Author name: CBCL

Navigating the Efficacy of Post-Crisis Legal Reforms of The IL&FC Crises In India

[By Shraddha Tiwari & Tejaswini Kaushal] The authors are students of School of Law Christ University, Bangalore and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow.   Introduction Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited (“IL&FS”), a distinguished stalwart in infrastructure financing, boasted a legacy spanning over three decades. Functioning as a shadow bank, this non-banking financial company (“NBFC”) emulated the services provided by conventional commercial banks. With its ownership lying substantially in the hands of esteemed state-backed entities and prominent international organizations and boasting an intricate network of subsidiaries coupled with connections with banks, mutual funds, and infrastructure players, it was recognized as a ‘systemically important’ enterprise. It was, somewhat ironically, classified as “too big to fail.” In 2018, the shadow bank faced a liquidity crisis and payment defaults due to a risky combination of short-term debt and imbalances in long-term assets. Compounded by delayed bond issuance, disputes over government payments, and investigations by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (“SFIO”)and the Enforcement Directorate (“ED”)for procedural lapses and money laundering, the IL&FS crisis sent shockwaves across the stock market. The company’s market reputation suffered, leading to a downgrade in its debt rating, causing concerns among investors such as banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds about its financial stability and potential ripple effects. As the company experienced delays and defaults on its debt obligations and inter-corporate deposits, it ultimately collapsed, worsening existing issues arising from mismanagement in the banking sector and regulatory shortcomings. Evidently, insolvency was IL&FS’s only chance to limit further economic damage. IL&FS, an NBFC established under the Companies Act (“CA”) 2013, faces challenges in efficient insolvency proceedings due to delays and concerns in implementing the recommended ‘Financial Data and Management Centre’ to monitor systemic risk. The proposed Resolution Corporation, meant for crisis resolution, also encountered opposition, leading to the withdrawal of the Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill 2017 (“Bill 2017”). These issues hinder the smooth functioning of insolvency proceedings for NBFCs. Under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC”) 2016, IL&FS wasn’t subjected to the insolvency process despite the Central Government’s authority to invoke its Section 2 to refer financial service providers for resolution since NBFCs themselves cannot resort to the IBC owing to their status as financial service providers. However, IL&FS’s non-financial subsidiary entities, such as power and infrastructure projects, could use the IBC individually. However, the complicated connections between group companies and the uncertainty surrounding group bankruptcies were obstacles for a conglomerate like IL&FS in choosing the IBC route. The inability to bring the ultimate holding company, IL&FS, under the purview of the IBC posed a significant obstacle to the resolution process, and the creditor-driven nature of the IBC did not align with the desires of IL&FS’s promoters to retain control and management. Additionally, prior scholarship suggested that IL&FS primarily faces a temporary liquidity issue rather than insolvency, further dampening the desirability of the IBC as a resolution option. The Alternate Route taken by IL&FS The alternate route that IL&FS undertook was of Sections 230, 231 and 232, CA 2013, which offer provisions for schemes of arrangements and compromises, although infrequently utilized in India for debt restructuring purposes. Unlike the UK and Singapore, the schemes of arrangements mechanism have faced limited adoption in India due to cumbersome procedural requirements, lengthy delays, and creditor resistance. However, for IL&FS, this route presented certain advantages over the IBC, given its broader scope and flexibility to tailor the revival plan to the company’s specific needs, encompassing corporate and credit restructuring. Moreover, promoters can retain control throughout the scheme’s implementation, and unlike the IBC, a particular default is not a prerequisite under Section 230 of the CA 2013. This potentially allowed IL&FS to include financially sound entities within the scheme as necessary. Though the best suited for IL&FS, this crisis underscored that the CA 2013 only offered a potential but imperfect solution through a scheme of compromise or arrangement between a company and its creditors or shareholders to reorganize its financial structure. The CA 2013 route entails securing approval from at least 75 percent of secured creditors or shareholders and the National Company Law Tribunal. While it preserves equity rights and provides flexibility for crafting comprehensive solutions, its drawbacks include the absence of explicit provisions for a moratorium or fixed timelines, and the lack of overriding effect over other laws like the Income Tax Act, 1961 unlike resolutions approved under the IBC. Challenges arise from the absence of a comprehensive framework encompassing all classes of creditors and the untested nature of anonymity of schemes in group insolvency scenarios. Additionally, the CA 2013, lacking a moratorium provision like Section 14 of the IBC, does not offer a time-bound resolution, which it reserves solely for specific creditors, and leaves uncertainty regarding the impact of IBC proceedings initiated during the scheme’s NCLT approval. Effect of the Crisis The IL&FS crisis exposed weaknesses in India’s financial regulatory framework, emphasizing the urgent need for comprehensive reforms to manage risks effectively. The default sent shockwaves, impacting NBFCs significantly as they are primary borrowers from banks. Credit rating downgrades affected even stable NBFCs, eroding credit profiles and damaging the overall economy. Investors lost confidence and withdrew investments, leading to a liquidity crunch. The absence of a specific bankruptcy law for financial service providers made the resolution and liquidation processes cumbersome and costly under the CA 2013. This highlighted the critical necessity of implementing a tailored bankruptcy law for such entities. Post-Crisis Legal Reforms The Central Government, by §227 of the IBC 2016, came up with the Bill 2017, but it was withdrawn due to various loopholes. Against the backdrop of the IL&FC crisis, it formulated the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings of Financial Service Providers and Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2019, for NBFCs. These rules incline more towards the ‘regulator-driven approach’ than the traditional ‘creditor-driven approach’ followed by the IBC. These rules include housing finance companies with asset size of Rs. 500 core or more as per the previously audited balance sheet. The insolvency process

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Inverse ETFs Revisited: A Case for Regulatory Reassessment by SEBI

