Author name: CBCL

From Enforcer to Facilitator: Analyzing CCI’s Green Channel for M&A clearance in India

[By Rashmi Birmole and Sahaja Burde] The authors are third year students of ILS Law College, Pune and can be reached at rbirmole@gmail.com. Introduction In what appears to be a complete overhaul of the Indian merger approval process, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI“) recently introduced a deemed approval mechanism called the “Green Channel” by way of its 7th set of amendments (Amendment Regulations 2019) [i] to the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011 [ii] (“Combination Regulations“) in an attempt to move towards an increased disclosure based regime [iii] regarding mergers and acquisitions and promotion of ease of doing business in India. The recent amendments have come into effect from 15th August, 2019 and are in line with the recommendations of the Competition Law Review Committee, constituted in 2018 to strengthen and re-calibrate the Competition Act, 2002 (“The Act“) to address emerging competition concerns and economic challenges in India. Through this post, the authors seek to analyze the Green Channel mechanism and its implications on the evolving M&A landscape in India. Background Under the Act, a combination is defined as the acquisition of one or more enterprises by one or more persons or mergers or amalgamation of enterprises [iv]. The Competition Regulatory Authority, i.e., the CCI is vested with the power [v] to approve mergers or combinations falling within certain deal value threshold limits, not eligible for any available exemptions and not causing any appreciable adverse effect on competition (“AAEC”) in the relevant market. Prior to the amendments, the parties involved were obligated to file mandatory pre-merger notifications for approval with the CCI, a cumbersome process [vi] that involved a number of phases and took a minimum of 210 days to be completed.  Under the recently introduced Green Channel, parties can get their proposed combination automatically and expeditiously approved on filing of notification with the CCI and fulfillment of certain eligibility criteria and subsequently give effect to them. Report of the Competition Law Review Committee- an Overview The Report of the Competition Law Review Committee [vii] (“The Committee”)  while considering mergers as a means for companies to effectively compete and gain welfare-enhancing efficiencies, observed that a delay in merger implementations leads to an increase in costs borne by the merging parties in particular and the society in general. The ideation of the Green Channel by the Committee was based fundamentally on two premises. Firstly, the data gathered from the Annual Reports [viii]   of the CCI showed that a majority of the combinations were approved without modifications and secondly, that merger control increased costs and caused delayed transactions. The Committee sought to introduce the Green Channel route to ensure a vital balance between adequate regulatory control and a greater ease of doing business. Among the recommendations for the Green Channel include self-assessment by the parties, envisioning a disclosure based regime for combinations that are unlikely to result in any AAEC. Opting for the Green Channel route would imply the waiver of the 210-day standstill period and result in the consummation of the proposed combination on mere intimation to the CCI. The possible downside of allowing parties to waive off the 210-day standstill period by opting Green Channel, as observed by the Committee, would be the difficulty involved in untangling the assets and business relationships when required. The pre-filing consultation, as suggested by the Committee, would minimize the above anticipated risk. Amendment Regulations 2019- Salient Provisions In light of the Committee’s recommendations and enduring deliberations with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs [ix], the CCI notified the 7th set of amendments to the Combination Regulations materializing the proposed Green Channel [x] as an automatic clearance channel for certain type of transactions added in Schedule III of the Combination Regulations. Provisions specifically relating to the Green Channel are as follows: Criteria for eligibility and permitted transactions The parties to the combination are required to self-assess and determine the applicability of the Green Channel route to the transaction [xi]. While determining their eligibility for the Green Channel, the parties are required to declare the absence of any horizontal and vertical overlapping between the respective group entities and any entity in which they, directly or indirectly, hold shares and/or exercise control. The absence of overlapping must be ascertained after considering all reasonable alternative market definitions. In addition to the horizontal and vertical overlapping, Schedule III also requires the parties to not engage in any activities which are complementary to each other. Eligible transactions will be deemed approved upon receipt of acknowledgement of the filing. Structure of the Form Form I in Schedule II has been replaced with a simpler form including standard declarations attesting to the lack of possible overlapping and non-causation of an AAEC. The sole objective of making the Form simpler and less cumbersome is to encourage parties to opt for the Green Channel. Additionally, sub-regulation (1A) under Regulation 13 was altered and substituted making the word limit of the summary of the combination, not consisting of confidential information, from 2000 words to 1000 words. Sub-section (1B) which required the parties to submit an additional 500 word summary is omitted, hence resulting in only one necessary submission. Penalties On occasions where the Committee finds the non-fulfillment of the eligibility criteria i.e., if the combination does not fall under Schedule III and/or declaration filed under sub-section (1) is incorrect, the notice and approval granted under the Green Channel will be held void ab initio[xii]. The Commission, retaining its regulatory power, will deal with such combinations in accordance with the power vested upon it by virtue of Section 44 and Section 20(1) of the Act, wherein the filing of wrong/incomplete information may attract penalty and such notification may be looked into by the CCI in order to assess the ability of the combination to cause an AAEC up to one year from the date of effect. The parties however, will have an opportunity to be heard before deciding on the matter. Comment While the institution of the Green Channel marks a commendable step towards facilitating

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Cross-Border Insolvency Problem in India: The Jet Airways Conundrum

