Author name: CBCL

Not So Universal: Differing Timing Approaches to COMI and the Policy Challenge for India

[By Sachika Vij & Kartikeya Misra] The authors are students of Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University Lucknow.   INTRODUCTION The UNICTRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (MLCBI) has recently celebrated its 25th anniversary.  The inclusion of the UNCITRAL MLCBI has gained significant traction and is now being incorporated into the domestic legislation of numerous countries worldwide. An increasing number of international jurisdictions, including Hong Kong and Singapore, are aligning themselves with the global trend of embracing a Centre of Main Interest (COMI)-based approach to recognition to insolvency proceedings. However, several challenges have cropped up in its implementation. One such issue is with the interpretation of the date of determination of COMI. India on the other hand is still in the process of enacting the cross-border insolvency framework. With the different interpretations already in place there is a greater mantle on the Indian authorities to ensure that these loopholes are not used to delay the resolution process and that they do not hamper the interests of the parties involved in seeking recourse. THE CENTRALITY OF COMI IN INSOLVENCY AND ITS DETERMINATION Imagine a scenario, where a debtor company finds itself entangled in insolvency proceedings spanning multiple jurisdictions. The COMI holds immense significance when it comes to navigating such a complex realm of cross-border insolvency. Article 17(2)(a) of the Model Law states that a foreign main proceeding is where the COMI lies. It acts as the determining factor as to which jurisdiction shall have the authority to grant the necessary relief for the debtor’s ongoing financial concern. Though, it has not been defined anywhere in the Model Law but has been of extensive use worldwide. For determining COMI, a comprehensive assessment of various factors is required. Article 16 of the Model Law lays down a rebuttable presumption that the debtor’s registered office is taken to the COMI and as per the Recitals (12) and (13) of the European Commission Regulation should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties. However, UNCITRAL MLCBI with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation provide for other factors which may include the jurisdiction where the debtor takes its key managerial decisions and conducts the majority of its economic activities, where it manages its key assets, etc. Ascertaining COMI is not simple and the determination is to be based on the fulfillment of two important requisites which are: Determination of the date for deciding the debtor’s COMI Determination of the factors for deciding the location of the debtor’s COMI It is only once the first element has been determined, the Court will determine the location of COMI under various non-exhaustive factors. Although the preamble and interpretation under Article 8 of the Model Law clearly state that it was enacted for the sole purpose of bringing uniformity to cross-border insolvency proceedings by harmonizing national insolvency laws dealing with it. However, there is no established position on the specific date that will serve as the decisive factor for determining the COMI. THE TIMING CONUNDRUM IN COMI DETERMINATION In 2013 answering the approach to be adopted for the timing of determining COMI, the Guide to the Enactment of the MLCBI mentioned that the relevant date for determining the  COMI should be the date of commencement of the foreign proceeding. However, before this guide, US developed its own principles for the date of determining the COMI in the case of Fairfield Sentry which was upon the filing of the recognition application. Australian Courts have on the other hand, stemming from the case of Australian equity investors, held the relevant date of COMI to be the time the Court is called for a decision on the requisite recognition application. In 2022, a Hong Kong Court Global Brands Group Case opined that the determining factor of COMI should be the date of the   foreign office-holder’s recognition application The Court noted that this preference aligns with Article 6 of The Supreme People’s Court’s Opinion on Taking Forward a Pilot Measure for the Recognition of and Assistance to Insolvency Proceedings in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Moreover, claiming it to be consistent with the approach taken by the Singapore Courts in Re Zetta Jet in 2019. Therefore, Courts internationally have come up with different approaches in deciding the timing  of COMI which are relevant because they can have a huge impact on the proceeding and can even impact the location of COMI. INDIAN APPROACH TO DATE OF DETERMINING COMI India’s iteration of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency is still under consideration in the form of Draft Part Z to be introduced in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Cross Border Insolvency Resolution Committee (CBIRC) in its Report on the Rules and Regulations for Cross Border Insolvency Resolution recommended that for the determination of the timing of COMI, appropriate date should be the date of commencement of a foreign proceeding under the local law of the jurisdiction. By adopting this approach, the CBIRC aimed to minimize forum shopping opportunities. Considering the time of filing of the recognition application as determining point of COMI there would only be the proceedings and actions of the foreign representative that would help indicate the COMI. Therefore, relying on the date of commencement of foreign proceedings would provide a clearer result compared to determining COMI at the time of the application. Additionally, this approach would be easier to apply across different jurisdictions, simplifying the practical implementation of the rule. On the other hand, proponents of the time of filing of the application approach argue that delving into the debtor’s past interests can be complex and may result in denying the true COMI. They believe that determining COMI based on the time of filing the application could prevent such complications and ensure a more accurate determination of COMI. WORKING IT OUT: THE POLICY CHALLENGE The different approaches in the timing of determination of COMI have been evolving as has been seen recently in