[By Hemant Tewari & Apoorva Singh Rathaur] The authors are students of Dharmashastra National Law University, Jabalpur.   Introduction Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) stand as mutual fund instruments affording access to an index or a collection of securities, trading on exchanges akin to individual stocks. Investors can seamlessly trade ETF units at prevailing market prices, enjoying exposure to distinct sectors, styles, asset categories, industries, or nations. ETFs offer cost efficiency surpassing conventional open-end funds, coupled with trading flexibility, diversification, and heightened transparency. The buy-and-forget strategy is often forced down retail investors’ throats with all finfluencers standing mighty behind it. As a retail investor, one can buy instruments like mutual funds and ETFs and only hope helplessly that their value increases. But retail investors are left without options when they would want to hedge their portfolios or short-sell securities. Derivatives like futures, options, and short-selling are risky and expensive ways of facilitating your bearish ambitions. On such occasions, Inverse ETFs become the harbinger of financial justice. The goal of inverse exchange-traded funds is to produce returns that are the opposite of those of an underlying index or benchmark. Inverse ETFs use financial derivatives like futures contracts to achieve their inverse performance. They are cheaper as compared to traditional shorting of stocks and using derivatives, with no need of maintaining a margin account or pay a stock loan fee. Daily churning is the norm with inverse ETFs and they are recommended for investors with a short-term view of the index. Currently, Inverse ETFs are not allowed in India and are regulated by SEBI. Introducing inverse ETFs would provide a wider range of financial products to retail investors and can facilitate the development of the market. It would also improve the ease of doing business without compromising the basic tenets of investor protection and risk mitigation in the market ecosystem. Present Standings In India, the first ETF, called Nifty BeEs, was launched in 2002 by Benchmark MF. The ETF industry has matured since then, the number of passive mutual fund schemes in March 2023 was 349, up from 229 in June 2022, representing a 52% increase with a net Asset under management(AUM) upwards of 5 lakh crores. It represents the growing trend of passive investors and the strength of the ETF market. Benchmark MF had submitted a document proposing setting up India’s first Inverse ETF in 2004 but later withdrew the document after it was acquired by Reliance from Goldman Sachs. No such attempts have been made by any AMC since and Inverse ETFs were unable to garner any support from SEBI or any AMC. The Indian Regulator does not allow Inverse ETFs in India. However, the National Stock Exchange(NSE) has two Inverse indices that the AMCs or retail investors can track- NIFTY50 PR 1x Inverse Index NIFTY50 TR 1x Inverse Index Inverse ETFs that track these Indian indices do exist. They are however listed in foreign jurisdictions and not in India. Fubon Asset Management, located in Taiwan, launched the Nifty50 PR 1X Inverse ETF in October 2014. Similarly, in 2016, Hong Kong-based CSOP Asset Management created the CSOP Nifty 50 Daily (-1x) Inverse ETF. Inverse ETFs have grown in developed markets with the introduction of leveraged inverse ETFs wherein a move in any direction in the index is inversely mirrored by 200% i.e. if the leverage is 2x. Recently, Horizons ETF became the first fund to release the Bitcoin inverse ETF called the BetaPro Inverse Bitcoin ETF (“BITI”) on the Toronto stock exchange. The Indian markets also welcomed for the first time, debt ETFs in the markets. Internationally, there are Inverse ETFs for almost all the major global markets e.g. Europe (ProShares UltraShort FTSE Europe), China (Direxion Daily CSI 300 China A Share Bear 1X Shares), Japan (UltraShort MSCI Japan ProShares), Brazil (ProShares UltraShort MSCI Brazil), Emerging Markets (UltraShort MSCI Emerging Markets). There are Inverse ETFs for currencies as well like e.g. ProShares Short Euro (EUFX); which seeks to deliver minus 1x return of EUR over USD. Such developments in developed and emerging markets signify a strong demand for Inverse tracking products and subsequently indicate the robustness of Inverse ETFs. Benefits Inverse index ETFs offer several compelling advantages: Limited Risk: When investing in inverse index ETFs, the maximum potential loss is confined to the unit price of the ETF, similar to purchasing regular stocks. This is a significant improvement over alternative bearish strategies like shorting stocks or utilizing option strategies, both of which can lead to potentially unlimited losses. In this sense, using inverse index ETFs provides a more controlled risk environment. Daily Profit Potential: Investors leveraging inverse index ETFs have the unique opportunity to profit from declining stock prices on a daily basis. This ability to benefit from short-term market movements provides a dynamic approach for capitalizing on bearish trends. Cost-Effective Approach: Inverse index ETFs serve as a cost-effective means to express a bearish stance. Comparable to other exchange-traded funds, they typically maintain low expense ratios. This cost efficiency is particularly valuable for investors seeking to implement tactical strategies without incurring substantial fees. For domestic investors, options for bearish strategies are limited. Shorting stock or index futures is risky. Buying index or stock put options can be easier, but timing the market is challenging due to time value. Additionally, less-traded options and the volatile volatility index are risky alternatives, especially during turbulent times. Foreign Jurisdictions A direct comparison with developed markets might not be the best comparative strategy but comparing Indian markets to such jurisdictions where the markets are somewhat similar in size and socio-political context might help. For example, in Asia, countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, have Inverse ETF products where total assets in such instruments at the end of 2022 amounted to about $20bn. The first Inverse ETF in Asia was launched by Deutsche Bank on the Singapore stock exchange tracking the S&P500 index. Outside Asia, New Zealand, and France have allowed Inverse ETFs. Maybank Asset Management is preparing to introduce Malaysia’s inaugural mutual

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India’s Differential Voting Right Structure- A Futile Attempt to Change Corporate Framework?

[By Shyam Gandhi] The author is a student of National Law University, Jodhpur.   INTRODUCTION The introduction of Differential voting rights (DVR) shares was initially facilitated by the Companies (Amendment) Act of 2000. In 2008, Tata Motors became the first business to issue DVR shares. Subsequently, in 2009, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) implemented a prohibition on the issuance of ‘Superior Voting Right’ shares due to concerns of potential financial misappropriation by shareholders holding shares with differential voting rights (DVRs). The decision was motivated by the aim of safeguarding minority shareholders from potential tyranny and preventing the consolidation of managerial control within family-owned enterprises. In the year 2019, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) implemented a policy reversal by disallowing the issuing of shares with inferior voting rights while simultaneously allowing listed businesses to issue shares with Superior Voting Rights (SVR). Section 43(a)(ii) of the Companies Act permits companies to issue equity shares with differential rights in terms of dividend, voting, or other aspects. These shares are commonly referred to as DVR shares. DVR shares can be categorized into two types: ‘Superior Voting Right’ shares, which grant voting rights beyond the conventional ‘one share, one vote’ principle, and ‘Inferior/Fractional Voting Right’ shares. REINTRODUCTION OF DVR MECHANISM SEBI, the Securities and Exchange Board of India, published a consultation paper on March 20, 2019, on the issuing of DVR shares. The purpose of this document is to address the growing discussion surrounding the necessity of allowing the issuance and listing of shares with DVRs in India. The study underscored the advantages and necessity of DVRs in the context of India’s period of rapid economic expansion, which necessitates firms to secure funds in order to maintain this growth. Moreover, it is worth noting that certain companies that adopt asset light business models may exhibit a preference for equity capital as opposed to debt capital. In order to raise equity capital, these companies may consider the issuance of shares with superior voting rights (SRs) to founders as well as shares with lower or fractional voting rights (FRs) to private or public investors. This approach can be viewed as a feasible alternative for such companies. SEBI approved a framework for the issuance of DVRs, on 27th June 2019. ADOPTING A FLEXIBLE APPROACH On September 28, 2021, SEBI proposed the relaxation of restrictions pertaining to differential voting rights (DVRs) for company founders. This recommendation is intended to enhance the prospects of technology startups, wherein founders often possess minimal ownership stakes in later stages but wield disproportionate control over operational matters. During the meeting, SEBI made the decision to raise the minimum net worth requirement for entrepreneurs and their companies from Rs 500 crore to Rs 1,000 crore. This adjustment aims to grant these entrepreneurs enhanced voting rights within their own companies. Moreover, prior to the present time, corporations were required to observe a waiting period of six months before issuing these shares and submitting their documents for the purpose of being listed on the stock market. Based on the recorded minutes of the meeting, the duration has been reduced to a period of three months. The strategy is based on the model observed at prominent companies in Silicon Valley, such as Facebook and Alphabet’s Google. In this model, investors possess larger ownership stakes than the founders, yet the founders maintain control through the allocation of greater voting rights. Typically, this entails granting the founders 10-20 votes per share, while investors are granted one vote per share. EXISTING CHALLENGES REGARDING CURRENT FRAMEWORK Currently, DVRs mechanism faces several challenges. Firstly, there is a lack of awareness and knowledge regarding the DVR. One of the primary factors contributing to the low level of knowledge about DVR shares is the minimal marketing and educational initiatives that have been made. It is possible that many people who are interested in investing do not have a complete understanding of what DVR shares are and how they operate. People are less inclined to make financial commitments to something they do not fully comprehend if there are not sufficient marketing and education efforts. Secondly, those who are in possession of shares that have superior voting rights may, in some situations and under certain conditions, exploit their influence for the purpose of seeking personal gain or moving themselves closer to their own goals. It is possible that, as a result of this, decisions will be taken that are not in the best interest of the company or the individuals who have a stake in it. Third, companies that are organised in a DVR fashion could run into a number of obstacles when they are attempting to raise capital. If a company does not grant equal voting rights to all of its shareholders, there is a risk that some investors may be hesitant to join that company. Thus, as a consequence of this fact, the business can have a more challenging time generating capital. Lastly, there is an unequal distribution of voting power, which prompts people to worry about the propriety of corporate governance. Shareholders who have greater voting rights than other shareholders may be more likely to make decisions that prioritise their own personal interests above the long-term prosperity of the company as a whole or the interests of other shareholders. This has the potential to result in conflicts of interest as well as assessments that are not in line with the development of long-term value. FAILURE OF DIFFERENTIAL VOTING RIGHTS MECHANISM Even after more than 23 years of operation in India, only a handful of listed businesses have issued DVR shares, despite the fact that DVR Shares were originally established there in 2000. Tata Motors, was the first to opt for the DVR Shares, but recently Tata Motors announced that it will convert the DVR Shares into ordinary shares. The aforementioned action is being undertaken with the intention of streamlining its capital structure. As per the company’s statement, the proprietors of ‘A’ shares, who currently receive superior dividends compared to

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Exploring the Sony-Zee Merger: A Comprehensive Analysis