[By Shantanu Lakhotia] The author is a student of Jindal Global Law School, Delhi and can be reached at shantanulakhotia@gmail.com. Introduction Defunct airlines, Jet Airways has a gross debt and liability that adds up to more than Rs. 36,000 crores. This includes money owed to both domestic as well as foreign lenders, employees, vendors etc. However, currently, the major issue that is critically being debated in the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) is regarding the question of jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in Netherlands to try matters as well as pass orders of a company registered and incorporated in India. The present article will provide a history of the account that led to such a dispute being raised in the NCLAT as well as try to provide a possible answer to the same. History In June 2019, a consortium of banks led by State Bank of India well as other creditors had approached the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), seeking declaration of Jet Airways as bankrupt and to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against it. During the hearing scheduled on 20th June 2019, NCLT was apprised of the fact that in April 2019, two European creditors, H.Esser Finance Company and Wallenborn Transport had filed a bankruptcy petition in the Noord-Holland District Court of Netherlands, against Jet Airways citing unpaid claims worth nearly Rs. 280 crores. The Dutch Court, claiming jurisdiction under Article 2(4) of the Bankruptcy Court of Netherlands, had passed an order dated 21st May 2019, declaring Jet Airways bankrupt and had ordered seizure of one of Jet Airways’ Boeing 777 aircraft that was parked in the Schiphol airport in Amsterdam. The Administrator appointed by the Noord-Holland District Court to manage the assets of Jet Airways had approached the NCLT, requesting it to withhold the bankruptcy proceedings going on in India, as a competent court in Netherlands had already initiated the same proceeding against Jet Airways in Netherlands. The Administrator raised the contention that if two parallel proceedings take place, it would lead to a great detriment to the Creditors of Jet Airways. The NCLT refused to withhold the proceedings in India, as according to them, the relief provided under Section 234 and 235 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of India (“IBC”) for cross-border insolvency could not be used as the two sections had yet not been notified by the Government of India, and in the absence of such notification, an order passed by a foreign Court would not be binding to the NCLT. To the contention raised by the Administrator, the NCLT had categorically stated in para 29 of its order that, ‘The order passed by Noord Holland District Court, Netherland for the company registered in India is nullity ab-initio’. Aggrieved by the order passed by the NCLT, the Administrator approached the NCLAT in appeal. The NCLAT, on the assurance of the Administrator that he would not alienate any offshore assets of Jet Airways in his possession, stayed the order of the NCLT, and listed the matter for arguments. The NCLAT further passed an order that in the pendency of the present Appeal, the Administrator will co-operate with its Indian Counterpart, to collate the claims of the offshore creditors. Furthermore, the NCLAT through its order also allowed the Administrator and its Indian Counterpart to negotiate a settlement in the best interest of Jet Airways and all of its stake holders. Analysis Countries have broadly tried to tackle the problem of cross-border insolvency, through two different and contrasting principles. The first principle is one in which one Court is provided with the jurisdiction to try a bankruptcy matter in regard to a debtor and the administrator appointed by the Court has the power to take charge all the assets of the debtor, located throughout the globe. According to this approach the Courts and laws of the country in which the debtor is domiciled or has his registered office should be given preference. This is known as the principle of unity or universality. On the other hand, there exists a principle that the Court in whose jurisdiction the bankruptcy proceedings has commenced, has jurisdiction on assets present only within its country’s state boundary. The consequence of this is that the Court, cannot pass an order against any asset of the debtor abroad and the administrator appointed by the Court can also only take charge of these limited assets. Furthermore, Court will follow its local laws on the matter. This is known as the principle of territoriality. A complication that is present in the Jet Airways case is that, both India as well as Netherland’s follow different principles of cross-border insolvency law. Netherland’s insolvency regime does not perfectly fit into any one of the above-mentioned two principles, but incorporates the tenants of both of them and hence essentially forms a different kind of principle which can be described as limited-universalism principle. In India, the Joint Parliament Committee Report, 2016, in its report had clearly stated that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was brought forth to solve, the question of bankruptcy and insolvency purely limited to the domestic scenario of India. In so far as Section 234 and 235 of the IBC is concerned, it needs to be realized, that it was not added by the Viswanathan Committee to tackle the bigger picture of cross border insolvency or provide a comprehensive framework for it, but simply to allow Indian Administrator to take control of assets of a corporate debtor situated in a country outside of India as well as provide foreign Administrator with the reciprocal arrangement. The foundation of such a mutually benefit arrangement, lies in Section 234 of IBC through which the Government of India, can enter into a treaty with other countries to bring forth the principle of universality. However, in the absence of such a treaty, India will abide by a principle of territoriality. Regardless, as of this moment Section 234 and 235 of IBC, has not been notified by the Government of India and

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Algorithms and a Legislative Gap in Addressing Tacit Collusion