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When Platforms Themselves Compete: Preferential Listing and Unfair Contracts

[By Akash Gulati & Sanidhya Bajpai] The authors are students at RMLNLU, Lucknow.   Introduction India is the fastest-growing e-commerce market in the world. Online platforms like Amazon, Flipkart, Zomato, etc., offer a marketplace where the divergence of buyers, sellers, and advertisers partake in commerce. The presence of an online marketplace makes trade and commerce efficient and transparent. The testimonies of the stakeholders involved reveal that the online platforms, through preferential listing and unfair contract terms prima facie, constrain the marketplace and consequently bring competition concerns to the forefront. This piece delves into the key competition issues which have a proclivity to comprise the platform neutrality of the e-commerce platforms. Platform Neutrality Platform neutrality simply means a neutral treatment of complements by the platform free of unreasonable bias and discrimination. In the context of e-commerce, it means that any platform connecting the seller to the market cannot unreasonably put sellers at a disadvantage, either in isolation or in conjunction, by preferencing their own products over the other sellers. Platforms being in control of all listing parameters find themselves in such powerful positions where they can push around the discoverability of products that systematically alter sales. Further, platforms can also bestow perks upon certain sellers, some of which they directly or indirectly own, which make them seem more authentic when compared to peers. This piece is in the context of the market-leading platforms. Online marketplaces rely on algorithms to provide a sorted list of products from sellers in response to a user query/demand. This seems to be a task that enables efficiency, but when coupled with the vertical integration of goods sold by the marketplace itself, a leeway is cracked open. Thereon the platform is not only a service provider to the sellers, but also a competitor. Skewed Listing The algorithms which sort the sellers do not seem to produce neutral results. A common complaint of sellers on platforms such as Amazon and Flipkart is that their preferred sellers are usually displayed on the first few pages of search results (see CCI’s report as well). Consequently, the non-preferred sellers are pushed away from the reach of the customers onto the later pages. It is seen that even the lesser-priced products from general sellers are pushed back in order to increase the visibility of the same products from preferred sellers. Vertical Integration Foreclosing Competition The preferred sellers include the directly or indirectly owned entities of the platform itself and the other sellers who sign up for the preferred seller program. This vertical agreement between the sellers and the platform allowing sellers to pay a fee to gain visibility and outperform peers can tend to foreclose competition. Especially in cases where the competitors who are as efficient as the preferred sellers, both in terms of pricing and quality, lose out on sales simply because of lesser visibility. Such vertical arrangements seem to be in violation of Section 3(1) read with 3(4). These agreements tend to foreclose competition and drive current competitors out of the market which might result in an appreciable adverse effect on competition (“AAEC”). The lack of transparency on the modus operandi of these platforms makes it an iffy affair to determine the extent of such AAEC. Role of Private Labels A private label product is a third-party manufactured product that the retailer sells under its own brand name. In the e-commerce sector, giants such as Amazon and Flipkart sell private label products in vertical integration to their service as an intermediary. Such giants have access to the plethora of user data and preferences which the competitors lack. Therefore, the platforms have the means to delineate the most profitable market segments and enter with the most personalized products. This strategic entry into new relevant markets can be termed as the efficiency of the platform. However, when this gets coupled with the undue advantage of preferential listing of private label products (vis-a-vis similar products of identical ratings) and the deep discounting offered on these products, the platform might be venturing into violation of the Sections 4(2)(a)(ii), 4(2)(b)(ii) and 4(2)(c). Unfair Terms of The Contract The leading online shopping and other e-commerce platforms such as Amazon and Flipkart have a superior position to other sellers by virtue of them owning the platform and occupying large market shares. This bestows them with superior bargaining power and makes other sellers susceptible to the unfair terms of the contract coupled with unilateral changes. The same was also observed in the CCI’s report on the e-commerce market study in India. The French courts fined Amazon on the grounds that it imposed ‘unfair’ terms on its suppliers. The courts found that Amazon, through its higher bargaining power, has obtained contracts that allow it to change the terms and policies at any time without prior notice. The sellers in the commission’s report have alleged that e-commerce platforms have imposed similar onerous obligations in India. The seller/vendor testimonies prima facie show that the e-commerce platforms have indulged in agreements that are likely to have exclusionary effects on the competition and are unfair/exploitative to the sellers and consequently are in contravention to Section 3(4) of the Act. The platform’s higher bargaining power allows it to impose exploitative/unfair terms on the sellers, and how these terms distress the sellers and distort the competition will be discussed further. Exclusivity agreement The e-commerce platforms engage in exclusive supply agreements that make a certain product exclusively available on only one platform. This hampers the customer’s ability to choose from a wide range of products and impairs the seller from selling the products on different platforms. The exclusive agreements, as reported in the commission’s report, are of two types; a) agreements that make a product exclusively available on one platform, and b) agreements that make a platform list only one brand in a specific product category. These types of agreements could lead to situations where a certain brand’s product is listed on a platform exclusively, and its competitor is delisted, which would be detrimental to

