Author name: CBCL

Omission of Interim Moratorium from CIRP : A Dark Cloud Looming over Indian Insolvency Regime

[By Mohak Agarwal & Hemang Mankar] The authors are students at National Law University, Jodhpur.   GoFirst Insolvency: A tug of war with the lessors The recent case of GoFirst Airlines’ Insolvency has highlighted certain significant issues in the Indian Insolvency law regime. The tug of war between the airline and the lessors commenced on May 2, 2023, when GoFirst filed for voluntary insolvency proceedings under Section 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code [“Code”]. As soon as the insolvency application was filed, certain aircraft lessors terminated the lease agreement in order to seek repossession of the leased aircrafts. Subsequently, on May 5, the lessors invoked the Irrevocable Deregistration and Export Request Authorization [“IDERA”] and applied to Directorate General of Civil Aviation [“DGCA”] for deregistration and repossession of the leased aircrafts. IDERA confers an exclusive right on the lessors to effect deregistration of the aircraft and its export from India. It is a part of the Cape Town Convention [“CTC”], to which India is a signatory. The entire process has to be completed within 5 working days. However, before the elapse of 5 working days, the Adjudicating Authority [“AA”], on May 10, admitted the application and declared a moratorium under Section 14 of the Code. This led to a situation wherein though the lease agreement was terminated before the declaration of moratorium, the possession of the planes remained with GoFirst since the deregistration process could not be completed. The question of whether the possession of the leased planes would rest with the Corporate Debtor [“CD”] or with the lessors is still a debatable proposition and largely depends on the interpretation of Section 14(1)(d) of the Code that prohibits the recovery of property by the lessor which is in the possession of the CD. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that had the AA been late even by a couple of days, the lessors would have succeeded in securing repossession of the aircrafts and would have severely impacted the revival prospects of GoFirst. This threat has been averted, at least for now. However, this incident raises serious concerns over the present Insolvency regime and the possibility of the creditors rushing to secure their assets in the period between the date of filing and the date of admission, thus potentially trapping the CD in an irrecoverable state. Absence of Interim Moratorium: An Achilles Heel? The absence of an Interim Moratorium in the Indian insolvency regime raises significant concerns and poses a troubling scenario akin to an impending storm that threatens to disrupt the insolvency process of distressed companies. Although the Code stipulates that the AA should admit a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process [“CIRP”] application within 14 days of its filing (Section 7(4), 9(5), and 10(4) of the Code), the pre-admission stage is often plagued by substantial delays. According to the 2021 IBBI Survey on CIRP Timelines, the AA took an average of 133 days to make a decision from the filing date of a CIRP application. This protracted delay is troubling as it incentivizes syphoning off assets by promoters and/or encourages creditors to rush and enforce their debts, undermining the collective and value-maximising insolvency resolution process envisioned by the Code. In cases such as NUI Pulp and Paper Industries, and F.M. Hammerle Textiles, the Appellate Tribunal granted an interim moratorium when there was a reasonable apprehension of asset misappropriation. This underscores the pressing need for the incorporation of an interim moratorium into the Code through an amendment. Such an amendment is crucial to prevent a scenario where a distressed company’s assets are syphoned off even before the commencement of a moratorium, which would ultimately defeat the fundamental objectives of the Code. Therefore, it is imperative to address this gap in the Indian insolvency regime promptly to safeguard the integrity and effectiveness of the insolvency resolution process. Fixing the loophole: A global perspective The GoFirst case has highlighted a prominent issue in the Indian Insolvency regime that warrants attention. If the leading foreign jurisdictions are perused, majority of them provide for an interim moratorium at the time of filing the insolvency application. For instance, in Singapore, Section 64(14) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 [“IRDA”] imposes an automatic 30-day moratorium as soon as an application for Judicial Management is filed. Within these 30 days, the Court schedules a first hearing in order to review the status of the moratorium. Even before the passing of IRDA, Section 227C of the Companies Act, Singapore provided for a moratorium beginning from the date of filing of the application. In the UK, Section 44(1) of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act, 1986 provides for an interim moratorium from the time of making the administration application till the time a decision is made with regards to the appointment of an administrator. Similarly, in the USA, Section 362 of the US Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic moratorium upon the filing of a Chapter 11 petition. The purpose behind these provisions is twofold: (i) to prevent individual creditors from taking action against the CD and hampering its prospects of revival; (ii) to prevent the CD’s management from siphoning off its assets. Thus, the existence of an interim moratorium ensures that none of the stakeholders maliciously work towards securing their own welfare and protects their collective well-being by keeping the restructuring and revival prospects of the CD alive. These regimes have also taken the interests of creditors into consideration. This is important because during the pre-admission stage, the control is still vested in the CD’s erstwhile management which creates an exorbitant room for misuse. In the USA, the automatic moratorium could be lifted upon the application by secured creditors for appropriate cause, including the case wherein the debtor company has not ‘adequately protected’ the property interests of the creditor during the moratorium period. Even in the UK, sufficient power has been granted to the court to lift the moratorium in order to check the misuse. The Saga of Interim Moratorium: Tracing the history Let’s look back at the

Omission of Interim Moratorium from CIRP : A Dark Cloud Looming over Indian Insolvency Regime Read More »

GoFirst’s Insolvency Enigma: Untangling Complex Issues and Examining Future Ramifications

[By Biprojeet Talapatra] The author is a student of Campus Law Centre, University of Delhi.   Introduction Leasing-in of aircrafts by aviation businesses is extremely prevalent across the world, and according to projections, about half of the commercial aircrafts that fly the world’s skies are leased by the companies. Aviation companies enjoy considerable operational flexibility and financial advantages through aircraft leasing. In India, approximately 80% of the commercial fleet is obtained through leasing, a significantly higher percentage compared to the global average of 53%. According to a February 2021 report on ‘Aircraft leasing in India: Ready to take off,’ auditing major PwC said the size of the global aircraft leasing industry was estimated to be $290.07 billion in 2019. Aircraft lessors have seen their share in the total commercial fleet grow globally from 25 percent in 2000 to 48.9 percent in 2020. In light of this context, the recent decision of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) has triggered alarm signals among international lessors. In the case of SMBC Aviation Capital v. Interim Resolution Professional of Go Airlines (India), Abhilash Lal, the NCLAT rendered its verdict, affirming the National Company Law Tribunal’s (NCLT) decision to admit the application under Section 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (Code), granting defaulters the ability to initiate voluntary insolvency proceedings. As part of this ruling, the NCLT also imposed a moratorium, marking a critical turning point with far-reaching consequences for the aircraft leasing landscape in India. Background Go Airlines (India) Limited, which has since been rebranded as GoFirst, operated as a low-cost airline. However, the company faced significant financial challenges, resulting in defaults in payments to aircraft lessors, amounting to a staggering INR 2,660 crores. In response to the mounting financial strain, the corporate debtor (CD), GoFirst, opted to file for voluntary insolvency under Section 10 of the Code with the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). Operational creditors, representing the aircraft lessors, opposed the insolvency application, asserting that it was driven by fraudulent and malicious intent. Moreover, the creditors expressed concern over the absence of prior notice, depriving them of the opportunity to object to the application. The NCLT held that no specific law requires creditors to be notified when filing an application for voluntary insolvency. Furthermore, when ruling on the matter of opposing the application under Section 65 of the Code, which deals with fraudulent insolvency initiation, the NCLT found that the same may be dealt with once the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was initiated. As a result, the CD was subject to the moratorium established by Section 14 of the Code. In response to the lessors’ appeal, the appellate body NCLAT issued held that there is an established legal precedent and legislative provisions that the NCLT is obligated to allow the application if the NCLT is persuaded that there is a debt and default and if the Corporate Applicant has completed the conditions stipulated in Section 10(3). Before the application is approved, the Corporate Applicant is not required to issue notice to creditors and allow them to express their concerns with the NCLT. As a result, the NCLAT correctly affirmed the NCLT’s ruling. Exploring the Dynamics of Aircraft Leasing in the Context of Insolvency Aircraft leasing is characterized by a significant volume of cross-border transactions, necessitating the implementation of principles that safeguard the rights of lessors. The Cape Town Convention (CTC), officially titled the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, stands as a pivotal international agreement specifically focused on regulating aircraft leasing and related matters. Its provisions are designed to ensure the protection and interests of lessors in such transactions. Within the Aircraft Protocol of the Cape Town Convention (CTC), Article XI introduces essential provisions that offer creditors two viable options. Firstly, they may reclaim possession of the aircraft after the waiting period expires. Alternatively, the insolvency administrator can decide to either surrender the aircraft or continue utilizing it while fulfilling lease payments as per the existing lease agreement. Moreover, both the debtor and the administrator are obligated to uphold the equipment’s value. These measures have been established to ensure the protection of creditors’ rights without imposing any orders or actions that could hinder the creditors’ exercise of remedies. The two alternatives presented to creditors under Article XI enhance the flexibility and efficiency of dealing with leased aircraft during insolvency proceedings. This allows for a balanced approach that safeguards both creditors’ interests and the continued operation of aircraft assets. Analysis of the Verdict The moratorium was imposed, which is intended to protect the assets of the debtor and maintain the status quo while the insolvency proceedings are underway. The imposition of a moratorium implies that aircraft lessors are prohibited from repossessing the leased aircraft for a minimum period of six months, which may potentially extend further. Unfortunately, such delays in resolving debt-ridden companies can lead to a depreciation in the value of the aircraft. Moreover, during this period, the aircraft will remain grounded and unused, preventing them from being leased to more financially robust airlines. This delay in resolution has a well-established impact on diminishing the value of the corporate debtor’s (CD) assets and obstructing successful resolution efforts. Additionally, creditors, aside from the lessors, may also seize the aircraft to recover their outstanding dues. In the case of Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Mr. Amit Gupta & Ors., the Supreme Court has established a significant precedent. The court ruled that terminating a contract solely due to a company entering insolvency proceedings, which could potentially lead to the demise of the corporate debtor, should not be allowed. It emphasized that such terminations must be prohibited to safeguard the interests of the corporate debtor during insolvency. It is important to note a distinguishing aspect in the current case where lease agreements were terminated before the initiation of the CIRP against the Corporate Applicant. These terminations were made in anticipation of the probable initiation of insolvency proceedings and the subsequent enforcement of the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency

GoFirst’s Insolvency Enigma: Untangling Complex Issues and Examining Future Ramifications Read More »

Taxation of Cryptocurrencies as Rewards from Online Gaming

[By Tanya Verma] The author is a student of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University.   INTRODUCTION In the Budget 2022, the Finance Minister introduced a provision to impose income tax at a rate of 30% on profits obtained from the transfer of virtual digital assets (VDAs), although a clear provision still lacks, an attempt to shed clarity on VDAs and their exchange has been made. To that, this piece provides an in-depth analysis of the tax implications surrounding direct and indirect taxation, specifically focusing on the complexities involved in determining the taxable nature of winnings, including digital assets such as bitcoins and tokens, that are received as rewards from online games. Further, the article explores legal literature surrounding the skill-chance dichotomy inherent in online gaming and contributes to the existing discourse around technology driven transactions as rewards. VDAs UNDER INCOME TAX ACT Previously, income earned from cryptocurrencies was taxable based on the nature of the activity. Individuals involved in cryptocurrency investment were taxed under Income from Capital Gains or Income from Other Sources, as per IRS provisions. On the other hand, individuals engaged in cryptocurrency trading were taxed under Income from Business/Profession. However, this classification changed with the introduction of the Finance Bill, 2022.The author believes, considering the unique characteristics of online gaming in India and the necessity for specific regulations regarding taxation, the government has taken steps to address this, however a clear framework still lacks. In terms of income tax, if an individual sells bitcoins received as gaming rewards, the resulting gains would be taxable. The tax treatment of these gains can vary depending on the intent of the individual, whether they classify the gains as business income or capital gains. Previously, there was no dedicated provision for the taxation of online gaming. Instead, Section 194B of the Income Tax Act (ITA) was applied, which dealt with TDS deduction by person who is “responsible for paying to any person any income by way of winnings from any lottery or crossword puzzle or card game and other game of any sort in an amount exceeding ten thousand rupees.” Additionally, Section 194BB covered TDS deduction for horse racing and wagering. Furthermore, Section 115BB of the Act imposed a 30% tax rate on winnings. Though these provisions existed, it failed to provide an exact framework involving technology driven transactions or a settled position of earnings from games, be it that of skill or of chance. The Finance Bill 2023 introduces two new sections under ITA to regulate winnings from online gaming: Section 115BBJ: This section states that net winnings from online games will be subject to a 30% tax rate, effective from April 1, 2023. Section 194BA: This section mandates the deduction of tax at source at a rate of 30% on winnings from online games, effective from July 1, 2023. Together, these provisions signify the government’s intent to establish a comprehensive framework for taxing and regulating winnings from online gaming. The introduction of specific tax rates and the requirement of tax deduction at source aim to facilitate better monitoring, compliance, and revenue generation in the evolving landscape of online gaming, primarily under direct taxation provisions. VDAs UNDER GOODS AND SERVICES TAX (GST) GST Act lays no specific definition for cryptocurrencies or digital assets, new provisions provide that VDAs cannot be classified as money or securities and are considered as goods for GST purposes. Additionally, the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) has opined that cryptocurrencies are not treated as currency but rather as goods or services, which is important to note as currency is not taxable under the same, while goods and services are subject to taxation under different slabs. Crypto-related activities, including mining, exchange services, wallet services, payment processing, barter systems, and other transactions, require classification as either goods or services to determine the appropriate treatment. However, for determination of tax rates, there is no specific Harmonized System of Nomenclature (HSN) code for digital assets. However, HSN code 960899, which pertains to other miscellaneous articles, is often used with an applicable GST rate of 18%, the highest in that category. To understand how this is implemented, it is important to delve into the skill versus chance discourse. In a significant development last year, the Online Gaming Industry faced a major upheaval when the Department issued a Show Cause Notice to Gameskraft, demanding an extraordinary sum of Rs. 21,000 crores taxing as Goods at a rate of 28%, however, the Karnataka High Court delivered a landmark judgment addressing the concerns related to the key questions in the GST-related litigation for the Online Gaming Industry are: Skill-based or chance-based: Are the games considered skill-based or games of chance (betting/gambling)? Taxable amount: Should GST be levied on the full amount pooled by players or only on the platform fee charged by Online Gaming Platforms? Addressing the first prong, the Supreme Court established that competitions requiring a significant degree of skill are not considered gambling. If a game is primarily based on skill, even if it involves an element of chance, it is classified as a game of ‘mere skill.’ The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment and determined that Dream11’s fantasy sports predominantly rely on users’ superior knowledge, judgment, and attention, making it a game of skill rather than chance. Similarly, the Bombay High Court analysed Dream11’s Fantasy Games and concluded that they do not involve betting or gambling since the outcome is not dependent on the real-world performance of any particular team on a given day. Rajasthan High Court reached a similar conclusion and dismissed a Public Interest Litigation, stating that the issue of treating the game ‘Dream11’ as involving betting or gambling has already been settled. As for the second limb, the target of taxation, in the context of GST, can vary depending on the specific circumstances and regulations of a particular jurisdiction. However, in general, both players and the platform can be subject to GST. Players may be liable to pay GST on

Taxation of Cryptocurrencies as Rewards from Online Gaming Read More »

Project Wise Insolvency under IBC: Analysing SC’s Decision in Supertech Ltd.

[By Yash Arjariya] The author is a student at Hidayatullah National Law University.   Introduction In a series of cases like Chitra Sharma v. Union of India, Bikram Chatterji v. Union of India, etc., the Supreme Court (“SC”) has been tasked with adjudicating the claims and rights of house owners in the real estate sector as against the processes of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC”). The adjudications have been favourable to the house owners, with their rights elevated to a safer pedestal, providing representation of their interests in the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”) formed for the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) of the Corporate Debtor. However, the introduction of the concept of reverse CIRP, now moulded in the form of project-wise CIRP after the decision of the SC in Indiabulls Assest Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Ram Kishore (“Supertech Ltd.”), has added a new nuance to the insolvency processes in the real estate sector. Reverse CIRP, as propounded by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) in Flat Buyers Association Winter Hills-77 v. Umang realtech Private Limited (“Umang Realtech”), accords an opportunity to the promoter of a real estate entity to revive the entity and act as lender or financial creditor by fusion of finances. The SC in Supertech Ltd. has furthered the reverse CIRP as a project-wise CIRP, i.e., there is fundamental participation of the promoter in the CIRP, but such a CIRP does not operate over all the projects of the corporate debtor but only a specific project. This first part of this article identifies the basis of the judgement given in Supertech Ltd. and then goes on to comment on the utility of such a process in insolvency in the real estate sector. Furthermore, the legality of reverse CIRP is then tested on the statutory principles laid out by the IBC. This piece then concludes as a critical note on the processes of reverse CIRP and project-wise CIRP while remaining speculative about the future jurisprudence on this issue. Factual Underpinnings in the Insolvency Regime: The Vidarbha Effect? The recent judgement of the SC in Supertech Ltd., upholding the NCLAT’s rationale, has nuanced the reverse corporate insolvency resolution process, in effect turning the corporate insolvency resolution process into a project-wise insolvency process. The constitution of the committee of creditors was restricted only to a single project of the corporate debtor, precluding any impact on the several ongoing projects of the real estate entity. It may be argued that the concept of project-wise insolvency is alien to the IBC; however, the court fortified the tenability of the scheme by balancing convenience and practical viability. Visualising a contrary landscape, the court opined that allowing the CIRP against the corporate debtor as a whole will compromise and prejudice other ongoing projects of the debtor, and more importantly, greater inconvenience would be weighed upon the homebuyers as the efforts of the debtor to ensure continuous flow of funds into the project through personal undertaking would cease. This creative culmination of practical utility and viability into a new beginning of project-wise insolvency schemes in the Indian Insolvency landscape can be said to be a corollary effect of the Vidarbha Industries v. Axis Bank Limited (“Vidarbha’) judgement. Though the judgement related to the discretionary power of the adjudicating authority to admit applications by financial creditors under Sec. 7 of the IBC, it necessarily opened a new epoch of factual underpinnings in the Indian insolvency landscape. The judgement vacated enough room as an example for the courts to mould the insolvency process to ensure that parties are not prejudiced if the factual matrix warrants otherwise. The SC in Vidarbha fathomed the factors of feasibility of initiation of CIRP,  financial health of the stakeholders, viability of the corporate debtor, etc. with respect to CIRP. Much akin to the same understanding, the SC in its recent judgement devised a new scheme, not contemplated by the IBC but on account of facts warranting the same. The test of circumstances: Utility of Reverse CIRP The NCLAT, in its ruling in Umang Realtech, appropriately acknowledged that homebuyers, in contrast to other financial creditors, lack the commercial acumen to make informed judgments about which resolution plan would be most advantageous to them. The Reverse CIRP effectively addresses this concern by maintaining the existing management structure of the company while guaranteeing that the promoter mobilizes financial resources to successfully complete the project. Even the SC in Supertech Ltd. explained that reverse CIRP does not create any additional rights in favour of ex-management. Reverse CIRP involves oversight by the Insolvency Resolution Professional (“IRP”) coupled with efforts made for the infusion of funds with the active assistance of the ex-management, as in Supertech Ltd. Hence, the reverse CIRP offers an opportunity for real estate company promoters to revive a project without automatically removing them from the operational aspects of the company. Moreover, the project-focused approach ensures that only the assets associated with that particular project are brought into resolution, thereby preventing any undue burden on the company and averting potential uncertainties surrounding other projects. Further, the Reverse CIRP process, or project-wise CIRP, propounded by the SC is one that is shaped by the facts of the case. As a result, it cannot be considered an ideal model for all other instances of real estate insolvency. The decision of whether or not to employ the Reverse CIRP will hinge on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. The Reverse CIRP can be likened to a trial-like resolution process. Even in Supertech Ltd., the NCLAT in the impugned order was experimental, suggesting that project-wise resolution may be started as a test to find out the success of such resolution. Thus, as a logical conclusion, on failure of resolution by the Reverse CIRP, the NCLAT would proceed with the normal CIRP process. Testing Waters: The Legality of Reverse CIRP Section 29A of the IBC bars the promoter of the entity (the corporate debtor) from being the resolution applicant. The purport of this provision is to forbid the

Project Wise Insolvency under IBC: Analysing SC’s Decision in Supertech Ltd. Read More »

Upholding Auditor’s Liability in Strict Corporate Governance: Deloitte’s Case Analysis