[By Shreya Jha] The author is a fourth year student of Amity Law School, Delhi and can be reached at shreya.jha78@gmail.com. Introduction In general parlance, the concept of “algorithm” refers to the set of rules which should be followed in order to carry out a certain task. They can be represented in the form of plain language, diagram, codes, programmes, etc. The advent of the digital economy has led to the increasing use of “algorithms” in businesses to improve decision-making and predictive analytics. This is because the algorithms have the ability to process and create value out of large data sets in the form of targeted advertising, data-driven innovations, product recommendation, etc.For example, firms like Amazon and Flipkart employ “dynamic pricing” which allows them to monitor and alter the prices of goods due to changes in demand and supply. Similarly, Uber uses algorithms to adjust the price of car rides based on the demand for cab services and supply of drivers. Given its increasing use, firms’ use of algorithms has garnered the attention of antitrust regulatory authorities across jurisdictions. In India, the competition watchdog, Competition Commission of India (“CCI“) is conducting a study to understand and examine the algorithmic trends in the digital market and its antitrust implications. The use of these algorithms to fix prices might lead to unintended collusion of prices as similar prices are set across the board, leading to “tacit” collusion. How Algorithms can be used to Collude? According to Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke, there are four ways in which algorithms may be used for collusion. First, is the “Messenger” where specific algorithms are used to implement the will of humans beings who agree to collude.An example of this is the Poster Cartel case in which David Topkins, the founder of Poster Revolution and his co-conspirators were prosecuted by the US antitrust authorities for agreeing to price coordination by adopting specific algorithms for the sale of posters in the Amazon marketplace. The second type of algorithmic collusion is the “Hub and Spoke” where the same algorithm is adopted by the market players. In this type of collusion, the spokes are colluding competitors and hub is a facilitator of collusion by the spokes. There is a horizontal agreement among the spokes which is referred to as the rim as it connects the spokes. An example of this is United States v. Masonite Corp., in which Masonite, a patent-holder for hardboard entered into agency agreement with nine competitors to sell Masonite hardboards. According to the agency agreement each agent knew that others were entering into an identical agreement with Masonite. Thus, the Court inferred a horizontal agreement among the agents in this case. Third, in the case of “Predictable Agent” type of collusion, there is no agreement among competitors. Each firm unilaterally adopts its own pricing algorithm and they act as predictable agents who monitor and adjust to each other’s prices. Therefore, even though same algorithm is not used by the competitors, by programming algorithms to adjust to each other’s price, tacit collusion is affected. Fourth, is the “Digital Eye” collusion which involves machine learning algorithms who are not programmed to adjust to each other’s price or market data, but by virtue of self-learning, they collude on their own. According to an OECD Report, it is not clear how machine learning algorithms may reach a collusive outcome, however, once it has been asserted that the market conditions are prone to collusion, it is likely that algorithms learning faster than humans are able to achieve a cooperative equilibrium. Legal Framework Section 3(3) of the Indian Competition Act, 2002 (“the Act“) prohibits collusion. The Section has a broad scope as it includes both horizontal agreements as well as those practices which are done in a collusive manner. Section 3(3)can be broken down into three components: “agreement entered into”, “a practice carried on” or “decision taken”; by persons, an association of persons, enterprises or association of enterprises which directly or indirectly determines the purchase or sale prices; shall be presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition. Applying the Legal Framework to Algorithmic Express Collusion Express Collusion is when anti-competitive price is achieved through “direct and express communication” about an agreement. There exists a mutual understanding among the competitors in the market. Section 3(3) of the Act is applicable in the first two scenarios of “express collusion” which involve express collusion as the algorithm merely implements the collusive structure. The Messenger Scenario In this case, algorithms are employed to simply implement the anti-competitive agreements which have been previously entered into by the human market players. The programmers feed specific instructions to achieve collusive outcomes. Hence, these fall under “agreements” entered into by “persons”. The Hub and Spoke Scenario In the Eturas case, the Court of Justice of the European Union considered the coordination of discount rates by travel agencies through a third-party intermediary’s common electronic platform. The third-party intermediary, in this case, had sent a notice to the travel agencies to vote on discount rates. Even though no agent replied, the third party intermediary unilaterally limited the discount to 3%. The Court held that this behaviour would constitute a concerted practice under Article 101 of the TFEU. Following the Eturas Case, in case of usage of a common third party algorithm for price coordination, the persons infringing Section 3(3) of the Act can be held responsible. Applying the Legal Framework to Algorithmic Tacit Collusion Algorithms, without human interference, are capable of tacit collusion where a substantive part of the collusive agreement is achieved without express communication. A recent example of this is the sudden rise in airfares for flights between Delhi and Chandigarh during the Jat agitation. The rise in airfares was attributed to the collusion among self-learning algorithms. This has been a cause of concern among competition authorities. The Predictable Agent Scenario The act of programming algorithms in a certain way to meet market stimulants would amount to “action in concert” and “practice”. Further, for the predictable agent the

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Bringing Personal Guarantors under IBC: Individual Insolvency the Next Chapter?

[By Kartik Adlakha] The author is a fourth year student of Jindal Global Law School and can be reached at kartikadlakha.7@gmail.com. Introduction The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC” or “the Code”) is divided into three distinct parts. While Part I titled ‘Preliminary’ and Part II titled ‘Insolvency Resolution and Liquidation for Corporate Persons’ have been in effect for long. However, Part III titled ‘Insolvency Resolution and Bankruptcy for Individuals and Partnership Firms’ is yet to be brought into effect. Individuals and corporates are the two types of guarantors that usually guarantee a loan given to the corporate debtor. While corporate guarantors are already covered under Part II of IBC, personal guarantors find no place under IBC. Ministry for Corporate Affairs (“MCA”) is considering notifying and bringing Part III into effect in this regard. MCA and Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (“IBBI”) invited public comments on the Draft Regulations for Bankruptcy Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors. Draft Regulations for Bankruptcy Process for Personal Guarantors were published in a discussion paper by IBBI. Personal Guarantors being individuals would feature under Part III of the IBC. This blog post seeks to  present a comparative analysis between the current liquidation process for insolvent personal guarantors under Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (“RDDBFI Act”) and the process proposed under IBC. It also seeks to illustrate the pros and cons of the IBC process and will conclude with suggestions on how to make the process for individual insolvency better under IBC. Comparison between the Existing Legal Regime for Individual Guarantors and the Proposed Regime under IBC As of today, recovery from an individual guarantor is covered under the RDDBFI Act. The process under RDDBFI happens before the Debt Recovery Tribunals (“DRTs”). The Adjudicating authority under IBC as laid down by Section 179 would also be DRT but the proceedings would happen as per the new process envisaged under IBC. The process under the RDDBFI Act starts with an application to the DRT by a bank or financial institution under Section 19 of the Act which is to be accepted or rejected by the DRT within 30 days. If accepted, a summons is issued to the personal guarantor under Section 19(4) of the Act. The personal guarantor needs to submit a statement of defence as provided under Section 19(5) of the Act within 30 days of service of summons. Then, the Hearing for Admission or Denial of Documents takes place as specified under Section 19(5A) of the Act. The whole process concludes with the passing of the final order under Section 19(20) of the Act which has to be passed within 30 days from the conclusion of the hearing. A certificate of recovery is issued by the Presiding Officer with the Final Order as per Section 19(22) of the Act. The Presiding Officer then sends it to the Recovery Officer for Execution. The proposed process under IBC starts with a bankruptcy application to DRT by any individual creditor or debtor under Section 121 of the Code. Then on the direction of DRT, an Insolvency Professional will be appointed as the Bankruptcy Trustee by IBBI under Section 125 of the Code within 10 days. After this, DRT will pass a bankruptcy order under Section 126 of the Code within 14 days of receiving the confirmation of the appointment of the bankruptcy trustee under Section 125 of the Code. This order will vest all rights relating to the assets of the personal guarantor in the bankruptcy trustee until the bankruptcy process completes. This would follow a public notice by DRT inviting claims from creditors under Section 130 within 10 days from the bankruptcy commencement date (“BCD”). BCD is the date on which Bankruptcy Order has been passed. This would follow registration of claims under Section 131 of the Code and preparation of a list of creditors under Section 132 of the Code by the Bankruptcy Trustee. Post this, a meeting of creditors will be called by the Bankruptcy Trustee within 21 days from the BCD. As per Section 136, Administration and Distribution of Estate of Bankrupt will follow. After completion of administration and distribution, a final report has to be submitted by the bankruptcy trustee to the committee of creditors. The committee of creditors will have to approve the report and judge whether the bankruptcy trustee be released under Section 148 of the Code or not. The process will come to an end with the Bankruptcy Trustee applying for a discharge order under Section 138 of the Code which would release bankrupt from all bankruptcy debt. Need and Importance of Draft Regulations These regulations provide for a level playing field for recovery from both corporate and individual guarantors by bringing personal guarantors under IBC. They also promote transparency and accountability as they provide for regular reports by the Bankruptcy Trustee [i] in addition to the final report requirement under IBC. Voting process and guidelines for sale of bankrupt’s assets is also delineated under these proposed regulations. However the most important element of individual insolvency put forth by the regulations is the concept of minimum protection. The regulations elucidate that up to 5 lakh rupees of personal ornaments and a single dwelling unit would come under excluded assets and will not be subject to the bankruptcy proceedings. Working Group on Individual Insolvency, a group constituted by IBBI to recommend the strategy and approach for implementation of the provisions of the Code has proposed an all-encompassing formula for calculation of the single dwelling unit. This formula takes into account the size of the debtor’s family, the minimum area required for each family member and the circle rate of the area. This is important as it indicates that the Working Group is sensitive to the fact that individuals and not corporations are at stake here, and they do need minimum assets for their survival. However, it is felt that the upper limit of personal ornament protection is quite less and should at

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The Corporate Responsibility Report: Showing Government The Right Way?