[By Jose S Jose] The author is a student of The National University of Advanced Legal Studies (NUALS), Kochi.   INTRODUCTION In a significant stride within the entertainment industry, NCLT (National Company Law Tribunal) Mumbai recently granted approval for the merger of Zee Entertainment Enterprises and Culver Max Entertainment, previously known as Sony Pictures Networks India. This transformative green light not only ushers in the possibility of a formidable entertainment giant commanding about 26% of India’s entertainment market but also beckons the amalgamation of rich content portfolios and industry expertise. However, beneath this promising surface, a series of legal challenges have cast shadows over the merger’s realization, resulting in protracted delays. In this comprehensive analysis, we’ll first explore the intricacies of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings against Zee by NCLT Delhi and the subsequent SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) ban on Punit Goenka, Managing Director of Zee, which have collectively contributed to this prolonged period of uncertainty. Beyond legal matters, we’ll discuss the background of the merger, the strategic agreement between Sony and Zee, and the potential benefits for shareholders and consumers. We’ll also navigate the legal hurdles and strategic intricacies of the Sony-Zee Entertainment merger, ultimately shedding light on the promising future it holds for India’s entertainment landscape. BACKGROUND While industry analysts speculate that the merger could potentially materialize within the next 2 to 3 months, the  timeline remains subject to various factors, introducing an element of uncertainty. In the dynamic landscape of mergers and acquisitions, anticipation is met with caution. The seeds of this partnership were sown back in 2021 when both entertainment juggernauts, Sony and Zee, forged an agreement to pool their expertise, digital assets, and extensive networks. With this ambitious alignment, a new chapter in the entertainment industry seems inevitable. Under the terms of this strategic agreement, the Sony group stands poised to claim a controlling stake of approximately 51% in the nascent entity. Meanwhile, the founders of Zee are set to retain a notable 4% share. The remaining equity will be thoughtfully allocated among the existing shareholders of Zee, allowing for a diversified ownership structure reflective of the company’s roots. This merger is a juncture of strategic relevance, offering manifold advantages for the new conglomerate. By synergizing their strengths, these companies aim to fortify their competitive edge in the market. Beyond boardrooms, shareholders too are poised to reap the rewards, as the merger is anticipated to translate into an augmented value of shares. At the same time, consumers are expected to be the ultimate beneficiaries, as the amalgamation promises an enhanced content palette, catering to an ever-evolving appetite for diverse entertainment experiences. This significant milestone is currently hindered by the legal obstacles that have raised significant concerns. LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS: CORPORATE INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS (CIRP) A significant turning point emerged when IndusInd Bank set in motion the process for Corporate Insolvency Resolution Proceedings (CIRP) against Zee Entertainment. The initial salvo was fired with an application filed at the NCLT Mumbai, invoking Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), complemented by Rule 4 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudication Authority) Rules, 2016. Section 7 of the IBC confers the authority upon financial creditors to initiate the corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor before the NCLT. Meanwhile, Rule 4 of the Application to Adjudication Authority Rules outlines the procedural compass for filing such an application. In this legal overture, IndusInd Bank set its sights on resolving a financial debt that scaled beyond 90 crores—a threshold that bore implications for both Zee Entertainment and the proposed merger. The filing of this application injected a notable pause into the rhythm of the merger’s progression, casting a shadow of uncertainty over its timeline. The unfolding narrative took a series of twists as the legal pendulum swung back and forth. The order initiating the insolvency process issued by the NCLT Mumbai, which carried the resonance of a significant pronouncement, encountered an intermission when it was effectively stayed by an order from the NCLAT Delhi. However, the tide shifted once more as the same judicial forum, the NCLAT Delhi, ultimately terminated the CIRP order. The restoration of movement was prompted by a pivotal development—namely, the emergence of a settlement between the two principal entities involved: Zee Entertainment and IndusInd Bank. Remarkably, the settlement between the two has streamlined the process of merger. DISQUALIFICATION OF DIRECTOR BY SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA (SEBI) Empowered by the SEBI Act of 1992, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) stands as a consequential statutory body entrusted with safeguarding investor interests and fostering the growth of India’s securities market. In a sweeping move, SEBI wielded its regulatory authority to impose bans on two significant figures within the Essel Group—the Chairman, Subhash Chandra, and Zee’s CEO, Punit Goenka. This decisive action was catalyzed by compelling evidence that illuminated a troubling pattern: both individuals had allegedly misappropriated funds through a misuse of their directorial positions. The reverberations of SEBI’s stance echoed beyond its initial pronouncement. This interim ban, effectuated with resolute intent, was upheld by the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT). This affirmation cemented the gravity of the allegations and the necessity of the actions undertaken. The consequences rippled across the corporate landscape, throwing into question the identity of the future director of the envisaged merged entity—a role previously slated for Zee’s incumbent CEO, Punit Goenka. This unforeseen hurdle cast a shadow over the merger’s strategic blueprint, inducing fluctuations in market sentiment. The tangible ramifications extended to Zee’s stock price, experiencing a noteworthy reduction. Mandated by SEBI, a probe has been set in motion with the express aim of unravelling the intricate threads that have woven this complex narrative. The investigation’s scope, ambitiously encompassing an 8-month timeline, serves as a testament to the gravity of the situation and the meticulous inquiry required. NCLT APPROVAL OF THE MERGER While the ink on the merger agreement between these two entities was penned and announced back in 2021, the long-awaited

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ESG in Lending Decisions. What is in it for Banks?