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A Revamped Regulatory Landscape for Digital Competition in India

[By Mahiya Shah & Chaitley Sharma] The author are students at Gujarat National Law University.   INTRODUCTION Today’s world is rapidly transitioning into a new digital era, with digital marketing being one of the latest additions to the global economic landscape. This new digital economy involves the sale of goods through cyberspace, using digital platforms which facilitate interaction between multiple suppliers and customers. The present era sees this global phenomenon as a critical driver of prosperity by impacting innovation, productivity, and, most importantly, consumer welfare. Digitization has enabled the emergence is what is popularly known as “Big Tech,” which refers to Google, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple. The sizes and worldwide influence of these companies have prompted calls for antitrust action to put a rein on their growing size and power. Globally, imposing heavy penalties has been the go-to reprimand to address the concerns about unfair business practices and maintain a level playing field in the technology industry. First, Microsoft and now, Google and Meta Platforms have faced penalties due to their anti-competitive practices. Google was fined a whopping $5.1 billion for breaching EU antitrust rules in the 2018 decision of the European Commission. More recently, this year, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) imposed a fine of $1.3 billion on Meta Platforms, the parent company of Facebook, for breaching the data privacy regulations of the European Union. The recent cases of Google Android, Google Play store, FHRAI & anr. v. MMT-GO and OYO, ongoing inquiries against Apple, WhatsApp privacy policy, Amazon & Flipkart, Zomato & Swiggy, and Bookmyshow are illustrations of the growing convergence of digital markets and competition in the global economy. Undoubtedly, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) has done its fair share of keeping a check on these big-tech companies by conducting inquiries, imposing severe penalties, and passing orders to correct their wrong actions. However, there had been doubts regarding the effectiveness of such actions by the authoritative bodies under the existing regulatory framework which led to the formulation of the ex-ante regulations,  under the new Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023. Ex-ante regulations are those which are formulated with the purpose of identifying and resolving potential issues in advance, aiming to influence the conduct of stakeholders through proactive regulatory intervention and the potential detrimental effects of such adopting regulations in India will be discussed in the upcoming sections. RECENT MODIFICATIONS TO THE COMPETITION ACT: AN ATTEMPT AT STRENGTHENING FAIR TRADE Given this growing importance and the swift growth of digital businesses in the present age, discussions regarding the requisite modifications to the Competition Act of 2002 have been in progress since the constitution of the Competition Law Review Committee (CLRC) by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) in 2018 intending to provide the CCI with enhanced capabilities to monitor and regulate digital giants. In July 2019, the committee submitted its report, leading to the subsequent passing of  ‘The Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2022’. The Bill contained certain amendments targeted explicitly at digital markets. Later in 2022, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) proposed specific amendments to the Competition Act, which were subsequently referred to