[By Jayesh Karnawat] The author is a fourth year student of National Law University, Jodhpur and can be reached at jkarnawat19@gmail.com. Introduction Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his speech on the 73rd Independence Day of India asserted that wealth creators of the nation must be respected. He further said that these wealth creators must not be eyed with suspicion as they play a pivotal role in building that nation’s economy. However, the recent amendments in the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter “the Act”) do not reflect this approach. Through the recent Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 (hereinafter “2019 Amendment”), a stricter regime for complying with Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) obligations have been put in place. In this backdrop, a Committee headed by Mr Injeti Srinivas, Secretary, Corporate affairs submitted a report on August 14, 2019[i], highlighting the much-needed changes in the CSR regime. However, due to a severe backlash from the big corporations including India Inc.,[ii] the government has decided to take a few steps back and not to proceed with some of the clauses of the CSR amendment [iii] as introduced in the Amending Act. The Recent 2019 Amendment The newly passed 2019 Amendment compels companies to mandatorily spend the CSR funds within 3 years. In case the fund is not spent, the Companies have to mandatorily transfer the unspent funds in an account called “Unspent CSR Funds Account” post which, it will be spent on Schedule VII funds including Prime Minister’s Relief Fund. The Amendment also provides for penalty consequences in form of imprisonment of company officials up to three years and fine ranging from Rs 50,000 up to Rs 25 lakh for non-compliance of its CSR. In the backdrop of the recent 2019 Amendment, the Committee, which was set up to review the existing framework pertaining to CSR and further boosting its objectives, made several recommendations to the Central Government enumerated below. Some Important Recommendations Made by the Committee Are [iv] The Committee suggested that the obligation to comply with CSR norms should include within its ambit, apart from companies, Limited Liability Partnerships (which are also within the purview of MCA) along with Banks registered under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Moreover, the Committee mooted for including all the other profit-making entities operating under other specific statutes on mutatis mutandis If this proposal is accepted, it will reduce CSR obligation to be akin to a tax obligation. The Committee also recommended that clarification must be issued for the applicability of CSR obligation on newly incorporated companies. According to the Committee, rule of harmonious construction should be applied while reading sections 135(1) & 135(2) of the Act and therefore the obligation for the company should commence after it has been incorporated for a minimum of three years, which would also be in line with Ease of Doing Business objective of the government. This will give the Companies some breathing space to establish itself in the market. Otherwise, mandatory CSR obligation for new companies will act as a burden on them and hampers their growth. Once again, the Committee stressed on the need of making tax treatment for different activities uniform. It proposed allowing CSR expenditure as a tax-deductible expenditure. This would act as an incentive for the companies to undertake such activities. If this long-awaited recommendation-cum-demand is accepted, it would reduce the outgo on CSR from 2% to 0.67%. [v] Since most of the companies eligible for contributing to CSR activities have a threshold of Rs 50 lakhs, the Committee suggested that in order to reduce operational cost, the mandatory requirement of constituting a CSR committee must be done away with for such companies. The function of the CSR Committee can be performed by the Board itself. This will prove to be a major relief for small companies which do not have large quantum of funds to have a specialized committee to advise and assist in this expenditure. This move would not only save the expenditure incurred by the company on such committees, but also prove to be efficient. The Committee adopted a balanced approach while deliberating upon adequate punishment for non-compliance of CSR provisions. The Committee acknowledged that a mere statement of the reason for non-compliance is not enough, and there must be a substantive justification for the same. However, there must not be any imprisonment for the non-compliance. There can be a penalty which is twice or thrice the amount of default with a maximum cap of Rs 1 crore. In simple words, the offence shall be de-criminalized and shall be made a civil offence. Recently the government had planned to criminalise any default in complying with the provisions of CSR. This approach came in the backdrop of certain statistics which showed that company have slowly started to improve its CSR spending records. Statistics reveal that in last five years, CSE expenditure has increased from 70% to 90%.[vi] However, as stated above, this step of the government faced severe backlash from market players and forced the government to do away with this plan. Discussing the issue of time limit for the completion of the project, the Committee believed that mandating a company to incur CSR expenditure within a year without even considering the financial and technical challenges will not lead to desirable outcomes. It should be based on the nature of projects, gestation period, flexibility of the project. Considering this, the Committee suggested that the unspent amount and the interest thereon be spent within 3-5 years. The Committee recommended that the practice of contributing the amount mandated by CSR obligation to Central Government funds as specified in Schedule VII of the Companies Act be discontinued since it undermines the entire objective of CSR which is to ensure that business efficiencies and innovation could be used to the best interest of the society. The Committee suggested that it should be made mandatory for companies having a CSR obligation of Rs 5 crore or more for a period of 3 preceding financial years to undertake need and impact studies for their CSR activities. It

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Position of Corporate Social Responsibility in India and the Companies Amendment, 2019

[By Parth Tyagi and Achyutam S. Bhatnagar] The authors are third year students of NLIU Bhopal and NLU Orissa respectively. Meaning and Provisions of Corporate Social Responsibility The list of activities comprising Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) in Schedule VII of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter “the Act”) is inclusive and not exhaustive as it contains the phrase “such other matters as maybe prescribed”. However it does not give absolute discretion to Companies to include any activity as a part of their CSR policy. The Companies are mandated to adhere to activities mentioned in Schedule VII. An affidavit issued by Ministry of Corporate Affairs in Mohd. Ahmed v. Union of India defined CSR as an activity carried out by a Company covered under Schedule VII, which forms a part of its core business, if not done with a profit motive. [i] CSR as a concept involves an initiative by which, a company evaluates and takes responsibility for its impact on environment [ii] and social welfare. India is one of the few countries to have a law dedicated to CSR. [iii] No other country, except India had given CSR a mandatory legal character. [iv] Section 135 of the Act dealing with CSR makes the compliance of CSR mandatory, if, the Company has a net worth of Rs.500 crore or more, or a turnover of  Rs.1000 crore or more, or net profit of  Rs.5 crore or more during any financial year. [v] CSR Policy and Responsibilities of the Board in Relation to CSR The Companies that fall within the scope of the above three criteria are mandated to set up a CSR Committee with a minimum of 3 directors; with at least one of them being an independent director. In case of an unlisted or a private company, 2 directors are sufficient and there is no need of an independent director.[vi] The law further defines functions of the CSR committee. The committee is required to set up a mechanism regarding CSR and give their recommendations to the Board, indicating suggested CSR activities mentioned in schedule VII for implementation. The amount to be spent upon CSR activities is also decided by way of recommendations to the Board. Additionally one of the important purposes of CSR committee is to oversee the policy and review and revise it if needed.[vii] The Board, by acting as an approving body for CSR policy[viii] also plays an important role in carrying out CSR. The Act also provides for monitoring of the initiatives and projects under the CSR policy. The policy is to be included in the Director’s report [ix] as well as the steps taken in furtherance of it so far.[x] In the case of Meenakshi Textiles v. ROC, Tamil Nadu [xi]the Company was directed to carry out its CSR obligations as it had a net profit of more than 5 crores but somehow represented that it had profits in negative by deducting losses two times. The Tribunal, in its order mentioned that the appellant company was liable for not forming a CSR committee and therefore not carrying out its CSR obligations. The role of the board, as defined under Companies Act goes as far as to ensure the manifestation of the CSR policy on the website of the Company as well as to ensure that the company spends at least 2% of the average net profits made during the 3 financial years immediately preceding in pursuance of the policy (net profits to be calculated as per Section 198).[xii] During the expenditure of CSR funds, local areas should be preferred in the vicinity of the Company. The reasons for not spending the amount, if any should be mentioned in the Director’s report.[xiii] Funds spent on CSR engagements should be disclosed as a note in the profit and loss statement. Implementation of CSR Companies can act directly or through Trusts/ Societies or Section 8 companies operating in India and set up by it.[xiv] They can also enter into collaborations for CSR projects with other companies, provided, the collaborating companies report the CSR activities as per the CSR Rules, 2014. Section 134 (8) of the Act contains provisions for liability in case of non-compliance. In the matter of M/s. Celsia Hotels Private Limited,[xv] a petition regarding compounding of offence under Section 134 (3) (o) of the Act was made. The Tribunal directed the Company and erring directors to pay Rs. 25 lakhs and Rs. 5 lakhs respectively. Similar orders were issued in the matter of matter of Rapid Estates Private Limited [xvi]. Generally, the Tribunal imposes a compounding fee [xvii] rather than ordering imprisonment in case of contravention or non-compliance. The tribunal can also order utilization of CSR funds collected in a previous financial year if not already utilized.[xviii] In Coastal Gujarat Power Ltd. v Gujarat Urja Vikas and Ors.,[xix]wherein the Ministry of Environment and Forest issued a notification according to which companies were supposed to carry out CSR activities irrespective of whether they were making profits or not; Central Electricity Regulatory Commission held that the provisions of Companies Act, 2013 already had rules regarding CSR which mandated that the company had to be in profit to carry out CSR activities. Exceptions Activities or campaigns carried out in exclusivity for families of employees or the employees themselves do not fall under the ambit of CSR, nor does any money contributed towards any political party comprise CSR.[xx] Consequences of the Companies (Amendment), 2019 According to the recent Companies (Amendment), 2019 (“Amendment”), companies are allowed to transfer the money they fail to spend in a year to an “unspent CSR account” from which they can draw within the next three years to spend on CSR activities. If a company is still unable to spend the amount within that period, it can transfer it to a government fund specified under Schedule VII of the Act, such as the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund, failing which the penal provisions would be invoked.[xxi] The imprisonment clause is the most condemned clause of this new Amendment.  The amended clause provides for imprisonment of every officer of the

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Amendment to Section 34 of the Arbitration Act: A Desirable Change?

[By Arnav Maru] The author is a fourth year student of MNLU Mumbai. Recently in 2019, both houses of the Parliament passed a Bill to amend the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”). While the Bill is a successor to its 2018 counterpart, it comes with minimal additions and improvements. This blog post focuses on the amendment sought for section 34 of the Act. Section 34 deals with the setting aside of an arbitral award by a court. Sub-section (1) of Section 34 states that an award may only be set aside on an application being made for the same in accordance with sub-sections (2) and (3). Sub-section 2, under its two clauses, creates two categories for proceeding with such an application. Under the first, the court will set aside an award if “the party making the application furnishes proof that ..” Under the second, the inquiry is left up to the court by the use of the phrase “the court finds that …” The amendment changes the phrase under clause (a) from “furnishes proof that” to “establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that”. This change materially alters the scope of the inquiry undertook pursuant to the applications under Section 34. As has been noted by scholars, the arbitral process battles the paradox of seeking help from the same public authorities whose inefficiencies it seeks to escape. Since, section 34 is the sole recourse for seeking judicial intervention in the post-award stage, it needs to strike a fine balance between relying on the judicial system and escaping its various vices. Does the amendment go a step forward in doing so? The change in phrasing of section 34 means that the court will now have to decide the challenge to the enforcement of the award, solely based on the record of the arbitral tribunal. This would drastically reduce the time taken to dispose a suit, since the judge need only go over the material already available, and not wait for a lengthy evidence production phase of a civil suit. It would also ensure that delaying tactics, which are often employed by advocates in India, do not impede the arbitral process by guaranteeing a summary proceeding. However, the rigid wording of the amended section may also prevent a legitimate claim in succeeding. The grounds listed under sub section 2 of clause 34 might require extrinsic evidence to be produced to prove certain facts that could not have formed a part of the record of the tribunal. Incapacity of a party, inability of a party to suitably present its case, or the impartiality of an arbitrator may not always be apparent on the face of the record of the tribunal. An absolute embargo on the production of evidence would prove detrimental to genuine claims, based on wholly external facts. The amendment slightly deviates from a uniform line of judicial reasoning. Starting with the 2004 cases of the Delhi High Court in Sandeep Kumar v. Dr. Ashok Hans [i] and Sial Bioenergie v. SBEC Systems, [ii] the judicial position was that there was no rigid requirement of allowing parties to lead oral evidence in section 34 cases. In 2009, Fiza Developers & Inter-trade Pvt. Ltd. v. AMCI (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.[iii] laid down that the proceedings under section 34 are non-adversarial, summary proceedings, and need not follow the procedure of a civil suit, as under the Code of Civil Procedure. The court noted that the parties can file evidence by way of affidavit, and that cross-examination of such evidence may be permitted if the court deems it desirable. In deciding that issues need not be framed by a court, the judgement laid down that the procedure may be varied depending on the facts of a particular case. The same position was restated and resounded in the landmark 2018 case of M/s Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd. v. Girdhar Sondhi [iv]. The Supreme Court concluded, while interpreting the phrase “furnishes proof”, that the proceedings will ordinarily be conducted based on the record of the tribunal, save the cases that demand the appreciation of certain other evidence. While, the amendment is pursuant to the recommendations of the Shrikriashna Committee Report, and in tandem with the general scheme of the Act, inviting minimal judicial intervention to the arbitral process, it has disturbed a rather stable area of the Act and introduced a change not completely warranted in the present situation. The amendment would give the overburdened courts an easy way out of re-appreciating significant and relevant evidence. The prevailing judicial position struck the perfect balance between doing justice to a legitimate applicant and ensuring speedy disposal of cases. This insignificant looking amendment may lead to a significant change in the jurisprudence underlying section 34 and reduce the essential flexibility of procedure required in these cases. Endnotes [i] 2004 SCC OnLine Del 106. [ii] 2004 SCC OnLine Del 863. [iii] (2009) 17 SCC 796. [iv] Civil Appeal No. 8367 of 2018.

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Deconstructing the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Arbitrators’ Fee

[By Anshritha Rai] The author is a fifth year student at ILS Law College Pune. In a recent landmark decision of Supreme Court in the case of Gammon Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. v. NHAI [i], it was held that where the arbitrators’ fee is already fixed by agreement, section 31(8) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter “the Act”) is inapplicable. Section 31(8) of the Act provides power to the arbitral tribunal to fix costs of arbitration in accordance with Section 31A of the same Act.   Facts of the case In the instant case, an arbitration clause was invoked by Gammon Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (“Appellant”) pursuant to a contract entered into between the Appellant and NHAI (“Respondent”). Vide the contract, the parties had agreed on the fee payable to the arbitral tribunal (“Tribunal”). The fee structure was fixed as per the Respondent’s policy circulars. The Tribunal, however, passed an order stating that the fees shall be governed by the Fourth Schedule (“Fourth Schedule”) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Respondent, against this order, filed an application before the Tribunal to review its decision. In National Highways Authority of India v. Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Limited [ii], the Delhi High Court had held that the arbitral tribunal is competent to fix the fees notwithstanding the agreement between the parties. Relying on this judgment, the Tribunal dismissed the Respondent’s application. Aggrieved by this, the Respondent sought to terminate the mandate of the Tribunal. Accordingly, an application under section 14 of the Act was filed before the Delhi High Court (“Court”). The Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Fourth Schedule was not required to be mandatorily followed. Further, the dictum laid down in Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Limited was declared to be per incuriam. Thereafter, the Appellant challenged this decision before the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition. Issues framed by the Court (i) Whether the fee structure stipulated in the Fourth Schedule supersedes the fee fixed by agreement? (ii) Whether the termination ordered by the Delhi High Court is sustainable? Judgment Issue (i) The Supreme Court noted that the fee structure was mutually agreed between the parties. It was further observed that considering the time gap between the date of the agreement and the date of the disputes, the fee schedule was naturally bound to be updated. Section 31(8) of the Arbitration Act [iii] originally stated that “unless otherwise agreed by the parties”, the arbitral tribunal is competent to fix the costs of an arbitration. The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 omitted the expression “unless otherwise agreed by the parties” appearing in Section 31(8). The deletion of this expression was understood in Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Limited case to mean that the rates specified in the Fourth Schedule takes primacy over any agreement between the parties. However, the Court disagreed with the decision in Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Limited. The reason for this was that the judgment in that case had not taken the 246th Law Commission Report and relevant earlier decisions into due consideration. The apex court too found that the ratio laid down in Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Limited is not a correct view of the law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court overruled the judgment in the case of Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Limited. The Court had also observed that section 31(8) of the Arbitration Act governs costs, of which the arbitrators’ fee is only a component. In other words, section 31(8) deals with costs in general, and not the fee payable to the arbitrators. It was noted that section 31(8) will not apply if the fee is already fixed by agreement. The Supreme Court concurred with these findings. The rates stipulated in the Respondent’s circular dated 01.06.2017 was ultimately held to govern the fee schedule. Consequently, the apex court clarified that the arbitrators are entitled to charge their fees in accordance with the Respondent’s circular, and not the Fourth Schedule. Issue (ii) The division bench of the Supreme Court found that the Delhi High Court had erroneously terminated the mandate of the tribunal. The apex court affirmed that the tribunal was required to comply with the Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Limited decision which mandated that not the agreement, but the Fourth Schedule would apply. In light of this, the Supreme Court noted that the arbitrators cannot be said to have done anything wrong. The court reasoned that an arbitrator does not become de jure unable to perform his/her functions on account of having followed the law laid down by a court. On this account, the Supreme Court quashed the termination order. Analysis In the past, there have been instances of placing reliance on the fee structure mentioned in the Fourth Schedule notwithstanding that the parties have agreed otherwise. Vide its judgment, the Supreme Court has provided much-needed clarity on whether the rates specified in the Fourth Schedule overrides the fee structure mutually agreed between the parties. The agreement entered into between the parties has been given utmost importance under the judgment. This decision underpins the principle of party autonomy and sanctity of the contract entered into between the parties. In Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Limited, the Delhi High Court essentially permitted an arbitral tribunal to determine its fees irrespective of an agreement between the parties. By overruling this decision, the Supreme Court has given immense weightage to freedom of the parties. The apex court has set a precedent that the Fourth Schedule of the Act is not mandatory, but merely suggestive in nature. Arbitrators cannot demand that the Fourth Schedule shall be applicable unless the parties have mutually agreed to invoke the provision. Needless to say, the pro-arbitration approach adopted by the Supreme Court will be hailed by prospective litigants. It is now necessary for courts to set out guidelines applicable to parties when determining the fee structure. However, a matter of concern is when the agreed fee schedule is unacceptable to the arbitrator. In such a situation, the mandate is likely to be rejected by the arbitrators,