[By Dhanush Thonaparthi] The author is a student of NALSAR University of Law.   Introduction Economic Social and Governance (ESG) policy is a concept of growing relevance among business houses, replacing the more traditional Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) concept. It is reflected in the legislative and policy space of the government, with the most prominent example of this being the introduction of the Business Responsibility & Sustainability reporting mandated by The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), for India’s top 1000 listed companies by market capitalization. In this context, the article argues that banks should incorporate the ESG performance of a company alongside other factors when considering a lending decision, with persuasive reasons for the same and examples as to how ESG is already becoming a key factor in credit ratings and lending decisions. What is ESG and how is it relevant for companies?  ESG includes three components, its pillars, namely Environmental, Social and Governance. ESG refers to a set of standards regarding a company’s activities and behavior concerning the components of ESG. These factors, in the corporate context, are used to look at the long-term sustainability of a company. With an increased global push towards environmental consciousness, respecting social considerations, and better governance in companies, this framework becomes important in evaluating a company’s future performance and opportunities. Achieving high ESG standards also becomes important for companies in the context of the stakeholder theory[1], which postulates that corporate success is not dependent only on shareholder and management satisfaction, but also on its relationships with its customers, the Government, creditors, and the public. The long-term survival and profitability of a company depend on it maintaining a good relationship with all its stakeholder groups. This is where ESG standards play an important role, considering that they address the environmental aspect, (which has been a major point of concern across countries and the public) the social aspect (mostly relating to the general public welfare, which is important for a company’s reputation and goodwill) and the governance aspect (better governance instills public and corporate confidence, meaning access to cheaper lending, more and better customers and more investment options). How is ESG relevant to banks when making lending decisions  Banks are financial institutions driven by profit motives and financial considerations. A major concern for banks is non-performing assets and delays in repayments by borrowers, reducing the profitability of the bank. This can lead to unrealized gains and/or unnecessary litigation for recovery, both of which any bank will want to avoid. Therefore, banks would want metrics that help determine whether a lending decision could translate into an unprofitable venture. A key factor that can be incorporated into such metrics is ESG. A review of the literature on ESG as a factor in corporate lending has found that better ESG performance may correlate with lower credit risk, legal risk, and downside risk.[2] Additionally, a survey by Morningstar indicates that better sustainable performance leads to better risk mitigation. We are currently undergoing the largest wealth transfer in history, with experts suggesting that nearly sixty eight trillion dollars of wealth will be transferred to the newer generations. We are in the middle of the largest wealth transfer in history. This is important for financial institutions as millennials fear climate change and would be willing to sacrifice financial benefits in favour of sustainability, and a company that is able to gain a leadership position in sustainability will be more preferred by millennials. Before delving into more specific reasons as to why ESG is important for banks in their lending decisions, we have to, first consider the Environmental pillar of ESG. Companies that are compliant with existing laws and regulations are less likely to be penalized and fined for any potential violation. The future outlook regarding environmental legislation is that it will be more protective of the environment, leading to more restrictions for a company, which translates into more potential liabilities for companies that do not comply and additional costs for compliance. For banks, this becomes important as a compliant company is less likely to incur these additional liabilities that add to the company’s costs. A company that goes beyond legally mandated environmental norms is more insulated from changes in regulation making it less susceptible to changes in legislation. Secondly, the Social pillar of ESG is important for banks, as it helps determine the brand value of the company and to assess how much public goodwill the company enjoys. If companies do not value the rights of people, it leads to public resentment and outcry, which forces the governments to intervene, leading to unnecessary interference and even litigation and reparations. An example in this regard is the case of Facebook. Facebook had to pay nearly 725 million dollars to settle a class action lawsuit after it disclosed that information relating to 87 million users (about twice the population of California) was improperly shared with Cambridge Analytica. Thirdly, Governance is an important pillar for banks to take cognizance of when lending, primarily because better governance means better company performance, a higher level of employee quality, and reliable company disclosures. If a company has bad governance practices, it can spell disaster for banks that choose to make lending decisions based on the company’s financials as disclosed by the company itself. A good example of bad governance translating into unreliable disclosures is the well-known Satyam scandal. In this case, the company had falsified accounts, inflated the share price, and invested enormous amounts in property. Upon admission by the company’s chairman, the fraud became known, leading to a collapse of the market’s reputation and confidence in the company. This is a prime example, demonstrating how dishonest and inefficient governance practices can lead to the collapse of a company, putting lenders at immense risk of their loans turning into non-performing assets or defunct loans. Fourthly, companies must be able to align themselves with the social values of the public and contribute towards the welfare of the society they operate in, because company perception plays

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Confronting Disability Discrimination in Insurance: Saurabh Shukla V. Max/Niva Bupa and Beyond

[By Saiyam Shah] The author is a student of Auro University.   Introduction Insurance, particularly health and life insurance, plays a pivotal role in alleviating stress for most individuals and families, assisting them in coping with unforeseen and unfortunate circumstances. People with disabilities (PWD), especially those with congenital disabilities, are often denied access to health and life insurance policies solely based on their disabilities, without any proper risk analysis or objective justifications. Testimonials of the PWD, who were denied insurance or were not given the amount they were entitled to when required on inconsequential grounds are many. Though the judicial intervention has provided some relief, the attitude of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) was not impressive until the intervention of the Delhi High Court.. This article delves into the recent developments concerning discrimination against PWD in insurance-related matters and highlights what IRDAI can learn from the practices of the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) to curb instances of discrimination. The initial section highlights the importance of health and life insurance and sheds light on the direct and indirect discrimination faced by PWD. Subsequently, it briefs about the provisions pertaining to discrimination. In the next part, it delves into two significant decisions by the Delhi High Court on the issue of discrimination and concludes by addressing recent developments and advocating for IRDAI to consider issuing binding circulars or non-binding guidelines akin to those adopted by the AHRC to take substantial steps towards reducing instances of discrimination and fostering a fair and inclusive insurance environment for all. Importance of insurance for the PWD As it is for every individual, health and life insurance are essential for PWD to mitigate accidents and other such uncertain events. As noted by Thomas Weston in the context of the UK, but also applicable generally, the PWD (1) are less likely to be employed by the private sector, (2) their income may be lower than their counterparts, and (3) specific needs for assistive equipment, care, and therapy add to their daily cost burden. Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary for them to have health insurance to financially deal with the uncertain events requiring immediate payment of a large amount. Direct and indirect discrimination Often, PWD are denied health or life insurance solely based on their disability without conducting an objective assessment of the risk factors and considering the possibility of providing a policy with a higher premium and non-standard terms. The PWD are discriminated against by: (1) denying to provide the insurance policy, (2) providing the policy with non-standard terms and/or a higher premium and (3) not paying the legitimate insured amount when required on inconsequential grounds. The discrimination is also visible in instances involving family insurance plans. The legal provisions Section 3 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act (RPWD Act) prohibits any kind of discrimination based on disability unless one satisfies that the same act or omission is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Section 24(k) of the Act mandates the appropriate government to make a comprehensive insurance scheme for the PWD, and 26 mandates it to make insurance schemes for employees with disabilities. However, the customised insurance policies, customer service, and range of options available in the private sector make it imperative to ensure that they are available to everyone, including PWD. India has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, article 3 of which obligates the states to abide by the principles of non-discrimination and full and effective participation and inclusion in society. Article 25(e) of the CRPD obligates the states to prohibit discrimination against PWD in the provision of health and life insurance where such insurance is permitted by national law. Due to the lack of express provision addressing this issue, the litigants seek relief U/A 14 and 21 of the Constitution against such practices. Protection in foreign jurisdictions The Australian Disability Discrimination Act (ADDA) allows discrimination in life and health insurance only if (i) it (1) is based upon actuarial or statistical data and (2) is reasonable having regard to the matter of the data and other relevant factors; or (ii) if the same is not available and cannot be reasonably obtained, the discrimination is reasonable having regard to any other relevant factors. The US’s Affordable Care Act prohibits insurance companies from not providing insurance to people with pre-existing conditions. Other countries or states, that have some express provision against such discrimination include Hong Kong, Japan, Spain, the UK, Portugal etc. Judiciary on disability discrimination Are PWD more prone to accidental risks? In Vikas Gupta v. Union of India (2012), the petitioner filed a PIL against the discrimination in premium as well as the maximum amount ensured in the Postal Life Insurance Policy for government employees. The respondent defended their actions on the ground that PWD are more prone to accidental risks. As rightly countered by the petitioner, (1) there is no such empirical data to support such a general statement, and (2) living with a disability and suffering from a disease are not synonymous. Can a class be excluded on the ground of the contractual relation The bench referred to LIC v. Consumer Education & Research Centre and observed that though insurance is a contract between the insurer and the insured, the conditions prohibiting a class from entering into such a contract are unconstitutional. The LIC had distinguished the persons working in government, semi- government and reputed commercial firms from those living in vast rural and urban areas engaged in unorganized or self-employed sectors and denied insurance policy to the latter. The court struck down the classification as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The bench, applying the same case, held that charging a higher premium and discriminating on the basis of the disability is unconstitutional. Saurabh Shukla v. Max/Niva Bupa Health Insurance & Co.; IRDAI’s failure as a sectoral regulator Regulations ; a paper tiger IRDAI’s 2016 Health Insurance Regulations, Para 8(b) and (C), used