the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee (Standing Committee) for comprehensive examination and engagement with different stakeholders. After considering the inputs from the Standing Committee, the MCA incorporated additional amendments and presented the final draft to Parliament on 8th February 2023. On 22 December 2022, the Standing Committee issued its 53rd Report concerning ‘Anti-competitive Practices by Big Tech Companies‘ advocating the need for ex-ante regulations through a new legislation called the ‘Digital Competition Act’ (DCA). In consultation with various stakeholders, the committee highlighted anti-competitive practices in the digital sector and to combat these practices, it proposed enacting a sui generis law to govern the digital market in an ex-ante way. The rationale behind implementing such rules was to tackle anti-competitive practices and market dominance at an early stage, thereby promoting fair competition and protecting consumers’ interests. By imposing specific obligations on ‘big’ digital players, the goal is to ensure a level playing field and prevent market distortions caused by the dominant position of certain players. Following the Standing Committee’s report, the MCA provided the Committee on Digital Competition Law (CDCL) with specific terms of reference: (i) determine whether the current framework of the Competition Act is adequate to address the challenges brought on by the digital economy; (ii) clarify the need for a separate piece of legislation is necessary to establish an ex-ante regulatory mechanism for digital markets; and (iii) research global best practices for regulation in the area of digital markets. In light of this, CDCL held its first meeting on February 22, 2023, to discuss the need for ex-ante law. The Lok Sabha passed the amendments to the Act on March 29, 2023, for stricter compliance, including by giving the antitrust regulator the authority to impose penalties on the global turnover of offending firms, which could pave the way for harsher sanctions against organizations like Big Tech. Today, the CCI cannot penalize corporate entities based on their annual worldwide turnover. Penalties only apply to the company’s sales in the relevant market. The amendments also simplify compliance by giving CCI the authority to control mergers and acquisitions (M&A) based on deals valued at or above the 2,000-crore threshold, provided that the target company has significant business operations in India. It also suggested that CCI must decide within 30 days whether a merger or acquisition will likely negatively impact the market. While these amendments were introduced with the view to provide a suitable conclusion to these discussions and ensure fairness, contestability and innovation in the digital landscape, the ex-ante nature of these regulations has sparked a new debate on whether ex-ante regulations while seeking to address competition concerns proactively, may inadvertently create adverse effects in the existing ecosystem. The recommendations put forth by the committee demonstrate commendable intentions and justifications but the n ex-ante method to govern the firms’ activity is doubtful to be suitable for the current landscape. If ex-ante regulations in a digital

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Revisiting SEBI(PIT) Law: SEBI v Abhijit Rajan and Motive to Trade

[By Himanshi Garg] The author is a student at University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. Abstract The Supreme Court (Hereinafter as “SC”) in the case of the SEBI v Abhijit Rajan has held that the motive on the part of an insider is an essential element to hold an insider in violation of the provisions of the SEBI (PIT) