Navigating the Efficacy of Post-Crisis Legal Reforms of The IL&FC Crises In India
[By Shraddha Tiwari & Tejaswini Kaushal] The authors are students of School of Law Christ University, Bangalore and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow. Introduction Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited (“IL&FS”), a distinguished stalwart in infrastructure financing, boasted a legacy spanning over three decades. Functioning as a shadow bank, this non-banking financial company (“NBFC”) emulated the services provided by conventional commercial banks. With its ownership lying substantially in the hands of esteemed state-backed entities and prominent international organizations and boasting an intricate network of subsidiaries coupled with connections with banks, mutual funds, and infrastructure players, it was recognized as a ‘systemically important’ enterprise. It was, somewhat ironically, classified as “too big to fail.” In 2018, the shadow bank faced a liquidity crisis and payment defaults due to a risky combination of short-term debt and imbalances in long-term assets. Compounded by delayed bond issuance, disputes over government payments, and investigations by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (“SFIO”)and the Enforcement Directorate (“ED”)for procedural lapses and money laundering, the IL&FS crisis sent shockwaves across the stock market. The company’s market reputation suffered, leading to a downgrade in its debt rating, causing concerns among investors such as banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds about its financial stability and potential ripple effects. As the company experienced delays and defaults on its debt obligations and inter-corporate deposits, it ultimately collapsed, worsening existing issues arising from mismanagement in the banking sector and regulatory shortcomings. Evidently, insolvency was IL&FS’s only chance to limit further economic damage. IL&FS, an NBFC established under the Companies Act (“CA”) 2013, faces challenges in efficient insolvency proceedings due to delays and concerns in implementing the recommended ‘Financial Data and Management Centre’ to monitor systemic risk. The proposed Resolution Corporation, meant for crisis resolution, also encountered opposition, leading to the withdrawal of the Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill 2017 (“Bill 2017”). These issues hinder the smooth functioning of insolvency proceedings for NBFCs. Under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC”) 2016, IL&FS wasn’t subjected to the insolvency process despite the Central Government’s authority to invoke its Section 2 to refer financial service providers for resolution since NBFCs themselves cannot resort to the IBC owing to their status as financial service providers. However, IL&FS’s non-financial subsidiary entities, such as power and infrastructure projects, could use the IBC individually. However, the complicated connections between group companies and the uncertainty surrounding group bankruptcies were obstacles for a conglomerate like IL&FS in choosing the IBC route. The inability to bring the ultimate holding company, IL&FS, under the purview of the IBC posed a significant obstacle to the resolution process, and the creditor-driven nature of the IBC did not align with the desires of IL&FS’s promoters to retain control and management. Additionally, prior scholarship suggested that IL&FS primarily faces a temporary liquidity issue rather than insolvency, further dampening the desirability of the IBC as a resolution option. The Alternate Route taken by IL&FS The alternate route that IL&FS undertook was of Sections 230, 231 and 232, CA 2013, which offer provisions for schemes of arrangements and compromises, although infrequently utilized in India for debt restructuring purposes. Unlike the UK and Singapore, the schemes of arrangements mechanism have faced limited adoption in India due to cumbersome procedural requirements, lengthy delays, and creditor resistance. However, for IL&FS, this route presented certain advantages over the IBC, given its broader scope and flexibility to tailor the revival plan to the company’s specific needs, encompassing corporate and credit restructuring. Moreover, promoters can retain control throughout the scheme’s implementation, and unlike the IBC, a particular default is not a prerequisite under Section 230 of the CA 2013. This potentially allowed IL&FS to include financially sound entities within the scheme as necessary. Though the best suited for IL&FS, this crisis underscored that the CA 2013 only offered a potential but imperfect solution through a scheme of compromise or arrangement between a company and its creditors or shareholders to reorganize its financial structure. The CA 2013 route entails securing approval from at least 75 percent of secured creditors or shareholders and the National Company Law Tribunal. While it preserves equity rights and provides flexibility for crafting comprehensive solutions, its drawbacks include the absence of explicit provisions for a moratorium or fixed timelines, and the lack of overriding effect over other laws like the Income Tax Act, 1961 unlike resolutions approved under the IBC. Challenges arise from the absence of a comprehensive framework encompassing all classes of creditors and the untested nature of anonymity of schemes in group insolvency scenarios. Additionally, the CA 2013, lacking a moratorium provision like Section 14 of the IBC, does not offer a time-bound resolution, which it reserves solely for specific creditors, and leaves uncertainty regarding the impact of IBC proceedings initiated during the scheme’s NCLT approval. Effect of the Crisis The IL&FS crisis exposed weaknesses in India’s financial regulatory framework, emphasizing the urgent need for comprehensive reforms to manage risks effectively. The default sent shockwaves, impacting NBFCs significantly as they are primary borrowers from banks. Credit rating downgrades affected even stable NBFCs, eroding credit profiles and damaging the overall economy. Investors lost confidence and withdrew investments, leading to a liquidity crunch. The absence of a specific bankruptcy law for financial service providers made the resolution and liquidation processes cumbersome and costly under the CA 2013. This highlighted the critical necessity of implementing a tailored bankruptcy law for such entities. Post-Crisis Legal Reforms The Central Government, by §227 of the IBC 2016, came up with the Bill 2017, but it was withdrawn due to various loopholes. Against the backdrop of the IL&FC crisis, it formulated the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings of Financial Service Providers and Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2019, for NBFCs. These rules incline more towards the ‘regulator-driven approach’ than the traditional ‘creditor-driven approach’ followed by the IBC. These rules include housing finance companies with asset size of Rs. 500 core or more as per the previously audited balance sheet. The insolvency process
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