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Arbitrability of IPR Disputes in India: Time for the Legislature to Step Up

[By Saumitra Shrivastava] The author is a fifth year student of NLU Raipur. Introduction The issue of arbitrability of intellectual property rights (hereinafter “IPR”) disputes has always been a subject of great speculation and interest. This is partially because of the massive role of IPR in the world of commerce which eventually leads to a significant number of disputes. For a healthy functioning economy, it is imperative to resolve these disputes as soon as possible. This has necessitated the Indian courts, over the time, to acknowledge the arbitrability of a class of these disputes and reject the blanket ban on arbitration of same. This post analyses the position of Indian law and proposes certain amendments to Indian laws in order to clear the air on the issue of arbitrability of IPR disputes. Indian legal position on arbitrability of IPR disputes The first time the Indian courts dealt with this question was in Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v SBI Home Finance Ltd.(2011) where the Supreme Court gave a framework popularly known as “Booz Allen Framework” to determine the arbitrability of any dispute. It states, when the dispute is based on assertion of rights in personam, it is arbitrable. Otherwise, it is not. It further held: ‘Every civil or commercial dispute, either contractual or non-contractual, and which can be decided by a court, is in principle capable of being adjudicated and resolved by arbitration unless it is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication.’ Though the arbitrability of IPR disputes was not in issue, the Supreme Court included ‘disputes of patent, trademarks and copyright’ in category of ‘generally non-arbitrable disputes’. Since the question was not an issue of the case, it is argued that the above conclusion was an obiter dicta and not ratio decidendi. In Mundipharma AG Vs. Wockhardt Ltd., the Delhi HC categorically held that where copyright in any work is infringed, the remedies by way of injunction damages, account and otherwise as are or may be conferred by law for the infringement of such a right, cannot be subject-matter of arbitration. In IPRS v. Entertainment Network , the Bombay High Court set aside that part of award in which the arbitrator decided upon validity of copyright subsisting in one of the parties. Later, in Vikas Sales Corp, the Supreme Court held that these rights can be included in definition of movable property and are rights in rem. This reasoning would essentially make the Booz Allen Framework conclude that all IPR disputes are inarbitrable. However, in the landmark Eros v. Telemax (which has been followed in many subsequent cases), the Bombay HC allowed the arbitration of IPR disputes given they are contractual. It is to be noted that although Booz Allen Framework provided for adjudication of both ‘contractual as well as non-contractual disputes, of commercial/civil nature or those which are not barred by express or implied provision,’ yet in this case, the HC added a qualifier ‘contractual’ for adjudication of IPR disputes, thus contradicting the Supreme Court’s stance. These judgments show that the judiciary has been quite unable to provide a clear position of law on the issue. Coming to the statutory position of law in India, section 2(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides that: ‘This part (which deals with domestic arbitration) shall not affect any other law for the time being in force by virtue of which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration.’ Since Indian laws (including IPR laws) do not provide for any exhaustive list as to which disputes are arbitrable and which are not, it depends significantly upon the courts to decide upon arbitrability of the matter, giving courts discretionary power to adjudicate upon the same. Different Courts are either giving contradictory decisions or they are giving the same decisions with different reasoning, thus rendering the law not just unclear but also ambiguous. How do foreign jurisdictions approach the afore-said issue? The issue of arbitrability of these disputes has been dealt by different countries in different ways. Some countries almost put a blanket ban on it while some allow full arbitrability subject to a very small set of conditions. But most of the countries remain somewhere in the middle. For instance, Spain allows arbitration of disputes involving registration of trademarks with exceptions. Akin to India, several national legal systems like Germany and France traditionally reject the arbitrability of disputes concerning the validity of registered IP rights but have been moving towards arbitrability of contractual IPR disputes in the last few decades. Hong Kong (Amendment) Ordinance 2017 The government of Hong Kong brought the Hong Kong (Amendment) Ordinance in 2017, which adds a whole part (Part 11A) namely ‘Arbitration Relating to Intellectual Property Rights’. Part 11A provides that an IPR disputes are capable of settlement by arbitration as between the parties to the IPR dispute [i]. It further provides that the subject matter of a dispute is not incapable of settlement by arbitration under the law of Hong Kong, nor the award out of arbitration is against the public policy of Hong Kong only because the subject matter/award relates to an IPR disputes [ii]. Similar developments have been seen in countries like Switzerland, United States and Israel. Unnecessary litigation due to unsettled law on the issue According to a noted international scholar, Francis Russell, the question of arbitrability can arise at three stages of arbitration. In India, these are akin to the following sections of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act“): (i) Application to stay arbitration (Section 8); (ii) Application to question the authority of the tribunal to entertain the subject matter of arbitration (Section 16); and (iii) Application to set aside the award (Section 34). In absence of a clear law and multiple opinions of the Supreme Court and various High Courts of India, Section 8 of the Act rarely bars all arbitral proceedings on the ground of non-arbitrability of the subject matter (which are later proved not arbitrable after lengthy litigation proceedings). The arbitral tribunal under Section 16 of the

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