Author name: CBCL

[By Manas Shrivastava & Adaysa Hota] The authors are students at National Law University Odisha.   INTRODUCTION During a company’s liquidation proceedings, a secured Creditor has been presented with two options under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “IBC”) “relinquish its security interest to the liquidation estate and receive proceeds from the sale of assets by the liquidator” or “realise its security interest”. If the secured creditor realises its security interest outside the liquidation proceeding, two circumstances follow. Firstly, where the enforcement of a security interest results in a sum by way of proceeds that is greater than the amount owed, they must give the liquidator any surplus funds in addition to their share of the costs associated with the liquidation procedure. The previous situation is straightforward, but the complexity arises in the second situation, where the proceeds of realisation are insufficient to cover the debt, and the liquidator must pay the secured creditor’s outstanding debts in accordance with Section 53. Furthermore, in accordance with Section 52, as stated above, the secured creditor may also choose to relinquish its security interest but this too must be done in the manner specified under Section 53. This is where the waterfall mechanism for liquidation comes into play, i.e. when a corporate debtor is unable to repay all its creditors, the entire sum due. The remaining amount of debt and number of creditors is the Rubicon of the waterfall mechanism. The debt, thus befitting the term “waterfall”. Although the waterfall mechanism is considered to be the heart of the IBC, it was introduced in the Companies Act, 2013. COMPARING THE WATERFALL MECHANISM UNDER COMPANIES ACT 2013 AND IBC 2016 Since the inception of the IBC, there has been a debate raging on whether the mechanism under the Code is essentially the same as that enshrined under Section 326 of the Companies Act, 2013. And if the answer to that is yes, scholars argue that the redundancy must be done away with. Even the Supreme Court has recently considered this matter. But, before we try to find the answers to these questions, it is imperative to understand the mechanism, separately, from the context of IBC as well as the Companies Act 2013. One can decipher from the provisions that there are several tiers of creditors, and priority will be granted in accordance with their order. For instance, under the IBC, secured creditors rank second while government obligations rank fifth. But while the Act lays the mechanism for winding up of the company, the Code focuses only on liquidation. Insolvency Resolution Procedure (IRP) and liquidation costs are paid with the highest priority under section 53 of IBC. Thereupon, “workmen’s dues for twenty-four months preceding the liquidation commencement date” and “debts owed to a secured creditor in the event such secured creditor has relinquished security in the manner set out in section 52” are placed in the same hierarchy for repayment. Herein lies the second distinction between the waterfall mechanisms used by IBC and CA. In contrast to the Code, payment of workmen’s compensation and a secured creditor who has achieved its security interest is not pari passu from the outset under section 326 of the 2013 Act. They will be in the same hierarchy only after paying any outstanding workmen’s compensation and accumulated vacation pay from the two years before the winding up order. The Proviso to Section 326(1) requires the company to reimburse the above-mentioned sum to workers or “in case of their death, to any other person in his right” before repayment to the secured creditors within thirty days from the sale of assets. Thirdly, IBC’s waterfall mechanism requires payment of “wages and any unpaid dues owed to employees other than workmen for twelve months preceding the liquidation commencement date,” whereas CA only allows four months. Thereafter IBC ranks unsecured creditors for repayment but CA has no such provision for such creditors. IBC at fifth position ranks, “any amount due to the Central and State Governments including the amount to be received on account of the Consolidated Fund of India and the Consolidated Fund of a State, if any, in respect of the whole or any part of the period of two years preceding the liquidation commencement date” and “debts owed to a secured creditor for any amount unpaid following the enforcement of security interest” equally. Whereas, CA provides for payment of the preceding year only. Additionally, IBC houses provisions for payment of the debt owed to unsecured creditors and to Secured Creditors if they relinquish their security interest and opt for preferential payment, whereas CA fails to do so. Furthermore, the IBC Amendment Act of 2019 has added provisions for operational creditors and dissenting financial creditors in the waterfall mechanism, which the CA has yet not recognized. DEVIATION SHOWN BY THE COURTS FROM THE PATH OF THE WATERFALL MECHANISM The supreme court in various cases has upheld the validity of the waterfall mechanism under IBC, but still, there is a current trend going on where the courts are deviating from following the waterfall mechanism while distributing the assets. In a recent case of State Tax Officer v. Rainbow Papers Limited (hereinafter “Rainbow