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Arbitrability of Insolvency Disputes – Harmonising the Conflicting Theories of Harm

[By Mayannk Sharma] The author is a student of Jindal Global Law School, Sonipat.   Introduction The objective of commencing an insolvency proceeding against a Corporate Debtor is to collate all pending claims against the Corporate Debtor, and institute in rem proceedings against the same. Arbitration on the other hand intends to institute in personam proceedings between the parties. Similarly, Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter “IBC”) imposes a moratorium against all pending proceedings against the Corporate Debtor, which includes pending arbitration proceedings as well. This is further complicated by Section 238 (non-obstante clause) of the IBC which overrides any other legislation the IBC comes in conflict with (including the Arbitration Act). Against the backdrop of these competing approaches to dispute settlement, two schools of thought emerge. Should arbitrable disputes continue alongside the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (hereinafter “CIRP”) with a view to harmonise proceedings under both the laws; or should arbitration proceedings cease with immediate effect upon the commencement of the CIRP giving absolute authority to insolvency proceedings. I answer this question by relying upon the core and non-core distinction of disputes as followed in the American insolvency regime and how a similar approach is ultimately beneficial for parties to an arbitration. Delineating the emerging pro-arbitration trend in insolvency disputes Over the past few years, the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) have been increasingly trying to harmonise insolvency and arbitration proceedings. The earliest known position on this conundrum was laid down in the landmark Booz Allen case, according to which insolvency matters were absolutely non-arbitrable. About two decades later, in Indus Biotech Private Limited v. Kotak India Venture there was a material shift in the Court’s practices towards arbitrability of insolvency disputes. Essentially, the Court held that the validity of a Section 8 application under the Arbitration Act would not stand dismissed merely upon filing an application for the commencement of the CIRP. In the author’s opinion, the Apex Court theorised an ex-ante and ex-post test towards determining the status of a Section 8 Application under the Arbitration Act where, if the Adjudicating Authority is of the view that there does not exist a default on behalf of the (possible) Corporate Debtor then the pending Arbitration Application does not cease to exist since the dispute remains in personam. Whereas, upon admission, the arbitration proceedings are halted since the dispute now becomes in rem and hence subject to the moratorium period. Similarly, in March 2022, the Apex Court went a step further to harmonise the conflicting jurisprudence by allowing contingent claims[i] to be pursued in an arbitral tribunal pursuant to the completion of the CIRP process. Contingent claims have been habitually written off by the Resolution Professional with a normative value of INR 1/- citing their “inability to estimate a contingent claim’s value” which is a clear abuse of the clean slate theory. By juxtaposing earlier developments, it becomes apparent that Courts have, of late, been deviating from this settled practice. Similarly, the Apex Court in Fourth Dimension allowed the aggrieved creditors to pursue operational dues worth Rs 2400 Crores before an arbitral tribunal which were earlier written off as ‘nil’ by the Resolution Professional during the CIRP in furtherance of its previous (mal)practices. This is a positive development for both the fields of Law since it would now be permissible for contingent creditors to pursue their claims before an arbitral tribunal despite the conclusion of the CIRP process, which were earlier written off by the Resolution Professional to the detriment of such creditors. Similarly, with the newfound clarity on foreign-seated arbitrations in India against the backdrop of PASL Wind Solutions Private Ltd. v. GE Power Conversion India Pvt. Ltd, the Supreme Court has opened avenues for creative solutions to arbitrate insolvency disputes. At present, the IBC does not envisage a cross-border application. It essentially means that the Code’s ability to centralise disputes revolving around foreign creditors or debtors is severely truncated since core concepts such as the moratorium period would no longer apply to such a foreign seated entity (or entities). Prior to PASL Wind Solutions, the only remedy that parties to a foreign seated Arbitration had in view of enforcing an arbitral award was to submit their claim to the Resolution Professional. However, IBC proceedings did not, at the time, consider such an award as valid proof of a ‘debt’, which, as per Indus Biotech is the sine qua non of initiating the CIRP proceedings and paramount for determining whether a dispute exists in rem or in personam. To that effect, with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in PASL Wind Solutions, domestic parties have the liberty to choose a foreign seat of arbitration and pursue their claims accordingly. From a cursory understanding, it is evident that this does not ipso facto render such a ‘foreign award’ as invalid, rather, basis the recognition and enforcement of the award upon the two-fold test laid down in Section 48 of the Arbitration Act. Harmonising Arbitration and Insolvency Disputes – An International Viewpoint The United States has been widely acclaimed as a global arbitration and restructuring hub. The substance of practices adopted by the United States vest in segregating disputes that are exclusive to either insolvency or arbitration proceedings and letting the appropriate judicial fora take its course. For example, it would be apt to look at the practice of distinguishing between ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ proceedings that has been adopted by courts in the United States which is a much more refined approach towards arbitrability of insolvency matters. The American jurisprudence on the subject matter (particularly the U.S. Bankruptcy Code) proposes a non-exhaustive list of ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ proceedings, where insolvency courts would have jurisdiction over the former and arbitration would govern the proceedings in the latter case. To put it simply, the fundamental distinction between ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ proceedings is the degree of relativity that a claim enjoys vis-à-vis the bankruptcy filing. It can be said that a non-core

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India’s Digital Tax Odyssey: Charting a Course in the Intangible Economy

[By Trilok Choudhary & Arya Tiwari] The authors are students of Gujarat National Law University.   INTRODUCTION Digitization has transformed the business landscape, blurring the boundaries between physical and virtual realms. As businesses navigate this digital frontier, so must tax policies evolve to ensure a fair and equitable taxation framework that captures value in an increasingly intangible economy. TAXATION UNDER OECD MODEL CONVENTION The challenge of taxation initially arose from how to tax foreign corporations. While India could tax domestic entities, complexities emerged with foreign companies operating internationally. The core issue was the risk of double taxation. Each nation holds the right to tax its residents, but this posed questions about where foreign enterprises’ profits should be taxed. This led to a conflict between the company’s incorporation state (resident state) and the state where profits were generated (source state). The OECD Model Convention’s Article 7 introduced the “permanent establishment” concept, a fixed business location in the source country. Foreign companies were primarily taxed by their resident state, but if they had a permanent establishment in the source state, that state could also tax them. Article 7(2) clarified permissible taxation, treating permanent establishments as separate entities. For example, let’s take a hypothetical situation involving a company, say Rico, and its establishment in different states were seen as distinct entities for tax purposes. Transactions between them involved theoretical compensations, like managerial services or licensing fees, determined through a process called benchmarking. The source state could then tax Rico based on these hypothetical payments. Despite attempts, the issue of double taxation persisted, as both source and resident states had tax authority. Article 23 resolved this with the Exemption Method (taxing remaining income after source state tax) and the Credit Method (taxing entire income but crediting back the source state tax). Article 10 extended source state authority to tax passive incomes, imposing conditions on dividends. The foreign company must hold 25%+ shares in the permanent establishment for 365+ days and qualify as the “Beneficial owner” of dividends. This ensures funds are genuinely for its use, and merely as a conduit. Source states can tax dividends (up to 5%) and interest (up to 10%). The “Beneficial owner” concept prevents non-treaty states from exploiting reduced tax rates for entities in treaty states. How exactly do you tax digital entities that have only a digital presence within the market and no permanent establishment (The Digital Challenge)?  This is perhaps the biggest challenge in the arena of international taxation in recent time and in this regard on July 11, 2023, 138 members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS agreed upon an outcome statement to address taxation challenges stemming from the digital transformation of global economies. This need was heightened by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) exploiting tax discrepancies to shift earnings to low or no-tax areas, weakening the tax base of many nations. This exploitation, coupled with the ability of businesses to operate in areas without a tangible presence, challenged traditional tax norms based on “permanent establishments.” Consequently, the framework aims to promote fairness, tackle intricate tax avoidance tactics, establish a standardized global tax landscape, avoid double taxation, and amplify transparency. The solution comprises two main pillars. Pillar 1 focuses on Profit Allocation and Nexus, moving beyond the older notion limited to Permanent Establishment. It introduces taxation rights for nations with significant user/consumer bases, even if a business doesn’t have a tangible presence there. For MNEs surpassing a turnover of USD 20 Billion and a profitability above 10%, taxes are based on revenues from that specific jurisdiction. However, this might lead to additional tax levies. To counter this, the GloBE regulations mandate that MNEs contribute at least 15% tax on earnings from every jurisdiction.  These rules complement current corporate tax norms; if taxes on revenue in a jurisdiction meet the minimum tax requirement, no extra tax is levied. Furthermore, Pillar 2‘s 15% minimum tax levy addresses under-taxation by tax havens. For instance, if State S taxes a company at only 9%, the home state can impose an additional top up tax of 6%, guaranteeing the minimum tax threshold, addressing concerns related to patent boxes, thin-capitalization, and transfer pricing. INDIAN EQUILISATION LEVY India initially chose not to directly adopt the OECD BEPS recommendations. Instead, in 2016, it implemented its unique tax measure, known as the Equalization Levy, set at a 6% rate. This levy applied to specific services, primarily targeting online advertising services received by Indian resident businesses or non-residents with a permanent establishment in India, from non-resident service providers. This was referred to as Equalization Levy 1.0. In 2020, India further expanded the Equalization Levy’s scope through an amendment, introducing a new 2% levy on e-commerce supplies or services. This updated version is often referred to as Equalization Levy 2.0, it encompasses all e-commerce operators, regardless of their Indian residency status. An e-commerce operator, in this context, refers to a non-resident entity that owns, manages, or operates a digital platform facilitating online sales of goods or service provision. Under this framework, such operators are subject to a 2% charge on the total consideration received or expected. However, this levy does not apply to entities possessing a permanent establishment within India, provided the e-commerce activity is directly associated with that establishment. The following scenarios such as digital entities already subject to the existing 6% equalization levy, transactions with an annual consideration value under INR 2 crores are likewise excluded from this levy. However, the Equalization Levy was not without its shortcomings. The broadly phrased provisions in the levy introduce both interpretational and practical challenges. For instance, the levy stipulates that individuals providing services utilizing an Indian IP address can be subject to taxation. However, this raises a quandary when dealing with non-Indian residents using Indian IPs for transactions with service providers outside India. This ambiguity sparks concerns about the levy’s extrajudicial reach. Moreover, it’s unclear if the levy targets the total sales of goods or just the commission charges by e-commerce platforms. This distinction is significant, particularly for entities like

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RBI Guidelines on Compromise Settlements: Demystifying the Stakeholders’ Concerns

[By Vaibhav Gautam] The author is a student of NALSAR University of Law.   INTRODUCTION Earlier last month, the Reserve Bank of India released a comprehensive circular (“Circular”), on the compromise settlements and technical write-offs, to provide the lenders with multiple options to recover the maximum possible amount from their distressed assets without delay. The RBI’s primary objective behind this move appears to ensure greater transparency in the process of resolving distressed assets. However, this circular can also be seen as an attempt to widen the applicability of the compromise settlements as envisaged under the Prudential Framework for Resolution of Stressed Assets, 2019, (“Prudential Framework”). At the same time, the circular has stirred controversy and invited criticism from several stakeholders, such as major bank unions, like, All India Bank Officer’s Confederation (AIBOC), and All India Bank Employees Association (AIBEA), which are representative of around 6 lakh bank employees. There is a genuine concern among bank unions that a willful defaulter’s refusal to pay the owed amount might potentially lead to a loss of the general public’s money and confidence in the banks. Through this article, the author aims to analyze the said circular, as envisioned by the RBI and also attempts to demystify some of the concerns that have been associated with the circular. BACKGROUND The term “compromise settlement,” as explained by the RBI, basically means that the Regulated Entities (“REs”), primarily the banks, can enter into a negotiated agreement with the borrowers. The main purpose of such a resolution process is to effectively streamline the resolution process and also to rectify the problems that are caused by the distressed assets, such as huge losses for the lenders, financial instability in the economy, etc. Compromise Settlements resolve this by allowing the lender to recover the maximum possible amount of such distressed assets by reaching a mutually beneficial agreement involving a waiver of claims by the borrower, and a partial waiver of the amount by the banks. This is not the first instance of the RBI introducing such a concept. In 2007, RBI provided for compromise settlements as a valid resolution practice, where the banks were allowed to enter into compromise settlements with the borrowers, contingent on the decision of the management board of the bank. In the present circular, RBI has clarified its position regarding the compromise settlements, however this time they have also taken other REs into account, such as cooperative and local area banks. It has also reiterated the prescriptive cooling period of a minimum of 12 months, where the borrowers can take fresh loans after the said period. Later, on June 20, RBI published FAQs on the circular, where it provided clarification that this process of compromise settlements is not a major overhaul of the current resolution framework but rather it has been in practice for more than 15 years, with the earliest guidelines being released in the year 2007. CONCERNS OF THE STAKEHOLDERS One of the major concerns raised by the stakeholders, particularly bank unions has been that this circular will unduly advantage the defaulters by condoning their fraudulent or default act, thereby, eroding the public’s confidence in the banking system. Furthermore, it might set a dangerous precedent by allowing the defaulters to settle their large defaults by paying a minuscule amount of their original debt. Secondly, bank unions have further argued that these guidelines bring a sudden change into the process of clearing distressed assets from banks’ accounts, and will lead to the reversal of the guidelines that are provided under the Prudential Framework of 2019. Additionally, there is an apprehension that this reversal might entail major implications for the overall economy, such as systemic instability in the financial institutions, adverse market behavior, etc. Lastly, there is a concern that the circular would allow the defaulters to restructure their loan records to keep their reportable Non-Performing Assets (NPA) levels lower than they are, through the process of “evergreening.” This process allows for additional adjustments to be made to the existing debts of the borrowers, to make the repayment more feasible. However, instead of constituting a concrete solution to the recovery of distressed assets, evergreening is a temporary measure and different from compromise settlements. UNRAVELLING THE BANK UNIONS’ CONCERNS The concerns of the bank unions are seemingly contrary to the purpose envisioned by the RBI. These guidelines as provided by the circular impose the liability on the REs, primarily the banks to create and enforce a comprehensive framework that would be contingent on the approval of the management board of the bank. This requirement aligns with the ultimate goal of the circular, i.e., to increase the transparency and accountability between the lenders and the borrowers. The circular also clarifies the position on the minimum cooling period of 12 months. Accordingly, it will be the discretion of the banks to decide the upper limit of the cooling period. And only after that period has ended can the fresh loans be issued to the respective borrower. It is crucial to understand that rather than setting a dangerous precedent, this requirement puts a reasonable and justifiable restriction on the willful defaulter who seeks to get a fresh loan from a bank. The compromise settlements that are undertaken in consonance with these guidelines would be without prejudice to criminal proceedings and other penal matters. Hence, the argument that it unduly advantages the willful defaulters and the fraudsters, is not tenable. With respect to maintaining the integrity of the process, the permission of the board plays an imperative role, as it is provided in the circular, such borrowers might get debarred from issuing a fresh loan for 5 years. It is largely a misplaced concern of the bank unions to assume that the present circular would bring major changes to the process that is provided under the 2019 framework. It is pertinent to note that the Prudential framework deals with the illegibility of the defaulters for restructuring their debts whereas the current circular concerns compromise settlements. So, essentially, they are

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