded an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the procedure established by law. This is the general process followed by CCI. Due process, on the other hand, is the backbone of fair law enforcement, requiring the state to respect principles of natural justice. It goes beyond mere rule-following to ensure that the procedure itself is fair and just. With this foundation in mind, it becomes important to explore how lapses in procedural standards undermine fairness and lead to significant financial and operational consequences for businesses. The Need for Due Process? 1.Lapses in Procedural Standards Despite nominal procedural safeguards under the Act and the Regulations, the CCI’s investigative process suffers from serious procedural flaws that seriously undermine fairness and due process. For example, Regulation 41 allows evidence from informants or 3rd parties to be recorded without the enterprise’s presence, causing concerns of bias. Further, the DG is vested with discretionary authority to permit or deny cross examination of witnesses. When there is no mandatory right to cross-examine, it becomes harder to test the veracity of evidence and ensure a fair trial. In the recent Schott Glass case, the SC noted that despite a clear request for cross-examination, the CCI refused it on the technical ground that no “separate application” had been filed. It made no attempt to assess whether cross-examination was necessary or if its denial would cause prejudice. It was evident that the request was rejected on procedural formality rather than substantive fairness. The Court referred to several precedents that contradicted the CCI’s approach. In Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. Director General (Investigation and Registration) and State of Kerala v. K.T. Shaduli Grocery Dealer, the courts upheld the right to cross-examination as a fundamental aspect of fair procedure. Similarly, in Andaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata, the SC held that denying cross-examination undermined the entire proceeding and vitiated the decision. The Delhi High Court, in Cadila Healthcare Ltd., reinforced this view by holding that when findings rely substantially on oral statements, refusal to permit cross-examination invalidates the decision. It emphasized that discretion to allow or deny cross-examination must be exercised judicially, as was followed by the Schott Glass ruling. Also, the procedural lapses are not limited to just cross-examination but extend beyond the broader rules of fairness and principles of natural justice. There are plenty of matters where the appellate stage revealed such various procedural lapses. To highlight a few, in Google v CCI, the SC held that non-disclosure of key documents violated due process. In Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd. v. CCI, the CCI’s order was overturned primarily due to violations of the principles of natural justice where only three members signed and pronounced the final order despite six members having heard the matter. Further, the parties were not provided an opportunity to be heard after receiving the Supplementary Investigation Report or regarding the quantum of penalty before its imposition. There was also an inordinate delay of 13 months between the conclusion of hearings and the pronouncement of the order, during which the bench composition changed, all of which cumulatively amounted to a breach of the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. In BCCI v. CCI, CCI was found to have relied on information from the internet public domain materials without giving BCCI an opportunity to respond to that material, thereby violating principles of natural justice. Such procedural lapses in adjudication not only undermine the integrity of the regulatory process

Due Process in Indian Antitrust Law: A Reform Long Overdue Read More »

Sebi’s Scale-Based Rpt Threshold: A Step Forward, but Not Far Enough

[By Dewansh Raj] The author is a student of National Law University Odisha (NLUO)   Introduction The Security and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) as a significant move,introduced a new consultation paper which provides for bringing substantial change to the Related Party Transaction (RPT) framework. Related-party transactions encompass commercial arrangements between a company and connected entities, including subsidiaries, entities controlled by directors or significant shareholders, and businesses associated with board members or senior management. Although such transactions are not necessarily improper, they present risks of conflict of interest and misuse. Their permissibility depends on compliance with the arm’s length and ordinary course of business criteria; otherwise, prior approval of the Board or shareholders is required as per statutory thresholds under Section 188 of Companies Act 2013 and SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“LODR”). The main objective of RPT is to prevent conflicts of interest, protect minority shareholders, ensure transparency, and strengthen corporate governance through mandatory disclosures, approval requirements, and restrictions on voting by interested parties. While the present paper addresses various aspects of related party transactions, the most notable is the proposal for a scale-based threshold. This blog examines the recommendations in detail and evaluates whether the scale-based approach is likely to achieve its intended benefits. Proposed changes The consultation paper aims to bring the following changes- The flat materiality threshold for related party transactions (₹1,000 crore or 10% of turnover) will be replaced with a scale-based system linked to the listed entity’s turnover, with an upper cap of ₹5,000 crore. For subsidiaries, audit committee approval will be required for transactions above ₹1 crore that exceed the lower of the parent’s new materiality threshold or 10% of the subsidiary’s turnover if it has at least one year of audited financials, or 10% of its net worth or share capital plus securities premium if the net worth is negative and it does not have one year of audited financials.. The threshold for providing reduced “minimum information” for RPT approvals will rise to the lower of 1% of turnover or ₹10 crore, while retaining the ₹1 crore exemption for very small transactions. Omnibus shareholder approvals for material RPTs will be valid until the next AGM which can be for a maximum period of 15 months or for one year if approved in other general meetings. The retail purchase exemption will apply only to directors, key managerial personnel, and their relatives, removing employees from its scope. The holding–subsidiary exemption will be clarified to apply only when the holding company is listed and the subsidiary’s accounts are consolidated. The Scale based approach is a step in the right direction The new proposed threshold creates three brackets according to the annual consolidated turnover of the company and accordingly creates different thresholds for each bracket. The primary and most apparent benefit is the significant reduction in compliance burden, particularly for larger entities. Under the current framework, these organizations were mandated to obtain shareholder approval for all transactions meeting the threshold, regardless of their materiality or strategic significance. The paper demonstrates this impact quantitatively, highlighting that over 60% of transactions currently requiring shareholder approval would be exempt under the revised framework, thereby streamlining corporate governance processes while maintaining appropriate oversight for truly consequential matters. However, a more crucial impact of this change is the enhanced flexibility it provides SEBI to adjust RPT thresholds for specific entity categories without requiring a comprehensive overhaul of the entire regulatory framework. This modular approach enables targeted regulatory refinements based on market conditions, entity size, or sector-specific requirements, allowing for more responsive and nuanced governance without disrupting the broader system architecture. The Indian economy, particularly the stock market, has experienced tremendous growth over the past decade, necessitating continuous evolution of the RPT framework. This regulatory dynamism is evidenced by the frequency of modifications the current consultation paper represents the third major revision this year alone. Such regulatory volatility creates market uncertainty and escalates compliance costs for companies, who must continuously adapt their governance structures and processes to meet changing requirements. The SEBI could now bring a change in the RPT framework for the companies falling in one particular bracket without altering the same for other companies ensuring consistency and in turn improving the ease of doing business. Over reliance on the turnover Although the consultation paper offers promising improvements, the proposed framework continues to depend exclusively on company turnover as the criterion for classifying transactions as related party transactions, which presents significant limitations. A turnover-based threshold for determining material related party transactions has two key problems. Firstly, it opens the door to manipulation. Companies can artificially inflate their turnover often through low-margin, high-volume sales, premature revenue booking, or circular transactions so that the numerical threshold for requiring shareholder approval rises. For example, a company with a turnover of ₹9,000 crore would face a 10% threshold of ₹900 crore, meaning any RPT above that amount would need approval. If it boosts turnover to ₹11,000 crore, the threshold becomes ₹1,100 crore, allowing a ₹1,000 crore transaction that was previously “material” to slip under the limit and avoid scrutiny. Secondly, this approach is disadvantageous to low-turnover but high-value businesses, such as infrastructure or real estate firms, whose balance sheets are large but annual sales are relatively modest. For such companies, even routine, proportionate transactions can easily exceed the turnover-based limit. For instance, an infrastructure company with ₹300 crore turnover but assets worth ₹2,000 crore would have a materiality threshold of just ₹30 crore under the turnover rule, so a ₹200 crore land purchase normal for its scale would require shareholder approval, causing unnecessary delays and compliance costs. In both scenarios, turnover alone fails to reflect the true economic significance or risk of a transaction. A need for more holistic framework While the introduction of the scale-based framework is definitely a step in right direction there is a need to look beyond threshold. This is where models like the UK’s multi-test approach offer valuable lessons in creating a more comprehensive framework. In

Sebi’s Scale-Based Rpt Threshold: A Step Forward, but Not Far Enough Read More »

From Barriers to Bridges: Sebi’s Investment Advisory Modernization Initiative

[ By Anikait Chawla and Chinmaya Saraswat] The authors are students of Gujarat National Law University On 7 August 2025, the Securities and Exchange Board of India released a consultation paper called, “Proposals for Ease of Doing Business for Investment Advisers and Research Analysts” (the Paper). The Paper aims to lower procedural barriers for advisers and analysts while keeping investor protections in place. It builds on changes from December 2024 that gave advisers more fee flexibility and cleared up onboarding steps. The Paper addresses six persistent market concerns: the limited ability to share past performance, unclear rules on second-opinion services, short corporatization timelines, narrow qualification criteria, and repetitive documentary checks. SEBI tied these easing measures to safeguards such as certification, disclaimers and time limits. The regulator wants to make life easier for advisers while keeping verification where it matters. Regulatory backdrop and principal proposals The Investment Advisers Regulations, 2013 (IA) and the Research Analysts Regulations, 2014 (RA) set rules for who may advise, how research should be published, and what disclosures advisers must make. Those rules helped professionalise a market that had relied on informal practice. As advisory work evolved, the rules showed strain. Firms and solo advisers report repeated documentary checks, academic thresholds that block experienced practitioners, and disruption when individuals convert to a corporate form. Small advisers feel these burdens most because they lack in-house compliance teams. SEBI responds with a significant change aimed at broadening eligibility. Any graduate could register if they pass the relevant NISM exam. That keeps a baseline of competence while allowing more professionals to enter the market. The Paper would permit one-to-one sharing of certified past-performance data when a prospective client requests it. Advisers may present certified results to interested clients, with mandatory disclaimers and a time-limited allowance. The approach lets advisers show a genuine track record without enabling mass-market promotion of unverified returns. The Paper also formalises second-opinion services. Advisers often give informal second opinions on products distributed by others. SEBI would let advisers charge for those services within capped arrangements and with clear disclosure. The Paper references a 2.5 percent ceiling as a guardrail. It also proposes annual consent for ongoing fee arrangements so clients stay informed about layered charges. On corporatization, SEBI proposes a longer transition window and limited client onboarding during conversion. The current short period often forces advisers to pause or alter services. Extending the window, while requiring continued professional-liability cover and client notice, aims to smooth the process without reducing accountability. Additionally, the Paper aims to prune redundant documentary checks. Repeated proofs of address, multiple credit reports and duplicate tax submissions add time and cost without improving oversight. SEBI suggests replacing many routine checks with digital verification, sworn declarations and targeted spot checks. That approach redirects supervisory effort toward risks that matter for investors. Taken together, these measures show SEBI trying to reduce admin friction while keeping guardrails. Certification, templates and sunset clauses serve as those guardrails. The outcome depends on how precise and operable the implementing rules become. Implementation challenges and standardisation requirements The reforms will succeed only if SEBI provides clear technical guidance and reasonable timelines, beginning with standardisation, since past-performance disclosures help clients only when advisers calculate and report returns uniformly.. SEBI should mandate a template that shows one-, three- and five-year gross returns, the corresponding net returns after fees, the benchmark used for each period, start and end dates, and a short note on the calculation method. The template should explain how to treat cash flows and whether to use time-weighted or money-weighted returns. It should also describe how to present multi-asset strategies. Without that clarity, numbers will be hard to compare and easy to manipulate. Verification should remain proportionate, and while chartered-accountant certification provides a strong safeguard, its costs weigh most heavily on small advisers. . SEBI should provide tiered options wherein larger firms can use full certification, mid-sized firms can rely on accredited third-party verifiers or audited internal reports and the small advisers can face random audits or accept higher liability if they self-certify. These alternatives keep oversight while avoiding a one-size-fits-all burden. Record-keeping and consent require fundamental digital systems. To track consent renewals, provide client-specific performance, and maintain auditable records, advisers will require secure solutions. SEBI ought to establish minimal technical requirements and permit gradual adherence. In order to prevent smaller firms from falling behind, the regulator can also promote open-source toolkits and low-cost vendors. Supervisory inspections will be sped up and conflicts will be decreased with the explicit guidelines on encryption, retention periods, and access limits. Digital verification can reduce documentation without compromising oversight. By connecting checks to trustworthy databases like PAN and verified tax records, SEBI can implement a verify-once paradigm. This lessens the need for duplicate checks, but it also necessitates privacy protections, backup plans in case of system failures, and a clear understanding of who is responsible for automated checks that go wrong. Efficiency and safety would be balanced by a hybrid architecture that automates regular inspections and saves manual review for outliers. The chartered-accountant requirement raises timing and cost questions such as who bears the charge and when must certification occur? SEBI could allow phased certification, for example a short self-certification period followed by formal attestation within a defined window, or it could permit accredited data providers to give standard attestations. Both options would maintain verification while easing the burden on small firms. Surveillance and enforcement must match a lighter prescriptive approach. A disclosure-led model needs better detection tools such as sample audits, anomaly detection and proportionate penalties that deter misuse. SEBI should build risk-scoring systems that flag outliers and support those systems with periodic manual checks. Targeted enforcement will keep the regime credible without reverting to blanket paperwork requirements. Finally, continuing competence matters. NISM exams can remain the baseline, but advisers should complete modest annual training and face occasional competency checks. Regular education and random assessments will keep standards current and reduce the risk of persistent low-quality advice. These measures, precise templates, tiered

From Barriers to Bridges: Sebi’s Investment Advisory Modernization Initiative Read More »

Pre- And Post-Importation Services: Doctrinal Challenges in Customs Valuation

[By Manav Chakraborty and Manya Singh] The authors are students of Jindal Global Law school The computation of proper customs is a matter of vital importance for both Government and importers alike as it forms the backbone of revenue collection and compliance in cross-border trade. In a recent decision, titled Coal India Limited Vs. Commissioner Of Customs (Port) (Coal India) the Supreme Court of India confronted a contentious and commercially significant issue in this field: whether “product service fees” paid to a third party which is separate from the price paid to the foreign exporter should be included in the assessable value of imported goods under Rule 9(1)(a) and (e) of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Price of Imported Goods) Rules, 1988. (Valuation Rules) While the judgment establishes an important precedent with far-reaching consequences for transactions involving complex import arrangements, it also raises several interpretive and doctrinal issues that need to be resolved. In particular, the ruling raises questions about the scope of “condition of sale”, the distinction between pre- and post-import services, and the extent to which form can be disregarded in favour of commercial substance. This article critically analyses the decision, examining its reasoning, statutory context, and potential consequences for future customs valuation disputes. Factual Matrix and Supreme Court’s Ruling The case arose out of a contract for the supply of spare parts for P&H Shovels entered into between Central Coalfields Ltd. (a subsidiary of Coal India Ltd., the appellant) and Harnischfeger Corporation, USA (the foreign supplier). The contract was routed through the latter’s Indian distributor, M/s Voltas Ltd., which was to be paid 8% of the Free On-Board (FOB) value of the contract in Indian rupees towards “engineering and technical service fees.” This payment was not deducted from the FOB value and was made directly to Voltas. Following provisional assessments, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs included the 8% fee paid to Voltas in the assessable value of the goods under Rule 9(1)(a) and (e) of the Valuation Rules, read with Section 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The short levy of duty was quantified at Rs. 64,47,244 and the appellant was directed to furnish this amount within 15 days. The Court first began by scrutinizing the pertinent contractual documents and its clauses specifically focusing on Clause 5 of the Purchase Order. It observed that the 8% payment to Voltas Ltd. was not a collateral arrangement but an integral term of the sale contract and the obligation to pay this amount was inextricably linked to the act of importation. The Court therefore held that the foreign supplier’s quotation made it clear that the payment to Voltas Ltd. was to be made in addition to the FOB price, and not deducted from it, reinforcing the viewpoint reached by different authorities before that this payment was a condition of sale and not a separate post-importation service. The Court’s main reasoning as to why the 8% payment obligation under the Purchase order was rightfully included in the assessable value of the imported goods under Rule 9(1)(a) and Rule 9(1)(e) of the Valuation Rules read with Section 14(1)(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 lied in the nature of the services rendered by Voltas Ltd. While the appellant characterized these services as post-importation maintenance and technical assistance, the Court essentially found them to be fundamentally tied to the import transaction activities to ensure smooth execution of the sale and importation of goods and hence includable in the assessable value. In addressing the appellant’s reliance on the Note to Rule 4 of the Valuation Rules and previous Supreme Court decisions such as Commissioner of Customs (Ports), Kolkata Vs. J.K. Corpn. Ltd (J.K Corporation) and Commissioner of Customs Vs. Ferodo India (P) Ltd. the Court drew a clear distinction between the cases on the basis of their factual matrix. In J.K Corporation, the Court held that payments for post-importation activities (such as technical know-how or license fees for plant operation after import) were not a precondition for the sale of goods and hence would not come within the purview of assessable value of the imported goods so as to enable the authorities to levy customs duty in view of the Note to Rule 4. In contrast, the services in the present case were pre-importation or contemporaneous with importation and thus includible in the assessable value under Rule 9(1)(e). Substance Over Form: Doctrinal Application and Limitations One of the central takeaways from the judgement rendered by the Court is the reaffirmation of the principle of “substance over form” adopted by judicial bodies in the context of customs valuation. Despite the contractual clause classifying the services rendered by Voltas Ltd. as engineering and technical service, the Court based on a granular and detailed reading of the clause and all the other surrounding documents, termed these “product service” charges as nothing but commission being paid to Voltas Limited for procurement of spare parts and making the sale as effective as possible. This principle has long held a foundational role in the jurisprudence of indirect taxation, with courts repeatedly cautioning that mere contractual form or nomenclature cannot immunize a transaction from scrutiny when the economic substance suggests otherwise. In CCE v. Acer India Ltd., the Supreme Court underscored that the artificial division of prices into dutiable and non-dutiable components, without justification, is impermissible. The Court emphasized that the true character of consideration must be evaluated in substance and not in structure. While the Court’s reliance on this principle in Coal India Ltd. is consistent with its past jurisprudence, its broad classification of the services provided by Voltas as having a direct nexus to the value of imported goods—and hence dutiable—raises concerns. If interpreted expansively, this reasoning could enable customs authorities to include a wide range of third-party services within the assessable value, even where such services are tangential to the transaction. The Court’s conclusion that Voltas’ services were merely facilitative of the sale was primarily grounded in Clause 5 of the Purchase Order, which outlined Voltas’ role in

Pre- And Post-Importation Services: Doctrinal Challenges in Customs Valuation Read More »

Digitisation’s Dark Side: Anti-Competitive Practices in India’s Film Exhibition Industry Post-Ufo Movies

[By Pathmanabhan Sooraj and Mahadev Krishnan] The authors are students of  National University of Advanced Legal Studies, Kochi and National Law University, Odisha, respectively Keywords: Digital Cinema Equipment, Virtual Print Fee, Anti-Competitive Practices Introduction Over the years, India’s film exhibition industry has moved from the age of physical film reels to a fully digitised world driven by high-tech Digital Cinema Equipment (“DCE”). Although this change has led to the development of technology and has improved the viewing experiences for audiences, it has also created a new dimension of anti-competitive behaviour. The delivery of films to theatres might be different, but the underlying issues are still the same, which include market foreclosure and limiting access to essential infrastructure. DCE encompasses digital projectors, servers, software, and security systems, which are required to screen films in theatres as well as to ensure quality and standardisation. Digital Cinema Initiatives (“DCI”) sets common technical standards to make DCE systems interoperable and fair for all market players. Recently, in Qube Cinema Technologies Pvt Ltd v. CCI, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) has clearly held that these standards set by the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) cannot be tampered with by any private entity to block access or favour affiliates. The entrance of digital infrastructure in the market of film distribution has allowed powerful and dominant players to employ exclusive software controls, firmware locks, and restrictive-lease contracts to bar and distort the competition. What previously used to occur as physical supply rejections or price cartels has now become technological gatekeeping. The authors, through this blog, firstly delve into how cartelisation started to emerge in the film distribution and exhibition market, and secondly how the introduction of Virtual Print Fee (“VPF”) has concentrated the market. Lastly, the authors analyse the impact of the UFO decision, and how DCE, while it was meant to enable access, has, in some cases, created digital bottlenecks that isolated rival players from the market, leading to limited market access and foreclosure. The FICCI Saga: An Impetus for Concert Action in the Film Exhibition & Distribution Market During the period from 2001 onwards, the development of multiplexes revived the cinema theatre market; however, this led to the vertical integration of the film production and distribution sector. In FICCI  Multiplex Association v. United Producers, producers and distribution associations came together to bargain with multiplexes for a larger revenue-sharing model, where exclusionary measures, including collective boycotts by producer associations, led to Multiplexes not being able to screen films for a period until their demands were met. Subsequently, the Director General (“DG”) came to the conclusion that there was an onset of cartelisation to limit the supply of films to multiplex owners in order to gain higher revenue. This was further affirmed by the CCI, which held such conduct to be a cartel and in violation of §3(3) of the Competition Act (“Act”) and had caused Appreciable Adverse Impact on Competition (“AAEC”). Further, the CCI’s latest market study on the film distribution chain  in India also acknowledges the fact that there is a need for self regulation by the film industry itself to prevent such anti-competitive practices. The market study also brings out the fact that an average DCE per screen is about 30 lakhs, therefore, DCE providers enter into a lease with Cinema Theatre Operators (“CTO”) and agreements with the lessee cinemas for advertising and VPF, where they retain a majority of the revenues, which ultimately has resulted in a barrier for small CTOs. The Price of Projection: How Virtual Print Fee Entrenches Entry to the Market With the emergence of DCE, India’s film exhibition industry saw a complete technological transformation. Physical reels were replaced by digital projectors, servers, and software-based delivery systems. While this brought better quality and efficiency, it also created new ways to control the market, most notably through the VPF. VPF is a fee paid by producers or distributors to exhibitors, whether large multiplex chains or standalone theatres, to help recover the cost of DCE. This fee was at the heart of the controversy in Unilazer v. PVR, Inox & Cinepolis. Here, the multiplex giants were demanding payments to film producers to screen movies in their digital systems. Although the charge was initially designed to pay back initial DCE expenses, it quickly turned into a regular fee, which persisted even after the investments had been recouped. Further, it was alleged that the dominant players were exerting uniform VPFs through coordination. This made it harder for producers, especially small or independent ones, to access digital screens without paying a premium. The VPF model had started as a short-term solution with a sunset clause (a specified date or time when the VPF would no longer be charged) to substitute the cost of physical film prints, reduce piracy, and increase quality. However, the revenue sharing mechanism became a burden in the long run, especially for the smaller exhibitors in the relevant market of DCE. This shift from collaboration to control was the worst on the smaller multiplexes. Smaller exhibitors had no capital to invest in the DCE of their own or had any bargaining power to negotiate fair terms, and were left with no choice but to accept the terms of the dominant players. Many were forced to rely on digital infrastructure bundled with restrictive software or firmware locks, making interoperability nearly impossible and switching service providers prohibitively expensive. As a result, smaller exhibitors were embroiled in a technological trap of paying higher, receiving less, and falling behind in competitiveness. What was once a physical barrier to entry has now transformed into a digital bottleneck. Digital Domination: Anti-Competitive Leasing Practices in UFO Moviez Following the FICCI-Multiplex cartel case, the CCI has shifted its attention to a more modern form of anti-competitive behaviour where contractual design and digital infrastructure became a medium for exclusion. In PF Digital Media Services Ltd. & Anr. v. UFO Moviez & Ors., the CCI ordered a detailed probe into how control over DCE is being used to limit

Digitisation’s Dark Side: Anti-Competitive Practices in India’s Film Exhibition Industry Post-Ufo Movies Read More »

Substance Over Form Prevails: Supreme Court’s Landmark Ruling in Hyatt International

[By Runit Rathore and Lakshita Goyal] The authors are students of Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur On 24th July 2025, the Supreme Court (SC) delivered a landmark judgment in Hyatt International Southwest Asia Ltd v. Additional Director of Income Tax (Hyatt Ruling), wherein it was confronted with a seemingly straightforward question: whether Hyatt International (Hyatt) had a permanent establishment (PE) in India under the provisions of the Indo-UAE Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) or not. To set the stage, DTAA is a bilateral treaty that allocates taxing rights between the source country and the country of residence, thereby ensuring that income is not taxed twice. Typically, Article 5 of the DTAA defines the concept of a PE as a “fixed place of business” through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on thereby enabling the source country to tax the profits attributable to such PE. Article 7 of the DTAA permits India to tax so much of the profits of the enterprise as are attributable to the PE. Importantly, once a PE is established, the source country is entitled to independently attribute profits to it, irrespective of whether the parent entity is incurring losses. The primary issue in the Hyatt Ruling pertained to the permissibility of India taxing the profits earned by Hyatt from rendering services to Indian hotels. This piece examines the reasoning adopted by the Court and how it gave precedence to substance over form. It also explores the potential influence the judgment may have on the development of Indian tax jurisprudence. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Hyatt was incorporated in Dubai and managed Hyatt brand across the Asia. It entered into long-term Strategic Oversight Services Agreements (SOSAs) with Asian Hotels Limited (AHL), according to which it provided branding, managerial oversight, training, procurement advice and other hotel-management services. Hyatt dispatched executives and staff to India periodically, but it had no office or lease in India. The operations were coordinated remotely from Dubai and the service fees linked to the revenues of AHL were remitted to the UAE. The dispute arose when the Assessing Officer treated Hyatt’s presence as constituting a PE in India. The tax authorities argued that its continuous involvement in, and control over, the hotel operations satisfied the conditions for a PE under the applicable DTAA. On the contrary, Hyatt argued that it neither maintained an exclusive or permanent office in India nor did any of its employees exceed the 183-day threshold under Article 5(2)(i) of the DTAA, as all visits were intermittent in nature. However, both the Tribunal and the Delhi High Court rejected Hyatt’s contentions, leading the matter to be escalated before the Hon’ble SC. SUPREME COURT’S RULING The SC held that the Hyatt had a fixed place PE in India and that its income was therefore taxable in India. The court’s reasoning relied on the twin conditions set out in Article 5(1) of the DTAA: first, whether there was a fixed place of business at Hyatt’s disposal in India and second, whether its business was carried on through that place. Firstly, court ruled that a fixed place need not be exclusively owned or leased by the enterprise. It observed that it is sufficient if a certain space is made available at the disposal of the enterprise, even if such space is shared and no formal lease exists. It found that the Indian hotel premises, where Hyatt’s personnel were continuously present and performed core functions, were effectively in control of it. In practical terms, it did not have its own office but the hotel premises functioned as its de-facto office for core management tasks. The second condition was met by looking at its aggregated activities. The court observed that Hyatt’s executives made frequent and substantial visits under the SOSAs. Although no single employee exceeded the 183-day threshold under Article 5(2)(i), the combined presence of multiple personnel over the duration of the contract demonstrated a continuous business presence. The court held that the relevant consideration is continuity of business presence in aggregate, rather than the individual duration of stay of each employee. These facts satisfied the classic PE tests of stability, productivity and independence. The court carefully distinguished the present case from the Assistant Director of Income Tax v. E-Funds IT Solutions Inc. (E-Funds), where no PE was found. In this case, the SC held that the operation of Indian subsidiary was purely auxiliary in nature and conducted at arm’s length and thus did not constitute the foreign parent carrying on business through that location. In the present case, the court noted that E-Funds is factually different, the foreign parent did not perform any core business in India; here, the hotel itself was the situs of Hyatt’s primary business activities. Thus, what mattered was that in present case, the foreign company’s main work (hotel management) was literally going on in India, whereas in E-Funds it was only simple support work. The court emphasized that the key distinction lay in the nature of the functions performed, Hyatt involved the conduct of core operational activities in India, while E-Funds involved only back-end, support functions. SUBSTANCE OVER FORM: A SHIFT IN JUDICIAL APPROACH One of the most noteworthy aspects of the Hyatt Ruling is the SC’s clear emphasis on economic substance over legal form. It rejected the argument that the absence of a formal office or lease in India would shield Hyatt from taxation.It held that the functional reality of its business presence was determinative. The court emphasized on the reality of who did what, where and how often within Hyatt’s business model. As observed, the SC undertook a detailed factual inquiry by examining travel records, revenue sharing provisions and the scope of contractual duties to determine the degree of control exercised by Hyatt over hotel operations. The judgment reflects a clear shift away from a purely formalistic approach thus favoring a more substantive and fact-driven analysis. The court held that the disposal test for determining a fixed place PE must be used with flexibility and

Substance Over Form Prevails: Supreme Court’s Landmark Ruling in Hyatt International Read More »

Scroll to Top