Author name: CBCL

Analysing RBI’s Digital Lending Directions 2025: A Positive Step Towards Responsible Lending?

[By Atish Biswas] The author is a student of The West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences. Introduction Digital lending, through websites and applications, has transformed the way individuals borrow money by integrating technical innovation with traditional banking services. This has resulted in easy and simple borrowing, quicker loan disbursement with fewer paperwork, and increased credit availability for a wider range of individuals. However, several concerns were raised regarding the business operations and conduct of these platforms, data privacy breaches, and misuse of data collected. To investigate these issues, the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) had set up a Working Group in 2021. Pursuant to the RBI’s Working Group’s Recommendations on Digital Lending[1], the RBI released Guidelines on Digital Lending in September 2022. The Digital Lending Guidelines, along with the Default Loss Guarantee Guidelines and other Circulars, formed the existing Digital Lending Framework in India. On 8 May 2025, the RBI released the Digital Lending Directions, 2025 (“2025 Directions”), consolidating, streamlining, and updating the regulatory framework that governs digital lending.[2] This article analyses the new Digital Lending Directions and suggests some future reforms. Key Changes The Reserve Bank of India’s 2025 Directions on Digital Lending broaden the regulatory scope and tighten compliance to enhance customer protection, data privacy, and institutional accountability. The definition of “Digital Lending” remains unchanged, referring to “remote and automated lending process, largely by use of seamless digital technologies for customer acquisition, credit assessment, loan approval, disbursement, recovery, and associated customer service”. However, its applicability has been expanded. In addition to commercial banks, co-operative banks, and NBFCs, All-India Financial Institutions are now covered under the framework. Furthermore, Digital Lending Apps (DLAs) now include any web or mobile app offering digital lending services, either standalone or as part of a larger suite. The definition of Lending Service Providers (LSPs) has been expanded to include not just agents of Regulated Entities (REs) but also those acting as LSPs for other REs, provided they are involved in the digital lending process. The 2025 Directions impose additional compliance obligations on REs. REs must enter into written contracts with LSPs, clearly defining their roles, rights, and responsibilities. REs have to periodically review the conduct of LSPs and enforce accountability. If LSPs serve multiple lenders, REs must ensure neutrality and transparency in loan offers. Creditworthiness assessments must, at a minimum, consider the borrower’s age, occupation, and income. REs have been allowed to process data outside India is now permitted, but processed data must be repatriated and deleted from foreign servers within 24 hours. The 2025 Directions lay down various measures to protect borrowers. REs are required to publicly display key details on digital products, grievance redress mechanisms, and privacy policies, along with links to the RBI’s CMS and Sachet Portal. All DLAs must be reported on the RBI’s Centralised Information Management System (CIMS). Any increase in credit limit must be explicitly requested by the borrower and recorded. Lending apps are barred from accessing sensitive mobile data, and LSPs may only retain borrower data as long as necessary. Camera and microphone use is restricted to onboarding with borrower consent. Borrowers can exit loans without penalty within a board-determined “cooling-off” period (minimum one day). Increased Scrutiny: A Positive for the Digital Lending Sector? The 2025 Directions brings digital lending participants under the ambit of a risk-based framework, balancing innovation with consumer safeguards. It consolidates fragmented guidelines into a unified framework and removes ambiguities in earlier definitions. The change in definition of LSP clearly lays down who is covered under the new Directions. By explicitly mentioning that only agents involved in the Digital Lending process are to be covered under the Directions, it clarifies that the Directions are not applicable to agents involved in non-digital loans, who would be covered under the RBI’s Directions on Outsourcing of Financial Services. Expanded definitions bring previously unregulated fintech intermediaries under scrutiny. The 2025 Directions is a positive step towards ensuring transparency and accountability in the Digital Lending Sector in India. It reduces the possibility of misrepresentation or deception in loan offers and enables productive cooperation between REs and LSPs while protecting borrowers’ interests. Furthermore, the Directions align data collection, processing, and storage with the DPDP Act. However, the success of these Directions will depend on monitoring by the RBI and implementation of the Directions. One of the most significant changes brought about by the Direction is the creation of the CIMS Portal, a public repository of authorised DLAs. The proliferation of unauthorised DLAs has posed a significant challenge to regulators and the industry. With new digital lending apps appearing frequently, it is challenging for consumers to distinguish between legitimate and dubious platforms. The rise of unauthorised DLAs erodes consumer confidence in Digital Lending. To counter this problem, the RBI Working Group had proposed a ‘Whitelisting Framework’. It recommended setting up an independent nodal agency named Digital India Trust Agency, which would verify DLAs and maintain a public repository of authorised DLAs. The RBI has adopted a modified version of this framework, with the RBI being the nodal agency. The public repository will serve as a reference point for individuals seeking loans, allowing them to confirm whether a digital lending app is officially recognised and regulated. The New Digital Lending Framework: A Missed Opportunity? Despite the positives, the new Digital Lending Framework misses certain issues. Borrowers have been left unprotected against potential data breaches and the pitfalls of automated decision making. Furthermore, there are no changes concerning regulations relating to Short-Term Credit Products. Baseline Cybersecurity Standards to Prevent Data Breaches The RBI Working Group recommended the formulation of baseline digital hygiene guidelines and technology and cybersecurity standards for LSPs and DLAs. Uniform technical/cybersecurity standards and baseline digital health guidelines are necessary for safeguarding sensitive borrower data. With digital lending apps handling large volumes of personal and financial information, the use of outdated security and technical measures can increase the risk of data breaches and misuse of customer information.[3] Algorithmic Fairness DLAs are relying increasingly on automated decision-making (“ADM”) for

