Author name: CBCL

Swiss Ribbon Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India : The IBC Case

[Anmol Jain and Srishti Rai Chhabra] The authors are 3rd year students of NLU, Jodhpur. Introduction “The defaulter’s paradise is lost. In its place, the economy’s rightful position has been regained.” The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Cody, 2016 [“the Code”] received the official sanction[i]recognizing its constitutional tryst in entirety in quite a significant verdict. We still remember the packed courtroom to hear the amusing and intelligent arguments of the virtuoso lawyers. IBC, a landmark aspired by high-ranked officials for improving the financial structure of the country (seeI do as I doby Raghuram G. Rajan and Of Counselby Arvind Subramanian) has sustained the constitutional scrutiny. It is worth mentioning that the judgment is beautifully written and structured. Though at certain places one might feel less satisfied with the restricted reasoning of the Court, however, such concession can be granted for the Court’s recognition of limited judicial review in economic matters at the outset of the judgment. Here, we endeavour to present a brief overview of the judgment spiced with our critique. The Case The Court has tried to establish the premise behind its reasoning and exercising judicial restraint by considering the fall of Lochnerdoctrine (practice of the US Supreme Court to declare the socio-economic legislations as unconstitutional using the ‘due process’ clause) in the US, which initiated with the dissents of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis of the U.S. Supreme Court. As per Justice Holmes’ dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York[198 U.S. 45 (1905)]: “The courts do not need to substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.” Further, the Court relied on its own judgment in R.K. Garg v. Union of India[ii]to hold that the laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude as compared to laws relating to civil rights. As there is no straitjacket formula to solve an economic problem, the legislature will employ trial and error method to find solution of such problems. The Court, therefore, should exercise judicial restraint in interfering with legislations like the Code, and question the constitutionality only when such legislations are ‘palpably arbitrary, manifestly unjust and glaringly unconstitutional’. The Court, after establishing the premise behind presuming the constitutionality of the court, delved into the objects underlined the Code – to bring the insolvency law in India under a single unified umbrella, to speed up the insolvency process and to ensure revival and continuation of the corporate debtor. Prior to the Code, the insolvency matters were dealt by multiple fora under various laws such as Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985; the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993; the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002; and the Companies Act, 2013. The petitioner had successfully argued that the constitution of the NCLAT, with its lone bench in Delhi, goes against the judgment of the Court in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India[iii](2014) where it was held that permanent benches of NCLAT have to be constituted wherever there is a seat of the High Court, or circuit benches be constituted. The Court has ordered the Union of establish circuit benches of NCLAT within 6 months. Next, the petitioner argued that in Madras Bar Association v Union of India[iv](2015), it was held that the administrative support to all the tribunals should be from the Ministry of Law and Justice; therefore, the NCLAT should not function under the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. Though the Government cited Article 77(3) of the Constitution and Delhi International Airport Limited v. International Lease Finance Corporation and Ors.[v]to argue that the allocation of rules of business among various Ministries is mandatory, the Court accepted petitioner’s claim. However, we see the existing regime, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs deals exclusively with all the matters pertaining to the administration of companies – the Code;[vi]the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India; the Competition Commission of India; the Companies Act, et al. Therefore, we argue that for better corporate governance, NCLT and NCLAT should continue to function under the Ministry of Corporate Affairs only. This goes in line with the existing setup wherein Ministries provide administrative support to their corresponding tribunals. For instance, Department of Telecommunication administers Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal; Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change administers National Green Tribunal and Department of Revenue administers the GST Appellate Tribunal. Next, the Court was confronted with multiple challenges related to arbitrariness, the first being the issue of reasonable classification between financial creditors and operational creditor. At the outset, the Court laid down a common rule of Article 14 for all such challenges – A constitutional infirmity is found in Article 14 only when the legislation is manifestly arbitrary.The petitioners had challenged the requirement of a demand notice to the operational debtor by the operational creditor before initiating the process under the Code, which is absent in case of a financial debt. The Court did not uphold this argument and distinguished the two debts as follows: Financial Debt Operational Debt Financial debt is given for establishment of business and keeping the business as a  going concern in an efficient manner. Operational debt is generated as part of a business activity owing to exchange of goods and services, including employment. Evidence of debt is readily available with the financial creditor and in the records of information utilities. The information utilities are under the duty to send notice to the debtor before recording any debt for verification purposes. All operational creditors might not have accurate account of all liabilities in verifiable form due to its recurring nature. It increases the possibility of disputed debts. It is generally given in large sum and by a small number of persons. It is given in small sum by a large number of persons. It is a secured debt. Sometimes, it is not secured against collaterals. Here, the contracts provide a specified repayment schedule, wherein defaults entitle financial creditors to recall a

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Counterclaims: A Need in Stockholm Chamber of Commerce

[Srijan Srivastava]   The author is a 3rd year student of NLU, Jodhpur. Introduction “Counterclaims: An indispensible component of Investment Arbitration”. Counterclaims are the claims that are made by the respondent which retaliate the primary claims as put forth by the claimant. It basically lays down the defence of respondent by asserting a separate cause of action taken out by the claimants. It not only defends the respondent, it also attacks the claimant for their actions. The reason for allowing a counter-claim to be included as part of an existing case is not because it assists in disposition of the principal claim but, rather, to assist in the disposition of two autonomous claims.[i]The counterclaim is allowed to become a part of an existing case ‘in order to ensure better administration of justice, given the specific nature of the claims in question’ and ‘to achieve a procedural economy whilst enabling the Court to have an overview of the respective claims of the parties and to decide them more consistently’. Counterclaims in various tribunals ICSID Convention The ICSID convention categorically talks about rules of filling counterclaims in arbitration procedures. It says that, the tribunal shall if requested determine any counterclaims arising directly out of the subject matter of the dispute provided that they are within the scope of the consent of the parties and are otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Centre.[ii] If we dissect this provision we will see that this provision sets out certain conditions to be complied with in order to file a counterclaim. First, the counterclaim must fall within the consent of the parties to a dispute. Second, there must be a close factual and legal connection between a counterclaim and the primary claim. This is also known as the close connection test. Finally, the counterclaim must fulfil the requirements as given under Article 25 of the Convention. This is to see that the counterclaim fits within the jurisdiction of the Centre, i.e. the counterclaim must directly arise out of an investment. The ICSID Additional Facility Rules under Article 47 permits the filing of the counterclaims. They just mandate that the counterclaim should fall within the arbitration agreement of the parties. Apart from the condition of consent, they do not pose further restrictions for the filing of counterclaims, leaving it to the consideration of arbitral tribunals whether they fall within their jurisdiction. UNCITRAL Convention UNCITRAL Convention talks about the twin requirements of any counterclaims to be admissible before the tribunal. The Arbitration rules require that the counterclaims should arise “out of the same contract.”[iii]This section when narrowed down is considered as “inappropriate to arbitration arising under international treaties.”[iv]In cases where an investment contract is absent between an investor and a host state, the Arbitration Rules has certain loophole with regard to treaty violations ad as the language of the arbitration rules were discarded by the tribunals. However the UNCITRAL working group on Arbitration and Conciliation proposed to modify the provision that will fill this loophole. The group allowed counterclaim that were substantially connected or arose out of the initial claim as put forth by the investor or claimant. After the abovementioned modification, the provision was replaced by Article 21(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010. This provision includes a description of counterclaims in the state’s response to the notice of arbitration provided that the arbitral tribunal has a jurisdiction over it. Therefore UNCITRAL in a way give express permission of admissibility of counterclaims. International Court of Justice The ICJ Statute does not directly address the issue of the respondent filing a counterclaim against the applicant. Article 80 of the Rules, however, it provides that the Court may entertain such a counterclaim in certain circumstances, as a part of the incidental proceedings of an existing case. The Court has focused on the other language of Article 80(1) of the Rules, which provides that the Court may entertain a counterclaim ‘only if’ two requirements are met: First, when the counterclaim ‘comes within the jurisdiction of the Court’. Second, when the counterclaim is ‘directly connected with the subject matter of the claim of the other party’. The Court has characterized these two requirements both as requirements on the ‘admissibility of a counter-claim as such’, explaining that admissibility ‘in this context must be understood broadly to encompass both the jurisdictional requirement and the direct-connection requirement’.[v] Absence of provisions regarding counterclaims in SCC Arbitration Rules Despite the growing popularity of investment arbitration for the settlement of disputes between investors and host states that are governed by Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, provisions governing counterclaims are not well defined in the SCC arbitration rules. The rules only lay down general framework regarding filling of counterclaims. A provision of SCC Arbitration Rules says that counterclaims shall be outlined in Respondent’s answer to Claimant’s request for arbitration.[vi]The rules are silent when it comes to any other conditions such as the parties consent or the close connection test between the claim and the counterclaim. However the tribunal in the case of Amto v. Ukraine explained that the jurisdiction of the counterclaims depends on the terms of the dispute resolution provisions of the treaty, the nature of the counterclaim, and the relationship of the counterclaims with the claims in the arbitration.[vii]  The tribunal, therefore, confirmed uniform application of these requirements, irrespective of the nature of the rules governing the dispute settlement procedure. Impact and Consequences The recent UNCTAD statistics shows that there are over 800 known treaty-based investor-state arbitrations, yet counterclaims were filed and effectively addressed in less than 30 of them.[viii]This is clear enough to indicate why the host states are at certain disadvantage. They do not get adequate opportunity to adopt a more offensive tactics against investors is the language of IIAs that determines whether counterclaims can be heard or not. Arbitral tribunal has a vital role in smooth functioning of the disputes that arise. They have to lay down the procedures through which any dispute can be amicably resolved. They have to lay down certain guidelines

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Analysis: SEBI (Settlement Proceedings) Regulations, 2018

[ Debayan Gangopadhyay ]   The author is a 3rd year student of ILS, Law College. Introduction Settlement Proceedings in relation to violation of provisions in securities laws have been conducted under a mechanism by the Securities Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) since 2007. The last legislation on settlement proceedings was stipulated by SEBI in 2014[i]. The said regulations apart from giving SEBI other powers of initiating proceedings on its own, also gave it the power to initiate settlement proceedings. However, to quantify the number of settlement cases more, a committee was set up by SEBI as the Justice Anil Dave Committee (“Committee”). The committee submitted its report in December, 2017 pursuant to which the SEBI notified the SEBI (Settlement Proceedings) Regulations, 2018 (“Settlement Regulations”) on 30thNovember, 2018 which are effective since 1stJanuary, 2019. The Settlement Regulations are the first piece of legislation in securities laws in India solely created for the purpose of regulating settlements in cases. These regulations provide for new scope in different factors of settlement proceedings and if implemented properly, is quite beneficial for the entire procedure. This article will discuss and review certain key highlights of the Settlement Regulations which provide for wider scope and sophisticated methods in settlement proceedings. “Securities Laws” and “Specified Proceedings” re-defined Securities Laws under the previous SEBI regulations on settlement proceedings[ii]had only given scope to the SEBI Contract (Regulations) Act, 1956 and Depositories Act, 1996. These regulations widen the scope by defining “Securities Laws” as: “securities laws” means the Act, the Securities Contract (Regulations) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956), the Depositories Act,1996 (22 of 1996), the relevant provisions of any other law to the extent it is administered by the Board and the relevant rules and regulations made thereunder;[iii] By adding “any other law”, the Settlement Regulations provide for the inclusion of other laws as well in relation to securities laws. There is an explicit recommendation of the Committee in the draft Settlement Regulations to include the contravention of the provisions of any other law (such as Companies Act, 2013) to the extent it is administered by the Board within the definition of ‘securities laws’ in the regulations, in order to settle any matter under the securities laws.[iv]This clause has widely increased the ambit of applicable laws to these regulations. Further, “specified proceedings” in the Settlement Regulations have been defined as: “specified proceedings” means the proceedings that may be initiated by the Board or have been initiated and are pending before the Board or any other forum, for the violation of securities laws, under Section 11, Section 11B, Section 11D, sub-Section (3) of Section 12 or Section 15-I of the Act or Section 12A or Section 23-I of the Securities Contracts (Regulation)Act, 1956 or Section 19 or Section 19H of the Depositories Act, 1996, as the case may be;[v] The definition provides for scope to cases which are pending before the SEBI Board or any other forum which is an effective tool to quantify settlement proceedings. The scope of pending cases has been re-iterated in further regulations of the Settlement Regulations. The Settlement Regulations have further introduced a new term called “settlement schemes”. SEBI shall specify the procedure and terms of settlement of specified proceedings under a settlement scheme for any class of persons involved in respect of any similar defaults specified. A settlement order issued under such a settlement scheme shall deemed to be a settlement order under the regulations.[vi] Also, the terms of settlement may include monetary or non-monetary terms or a combination of the two. This is given under Chapter IV of the Settlement Regulations.[vii]Non-monetary terms may include suspension or cessation of business activities for a specified period, disgorgement on account of the action or inaction of the applicant, exit from the management of the company, submit to enhanced internal audit and reporting requirements, locking – in securities, etc.[viii]  Confidentiality The Settlement Regulations provide for the scope of seeking confidentiality on the proceedings before the SEBI Board. The Committee recommendations in the draft regulations provide for a chapter similar to the practices of securities regulators globally and that provided in the Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2009 for “settlement with confidentiality” to any person that provides material assistance to the Board in its fact-finding process and proceedings.[ix]The said provisions are given under Chapter IX of the Settlement Regulations. These lay down the factors essential to the entitlement of confidentiality and the procedure thereof. As observed time and again, most of the provisions in SEBI have been adopted from US laws. The insertion of provisions dealing with confidentiality have been adopted though an understanding from the US Securities Exchange Commission and the Competition Commission of India. According to the regulations, such privilege of confidentiality shall be provided to such applicants who agree to provide “substantial assistance in the investigation, inspection, inquiry or audit, to be initiated or ongoing, against any other person in respect of a violation of securities laws”. However, the application herein shall be considered only in cases prior to or pending investigation, inspection, inquiry or audit.[x] Limiting the scope of settlement proceedings There are provisions in the new Settlement Regulations which deny settlement proceedings to certain categories of individuals under Chapter III which talks about the scope of settlement proceedings. Regulation 5 (2) lays down factors affecting which an alleged default will not come under the scope: (2) The Board may not settle any specified proceeding, if it is of the opinion that the alleged default, – has market wide impact, caused losses to a large number of investors, or iii. affected the integrity of the market.[xi] Similar restriction is provided for where the applicant is a wilful defaulter, a fugitive economic offender or has defaulted in payment of any fees due or penalty imposed under securities laws.[xii]The earlier regulations provided that breach of laws governing insider trading, fraudulent and unfair trade practices shall not be considered for settlement. However, in the Settlement Regulations, the scope of the settlement has been limited to

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The Companies (Amendment) Ordinance 2018

[ Priya Udita & Kumar Akshay ]   Priya and Akshay are 3rd year students from SLS Pune and ILS Law College respectively. Introduction Companies Act, 2013 is an important legislation for regulating the corporate world. It includes the provisions from regulating the incorporation of company till the dissolution or strike off of the company. In the wake of scams, the provisions were made burdensome which hampered with the ease of doing business in India. With the increase in the transaction involving mergers, acquisitions and insolvency, there were volumes of pending cases with NCLT. Thus, the need was felt to amend the prevailing provisions in the act.  The ordinance was introduced on 2ndNovember 2018 with the intention to ease the reporting and compliance needed by the companies act, 2013 and promote the ease of doing business in India. The commentary encompasses the changes brought forward by the ordinance under the four headings – (a) Re-categorisation of offences (b) De-clogging of NCLT (c) Tackling shell companies and lastly, (d) In-house adjudication.  The authors discuss the amendments at length and compare it with earlier provision. The intent of the authors is to make ordinance easily understandable. Further, the authors discuss the impact of the ordinance and its inherent benefit. The Companies (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018 received the President’s assent on 2ndNovember, 2018[i]and it came into force at once. The ordinance is in consonance with the Government’s approach to ease the business regulation in India and at the same time tighten the regulations for serious offences. The twin objective of the ordinance is Ease of doing business and better corporate compliance. But firstly, we need to understand why this ordinance was needed. Several committees have observed that the Companies Act, 1956 was very lenient with the offences committed by the companies. The penalties were nominal and offences were easily compoundable. Therefore, in the wake of scams, the legislators came up with Companies Act, 2013 which deliberately made the serious offences non-compoundable. However, due to the overprotective intent, the act introduced cumbersome compliances and onerous reporting which made the business in India a hectic job. It was observed by the committees that there was need to re-categorize the offences in order to de-burden the NCLT, and introduction of online platform for e-adjudication or e-proceedings, thus this ordinance. The Ordinance The aims of the ordinance are (a) Re-categorisation of offences (b) De-clogging of NCLT (c) Tackling shell companies and lastly, (d) In-house adjudication. We need to understand the changes according to these four aims. Firstly, re-categorisation of offences was much needed as the NCLT was burdened with cases. Here, the recommendation laid down in Report of Committee on Review of Offences under Companies Act, 2013 was taken into consideration. The committee analysed the heterogeneous nature of offences and recommended that there should be civil penalty framework for procedural or technical defaults. Therefore, the ordinance makes number of changes in the penal provisions. In some of the cases, the imprisonment part has been omitted such as under Section 53 (Prohibition on issue of shares on discount). In civil penalty framework, the adjudicating officer will levy the penalty and the case will be closed. Secondly, with the introduction of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the NCLT is now burdened with lots of pending cases relating to insolvency along with company law and merger and acquisition cases. Therefore, the ordinance makes certain changes to remove the load from NCLT. The change has been brought under section 2(41) in which the power to change the financial year of the company has now been vested with Central Government. Under section 14 (Alteration of Article), the power to approve the conversion of private company to public company or vice versa has been vested with Central Government. However, any application pending before the commencement of the ordinance will be done by NCLT according to earlier provision. Last but not the least the pecuniary jurisdiction of Regional Director has been increased from 5 Lakhs to 25 Lakhs. Also the provision in relation to permission of Special Court regarding compounding of offences has been omitted (Section 441 (6)). Thirdly, in order to tackle the Shell Companies and to make better compliance, the ordinance makes following changes. A new section 10A has been inserted. Here, the director needs to file an application to Registrar of Companies (‘RoC’) stating that subscribers of the memorandum of association have paid the value of shares taken by them and the application for registered office has been filed with RoC as required under section 12. This application should be filed within 180 days from incorporation of the company. Also, in case of contravention of the provision, the company will be liable to pay Rs. 50,000 and every defaulting officer will pay Rs. 1000 per day till contravention to the maximum amount of One Lakhs. In the case where the director does not file an application within 180 days and where the Registrar has reasons to believe that the company is not carrying the business, he/she can strike off the name of the company from RoC. Another major change is that now the Registrar under Section 12(9) has the power to physically verify the registered office. The ordinance also makes changes under section 77 (Register of charges) of Companies Act, 2013. Earlier, 300 days were given to the companies for creation and modification of charges; however now the time limit of 60 days (30 days normal + 30 days with additional fees) is given. Additional 60 days can be given after the additional ad-valorem fees. However after 120 days, there cannot be any creation or modification of charges. Also the punishment has been enhanced for contravention of this provision. The ordinance adds another ground of disqualification for the Independent Director wherein if the Independent Director accepts more than permissible directorship, he/she can be disqualified. Fourthly, the changes have been done under section 454 regarding the additional power given to the adjudicating officer. Now the adjudication officer can direct rectification of the default in addition to

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Recalling the witness – Understanding the phenomenon of multiple cross examinations in the context of arbitration

[ Gibran Naushad & Susanah Naushad ]   Gibran Naushad is an Associate at S&R Associates, New Delhi and Susanah Naushad is an Associate at Khaitan & Co., New Delhi. Introduction It is often said that cross-examinations can make or break a trial, a testimony to the importance of the process in the overall scheme of adjudication. There are, however, different ways in which one could approach cross-examination, depending on the nature of the case and the eventual result desired. Given the importance of cross-examinations in trial, situations are bound to arise where a party might want to conduct such examination again owing to its dissatisfaction with the previous cross-examination, amongst other factors. Such multiple cross-examinations are, however, a tricky terrain, and it is not in all cases that such repetition would be allowed. This is particularly true in the context of arbitrations, where the parties would have to primarily depend on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to carry out such a process. The authors, through this post, try and explain the practical dimensions of cross examination and the options available to parties in case they are dissatisfied with a cross-examination already conducted. Case laws dealing with the subject would be looked at and an attempt would be made to understand the restrictions imposed on the parties to correct their mistakes or lapses by repeating a process that is germane to any trial. Understanding The Practice Of Cross-Examination Cross examination is one of the most vital constituents of trial. It becomes highly important to question the adversary on crucial facts relating to the matter to establish their falsehood or truthfulness, thereby establishing the credibility of such facts and claims to be taken up during the final arguments in the matter. There is no straightjacket formula for conducting cross-examination. The strategy and method could differ with different counsels. Additionally, the facts and circumstances of different cases along with the eventual result sought to be achieved would require different approaches to be adopted. Certain counsels prefer to attack the witnesses on each and every fact, thereby posing straight questions to such witnesses and subsequently changing the orientation of such questions with each answer so as to direct the witness to their preferred answer. This ensures that the inability of the witnesses to answer correctly and comfortably the questions posed to them on certain facts and claims could be used against them at the time of making the final arguments in the matter. The other approach, however, is a more subtle approach wherein instead of questions, the counsel puts across certain suggestions which follow questions. The suggestions are meant to point towards the insufficiency in the answers to the questions. An example of such a suggestion could be – ‘I put it to you that you are lying about the illegal termination of the contract with Party X’. The aim behind putting such suggestions is to create an adverse inference against the party at the time of final arguments. Therefore, while the former approach is a head-on approach where the answers themselves bring out the adverse inference, the latter approach is a more nuanced approach where the counsel realizes that it would not be possible to extract such answers and it would be better to suggest adverse inferences. In view of the fact that there is no fixed approach for conducting cross-examinations, there is a possibility that post the completion of the cross-examination; a party might feel that it wants to cross-examine its adversary again. The reasons for this could vary, from strategic lapses by the counsel to new facts coming on record which merit putting up the person on stand yet again. However, conducting such cross-examination for the second time is an uncertain proposition, particularly in the context of arbitration, and such strategy might not fly past the arbitrator in most cases. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”) does not contain specific provisions for examination of the witnesses. However, Section 19 of the Act does stipulate that the parties are free to choose a procedure for the conduct of the arbitral proceedings.[1] Additionally, in case such procedure has not been agreed upon by the parties, the arbitral tribunal could conduct the proceedings in the manner it deems appropriate.[2] The Act stipulates that the arbitral tribunal would not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the “Code”).[3]However, the Bombay High Court decision of Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Datar Switchgear Limited[4] becomes important in this context. The Bombay High Court, while dealing with Section 19(1) of the Act clearly stated that Section 19(1) of the Act contained words of amplitude and not of restriction.[5] Therefore, though the arbitral tribunal is not bound by the Code, it could draw sustenance from the fundamental principles underlying the Code.[6] Order XVIII Rule 17 is one such provision from where sustenance can be drawn. The provision stipulates that the Court could at any stage of the suit recall a witness who has been examined and put such questions to the witness as the Court thinks fit. Therefore, if the Court is satisfied that there are grounds that exist for the recalling of the witness, cross-examination can be conducted on such witness again. Order XVIII, Rule 17: Discretionary But Limited Scope of Recall Order XVIII, Rule 17 is clearly a provision of the Code which could be used for recalling witnesses in arbitration proceedings. Though the provision stipulates that the Court can recall the witness on its own if it feels the need to do so, the parties could also make applications to invoke this provision and request the Court for such recalling. It has been held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Om Prakash v. Sarupa[7] that the court could not only use Order XVIII, Rule 17 of the Code to recall a witness on its own but could also use this provision on an application made by the defendants. Similar views have been held by the

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India Rejects the Internationally Accepted Remedy of Emergency Arbitration: Reasons and Implications

[Nitya Jain]   The author is a 3rd year student of Nirma University. Introduction With growing transactions and declining approachability in trade and commerce, disputes inevitably arise. Today, irrespective of whether a dispute is domestic or international, parties prefer an unbiased forum for resolving their disputes. Effectively, Arbitration is the most suited method when it comes to sidestepping the lengthy procedures of court. The capability of parties to achieve a speedy relief is fundamental to any arbitration proceeding. In order to safeguard and further uphold party autonomy, major arbitration institutions develop mechanisms and procedures that eliminate judicial involvement in arbitration proceedings. When a party seeks an interim relief, they either resort to domestic courts or wait for the constitution of the tribunal. Resorting to courts undermined the very purpose of choosing arbitration over litigation and pendency of tribunal formation gravely hampers the expedite procedure.[i]In order to address the aforementioned fallacy international institutions and various countries have developed the concept of Emergency arbitrator. A party appoints an Emergency Arbitrator when it urgently requires a relief that if not granted, will lead to grave loss of asset or evidence. Proceedings of such an arbitration is governed by agreement and consensus of the parties. Emergency arbitrator is not a part of the tribunal in fact, his job ends with the granting of relief and he is not to decide the case on merits. The types of emergency reliefs sought  are broadly categorized in four broad headers- (i) anti-suit injunctions ; (ii) reliefs aimed at restoring status quo of the disputant ; (iii) measured intended at safeguarding enforcement of a future award and (iv) orders for interim payments. A good amount of time has passed since the concept of Emergency Arbitrator has been around. The institutions are continuously introducing provisions and rules as an attempt to improve the workability of the concept of emergency arbitrator. Various countries in their domestic laws have also adopted the concept.  Though the novel concept of emergency arbitrator is highly appreciated in the arbitration community globally, enforcement of the order passed by the arbitrator is still debatable. It eventually boils down to the subjectivity of various national courts and laws of the respective countries as to whether an order passed by an emergency arbitrator is enforceable or not.  Except Hong Kong and Singapore all other national laws are silent on the question of enforceability of emergency arbitrator’s decision. Provisions under Indian Law The Indian law does not expressly recognize the concept emergency arbitrator. In an attempt to abide by the global trend and also to provide statutory recognition to the awards passed under institutional rules like SIAC and ICC, the 246thLaw commission report did recommend the adoption of the concept of emergency arbitrator under sec 2(d) of the Act which stated “Arbitral tribunal” means a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators and, in the case of an arbitration conducted under the rules of an institution providing for appointment of an emergency arbitrator, includes such emergency arbitrator.” However the same was rejected by the legislature while amending the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and thereby the concept is not a part of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2015. There is also no express judicial recognition of the awards passed by emergency arbitrator or its enforcement. Till date the Indian courts, for that matter, had no opportunity to test the validity of the same.[ii]Due to the non- recognition of the concept of emergency arbitrator in India the trend has been such that parties after obtaining an emergency arbitrator award outside India, enforce the same in India via seeking interim order under Sec 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.[iii] The Indian legislature consciously omitted the inclusion of the provision of Emergency arbitration in the amended Indian Arbitration and conciliation Act. The non-acceptability of Emergency Arbitration in India has numerous probable reasons behind it. Firstly, Emergency arbitration fails to address the issues of third party i.e. an emergency arbitrator cannot grant measures against a third party. An emergency arbitrator’s jurisdiction is limited to the signatories and cannot be extended beyond. On the contrary, Indian courts, like courts of other jurisdictions, can grant interim relief against third parties under certain circumstances (for example, where such orders are necessary to protect the subject matter of the arbitration).  Secondly, unlike domestic courts, emergency arbitrators cannot pass ex-parteorders as this would go against the purpose of their constitution – both parties won’t be provided with an equal opportunity. Indian courts, like other jurisdictions, can grant ex parte orders in exceptional circumstances. Ex parte orders become necessary in some special circumstances where if the respondent comes to know about the order he might displace the assets or other similar grounds. Thirdly, an award passed by an emergency arbitrator is to be further scrutinized by the actual tribunal and can also be overturned, this however is not the case with the interim orders passed by the domestic courts. Lastly, enforceability of emergency arbitrator’s award is again a controversial question. The scant judgments passed by the Indian Judiciary only have dealt with the enforceability of the awards passed in Singapore or Hong Kong.[iv]India is yet to clarify its position regarding the enforceability of awards in other jurisdictions. Conclusion However, it is undeniable that Emergency arbitration ensures minimum court intervention which is the need of the hour in order to develop India as a pro-arbitration country. It would a progressive step towards making India a global hub for arbitration, like Hong Kong and Singapore. Often emergency arbitration proceedings are hassle free and ensure efficiency, which eventually develop a set standard of behavior for the parties. Experience also shows that parties are more likely to comply and abide by the orders passed by emergency arbitrators. An emergency award if recognized in India will definitely be beneficial for parties if the parties against whom the claim is made have their assets in a different jurisdiction which recognizes emergency awards. For India to become a pro-arbitration country, it is high time

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Time to Allow SEBI to Wiretap?

[Karan Yadav]   The author is a 4th year student of GNLU, Gandhinagar Introduction India is seeing a rise in the number of insider trading cases. Even the top blue chip firms are struggling with the leak of such sensitive information by some or the other source. This includes companies like ICICI Bank, Axis Bank, Videocon, Sun Pharma, Tata Motors and many more.  Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) was constituted in the wake of the Harshad Mehta Scam in 1992. The powers conferred to SEBI was a result of analysis of different Securities Market Watchdogs all over the world especially the US’s Security Exchange Commission (SEC). However, from the day of its inception, SEBI has been criticized for its failure to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of insider trading in India. If we look at the number, the convictions pronounced in such cases of Insider Trading are very low. This is because of a number of limitations that SEBI is facing in bringing such perpetrators to book. It is known that the white collar crimes often need a solid string of evidences which can prove intention of the wrongdoer. The best way that this can be proved in the cases of insider trading is if the sensitive information being passed on is itself intercepted by the authorities. This tool is a long shot for SEBI as for a number of years, it has been deprived of a number of investigative privileges. The malpractices of insider trading are not new to India, but still SEBI lacks basic powers like the power to call in for phone records. It took a USD 6 billion scam for legislators to realize this and bestow the power to SEBI. Hence, only after the aforementioned Saradha Scam of 2013, Parliament through an ordinance amended the Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014[i]and this certainly was a welcome move in order to bring SEBI’s power at par with other regulators all over the globe. As far as the concept of phone tapping is concerned, in India, as per the Indian Telegraphic Act, 1885, both the Central and State governments have the power to tap phones. When any authority of the governments seek to do so, Home Ministry’s or State Home Secretary’s prior approval is needed. This was challenged in the Apex Court of being violative of a number of fundamental rights, but the court still upheld the legislation citing nation’s security as one of the reasons why it cannot be scrapped off in entirety. Though the admissibility of such records in the courts is still unclear, the Courts have certainly asked the authorities to use the power as a last resort and sparingly. There are a number of authorities such as Crime Bureau of Investigation, Intelligence Bureau, etc. which have such powers in place to collect evidences, but SEBI is yet to be conferred with the same. SEBI has been requesting government to allow it to wiretap in order to improve the conviction rates, but time and again it has been denied to do so. In 2012, the then SEBI Chairman U.K. Sinha requested the government to grant them such powers, but they were denied and informed that SEBI has investigative powers of a civil court and hence does not possess power to wiretap[ii]. More recently in 2018, a SEBI committee headed by Dr. T.K Viswanathan suggested want of sweeping reforms to the watchdog which included powers to intercept calls in order to aid investigations.[iii]The committee has suggested for direct call interception powers akin to the Central Board of Direct Taxes. This will also help SEBI collect strong evidence against repetitive offenders in cases of insider trading, front running or market manipulation. While the committee has realized and mentioned the possibility of misuse of such power, it still asserts that call interception would be an improvement over the present case. We need to draw our attention on the world’s most active securities market regulator in order to better understand the robust approach which should be applied and hence the same has been discussed hereunder. The American Approach – Security Exchange Commission’s Powers The concept of “wiretapping” was discussed by the US Congress for the first time in 1934. Pursuant to this, they enacted the “Communications Act of 1934”. The statute categorically made the activity of wiretapping a federal offence and also inadmissible evidence in the court. But, by the next half of the century, the prosecutors were struggling in proving several offences and hence in 1968, the Congress passed the “Omnibus Crime Control Act”.  The Act deals with interception of communication and it states that for such an interception, an application shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the applicant’s authority to make such application and it also lays down the specific information that must be included in the application. Earlier, this statute was perceived to be covering certain blue collared crimes until the technology started taking over. As the use of non-interceptable phone calls, e-mails, etc. increased, the authorities concerning white collared crimes were also drawn towards the concept of “wiretapping”. The Securities Exchange Commission has made multiple insider trading crackdowns using this power which includes the high profile conviction of the Indian poster boy abroad- Rajat Gupta and one Rajaratnam. Here, Rajat Gupta was serving as a board member of corporations like Procter & Gamble and Goldman Sachs and he was accused to have passed sensitive information of these corporations to his business partner Rajaratnam who made illicit profits because of this. Though this method has received severe public flak, it still appears to be a necessary one since it aides in obtaining direct evidences in knowing the defendant’s intention to commit such act. The 1968 Act expressly lists out the nature of offences for which wiretapping can be used. This includes mail fraud, wire fraud, kidnapping, money laundering[iv]and a few other offences introduced later by amendments. However, this does not include securities fraud and this question

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PIPE Transactions: A failure in the Indian Scenario?

[ Arushi Gupta & Durga Prasad Mohapatra ]   The authors are 3rd year students of NLU Odisha. Introduction The concept of PIPE(Private Investment in Public Equity), developed in the US with separate provisions regulating the same. However, Indian law has no such specific regulations which guide the PIPE deals .The PIPE deals in India are regulated by the preferential allotment rules elucidated by SEBI. Considering the fact that the PIPE deals in India are not really developed, the article attempts to draw a distinction between the take of the US and Indian laws by analyzing the relevant provisions. SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements), 2009 The SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements), 2009 (“ICDR”)deals with various modes of issuance of securities wherein Chapter VII of the ICDR Regulations lay down the provisions regarding preferential issue of securities. The main area of emphasis with regard to PIPE transactions will be upon Section 72(1)(a) and Section 78(2) of the ICDR Regulations. Section 72(1)(a)[i]lays down the conditions for preferential issue whereby a special resolution passed by the shareholders is a prerequisite in cases of preferential allotment. However, in the US, the shareholder approval[ii]is not mandatory and is guarded by threshold limits. With regards to the NASDAQ, the shareholder approval is not required in case of bonafide private financing. A bonafide private financing[iii]is a sale whereby the issuer sells the securities to multiple investors, provided, that no individual investor would have more than 5% of the shares of the common stock. This is an effective way to avoid dilution of control and may act as a safeguard for the shareholders in the cases where their approval is not taken. The NYSE rules, on the other hand, impose a threshold limit of 20%, whereby shareholder approval is required in cases where the issue would amount to more than 20% of the outstanding common stock. This rule is also shareholder centric as it aims at prevention of dilution of control unless otherwise approved by the shareholders. It can be inferred from the practices in the 2 jurisdictions that ‘control’ as a factor is relevant in case of PIPE transactions and an attempt is made to prevent the dilution of control in both the cases but by the usage of different mechanisms and techniques. Section 78(2)[iv]provides for a lock-in period of 1 year in case of preferential allotment of specified securities being made to persons other than the promoter. A lock in period[v]is basically a time frame within which an investor is forbidden from selling or redeeming shares.Under Section 144, Securities Act 1933,[vi]such securities are restricted in nature but can be resold on the trading market once a registration statement has been declared effective[vii]by the SEC. In case of US, the transaction provides a higher level of liquidity as the statement is declared effective within 45-90 days[viii]of closing of the deal. Liquidity is one of the key factors which make a PIPE deal suitable for investors. PIPE transactions are preferred over other alternatives due to the increased liquidity they offer to purchasers of registered security with the certainty and speed of a private placement.[ix]The problem of liquidity which the Indian law poses in this matter can be cited as one of the reasons for PIPE deals still being at a nascent stage. SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 An area of prime concern with regards to PIPE transactions is that it leaves room for insider trading. A due diligence test[x]i.e. a process by which the investor gathers all the necessary information in order to evaluate the potential risks involved  is conducted by the investor in order to better understand the potential pitfalls associated with the deal . Due diligence is not a concern in law, provided that the process does not lead to dissemination of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (“UPSI”). UPSI[xi]refers to all such information which is directly or indirectly related to the company and has the potential of affecting the prices of securities of the company. Regulation 6 of Schedule II[xii]deals with disclosure of Price Sensitive Information to institutional investors whereby only public information can be provided to investors by the listed companies. With the recent amendment to the Insider Trading Regulations, any person who while conducting due diligence comes across UPSI would be referred to as an insider[xiii]. Furthermore, such a person is not allowed to deal with the securities of the company even if a confidentiality /non-disclosure agreement has been signed[xiv]between the parties. On the other hand, in US, the disclosures are governed by the Regulation Fair Disclosure[xv]wherein the acquirer of UPSI is allowed to trade in the securities of the company, provided that a confidentiality agreement has been signed between the parties. The disclosure regulations in India are stringent and hence may pose a threat to the investors as they would always apprehend the possibility of a liability being imposed upon them while conducting due diligence and consequently refrain from investing in PIPE deals. Conclusion The aspect of control whereby under the ICDR Regulations, the PE firms willing to invest in public companies have to deal with a lock in period of one year and hence cannot exit the companies even when they face heavy losses. With regards to the questions of insider trading, SEBI has put forth certain conditions such as appropriate confidentiality and non­disclosure agreements which have to be signed before any due diligence process begins as provided under Regulation 3(4) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations. Further, promoters often do not expect to cede any sort of control to private investors as they do not consider them to be an added source of expertise, they only expect them to be passive investors instead of a genuine source for newer perspective who can provide business guidance. Even though PIPE investments are a quick fix to gain financing especially by smaller companies who want immediate capital for working, the market environment in the country has still to be made conducive to such financing methods as a

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Kotak Committee: Separating the position of the CEO and the Chairman

[By Binit Agrawal] This Blog is part of a series of posts as a collaboration titled “KAIZEN” between the Centre for Business and Commercial Laws (CBCL), NLIU Bhopal and Law School Policy Review (LSPR). To view this blog on LSPR, please click here. Binit Agrawal is the Founder-Editor of LSPR and a 3rd Year B.A. LL.B. Student at  NLSIU, Bangalore. The Securities and Exchange Board of India has accepted most of the recommendations made by the Uday Kotak led committee on Corporate Governance Reforms. The Kotak Committee was set up as a response to the multiple board room struggles shaking up important corporate houses. These include the struggles within the Tata Group and Infosys. Both these companies saw their chairman being sacked, retired founders forcing their way through board decisions, independent directors being shown the door and allegations of shady dealings marring their reputations. Corporate governance measures were found wanting, leading to the setting up of the committee. One of the most important measures suggested by the committee has to do with the separation of the leader of the company management (CEO) from that of the board (Chairman). The final recommendation on this issue, which has now been accepted by SEBI, was that the posts of Chairperson and CEO/MD be separated for listed entities with more than 40% public shareholding. Further, it was recommended that from 2020 onwards all the listed entities be required to bifurcate the two posts. Quoting the Cadbury Committee on Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom, the Kotak committee wrote, “given the importance and the particular nature of the chairman’s role, it should in principle be separate from that of the chief executive. If the two roles are combined in one person, it represents a considerable concentration of power”. In this post, my aim will be to find out what the reasoning behind such a move is, what the counter arguments are, and what the practical reality is. I will leave the reader with a view that mandating of such separation may not be a prudent move. The controversy over CEOS simultaneously serving as Chairmen The debate on whether or not to separate the two key positions goes back to the very origins of the concept of corporate governance. Berle and Means, who are considered to be the earliest theorists on Corporate Governance, first depicted the phenomenon of large corporations having two different sets of interested parties, the shareholders and the executives. They found that the shareholders, who were the owners of the company, exercised near to no control over how it functioned. Rather it was the managers who exercised complete control over the workings of the company.[1] Instead, the managers had little, if any stake in the ownership of the company. Thus, the interests of the shareholders and managers often diverged, giving rise to the problems of corporate governance. This is theoretically referred to as the problem of agency. The problem of agency arises when the agent (in this case, the CEO) has certain goals which are contrary to those of the principal (in this case, the Board, representative of the shareholders). For example, a CEO who has no financial interest in the company will always be seen to be having goals which are significantly different from that of the shareholders, or entrepreneur CEOs. He will, prima facie, spend more time trying to expand his power and purse, as against rewarding shareholders. This hypothesis has also been found to be the reality in multiple studies.[2] This agency problem can be resolved if the position of CEO is separated from that of the Chairman. The CEO’s job will be to manage the company, while the Chairman and his board oversee the CEO and his team. Here one can clearly spot the benefits of having separate CEO and Chairman. Benefits Given the fact that the board is to oversee the management, a fusion of the leader of the board and the leader of the management presents a typical case of conflict of interest. If the CEO is also the Chairman, he will overlook failures on the part of the management and will be slow to take decisions which go against the interests of the company executives. Thus, he clearly cannot perform the essential functions of hiring, firing, assessing, and regulating remuneration, without keeping aside his personal interests.[3] Consequently, in theory, an independent chairman will give a fillip to the board’s ability to look after the management. By bifurcating the two posts, a corporation clearly delineates and distinguishes the responsibilities of the board and management. As a result, it gives one leader the sole authority of speaking on the board’s behalf and to oversee its meetings. The other leader is given the authority to speak on behalf of the management and be responsible for the operation and strategy of the company.[4] As a consequence of such separation, discords in the areas of performance appraisal, executive remuneration, succession designs, and director recruitment are eliminated. Furthermore, the CEO is also better enabled to concentrate exclusively on strategizing, overlooking operations, and resolving organizational issues.[5] Such separation is also important to avoid creation of all-powerful CEOs, as has been seen in many tech companies. If the CEO and the Chairman are one, such a leader will have immense power over who gets appointed to the board, and will thus be able to manufacture board loyalty.[6] Most of the executive directors in a board owe allegiance to the CEO. Non-executive directors too may feel a sense of gratitude to the CEO as he often plays an influential role in their election, more so when he is also the Chair. It has been found that even though directors may be legally independent, there are social ties and influence, leading to biases. Further, as the Chair, such CEO will have the ability to make committee assignments. This will lead to the creation of an all-powerful centre within the company, who may not act in the best interests of the company at large. Another argument in support of such bifurcation has to do with the flow of information. If the board has better

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