[By Gunjan Hariramani & Pooja Arora] The author is a student of Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai and ILS Pune.   Introduction In India, the role of an auditor affects the corporate governance of the company by promoting accountability, representing interests of the stakeholders, managing financial crises and assessing risks. However, an auditor must exercise reasonable care in the discharge of their duty. This ensures that a company or its directors do not defraud its shareholders and other stakeholders. A number of corporate scams including the Satyam scam, could have been prevented if there had been stricter guidelines and severe penalties on the auditors. Recently in the case of Union of India v. Deloitte Haskins and Sells LLP. [“the Deloitte’s case”], the constitutionality of 140(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 [“the Act”] which provides for removal of the auditors when they commit fraudulent activities was upheld. The Supreme Court held that it was not violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In this article, the authors have attempted to analyse the extent of auditor’s responsibility in light of the principles of corporate governance. Further, an analysis of the Deloitte’s case where the Supreme Court had ruled that an auditor’s resignation could not be the taken as a ground to escape from the liability stated under Section 140(5) of the Act, has been provided. Brief Facts In the present case, there were defaults faced by the IL&FS Financial Services Limited [“IFIN”], which amounted to over Rs. 91,000 crores in debt. These defaults occurred between June 2018 and September 2018. To address the situation, the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance issued an Office Memorandum on September 30, 2018 requesting the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to take action under the Act. The memorandum highlighted the magnitude of the debt of the IFIN, attributing it to the failures of corporate governance and the presence of window-dressed accounts. Further, it also emphasized that the defaults could have severe consequences on the financial markets and the Indian economy. In response to the defaults, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs filed a Company Petition before the National Company Law Tribunal [“NCLT”] seeking the removal of the existing Board of Directors of IFIN and the appointment of a new board. The NCLT, in an interim order on October 1, 2018 superseded the existing board and appointed a new Board of Directors to take charge of IFIN. Deloitte Haskins and Sells LLP [“Deloitte”] and BSR and Associates LLP [“BSR”] were appointed as the statutory auditors of IFIN. Consequently, IFIN issued a notice under Section 140(1) of the Act to BSR and Deloitte, seeking their removal as auditors. BSR denied the allegations, and a hearing was held on May 29, 2019. Subsequently, the Ministry filed a petition under Section 140(5) of the Act, on June 10, 2019, seeking the removal of BSR and Deloitte as auditors, as well as other related actions. BSR resigned as the auditor and both BSR and Deloitte challenged the maintainability of the petition filed under Section 140(5) before the NCLT. The NCLT upheld the maintainability of the petition. In the writ filed by BSR before the High Court, it upheld the validity of Section 140(5) and set aside the NCLT’s order also quashing the petition filed under Section 140(5) and the related directions from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. An appeal against the High Court’s decisions was filed before the Supreme Court. Judgment of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court interpreted Section 140(5) of the Act in light of other provisions of the Act i.e., Section 143(12) and Section 144. The Court highlighted that Section 140(5) explicitly states that its provisions are “without prejudice” to any actions under the Act or any other prevailing law. Thus, the legislative intent behind enacting Section 140(5) is clear, and the Tribunal has the authority to issue a final order against an auditor who has acted fraudulently, irrespective of other provisions in the Act. The Court emphasized that the powers of the NCLT under Section 140(5) are quasi-judicial in nature and must be exercised with due process and by providing opportunity to both the parties involved. The Court, while examining the question of violation of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, ruled that the auditors cannot be equated with directors or management. Auditors have a crucial role in protecting the public interest and stakeholders. Chapter X of the Act specifically addresses the importance of auditors; therefore, Section 140(5) cannot be deemed discriminatory or in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The court observed that it would not be correct that despite a fraudulent conduct by a person, they could claim the right to freedom of trade and profession under Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court also dismissed the claim that the penalty of automatic disqualification, including partners, for a five-year period is disproportionate or akin to civil death. It observed that auditors and their firms bear joint and several liability, and Section 140(5) serves as a consequence for acting fraudulently. The Apex court, therefore, set aside the High Court’s judgment that quashed the proceedings under Section 140(5) on the grounds that it was not maintainable after the auditors’ resignation. Scope of Section 140(5) of the Act vis a vis the principles of corporate governance The recent trends have shown that Indian Courts are opting to choose a stringent model of corporate governance in the wake of corporate scams. Corporate governance necessitates the establishment of a structured framework focused at maintaining an effective control and governance over the business corporations, thereby ensuring the proper distribution of rights and duties of every participant in the corporation. Auditors are one of the participant groups in the corporation that are held responsible to show an unbiased analysis of the financial statements to the shareholders and prevent or report any fraud within the corporation. Auditor’s scams and frauds in the past showed the failures within the structure of corporate governance. Satyam Scam was a glaring example

Upholding Auditor’s Liability in Strict Corporate Governance: Deloitte’s Case Analysis Read More »

NCLAT’s Inherent Powers: Understanding Recall and Review of Judgments

[By Ashutosh Anand & Shalini Puri] The author are students at National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi.   Introduction The National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) have transformed the Indian insolvency regime by affording a single platform for resolution, specialised expertise, a creditor-friendly approach, efficient resolution mechanisms such as Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, time-bound resolution, and an appellate body for review. However, there is persistence of a grey area regarding the powers of the NCLT and NCLAT in recalling their judgment. The concept of ‘Recall’ refers to a process by which the court, legislature, or administrative organisations withdraw or cancel their previous judgments or actions. On the other hand, ‘Review’ involves the court, legislature, or any other body re-examining their decisions. By using the method of review, the aforementioned bodies try to rectify the error in an act, judgement, or legislation. The NCLAT’s three-member bench in 2019, in the matter of Agarwal Coal Corporation Private Limited v. Sun Paper Mill Limited & Anr.[1] laid down a strong proposition of law of absence of any power or express provision of review and recall vested with the ‘Adjudicating Authority,’ i.e., the NCLT, and the ‘Appellate Authority’, i.e., the NCLAT, in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”). Hence, a judgment or an order passed by the same shall neither be reviewed nor recalled. Subsequently, another three-member bench of the NCLAT in Rajendra Mulchand Varma & Ors. v. K.L.J Resources Ltd. & Anr.[2] vehemently adhered to the ratio in the Agarwal Coal Corporation case. Therefore, it became binding on the NCLT and NCLAT not to recall their judgments or orders.[3] However, the landmark case called UBI v. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian & Ors.[4] was heard by a three-member bench of the NCLAT in 2023. The case raised an important legal question about whether the NCLT and NCLAT, despite lacking the power to review judgments under the Code, could consider an application for recalling a judgment if sufficient grounds were presented. To address this issue, the three-member bench referred the matter to a five-member bench for further deliberation. After thorough consideration, the NCLAT ruled in the affirmative. In light of the same, this piece tries to highlight the rudimentary jurisprudential difference between the definitions of review and recall. Furthermore, by navigating through the legal standing under the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (“CrPC”) and a plethora of precedents, the piece tries to find the conceptual distinction between review and recall. Further, it discusses the inherent powers of the Tribunal in relation to Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 (“NCLAT Rules”), and how that inherent power is to be utilised by the Tribunal to recall a decision. The piece also lists out the practical aspects of non-deliverance of justice in case a Court or a Tribunal is not able to recall its decisions. An Underlined Distinction between Review and Recall According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the phrase ‘recall a judgment’ means to revoke or reverse a judgment for matters of fact or when a judgment is annulled because of errors of law.[5] On the contrary, the Dictionary says that the word ‘review’ means to examine judicially, a reconsideration, second view or examination, revision, or consideration for purposes of correction. Review is used especially for the examination of a cause by an appellate court and for a second investigation.[6] In Vijaya Sri v. State of Andhra Pradesh,[7] the Court, after analysing the combined definitions of review and recall from various authoritative dictionaries, concluded that recall necessitates the complete abrogation of a judgment or final order. In contrast, review refers to the continuation of the initial judgment or order with specific modifications, along with a re-examination and reconsideration of the said decision. As a result, the power to recall a judgment differs from the power to review it.[8] The contentions related to review and recalling have also been persistently seen in the CrPC. Section 362 of the CrPC has been held to be mandatory and puts a complete bar on review, except only to correct arithmetic or clerical errors. Additionally, it has been held that Section 482 of the CrPC cannot be invoked for the purposes of reviewing or altering the judgment. Nevertheless, it is important to note that recalling is different from reviewing and altering a judgment. Section 482 permits wide enough powers to the court to cover any type of case for the purpose of it being recalled or re-heard, if three conditions mentioned therein so warrant, viz. (a) to implement any order issued under the CrPC; (b) to safeguard against the misuse of the judicial process; and (c) to ensure the achievement of justice.[9] However, a difficult and complex situation arises when there is  no express provision regarding the recalling of a judgment in the statute. This question was answered by the Apex Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Ors.,[10] wherein an application was filed to set aside an award given by the Industrial Tribunal. There was no express provision in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or the Rules framed thereunder that provided for setting aside an ex-parte order. However, the Court held that even though there was an absence of an express provision to set aside the award, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to pass the order, which is an ancillary and incidental power to discharge its functions effectively.[11] The Tussle of Interpretation Nevertheless, the ratio given in the Agarwal Coal Corporation case and the Rajendra Mulchand Varma case, as mentioned in the introduction, made it impossible for the NCLT or NCLAT to recall their decisions which posed a grave jurisprudential flaw in the justice system. Numerous cases have emerged where the Tribunal discovered that its decisions were influenced by fraudulent practices by the parties involved, or the Tribunal itself made mistakes that unfairly affected one party. Additionally, instances were found where the parties deceived the Tribunal, leading to unjust outcomes.

NCLAT’s Inherent Powers: Understanding Recall and Review of Judgments Read More »

The Implications of Finance Bill 2023 on Online ‘Gam(bl)ing’: An Income Tax Perspective

[By Reet Balmiki] The author is a student of NALSAR University of Law.   Introduction With the Union Budget 2023-24 being presented, the Finance Bill 2023 proposed key amendments to the provisions concerning the taxability of winnings from gambling under the Income Tax Act, 1961 and introduced separate provisions to govern online ‘games.’ This move proposed by the Union is in response to the increasing uncertainty in regulating online ‘games’ due to state-wise regulatory mechanisms. While certain states have imposed a blanket ban on all online games played for a stake, others have chosen to regulate the industry through a partial ban. Additionally, the imposition of a complete ban also results in the legislature blurring the distinction between games of skill and games of chance and, in effect diluting the judicial test of ‘preponderance of skill.’ Undeniably, the online gaming industry has cemented its place among the most prosperous sectors in the rapidly growing digital economy. Consequently, a consistent and transparent policy regulating the burgeoning industry while appreciating its contributions to the Indian economy is a pressing need. This article has three objectives: First, it sets out the evolution of the law related to gambling through courts and the legislature; Second, it discusses the controversy surrounding the legislative competence of the recent state laws/ordinances on the subject; Third, it traces the policy implications of the proposed amendments in the Finance Bill, 2023. Tracing the evolution of the meaning of ‘Gambling’ The debate over the gamut of ‘Gambling’ has dual significance, first, it lays down the foundation for the rational distinction between games of skill and chance which is the focal point of the debate over online gaming, and second, it defines the extent of regulatory jurisdiction of the state legislatures and lies at the heart of the recent controversy over the classification of online gaming. This section briefly traces the judicial interpretation of the term and the jurisprudence attached to it. The judicial foundation was laid down for the first time in the case of State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, (“Chamarbaugwala”) where the Supreme Court deliberated upon the Bombay Price Competition Tax Act, and referred to the definition of ‘Price Competition’ under Section 2(2) and held that any game which does not substantially depend on the exercise of skill constitutes ‘gambling.’ This reasoning was applied explicitly as the test of preponderance in the K Satyanarayana case. Here, the Court categorized Rummy as mainly and preponderantly a game of skill with only a certain element of chance, thus distinguishing it from chance-based ‘gambling.’ This test was further concretized in the K.R. Lakshmanan case, where the Court was faced with determining whether horse riding is a ‘game of skill’ and consequently saved by the exemption clause in the Madras Gaming Act, 1930. Here, the Court substantiated the ‘preponderance of skill’ test from Chamarbaugwala and concluded that games based on a substantial degree of skill (including games of mere skill or predominant skill) shall not constitute ‘gambling.’ The judicial categorization into predominantly skill-based and purely chance-based games does not foresee the possibility of a purely skill-based game, as evident in MJ Sivani. This conceptual vacuum results from the judicial non-consideration of differentiation between the ‘chance’ factor in a game and the element of ‘accident.’ Contrary to this, the Public Gambling Act, 1867 and state legislations have categorized these games into: games based on ‘mere skill,’ games based on ‘mere chance,’ and mixed games of skill and chance. It is only the games of ‘mere skill,’ with the possibility of ‘accidents’ but no ‘chance’ factor, which are exempted from the prohibition under gambling laws. Therefore, while mixed games where skill is predominant are allowed as per the judicial test, many state legislatures have sought to ban these. One prominent example is the Explanation to Section 15 of the Telangana State Gaming (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017, which refuted the judicial interpretation of Rummy being a skill-based game because of the luck/chance factor. However, this position is inconsistent among the states and indicates a broader policy gap. Legislative Competence for regulating Online Gambling: prerogative of the States or Union? Moving forward, it becomes noteworthy that nothing in the Constitution prohibits the legislatures from overriding the judicial interpretation of ‘gambling’ through a clarificatory amendment, provided the legislative body has the requisite competence. In this light, the controversy surrounding the definition of ‘gambling’ further intensifies in the case of ‘online gambling’, which has increasingly become susceptible to state regulation. In the scheme of federalism, the legislative powers have been defined under Schedule 7, where Entry 34 of the State List gives states the legislative competence to make laws on ‘Betting and Gambling.’ However, with the Karnataka Police (Amendment) Bill, 2021, and the Tamil Nadu Gaming and Police Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021 banning online skill-based games, the challenges to the legislative competence of states over such gambling laws has been a prominent issue. Two aspects become relevant; first, whether Entry 34 needs to be read expansively to include ‘games of skill’ and second, whether a liberal construction of Entries under the State list permit such a ban. The Tamil Nadu Amendment was challenged in Junglee Games case, where the Petitioners contended the competence of the State Legislature to impose a blanket ban on all online games for stake, including ‘games of skill.’ The contention here lies at the crux of our discussion. Firstly, the State attempted to take an expansive view of ‘gambling’ and ‘betting’ under Entry 34 to include any game played for a stake. However, the rational distinction between games of skill and chance cannot be diluted to such an extent as it goes to the very root of competence. An over-expansive reading of the Entry would change the very meaning of the entry, thus being held impermissible. Secondly, the amendment to Section 11 to undo the exemption clause for games of ‘mere skill’ further diluted the preponderance test by imposing a blanket prohibition. Per R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala, ‘games of skill’ form a different class

The Implications of Finance Bill 2023 on Online ‘Gam(bl)ing’: An Income Tax Perspective Read More »

Unveiling the Impact: Amendments to the Green Debt Securities Regime

[By Aditi Kundu] The author is a student at Hidayatullah National Law University.   Introduction In an attempt to strengthen the sustainable financing regime in India, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has revised its Green Debt Securities (GDS) framework, whereby it has expanded the definition of GDS, enhanced the disclosure requirements, and introduced guidelines to avoid greenwashing. SEBI’s review of the existing framework under Disclosure   Requirements   for   Issuance   and   Listing   of   Green   Debt Securities, 2017 is aimed at preventing misallocation of funds, ensuring transparency, and fighting greenwashing. GDS are green finance instruments specifically designed to fund environmentally sustainable projects. By SEBI (Issue and Listing of Non-Convertible Securities) (Amendment) Regulations, 2023 the definition of GDS has been expanded to include new categories of projects for which the proceeds from the issuance of bonds can be allocated. These include: climate change adaptation; pollution prevention and control; circular economy adapted products; blue bonds; yellow bonds; and transition bonds. Subsequently, SEBI also released a Revised Disclosure Requirement for Issuance and Listing of Green Debt Securities which mandates the appointment of a third-party certifier by the issuer who would audit and track the use and management of proceeds during both the pre-issue and post-issue phases. This requirement is applicable for two years from 1st April 2023 on a ‘comply or explain basis’. The initial and continuing disclosure requirements in financial statements and annual reports on the part of issuer have also been enhanced. These include details of process and criteria used for selection of eligible projects, green taxonomies/standards followed, details of temporary placement of unutilized funds, perceived risks and mitigation plan, details of the projects, and reporting of impact on environment. Further, most importantly, to curb the over-arching problem of greenwashing, SEBI released a guidance paper for do’s and don’ts relating to GDS. SEBI has made a monumental effort to define greenwashing as “making false, misleading, unsubstantiated, or otherwise incomplete claims about the sustainability of a product, service, or business operation”. Now, the issuers need to regularly monitor their use of funds and ensure that projects are contributing towards a sustainable economy by reducing adverse environment impact. Issuers are prohibited from using funds for purposes other than those mentioned in the definition of GDS, using misleading labels, and cherry picking data that works in their favour. Further, if funds are utilised for unqualified purposes, then, on the option of debenture holders, there can be an early redemption. At the centre of such regulatory revision lies India’s sustainable development and climate change action targets. India is a party to the Paris Agreement 2015 (the agreement), and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) is an action plan for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate change impacts under the agreement. According to NDCs, each country sets its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) and identifies its climate action goals. India’s current INDC is reduction of emission intensity of its GDP by 33 to 35 % by 2030 from 2005 level and increase in share of non-fossil fuel based energy 40% by 2030. It also aims to cut emissions to net zero by 2070. However, estimates suggest that more than $10 trillion will be required only for power, green hydrogen and electric vehicles to meet such goals. Since such huge amounts are required for financing the green goals, climate/green finance which is intended to be used only for certain specified purposed becomes the key factor, and GDS is one of the promising ways to achieve the same. Based on the aforementioned premise, this articles provides a critical analysis of the regulatory mechanism of GDS. Analysis What does “Green” signify? SEBI has commendably amplified the definition of GDS as it increases the scope of categories of projects for which debt securities that can be issued. However, the current framework provides a description of GDS, instead of particularising the term ‘green’. It describes GDS as debt securities issued for raising funds which are utilised for certain categories of green and sustainable projects. SEBI has stuck to a list of vacuous subject areas that are generally considered crucial to sustainable development. There is no India-specific justification as to why subject areas like biodiversity conservation, sustainable waste management, etc. which are essentially general aspects of sustainable development have been included. There is a lack of logical co-relation between the subject areas and India’s INDCs. Due to the absence of well-defined criteria as to what constitutes green under the mentioned categories, issuers get more window to broaden the scope of their green activity and making it easier for them to squander the funds in the name of “green”. This ultimately discourages investors from buying green bonds. The issuers get more window to dictate the scope of their green activity, making it challenging for the investors to make informed decisions. A suggestion at this end would be that the GDS regulation should recognise major sectors in the economy and incorporate a sector-specific list of activities and the detailed environmental criteria these activities must meet to be labelled ‘green’. This list can be timely updated with emerging economic sectors, and the criteria for existing sectors may be changed by analysing their potential impact on India’s climate mitigation goals. Furthermore, the current framework requires the issuer to state the environmental sustainability objectives of the issuance. However, there is no reference to the environmental targets which are being pursued by the regulation. This creates a gap between the environmental goals intending to be achieved by the issuer and green targets of India. In this regard, it becomes imperative to formulate a standard green finance taxonomy which aligns with India’s environmental targets. Curating a taxonomy would mean a clear definition of ‘green’ and ‘sustainable’ by segregating both the concepts in terms of category of project for which the funds from GDS are to be utilised. This would result in a clear distinction and help identify sustainable activities from green economic activities. Currently, the issuers are at a liberty to take reference from any taxonomy/ standard as they

Unveiling the Impact: Amendments to the Green Debt Securities Regime Read More »

Overseas Direct Investment and the Two Layer Rule

[By Vansh Gupta & Mehar Kaur Arora ] The authors are students at Gujarat National Law University.   Introduction Overseas Direct Investment (ODI) means acquisition of any unlisted equity capital or subscription as a part of the Memorandum of Association of a foreign entity, or investment in 10% or more of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity, or investment with control where investment is less than 10% of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity. RBI identified that entities having their subsidiaries in India and outside India would use round tripping to siphon-off funds by providing inter-corporate loans to their subsidiaries and evade tax liability leading to a ban on the practice unless undertaken for legitimate purpose with the approval of RBI. However, the ban could disincentivise foreign investment by Indian entities due to compliance burden and cost. In order to create a balance between the need for regulatory oversight and to facilitate ease of doing business, the new ODI Rules introduced the layering restriction. Although the layering restriction is expected to expand the horizon of growth for Indian entities, further clarity is required with respect to the understanding of layers and the exemption provided to certain entities. Overseas Direct Investment is allowed in a company engaged in Bona fide business activity only. An activity that is legal as per the laws of India and the host country is considered a bona fide business activity. Though the definition brings about a level of lucidity, there are certain reservations. For instance, it is not clear what repercussions does the term “law in force in India” have. It is possible that certain activities, lacking a central law, might be legal in some states, while not permitted in other states. This article explores the complexities of the ODI framework, the layering restriction, and the need for further clarity and harmonization of definitions to balance regulatory oversight and ease of doing business in India. Layering restriction and the base entity for calculation of Layers: Rule 19(3) of the New ODI Rules states that, “no person resident in India shall make financial commitment in a foreign entity that has invested or invests into India, at the time of making such financial commitment or at any time thereafter, either directly or indirectly, resulting in a structure with more than two layers of subsidiaries.” Hence, investment into foreign entities is not permitted if it results into a structure of more than two layer of subsidiaries. However, the confusion arises when determining how to calculate the layers, specifically whether to consider an Indian entity as the foundation or a foreign subsidiary. For instance, an Indian company ‘X’ makes investments in a foreign company ‘Y’, which in turn has two more layers of subsidiaries ‘G’ and ‘H’ which invest in India. Now if H is counted as a layer with respect to the Indian entity, it will be considered as the third layer, and therefore triggering the layering restriction. Clause 20(2) of the ODI Directions clarifies that foreign entity should be taken as the base for calculation of the number of layers of subsidiaries. The instructions for Form FC under the Master Direction – Reporting under the Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999, which state that the level of Step Down Subsidiary shall be calculated by treating the foreign entity as the parent, provide yet another confirmation in favor of foreign entities. Defining “Subsidiary” and the threshold for “Control”: Department of Corporate Affairs has time and again proposed steps to ensure that ‘subsidiary route’ is not used to siphon-off funds and to prevent the misuse of the complex corporate structure to bypass the restrictions. Hence, it was recommended to introduce a statutory cap on the number of layers of subsidiaries permitted for a holding company. However, there is a notable disparity between the definitions of “Control” and “Subsidiary” in the OI rules and the Companies Act. Rule 2(y) of the ODI Rules defines a subsidiary as a company in which a foreign company has ‘control’. “Control” refers to the right to appoint majority of directors or control of the management exercisable individually or with person acting in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders’ agreements or voting agreements that entitle them to 10% or more of voting rights. However, the definition of control under Section 2(27) of the Companies Act, 2013 is silent on the 10% threshold. On the contrast, a 50% threshold is mentioned for a company to qualify as a ‘subsidiary’ of a holding company under Section 2(87) of the Companies Act. Setting the threshold at 10% rather than over 50% for determining subsidiary status under the ODI Rules expands the scope to encompass a greater number of foreign entities. This ensures that they are subject to the restrictions on the number of subsidiary layers. Otherwise, companies could have easily invested substantial funds in another entity while maintaining ownership below 50%, allowing them to siphon funds to foreign entities without scrutiny. It is important to highlight that the definition of control is inclusive in nature and can cover other scenarios where an entity may not have 10% shareholding but may influence policy decisions of the company by certain exclusive veto powers or by any other means. Horizontal layers of subsidiaries: The definition of “Control” further talks about indirect control by the Holding Company. To illustrate A is a holding company having a subsidiary B and C. B further has control in C. Therefore, A may not directly control C but exercise an indirect control by virtue of B. Since there is no restriction in layers of subsidiaries in horizontal propagations, a company is allowed to make as much investment as it wants into enterprises at horizontal level. Further, the first proviso to Rule 2 of Companies (Restriction on number of layers) Rules, 2017 provides and allows an Indian entity to acquire a foreign entity having more than two layers if it is permitted under the

Overseas Direct Investment and the Two Layer Rule Read More »

Scroll to Top