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Abnormally Low Bids in Indian Public Procurement: Need for Regulatory Clarity

Abnormally Low Bids (ALBs) challenge India’s public procurement by risking fairness, quality, and sustainability. The General Financial Rules 2017 lack specific ALB provisions, leading to inconsistent practices. ALBs may signal collusion or predatory pricing, violating constitutional fairness under Article 14. This article proposes a unified Public Procurement Act to standardize ALB handling, ensuring transparency, constitutional compliance, and value-for-money, drawing from global best practices.

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From Flexibility to Formalism: The CCI’s Evolving Approach to Cost in Competition Law

[By Akanksha Sharan] The author is a student of Hidayatullah National Law University.   Introduction On May 6 2025, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) notified the CCI (Determination of Cost of Production) Regulations 2025 (“2025 Regulations”), came into effect the same day and replaced the 2009 regulations. Since the current competition law regime does not address challenges such as predatory pricing and strong digital platforms, the revision is needed now more than ever. The 2025 Regulations move away from assessing costs in each sector and introduce a common framework that addresses the needs of India’s developing and digital economy, following international standards. The main focus of the new framework is the use of efficient and economical cost measures. The introduction of Average Total Cost (“ATC”) and Average Avoidable Cost (“AAC”) is meant to make it simpler for regulators to find below-cost prices and review the effects on the market. It is now possible to use Long Run Average Incremental Cost (“LRAIC”) for multi-product companies and digital businesses, given that fixed, variable, sunk and common costs are now included in the definition. Now, total cost also includes depreciation which lets companies estimate costs over a long period, without counting financing overheads, since these can be different for every firm. In particular, not including market value is meant to ensure that the assessment depends on a company’s own costs rather than its changing value in the market. Since large tech and conglomerate firms can impact both cost and supplies, a standard and clear way to determine prices is necessary to ensure that competition remains fair. Ensuring a proper cost analysis is important when deciding on abuse of dominance in Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. Through this article, the author explores the 2025 Regulations in this article by highlighting its main changes, identifying its shortcomings and proposing plausible solutions. The discussion ends by considering how this framework could impact the way competition law is enforced in India. A Structural Shift: Unpacking the Innovation in Cost Determination The 2025 Regulations, introduces a new way for the CCI to review cost in abuse of dominance matters under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. The new regulations replace the 2009 framework and use a streamlined, economic approach to ensure the new rules are consistent, fair and adaptable. Four key shifts are at the heart of this new structure:- Firstly, switching to a framework that is not limited to certain sectors. The framework under the 2009 Regulations was not formally sector-specific, but it was largely used in the traditional sectors such as manufacturing, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals where cost structure were more transparent and easier to quantify. Because of the flexible rules in 2009, each industry had different views about possible dangers which resulted in inconsistent assessments. Since manufacturing and digital sectors have their own cost standards, similar pricing actions might be understood differently. The 2025 Regulations solve these problems by introducing a single method that all sectors must follow. Therefore, it promotes certainty, helps control competition avoidance and brings Indian competition enforcement in line with the rules of the European Union (“EU”) and the OECD. Secondly, the regulations officially include ATC and AAC as primary measures for tracking costs. ATC includes the total cost of each unit made which consists of fixed and variable costs. It provides a better overview of a firm’s costs and how its prices are likely to stand the test of time. Unlike average cost, AAC points out the amounts a firm could save simply by not creating additional units which is why it is useful for spotting predatory pricing. If the price is lower than AAC, it’s likely the company aims to remove competitors instead of competing on quality. Together, these metrics remove subjective and unreliable cost benchmarks and provide useful, proven tools instead. Thirdly, the new definition of LRAIC now covers sunk and common costs, in addition to the usual fixed and variable costs. The importance of this has grown lately, since many companies participate in several product or service areas. Looking at the company as a whole makes it hard for a leading firm to move losses from one area to another, as everything is visible. It also supports the detection of cross-subsidisation, a way for bigger companies to push out smaller rivals. Fourthly, when the elements of total cost are clearly identified, cost evaluation becomes more reliable and unbiased. The inclusion of depreciation allows long-term assets particularly in capital intensive sectors like infrastructure and manufacturing to be appropriately accounted for. Meanwhile, excluding financing overheads avoids the inclusion of costs like interest expenses, which vary significantly not only cross firms but also based on internal financial strategies rather than market dynamics. Additionally, by excluding the market value of assets – which tends to fluctuate and is influenced by investor sentiment – the Regulations emphasis the actual costs incurred by a company. This shift ensures that assessments are grounded in measurable, verifiable internal metrics rather than unstable external valuations. All in all, these changes bring India’s competition system up to date and allow the CCI to address changes in the digital economy with more accuracy and fairness. Flexibility or Fragility? Gaps in the New Regulatory Framework While the 2025 Regulations are a significant improvement to India’s competition rules, they still have a few issues. Moving toward a technical, cost-based analysis introduces challenges that could affect both market fairness and regularity consistency. Though the framework shows promise, its application – especially across market structures requires deeper scrutiny. One key issues is the lack of specificity regarding digital markets. Although the CCI acknowledges features like network effects, low marginal costs and scale economies, it has not issued any sector-specific guidance. While this flexibility was meant to help the system adjust, it actually leaves a gap. When there are no set limits, sample cost models or clear guidelines, regulators have a lot of power and large digital firms can organize their costs to escape review. For instance, there is

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NCLAT’s Order in NCC Ltd: Analysing the Approval of inter se OC Subclassifications

[By Atharva Kulkarni] The author is a student of Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai.   Introduction On 24 December 2024, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) pronounced its decision in NCC Ltd. V. Golden Jubilee Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Through this order, the tribunal has tackled a long-standing debate on inter-se classifications of Operational Creditors (“OCs”) and has permitted the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”) to conduct such classifications provided doing so is crucial for the existence of a Corporate Debtor (“CD”). This article aims to deconstruct the order in light of the pre-existing jurisprudence on sub-classification of OCs and the supremacy of the ‘Commercial Wisdom’ as employed by the CoC while modifying and approving a resolution plan (“RP”). Facts Golden Jubilee Hotels Pvt. Ltd. had leased land from Telangana State Tourism Corporation Limited and Shilparam Arts & Crafts Society Ltd. (hereinafter “Special OCs”) for the construction of a Hotel Trident in Hyderabad. After being admitted into CIRP, the CoC through the Successful Resolution Applicant (“SRA”) had determined that the liquidation value (“LV”) of the OCs as per Section 53 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code 2016 (hereinafter “IBC”) was nil and thus their original submitted claims were not admitted by the SRA. As per the RP, FCs were allocated Rs. 949 Crores which was almost the entirety of their claims, whereas the claims of the OCs were Rs. 112 Crores, of which only Rs. 50.02 Crores were admitted, everyone except Special OCs was allocated nil payments, and the latter ones were paid their entire claim. However, in the approved RP, special OCs had been allotted all of their payments. Leading to the plan being challenged in NCLT, which in turn upheld the RP and rejected the challenges lodged. Following this order multiple petitions were filed in the NCLAT against the RP primarily by the OCs. The NCLAT bench clubbed all these petitions together and adjudicated on them in the present case. The gravamen of the allegations of NCC Ltd. lies in the RP allocation, they argue that such a differential allocation of payments among the OCs is invalid under law, and that there is no provision in the code approving the existence of special OCs or the discrimination suffered by them. Deconstructing the Order The bench noted that Section 21 makes the CoC the primary supervising body managing the insolvency resolution process of a corporate debtor, under Section 30(4) it is also empowered to approve, reject or modify a resolution plan as submitted by the resolution applicant. In Swiss Ribbons v. Union of India, the apex court had observed that the CoC exclusively consist of FCs who, as per the Court’s rationale, are better equipped at governing the insolvency resolution of a corporate debtor owing to their vested interest in keeping the its business a going concern. The OCs on the other hand are not privy to the workings of the CoC, therefore, to safeguard their interests, Section 30(2)(b) mandates the allocation of minimum payments to such OCs which are proportional to their LV as detailed under Section 53. The bench observed that as per Section 5(21) of IBC, an ‘operational debt’ is any claim spawning out of trade credits, employment dues, or any other dues owed to the state or Central government whereas under Section 5(8) financial debt arises when money is disbursed against consideration of time value of money. It cited the judgement of the SC in Pratap Technocrats v Monitoring Committee of Reliance where the court had held that a standard of fairness and equity needs to be employed while distributing payments to the OCs in a resolution plan, as per the explanation 1 attached to Section 30(2), distribution of payments in accordance with the LV of OCs would be considered to be fair and equitable. NCC Ltd. relied on the ratio of Akashganga Processors v Ravindra Kumar Goyal to argue that such a subclassification of OCs is invalid, the tribunal had held that inter se classifications among the OCs who are similarly placed cannot be made in a resolution plan, this as per the tribunal was in keeping with the principles laid down in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel v Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors (Essar Steel). However, the NCLAT ended up disagreeing with the objections of NCC Ltd. and upheld the RP, thereby approving the subclassification. Analysis In Binani Industries v Bank of Baroda the apex court observed that no subclassification and its resultant differential treatment can be allowed among similarly placed OCs as the objective of the IBC is not sole profit and asset maximization of the CD but also to satisfy the interests of all the stakeholders involved in the debt-ridden CD. The aforesaid bar is applicable to creditors who are similarly placed. An identical stance was echoed by the NCLT in the recent case of Amit Goel v Piyush Shelters India Pvt. Ltd. where it observed that creditors in similar situations cannot be discriminated against in RP. Implying that the CoC is allowed to make such differential payments to OCs not similarly placed. The criterion for such a differentiation is the capacity of the creditor to keep the CD a going concern. Although the IBC does not explicitly categorize OCs into classes, it does recognize the existence of separate classes among them on the basis of their claims. It has also been argued that such classes of creditors are distinct even within the definition of OCs. The NCLAT in Gail India v Ajay Joshi used this reasoning to argue that the Code does not inflict an embargo on the CoC from classifying OCs in separate classes in order to determine the distribution and priority of payments. It is up to the ‘collective commercial wisdom’ of the CoC to determine the method and quantum of payments to the creditors, even in this case, the CoC chose to pay in full the dues which were essential for the corporate debtor to remain a going concern. In Essar Steel the court observed a

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Neo-Banks and Its Regulations: How Long Can the Present Symbiotic Arrangement Sustain

[By Avinash Kumar] The author is a student of Dr. RML National Law University.   INTRODUCTION All it took two and half decades, the internet and digital technology have become the backbone of modern living. Much like the world grew from conventional settings to digital platform-based service, the financial setting worldwide is going through a sweeping revision primarily driven by fast-paced innovation in digital technology. The semblance of conventional brick-mortar banking institutions with the growing distrust ever since the global financial crisis of 2008 is slated to be phased out by advancing FinTech institutions. At the frontline of this changing time are neo-banks, financial service providers breaking new ground in banking services. To grasp what the future of banking will look like in the years to come, this blog points out the current position of neo-banks and a significant opportunity to bridge the credit gap through accessible funding options. It further highlights the current regulation of which neo-banks face operational challenges depending on traditional banks. The paper explores several countries that have dedicated licenses for neo-banks and how the evolution of digital banking has the potential to shape India’s FinTech market. In general terms, neo-banks are not “banks,” but technology driven Financial Service Providers FSPs that rely on relationships with accredited local banks to provide financial services. They are distinct from traditional banking institutions by exhibiting their digitally exclusive operations and carrying out without storefronts i.e., no physical branch presence. The worldwide unfolding of neo-banks, around 2013-2015 in UK and Germany was rooted mainly by advancing technology, changing customer base especially from Gen Z preferring convenience and personalised experiences and a business model focused on lower interest rates. The global neobank market was worth $ 18.6 billion in 2018 and is expected to accelerate at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of around 46.5% between 2019 and 2026, generating around $394.6 billion by 2026. India’s financial landscape also mirrors the dynamics of digital transformation seen in other parts of the world. In India neo-banking sector has gained strong momentum with the presence of competitors like Jupiter, Fi Money, Open and Razorpay X. The early emphasis of these banks is not only a market capture approach but also a sign of systemic weakness within the existing banking structure. Consider the TransUnion findings of 2021 which reports more than 160 million consumers were deemed credit underserved in India lacking access to mainstream financial products due to thin credit files or low formal engagement. The credit inaccessibility is even more burdensome in the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) sector. An EY report states that among the 64 million MSMEs, there is an overall finance demand of around $1955 billion. This demand is supported by a leverage ratio of 3.8, i.e, for every $1 they put in equity, they require $3.80 in loans. Yet, only 14% of these MSMEs can secure credit from conventional banking sources. This leaves an estimated $1,544 billion in the form of debt financing of which nearly 47% MSMEs’ debt demand is unaddressable due to low financial viability. The debt leads them to rely on shadow lenders, charging a higher rate of interest. These gaps have created a shortfall of $819 billion, of which $289 billion is currently backed by private banking institutions. There remains an unmet financial debt of $530 billion offering a window entry point for FinTech companies and Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs). REGULATORY MECHANISM- THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL Neobanks in India are not yet licensed by the Reserve Bank of India. Section 22 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 stipulates that to conduct bank operations an RBI License is required. With RBI’s “Mobile Banking Transactions in India – Operative Guidelines for Banks (2014)” Circular, the functioning of neobanks is further challenged for Clause 6 specifies physical presence of bank to offer the mobile banking services. These FSPs (neo-banks) partner with RBI-approved banks and NBFCs to deliver banking solutions. Under this mechanism, the core financial services such as accounts, deposits, and savings instruments are provided by the partner bank or NBFC managing customers’ funds under RBI oversight. To go with that, neo-banks technology driven interface offers a user-centric platform leveraging AI and data analytics for financial services like account opening, payments, expense tracking and personalised insights through mobile and online platforms. This Banking-as-a-Service model outlined in Section 4 (Authorization of Payment Systems) as per the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 ensures customers’ digital interaction through neo-bank with the core banking operations limited under the purview of licensed partner banks. Alongside the sector-specific regulation under the RBI, all of this brings a layered “principal-agent” relationship, complicating the division of regulatory duties and liabilities. The lending service provider (the agent) incurs compliance risk and reputational damage if the licensed partner bank (the principal) faces RBI action, and neo-bank services can be abruptly disrupted. Consider the RBI action against the State Bank of Mauritius back in 2023. The disruption affected Niyo’s international forex services, leaving users stranded without any direct recourse overseas. With the regulatory licensed bank that bore scrutiny, this highlighted neobanks lack direct regulatory oversight for cybersecurity and incident response, relying instead on partner banks, highlighting a compliance and consumer protection gap in the current partnership model. The Information Technology Act, 2000 highlights the legal recognition of electronic records, electronic signatures and electronic contracts (Sections 4, 5, 10) essential to the paperless operations of neo-banks. Section 43A imposes liability on entities for compensation where the failure to implement reasonable security practices results in the misuse or loss of sensitive personal information. The Act also outlines various cybercrimes i.e, identity theft under Section 66C, punishment for information breach of a lawful contract under Section 72A, and liabilities applicable to neo-banks for security lapses. While neo-banks operate as technological innovation agents in this partnership, it is yet to be determined how they will comply with user data privacy, likely the Digital Data Protection Act, 2023 and AML/KYC regulations over time if granted a license. Guidelines on Outsourcing of Financial

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SEBI Flexes Its Muscles Again: Freezing Demat Accounts

[By Priyanshu & Mahek Gupta] The authors are students of Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. INTRODUCTION In a recent regulatory crackdown, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) froze the demat accounts of the designated persons in the Gensol Engineering fiasco related to diversion of loans and corporate misconduct. The Board exercised its power to freeze someone’s account for non-compliance with the SEBI Regulations from circular number SEBI/HO/CFD/CMD/CIR/P/2018/77 dated May 3, 2018, which outlines the procedure for suspension or revocation of trading in specified securities in case of non-compliance with the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (‘LODR Regulations’).  On May 9, 2025, the affected persons appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) to direct SEBI to unfreeze the unlisted securities held by them in such demat accounts. The appeal presented a critical question before the SAT: Can SEBI validly freeze demat accounts, particularly those holding unlisted securities? Given the increased use of demat-based enforcement and the lack of clarity on its limitations, the authors attempt to investigate this regulatory gray area, its repercussions, and comparative views on SEBI’s authority. WHY GENSOL ENGINEERING LTD. IS IN TROUBLE? Gensol Engineering Ltd. (‘Gensol’) is currently under serious financial and regulatory trouble. On 15 April 2025, the SEBI passed an interim order, prohibiting Anmol Singh Jaggi and Puneet Singh Jaggi, the promoters of Gensol, from occupying board positions or accessing the securities market. SEBI also ordered a freeze on their demat accounts and shareholding. SEBI alleged that a major chunk, i.e., Rs. 262 crores of a loan for Rs. 978 crores taken from various creditors for the purchase of EVs was diverted for personal use. The order was based on credit agencies downgrading their rating for Gensol on the issue of a falsified debt servicing track record and concerns over corporate governance practices. The order was challenged before the SAT, however, the Tribunal refused to grant relief, noting that SEBI was within its rights to take preventive steps and instructed the regulator to pass a confirmatory order within four weeks. Soon after, the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (‘IREDA’), one of the creditors of Gensol, filed an insolvency application against Gensol under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, claiming a loan default of ₹510 crore. The National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) issued a notice to the company to file its reply and scheduled the next hearing on June 3, 2025. Most recently, Gensol’s Chief Financial Officer, Jabirmahendi Mohammedraza Aga, resigned, citing that his decision was linked to internal turmoil and the ongoing regulatory probes. POWERS OF SEBI: DOES IT INCLUDE FREEZING OF DEMAT ACCOUNTS? The enormous powers of SEBI are not unknown to the securities market. In Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. SEBI, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Board has a vast range of powers under the Securities & Exchange Board Act, 1992 (‘the Act’). The Board is given enormous responsibilities under the Act to develop and regulate the securities market. Section 11A of the Act specifically empowers SEBI to take such measures as it deems fit in the interest of the investors. Banning parties from trading, freezing of demat accounts, or holding of securities are activities bound to severely impact any investor. Three notable circulars were passed by SEBI on November 30, 2015, October 26, 2016, and finally, the last on May 3, 2018. The third and last circular deals with the freezing of securities of the promoter(s) or promoter group. It is pertinent to refer to the circular passed on May 3, 2018, that superseded the earlier two circulars. Specifically, the circular proposes three main actions against an entity that fails to follow certain provisions of the LODR Regulations. They are – imposition of fines under Annexure I, freezing of holdings of the promoter(s) or promoter group as per paragraph 5 of Annexure I, and suspension of trading in the shares of such entity as per paragraph 1 of Annexure II. The holdings of the promoter(s) or the promoter group are generally frozen if the fine(s)/penalty imposed based on non-compliance with the LODR Regulations are not paid by the concerned entity. WHY DOES THIS POWER STAND OUT IN COMPARISON TO OTHER REGULATORS? The power of SEBI directing the depositories to freeze demat account(s) of an investor is rather unique. It is pertinent to compare such power with the powers of other financial market regulators across the world, especially the United States of America and the United Kingdom, as the Financial Regulators operating in these countries are believed to be some of the most powerful financial market regulators. USA Arguably one of the most powerful financial markets regulators, the United States of America’s Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) has never directly ordered the freezing of someone’s demat account. Such actions usually require judicial sanction. There have been numerous occasions on which the SEC has sought freezing of assets or accounts of individuals from a district court. In a press release dated June 21, 2021, the SEC notified an action of asset freeze on two individuals on the charges of offshoring of funds to the shell companies and defrauding the investors. The key point to note here is that the said action was taken in pursuance of an emergency court order, and the SEC did not act on its own. Similarly, in a press release dated April 14, 2017, the SEC announced a freeze of assets in two brokerage accounts that were used to generate a benefit of more than $1 million in an alleged insider trading case. The SEC undertook this move after getting an emergency court order from the District Court for the Southern District of New York. It is apposite to note that the SEC has never obtained such an order for non-disclosure of information. The Commission usually obtains such orders in cases of, but not limited to, fraud and insider trading. UK When it comes to the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’), their powers are similarly constrained. As per