Papers”) where the court clearly showed a deviation from the waterfall mechanism under section 53 of IBC 2016. The case deals with state legislation, where the state tax authority has a security interest against the corporate debtor thus, making the state tax authority as “secured creditor”. The court carved this exception under section 48 of Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 which provides a first charge to state tax authority, on the property of a corporate debtor, which goes against the mechanism. Similarly, in the case of Jet Aircraft Maintenance Engineers Welfare Association v. Ashish Chhawchharia (hereinafter “The Jet airways case”) the court deviated from following it and held that until the onset of the insolvency, the company has to pay the whole provident fund to the workers and employees and the gratuity payment. It is pertinent to note that under section 53(1)(b) of IBC, these payments are limited to a

[By Sachika Vij & Kartikeya Misra] The authors are students of Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University Lucknow.   INTRODUCTION The UNICTRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (MLCBI) has recently celebrated its 25th anniversary.  The inclusion of the UNCITRAL MLCBI has gained significant traction and is now being incorporated into the domestic legislation of numerous countries worldwide. An increasing number of international jurisdictions, including Hong Kong and Singapore, are aligning themselves with the global trend of embracing a Centre of Main Interest (COMI)-based approach to recognition to insolvency proceedings. However, several challenges have cropped up in its implementation. One such issue is with the interpretation of the date of determination of COMI. India on the other hand is still in the process of enacting the cross-border insolvency framework. With the different interpretations already in place there is a greater mantle on the Indian authorities to ensure that these loopholes are not used to delay the resolution process and that they do not hamper the interests of the parties involved in seeking recourse. THE CENTRALITY OF COMI IN INSOLVENCY AND ITS DETERMINATION Imagine a scenario, where a debtor company finds itself entangled in insolvency proceedings spanning multiple jurisdictions. The COMI holds immense significance when it comes to navigating such a complex realm of cross-border insolvency. Article 17(2)(a) of the Model Law states that a foreign main proceeding is where the COMI lies. It acts as the determining factor as to which jurisdiction shall have the authority to grant the necessary relief for the debtor’s ongoing financial concern. Though, it has not been defined anywhere in the Model Law but has been of extensive use worldwide. For determining COMI, a comprehensive assessment of various factors is required. Article 16 of the Model Law lays down a rebuttable presumption that the debtor’s registered office is taken to the COMI and as per the Recitals (12) and (13) of the European Commission Regulation should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties. However, UNCITRAL MLCBI with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation provide for other factors which may include the jurisdiction where the debtor takes its key managerial decisions and conducts the majority of its economic activities, where it manages its key assets, etc. Ascertaining COMI is not simple and the determination is to be based on the fulfillment of two important requisites which are: Determination of the date for deciding the debtor’s COMI Determination of the factors for deciding the location of the debtor’s COMI It is only once the first element has been determined, the Court will determine the location of COMI under various non-exhaustive factors. Although the preamble and interpretation under Article 8 of the Model Law clearly state that it was enacted for the sole purpose of bringing uniformity to cross-border insolvency proceedings by harmonizing national insolvency laws dealing with it. However, there is no established position on the specific date that will serve as the decisive factor for determining the COMI. THE TIMING CONUNDRUM IN COMI DETERMINATION In 2013 answering the approach to be adopted for the timing of determining COMI, the Guide to the Enactment of the MLCBI mentioned that the relevant date for determining the  COMI should be the date of commencement of the foreign proceeding. However, before this guide, US developed its own principles for the date of determining the COMI in the case of Fairfield Sentry which was upon the filing of the recognition application. Australian Courts have on the other hand, stemming from the case of Australian equity investors, held the relevant date of COMI to be the time the Court is called for a decision on the requisite recognition application. In 2022, a Hong Kong Court Global Brands Group Case opined that the determining factor of COMI should be the date of the   foreign office-holder’s recognition application The Court noted that this preference aligns with Article 6 of The Supreme People’s Court’s Opinion on Taking Forward a Pilot Measure for the Recognition of and Assistance to Insolvency Proceedings in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Moreover, claiming it to be consistent with the approach taken by the Singapore Courts in Re Zetta Jet in 2019. Therefore, Courts internationally have come up with different approaches in deciding the timing  of COMI which are relevant because they can have a huge impact on the proceeding and can even impact the location of COMI. INDIAN APPROACH TO DATE OF DETERMINING COMI India’s iteration of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency is still under consideration in the form of Draft Part Z to be introduced in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Cross Border Insolvency Resolution Committee (CBIRC) in its Report on the Rules and Regulations for Cross Border Insolvency Resolution recommended that for the determination of the timing of COMI, appropriate date should be the date of commencement of a foreign proceeding under the local law of the jurisdiction. By adopting this approach, the CBIRC aimed to minimize forum shopping opportunities. Considering the time of filing of the recognition application as determining point of COMI there would only be the proceedings and actions of the foreign representative that would help indicate the COMI. Therefore, relying on the date of commencement of foreign proceedings would provide a clearer result compared to determining COMI at the time of the application. Additionally, this approach would be easier to apply across different jurisdictions, simplifying the practical implementation of the rule. On the other hand, proponents of the time of filing of the application approach argue that delving into the debtor’s past interests can be complex and may result in denying the true COMI. They believe that determining COMI based on the time of filing the application could prevent such complications and ensure a more accurate determination of COMI. WORKING IT OUT: THE POLICY CHALLENGE The different approaches in the timing of determination of COMI have been evolving as has been seen recently in

[By Aritra Mitra] The author is a student at National Law University, Odisha.   Introduction In the recent judgment of Puissant Towers India (P.) Ltd. v. Neueon Towers Ltd., the Chennai bench of the NCLAT overturned the order of the Adjudicating Authority and held that ARCs (hereinafter “Asset Reconstruction Companies”)  can act as Resolution Co-Applicant in an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) resolution process, even without the permission of RBI. It observed that the Adjudicating Authority ought not to have placed reliance on Section 10(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as Section 238 of the IBC would prevail over the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, if there was any inconsistency with any provisions of the IBC. But the conundrum arises because ARCs are regulated under the SARFAESI Act and ARCs intending to perform any activity other than securitisation, reconstruction, and statutorily allowed functions, prior approval of the RBI is a must. Hence, even though there have been judicial precedents that state that IBC will override other conflicting other acts, but permitting ARCs to act as Resolution co-applicant without RBI approval creates issues, which the NCLAT has failed to consider before passing the order, and which the author shall discuss  in the following paragraphs. ARC as Co-Resolution Applicant – Beyond objectives under SARFAESI ARCs were introduced with the objective of helping banks and financial institutions manage their stressed assets by reducing the non-performing assets on their books. Whereas IBC was introduced to perform the function of reorganisation and resolution of insolvent entities. Since both IBC and SARFAESI perform a similar objective of reconstruction of bad loans, there are chances of inconsistencies and overlaps. The petitioners relied upon ARCIL v. Viceroy Hotels Limited, Manish Kumar v. Union of India, and the Delhi HC judgment in UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Union of India, where it was clearly held that ARCs have to take RBI approval. But the appellate authority completely rejected the submissions of the appellants. But by passing such judgment it failed to discuss certain points which should have been considered before passing such a decision. The legal and regulatory design of ARCs is primarily focused on recovery of debt from the borrower and not on resolution of the borrower’s insolvency. Under Section 2(1)(ba) of the SARFAESI Act, ARCs are set up solely for the purpose of asset reconstruction or securitisation, or both. Further restrictions have been provided in Section 10(1) in the form of business that ARCs are allowed to perform. There is no mention of resolution applicant. Furthermore, Section 10(2) of the SARFAESI restricts ARCs from performing any business without prior RBI approval. It clearly denotes the specific purpose of ARCs. Allowing ARCs to act as resolution applicant without RBI approval seems to go against the provisions of SARFAESI. Also, Section 12(2) lays out the RBI’s power to issue directions to ARCs. And the implied meaning of those directions cannot go beyond the business provided in the SARFAESI Act. Section 15(4) of the SARFAESI Act states as following: “if any secured creditor jointly with other secured creditors or any asset reconstruction company or financial institution or any other assignee has converted part of its debt into shares of a borrower company and thereby acquired controlling interest in the borrower company, such secured creditors shall not be liable to restore the management of the business to such borrower.” Thus, there is no such obligation on the ARC to return the business to the borrower where it has already acquired a controlling interest in the entity. This goes against the very objective of the Code and should have been considered before allowing ARC to act as resolution applicant without RBI approval. Beyond Legislative Intent The idea of establishing ARC was recommended for the sole purpose of performing recovery of NPAs of banks. The Expert Committee for Recommending Changes in the Legal Framework concerning Banking System, and the BLRC Report, 2015 had clearly demarcated the functions of the ARC to reconstruction and securitisation. There was no mention of roles in insolvency resolution. It was clearly explained that the intent and objective of an ARC is to ‘realise the dues’ and reposition the borrower, and not ‘rescue’. The NCLAT also failed to consider the legislative intent behind establishing the ARCs. Allowing them to act as resolution professional in IBC would effectively go beyond the purpose of the ARCs. This may Furthermore, the resolution of stressed assets under IBC is expensive. the resolution applicant has to burn cash for an elongated timeline before being able to derive profits from these assets. However, ARCs are required to redeem SR’s within a period of maximum 8 years, meaning that ARCs cannot burn holes in their pocket and are required to recover their dues within a tight timeline. Accordingly, the luxury of a long gestation period is not available with ARCs making them unsuitable for resolution of stressed assets under IBC. Inefficiencies in RBI notification Now even though the NCLAT did not even discuss it, but RBI on 11th October, 2022 came out with a new notification ‘Review of Regulatory Framework for ARCs’, which permits ARC to act as Resolution Applicant under IBC. But even such permission is conditional upon fulfilment of certain grounds. The NCLAT did not even consider whether the ARC has a minimum Net Owned Fund of ₹1,000 crore and a committee, consisting mostly of independent directors, to make decisions about proposals for the submission of a resolution plan under the IBC. Since the RBI notification was not considered to grant permit to the ARC, the NCLAT made another error in granting permit without even considering whether the statutory requirements were fulfilled. Furthermore, the RBI notification also mandates that ARCs cannot exert significant control over the acquired insolvent entity and has to dilute such control within five years of the date of approval of the resolution plan. This ultimately means that a situation may arise where the ARC will look to sell the insolvent entity at a high price instead of reviving it. This

[By Mohak Agarwal & Hemang Mankar] The authors are students at National Law University, Jodhpur.   GoFirst Insolvency: A tug of war with the lessors The recent case of GoFirst Airlines’ Insolvency has highlighted certain significant issues in the Indian Insolvency law regime. The tug of war between the airline and the lessors commenced on May 2, 2023, when GoFirst filed for voluntary insolvency proceedings under Section 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code [“Code”]. As soon as the insolvency application was filed, certain aircraft lessors terminated the lease agreement in order to seek repossession of the leased aircrafts. Subsequently, on May 5, the lessors invoked the Irrevocable Deregistration and Export Request Authorization [“IDERA”] and applied to Directorate General of Civil Aviation [“DGCA”] for deregistration and repossession of the leased aircrafts. IDERA confers an exclusive right on the lessors to effect deregistration of the aircraft and its export from India. It is a part of the Cape Town Convention [“CTC”], to which India is a signatory. The entire process has to be completed within 5 working days. However, before the elapse of 5 working days, the Adjudicating Authority [“AA”], on May 10, admitted the application and declared a moratorium under Section 14 of the Code. This led to a situation wherein though the lease agreement was terminated before the declaration of moratorium, the possession of the planes remained with GoFirst since the deregistration process could not be completed. The question of whether the possession of the leased planes would rest with the Corporate Debtor [“CD”] or with the lessors is still a debatable proposition and largely depends on the interpretation of Section 14(1)(d) of the Code that prohibits the recovery of property by the lessor which is in the possession of the CD. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that had the AA been late even by a couple of days, the lessors would have succeeded in securing repossession of the aircrafts and would have severely impacted the revival prospects of GoFirst. This threat has been averted, at least for now. However, this incident raises serious concerns over the present Insolvency regime and the possibility of the creditors rushing to secure their assets in the period between the date of filing and the date of admission, thus potentially trapping the CD in an irrecoverable state. Absence of Interim Moratorium: An Achilles Heel? The absence of an Interim Moratorium in the Indian insolvency regime raises significant concerns and poses a troubling scenario akin to an impending storm that threatens to disrupt the insolvency process of distressed companies. Although the Code stipulates that the AA should admit a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process [“CIRP”] application within 14 days of its filing (Section 7(4), 9(5), and 10(4) of the Code), the pre-admission stage is often plagued by substantial delays. According to the 2021 IBBI Survey on CIRP Timelines, the AA took an average of 133 days to make a decision from the filing date of a CIRP application. This protracted delay is troubling as it incentivizes syphoning off assets by promoters and/or encourages creditors to rush and enforce their debts, undermining the collective and value-maximising insolvency resolution process envisioned by the Code. In cases such as NUI Pulp and Paper Industries, and F.M. Hammerle Textiles, the Appellate Tribunal granted an interim moratorium when there was a reasonable apprehension of asset misappropriation. This underscores the pressing need for the incorporation of an interim moratorium into the Code through an amendment. Such an amendment is crucial to prevent a scenario where a distressed company’s assets are syphoned off even before the commencement of a moratorium, which would ultimately defeat the fundamental objectives of the Code. Therefore, it is imperative to address this gap in the Indian insolvency regime promptly to safeguard the integrity and effectiveness of the insolvency resolution process. Fixing the loophole: A global perspective The GoFirst case has highlighted a prominent issue in the Indian Insolvency regime that warrants attention. If the leading foreign jurisdictions are perused, majority of them provide for an interim moratorium at the time of filing the insolvency application. For instance, in Singapore, Section 64(14) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 [“IRDA”] imposes an automatic 30-day moratorium as soon as an application for Judicial Management is filed. Within these 30 days, the Court schedules a first hearing in order to review the status of the moratorium. Even before the passing of IRDA, Section 227C of the Companies Act, Singapore provided for a moratorium beginning from the date of filing of the application. In the UK, Section 44(1) of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act, 1986 provides for an interim moratorium from the time of making the administration application till the time a decision is made with regards to the appointment of an administrator. Similarly, in the USA, Section 362 of the US Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic moratorium upon the filing of a Chapter 11 petition. The purpose behind these provisions is twofold: (i) to prevent individual creditors from taking action against the CD and hampering its prospects of revival; (ii) to prevent the CD’s management from siphoning off its assets. Thus, the existence of an interim moratorium ensures that none of the stakeholders maliciously work towards securing their own welfare and protects their collective well-being by keeping the restructuring and revival prospects of the CD alive. These regimes have also taken the interests of creditors into consideration. This is important because during the pre-admission stage, the control is still vested in the CD’s erstwhile management which creates an exorbitant room for misuse. In the USA, the automatic moratorium could be lifted upon the application by secured creditors for appropriate cause, including the case wherein the debtor company has not ‘adequately protected’ the property interests of the creditor during the moratorium period. Even in the UK, sufficient power has been granted to the court to lift the moratorium in order to check the misuse. The Saga of Interim Moratorium: Tracing the history Let’s look back at the

[By Biprojeet Talapatra] The author is a student of Campus Law Centre, University of Delhi.   Introduction Leasing-in of aircrafts by aviation businesses is extremely prevalent across the world, and according to projections, about half of the commercial aircrafts that fly the world’s skies are leased by the companies. Aviation companies enjoy considerable operational flexibility and financial advantages through aircraft leasing. In India, approximately 80% of the commercial fleet is obtained through leasing, a significantly higher percentage compared to the global average of 53%. According to a February 2021 report on ‘Aircraft leasing in India: Ready to take off,’ auditing major PwC said the size of the global aircraft leasing industry was estimated to be $290.07 billion in 2019. Aircraft lessors have seen their share in the total commercial fleet grow globally from 25 percent in 2000 to 48.9 percent in 2020. In light of this context, the recent decision of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) has triggered alarm signals among international lessors. In the case of SMBC Aviation Capital v. Interim Resolution Professional of Go Airlines (India), Abhilash Lal, the NCLAT rendered its verdict, affirming the National Company Law Tribunal’s (NCLT) decision to admit the application under Section 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (Code), granting defaulters the ability to initiate voluntary insolvency proceedings. As part of this ruling, the NCLT also imposed a moratorium, marking a critical turning point with far-reaching consequences for the aircraft leasing landscape in India. Background Go Airlines (India) Limited, which has since been rebranded as GoFirst, operated as a low-cost airline. However, the company faced significant financial challenges, resulting in defaults in payments to aircraft lessors, amounting to a staggering INR 2,660 crores. In response to the mounting financial strain, the corporate debtor (CD), GoFirst, opted to file for voluntary insolvency under Section 10 of the Code with the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). Operational creditors, representing the aircraft lessors, opposed the insolvency application, asserting that it was driven by fraudulent and malicious intent. Moreover, the creditors expressed concern over the absence of prior notice, depriving them of the opportunity to object to the application. The NCLT held that no specific law requires creditors to be notified when filing an application for voluntary insolvency. Furthermore, when ruling on the matter of opposing the application under Section 65 of the Code, which deals with fraudulent insolvency initiation, the NCLT found that the same may be dealt with once the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was initiated. As a result, the CD was subject to the moratorium established by Section 14 of the Code. In response to the lessors’ appeal, the appellate body NCLAT issued held that there is an established legal precedent and legislative provisions that the NCLT is obligated to allow the application if the NCLT is persuaded that there is a debt and default and if the Corporate Applicant has completed the conditions stipulated in Section 10(3). Before the application is approved, the Corporate Applicant is not required to issue notice to creditors and allow them to express their concerns with the NCLT. As a result, the NCLAT correctly affirmed the NCLT’s ruling. Exploring the Dynamics of Aircraft Leasing in the Context of Insolvency Aircraft leasing is characterized by a significant volume of cross-border transactions, necessitating the implementation of principles that safeguard the rights of lessors. The Cape Town Convention (CTC), officially titled the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, stands as a pivotal international agreement specifically focused on regulating aircraft leasing and related matters. Its provisions are designed to ensure the protection and interests of lessors in such transactions. Within the Aircraft Protocol of the Cape Town Convention (CTC), Article XI introduces essential provisions that offer creditors two viable options. Firstly, they may reclaim possession of the aircraft after the waiting period expires. Alternatively, the insolvency administrator can decide to either surrender the aircraft or continue utilizing it while fulfilling lease payments as per the existing lease agreement. Moreover, both the debtor and the administrator are obligated to uphold the equipment’s value. These measures have been established to ensure the protection of creditors’ rights without imposing any orders or actions that could hinder the creditors’ exercise of remedies. The two alternatives presented to creditors under Article XI enhance the flexibility and efficiency of dealing with leased aircraft during insolvency proceedings. This allows for a balanced approach that safeguards both creditors’ interests and the continued operation of aircraft assets. Analysis of the Verdict The moratorium was imposed, which is intended to protect the assets of the debtor and maintain the status quo while the insolvency proceedings are underway. The imposition of a moratorium implies that aircraft lessors are prohibited from repossessing the leased aircraft for a minimum period of six months, which may potentially extend further. Unfortunately, such delays in resolving debt-ridden companies can lead to a depreciation in the value of the aircraft. Moreover, during this period, the aircraft will remain grounded and unused, preventing them from being leased to more financially robust airlines. This delay in resolution has a well-established impact on diminishing the value of the corporate debtor’s (CD) assets and obstructing successful resolution efforts. Additionally, creditors, aside from the lessors, may also seize the aircraft to recover their outstanding dues. In the case of Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Mr. Amit Gupta & Ors., the Supreme Court has established a significant precedent. The court ruled that terminating a contract solely due to a company entering insolvency proceedings, which could potentially lead to the demise of the corporate debtor, should not be allowed. It emphasized that such terminations must be prohibited to safeguard the interests of the corporate debtor during insolvency. It is important to note a distinguishing aspect in the current case where lease agreements were terminated before the initiation of the CIRP against the Corporate Applicant. These terminations were made in anticipation of the probable initiation of insolvency proceedings and the subsequent enforcement of the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency