Tenders in Limbo: The High Cost of Judicial Outsourcing
[ByVidhanshu Tyagi] The author is a student of National Forensic Sciences University, Gandhinagar Introduction The bedrock of tender jurisprudence in India is the principle of judicial restraint. Courts have steered clear of functioning as an appellate authority over administrative decisions, specifically in contractual matters. The rationale behind this is clear: the executive being the author of the tender is the master of the process, and judicial interference should be confined to the narrow corridors of mala fides, arbitrariness, irrationality, or a palpable impact on public interest. However, a recent trend emerging from the High Courts, particularly in cases alleging “technical glitches” in e-tendering portals, threatens to erode this well-settled principle. The appointment of external expert committees, as seen in the recent orders of the Delhi High Court in Karix Mobile Private Limited v. Union of India & Ors. (Karix Mobile) and Anandam Minerals Private Limited v. Union of India & Ors. (Anandam Minerals), marks a significant departure from established precedent and risks entangling tender processes in protracted, expert-led investigations, thereby defeating the very objective of timely and efficient public tenders. The Established Law: A High Wall of Restraint The Supreme Court and various High Courts have built a formidable body of case law that strictly circumscribes the scope of judicial review in tender matters. It is settled law that the court should not interfere in tender matters except in the limited exceptions laid down by the Supreme Court. The foundational principles established in Tata Cellular v. Union of India is that the court’s role in judicial review is limited to checking for illegality, irrationality (in the Wednesbury sense), and procedural impropriety. Further, the Delhi High Court in Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. v. Union of India (Jindal Steel), relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, reiterated the triple test that constitutes these exceptions for interference: Is the decision-making process mala fide or intended to favour someone? Is the decision so arbitrary or irrational that no responsible authority could have reached it? Does the decision harm the public interest? If the answers are in the negative, interference is impermissible. This principle was also upheld by the Supreme Court in MHADA v. Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. (P) Ltd. (Shapoorji Pallonji), wherein it overturned the High Court’s decision that had allowed a bidder to participate despite a failed submission. The Supreme Court found that since other bidders had successfully submitted their bids, there was no evidence of a systemic glitch, and granting a “second opportunity” was improper. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has issued a direct procedural caution to High Courts, advising that they must be “extremely careful and circumspect” when entertaining such petitions, as granting stays “may seriously impede the execution of the projects of public importance.” This line of reasoning became the standard for adjudicating “technical glitch” claims. Courts adopted a pragmatic and evidence-based approach. The primary question was whether the glitch was at the bidder’s end or a systemic failure of the e-procurement portal. The determinative factor, as established in Jindal Steel (supra) and the Orissa High Court’s ruling in Mythri Infrastructure & Mining India (P) Ltd. v. State of Odisha (Mythri Infrastructure), was whether other bidders could place bids during the alleged period of the glitch. If the server logs showed successful concurrent bidding activity, the presumption was heavily against the petitioner. The burden of proof to demonstrate a server-side failure, rested squarely and heavily on the aggrieved bidder. This was a high threshold that was often not met, which in turn led to the dismissal of such petitions, sometimes with costs, as evidenced by the decisions in The New Approach: Outsourcing Adjudication to Experts The recent orders in Karix Mobile and Anandam Minerals signal a notable deviation from this established path. In Karix Mobile, the Delhi High Court, faced with an allegation of a technical glitch on the Government e-Marketplace (GeM) portal, directed the Director of the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Delhi, to nominate an Expert Committee to investigate the issue. The court deferred its own judgment pending the submission of a technical report. Similarly, in Anandam Minerals, a bidder claimed its screen went “blank/white” for 2-3 minutes, preventing it from placing a higher bid. The portal operator, MSTC, categorically refuted the claim, stating that no other bidder, including those in other simultaneous auctions, had reported any issue. Despite this strong prima facie evidence aligning with the principles laid down in Jindal Steel and Mythri Infrastructure, the Court observed that the matter was “highly technical in nature” and could not be “ascertained by the Court.” Consequently, it directed IIT Delhi to form an Expert Committee to examine the alleged glitch. This deviation is not merely a departure from precedent but also overlooks a fundamental jurisdictional principle, as such disputed questions of fact cannot, and should not, be raised in writ courts. A writ petition under Article 226 is a summary proceeding designed to address patent illegality, not to conduct a roving inquiry into complex factual disputes. The very fact that a court deems an issue “cannot be ascertained” based on affidavits is a strong indicator that the matter is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Such fact-intensive disputes are not the proper subject matter for writ jurisdiction. If at all any issue exists, the appropriate remedy is a civil suit, where the court can decide the matter based on a full trial with documentary evidence, examination-in-chief, and cross-examination. This aligns with the Supreme Court’s long-standing position, as affirmed in both, Jagdish Mandal and By entertaining these disputes, writ courts are venturing into an evidentiary exercise for which they are not designed, effectively transforming a summary remedy into a fact-finding mission. This approach, sidestepping the established jurisprudence, raises several critical questions: Undermining the Primary Expert: Aren’t the portal operators, be it NIC, MSTC, or GeM, the primary technical experts? Their affidavits, server logs, and technical reports have historically been the primary evidence upon which courts have relied. Appointing an external body like IIT implies that the evidence from the portal operator is insufficient, thereby
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