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Ticking Boxes or Transforming Culture? The MCA’s 2025 Posh Overhaul

[By Arjun Kapur & Sameep Baral] The authors are students of Maharashtra National Law University Mumbai. Introduction What does it really mean for a workplace to be “safe”? Is it the lack of complaints or a culture where employees feel comfortable raising issues? In India’s fast-changing corporate world, where investor expectations, public scrutiny, and employee voices unite, companies discover that silence is not always beneficial. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) has recently pushed for more transparency and accountability, particularly regarding workplace behaviour. A clear example appeared in September 2023 when the Registrar of Companies in Karnataka fined Ceeta Industries for not revealing the structure of its Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) in the Board’s report. Introduced in 2013 after the Supreme Court’s Vishaka judgment, the POSH Act requires employers to keep a workplace free from sexual harassment and to set up formal ways to address complaints. For example, every organization needs an ICC, with at least half of the members being women. Over the past ten years, the law has become stricter and broader, including requirements for regular training, applying to more types of businesses, and setting tighter deadlines. For businesses, following POSH has shifted from a moral choice to a legal necessity within corporate governance. In this context, the MCA’s 2025 amendments indicate a significant change in the reporting requirements under POSH law for corporate entities. By requiring detailed POSH disclosures in the Board report, regulators expect companies to go beyond basic compliance. This blog discusses the regulatory shift from the 2025 MCA amendments, discussing its practical effects on corporate POSH compliance. It also identifies issues in compliance and suggests fundamental reforms to rethink workplace safety as part of corporate governance, rather than just a legal requirement. Understanding the 2025 MCA Update One can see this enforcement trend in the landmark Ceeta Industries case. In September 2023, the Karnataka Registrar of Companies penalized Ceeta Industries for not including the required Board Report statement on its POSH ICC. The company faced fines in several lakhs of rupees, and its key officers were also penalized. This case highlighted that even minor procedural lapses under the POSH framework can lead to strict enforcement. By law, any default in reporting can lead to a penalty of up to ₹3 lakh on the company and ₹50,000 on each defaulting officer per year. This underscores the financial stakes of POSH compliance. Building on this, the MCA’s Companies (Accounts) Second Amendment Rules, 2025, effective July 14, 2025, represent an apparent policy shift. Unlike the previous compliance regime, which simply confirmed the ICC’s structure in the annual report, the new rules require detailed data-driven disclosures. Under the amended regulations, every company must now report the number of sexual harassment complaints received during the year, how many were resolved in that year, and how many are pending beyond 90 days. The Board’s Report must also state that the company has met the POSH Act’s requirements regarding its ICC formation. This increase in disclosure turns POSH compliance into a performance measure. Companies must carefully track and record case data since these figures will become part of public filings. The data-driven approach raises the stakes, many unresolved or pending cases can indicate governance problems and damage a company’s reputation, while mistakes or missing information in reporting can lead to legal and financial penalties. This update effectively transforms POSH reporting from a simple formality into a significant corporate responsibility and risk management source. Why This Update Signals a Governance Shift By requiring transparency on workplace harassment statistics, the 2025 rules bring POSH into the spotlight. Annual reports will now feature POSH disclosures alongside financial results and governance statements. This change allows the independent directors, auditors, and investors to identify trends in the data. For instance, an increase in complaints or many pending cases may raise questions about oversight or company culture. Board members might actively seek explanations when POSH figures do not meet expectations, turning a previously hidden issue into a key topic of corporate governance. Annual board reports are usually public documents, making each metric visible to stakeholders and the media. For institutional investors and ESG analysts, these disclosure numbers become the new social metrics. Poor outcomes or unresolved cases could impact a company’s social rating and reputation. Leading governance frameworks consider worker safety a vital issue. Companies are now providing standardized data in this area. Because these reports are public, a pattern of low complaints or numerous backlogs will be noticed. This visibility creates a feedback loop. Companies must review their own processes and culture. Boards may require a closer look at delayed case resolutions or rethink ineffective training programs. Rather than being hidden in the Human Resources (HR) files, POSH has become part of regular corporate reporting. The 2025 update marks a significant step in governance, acknowledging that employee safety and respect are essential for a company’s integrity and performance. Corporate Blind Spots in POSH Despite the POSH law and its roots in the Supreme Court’s Vishaka judgment, many Indian companies view compliance as just a simple checklist. It is common to find ICCs that do not function well. For example, they may meet only occasionally, lack diverse representation, or fail to conduct proper training and awareness programs. Some organizations meet the requirement for the number of women and include an HR nominee, but they do not give the ICC the authority to act independently. Employees often do not know their rights or fear backlash, leading to many incidents going unreported. Poor record-keeping and documentation mean that even submitted complaints may go unnoticed. HR departments that manage ICCs can create conflicts of interest when investigations involve their managers. Employees may wonder if an HR-led committee can handle the case fairly if the accused is a supervisor. In some cases, victims perceive the process as biased, which fosters a culture of silence. From a governance perspective, a reported count of zero complaints in a year can be just as concerning as a backlog. This may reflect fear or

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Hey Siri! Sue the Car: Understanding Standard Essential Patents and India’s Antitrust Policy

[By Rishita Chatterjee] The author is a student of Jindal Global Law School, O.P Jindal Global University. Part I: Introduction to India’s Contentious Affair with Standard Essential Patents India’s digital economy is growing at an unseen scale, confirming that rapid technological innovation can have an impactful, lasting leapfrog effect, inducing economic growth even as physical infrastructure continues to lag. As the digital economy goes through this seismic shift, a pertinent question surfaces whether India is equipped for this growth. An important part in India’s digital economy toolbox is Industrial Internet of Things (‘IoT’) – a market that is to surge over 28 Billion USD by 2033 and consequently the connected vehicles market poised to become a USD 27 Billion industry by 2033. This transformation is enabled by a common language of standardized technologies like but not limited to 5G, LTE and Wi-Fi. The critical function of interoperability is safeguarded by a rather intricate framework of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs); however, the enforcement of these patents has proven to be a conundrum for both antitrust and patent regimes. Although not defined under the Patent Act, courts in India ensured robust discourse around it to ensure proper adjudication. In simple terms, a SEP is defined as a patent whose claim encompasses technology that is deemed “indispensable for the implementation of a technical standard”. This invites a very foundational legal tension. On one hand, the patent regime confers upon the patentee a statutory monopoly, including an “exclusionary right” to prevent third parties from utilising the patent. Conversely, the principles of antitrust law are designed to structure the exercise of market power derived from this status, ensuring that essential technology functions within a competitive market framework. It is also crucial to recognise that Indian law and policy on SEPs has been forged almost exclusively in the crucible of telecommunication disputes, a market dominated by a handful of mobile phone giants as licensors and handset manufacturers as the primary licensees. This results in a legal framework tailored to the said industry, however implementing this in the industrial landscape of IoTs and the automative sector places the licensing model in a classic  “square peg in a round hole” conundrum. This paper delves further into this problem, attempting to underscore policy implication, value propositions and the future of India’s regulatory role in the digital economy. Part II: Does India have a ‘Legacy Framework’ for SEPs ? The first leg of SEP litigation in India was dominated by a protracted legal battle between the Swedish telecom giant Ericsson and Indian handset maker Micromax and Intex. In response to SEP proprietors seeking compensation for investments primarily on R&D, Indian courts developed a distinctive equitable remedy of pro tem deposits, which orders a temporary and provisional financial arrangement pending the financial resolution of a dispute. The mechanism secures the patentee’s interest during litigation via a court mandated payment structure. The Delhi High Court pioneered these conditional injunctions, making relief contingent upon securing fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) licensing fee. A reading of the initial Ericsson v Micromax decision shows that the judiciary favors to recognize the complementary, rather than the contradictory nature of the Patents Act, 1970 and the Competition Act, 2002, enabling the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) to launch investigations into alleged abuse of dominance by SEP holders. The case further highlights the remedies that are put forth by the respective statutes, while the Patent Act provides for in personam remedies (like compulsory licensing for specific party), the Competition Act provides for in rem remedies (such as market wide cease and desist orders, notably structural remedies). A. Trouble in Paradise? The balance in jurisprudence has been thrown into disarray. The landmark judgment by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court pertaining to Ericsson and Nokia cases held that the Patents Act of 1970 constitutes a separate and distinct self-content law that effectively trumps the jurisdiction of the Competition Act of 2002 in SEP licensing transactions and the enforcement of patent rights. The judgment, appealable before the Supreme Court of India, has created unprecedented uncertainty. If upheld, it would considerably reduce the adjudicatory function of the CCI, thus challenging the ability of the antitrust regulator to police potentially anti-competitive licensing conduct by dominant SEP owners. Looking back  at the telecommunications conflict, arises a prevalent licensing pattern: the licensing of the end-product, that is, the mobile phone. This approach directly gave rise to the central, and contentious, disagreement regarding the proper royalty base. Two competing principles largely characterize this conflict. The Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit (SSPPU) principle argues that a FRAND royalty must be determined based on the value of the smallest unit that utilizes the patented technology, e.g., the cellular chipset. Supporters of this approach, as established in seminal U.S. case law such as LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer, argue that this approach avoids the patent owner from appropriating value associated with discrete innovations, branding, and features integrated in the final product. In contrast, the Entire Market Value Rule (EMVR), an approach frequently adopted by SEP owners, argues that the royalty should be derived from the entire retail value of the final device. Supporters of this approach found their position grounded in the argument that the standardized connectivity is the key feature driving the overall market value of the product and consumer demand. Adopting the EMVR route, could potentially inflate end device costs, slowing mass adoption of crucial technologies like 5G. The SSPU principle aligns for India’s national objective of prioritizing widespread digital penetration, encouraging lower licensing costs, fostering affordability and accelerating the very technological integration essential for building infrastructure. B. Bespoke or All-Purpose Competition: The Value Chain Conundrum This legacy design, tailored to smartphone industry, is poorly suited for India’s digital future. A radical redesign of markets is the very first real issue. Telecom wars were a rather concentrated industry of a few dozen industry behemoths around the world. The IoT ecosystem continues to grow, beyond what the infrastructure can handle, and key applications are emerging

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Progress With Pitfalls: Rethinking CCI’s New Cost Regulations in Digital Markets

[By Priyal Jain & Harshita Jindal] The authors are students of Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law.   Introduction Digital platforms have emerged as a focal point of debate in the evolving digital economic landscape, especially in the context of predatory pricing, where determining the cost of services remains an idea that defies consensus. It has again made headlines as the Competition Commission of India (CCI) notified the (Determination of Cost of Production) Regulations, 2025 (hereinafter, “New Cost Regulations”) which replaced its 2009 predecessor. These regulations assume high significance as they try to cater to the changing pricing strategies that have been on the rise with the advent of digital markets. The Indian Competition Watchdog, i.e., CCI, has been using the dual test of assessing predatory pricing as provided in the case of MCX v. NSE, focusing on prices below cost measure and the likelihood of recovering losses incurred. The assessment criteria needs to be outlined with refined discernment as deep discounting, which is done to expand the network of customers by giving heavy discounts and incentives, is a fundamental characteristic of digital markets and often leads to atypical deductions while determining predatory pricing in these markets. Consequently, to regularize the concept of cost, CCI adopted a mechanism based on the Areeda-Turner test, according to which the price of the product should be below Average Variable Cost (“AVC”) to establish predatory pricing. However, jurisprudence laid down in Bharti Airtel and Fast Track Call Cab (Ola case) takes an opposite stance where zero pricing was not a determining factor in accessing predatory pricing. These cases mark differential standpoints taken by CCI in applying cost regulation to e-commerce or digital platforms and create an ambiguous haze around the subject. This blog delves into the implications of the newly introduced cost regulations on the digital marketplace and what dual-edged effect it can create for the future of pricing strategies. Analysis of the New Cost Regulations The CCI in its recently notified New Cost Regulations has brought several changes with respect to the framework of cost determination, which it has also explained through its General Statement, used to assess predatory pricing in any market. The new regulations have amended the definitions of various cost benchmarks like Long Run Average Incremental Cost (“LRAIC”), Average Avoidable Cost (“AAC”), etc., removed the term market value, and introduced Average Total Cost. Moreover, CCI has adopted a sector agnostic, cost based framework allowing for case-by-case assessment of predatory pricing, as proclaimed by the General Statement. Predatory pricing is one of the many pernicious forms of abuse of dominance where a dominant entity, sets the prices of goods/services below the cost of production where an “as-efficient competitor” could not match the prices without incurring significant losses. Such conduct is taken by a dominant enterprise to drive existing market players out of the market, thereby hampering competition. Thus, to establish a case of predatory pricing, establishment of a dominant position in the relevant market, pricing below cost, and intention to reduce or eliminate competitors is essential. To satisfy the pre-requisite of demonstrating pricing below cost, an appropriate measure of determining the cost of the product is imperative, hence, CCI has formulated the Cost Determination Regulations to provide a structured and uniform framework for assessment of the same. The Cost Determination Regulations, elucidate various cost measures like LRAIC, AAC, AVC, etc., although CCI has only been using AVC to examine whether the pricing was below cost or not. However, now with the New Cost Regulations accompanied by the General Statement, CCI has stated that it will examine predatory pricing using other cost measures as well depending upon each case. How will CCI translate its statement into practice is yet to be seen. A Forward Step: Impact of the New Cost Regulations on the Digital Market Digital markets are characterised by certain unique features with respect to their cost and prices due to which the traditional Areeda-Turner or AKZO rule can notbe applied to them. The new regulations have opened a fresh chapter in competition compliance by such industries. CCI has clarified that the case-by-case assessment would enable the consideration of unique features and evolving dynamics of digital markets while evaluating predatory conduct. The cost structure of digital markets, particularly characterised by network effects, is quite different than most other industries since they are distinguished by higher fixed costs, lower variable costs, larger common and joint costs, etc. For instance, Instagram incurred high initial costs in developing the app but it does not incur any additional cost with an increase in the number of users, Netflix incurs costs for acquiring global content, and building algorithms and interface, however, these costs are not tied to any individual subscriber or content piece. Hence, in such a kind of market using the conventional AVC concept contradicts the intended reasoning. In digital markets, relying exclusively on the cost benchmark established in the AKZO rule may allow the pricing strategies to bypass scrutiny as prices can easily be set above AVC and still cause genuine harm to the competition. In various judgments of India as well as European Union (“EU”) , courts have concurred with the above-mentioned rationale. In MCX v NSE, the Director General report stated that since stock exchanges work on the basis of the high level of network externalities and incur huge sunk costs, the use of ATC or LRAIC to assess predation in their cases is more justified. Moreover, in the Qualcomm case, the General Court of EU while endorsing the LRAIC standard, expressed that technologically intensive markets are marked by substantial fixed costs, primarily from R&D, while variable costs remain low and since these fixed costs are closely associated with the specific product sold, LRAIC would be a suitable measure to assess below-cost pricing as it incorporates both fixed and variable costs along with the sunk cost. The European Case of Post Danmark also establishes that in certain cases pricing below AAC and AIC displays evidence of a plan for eliminating competitors

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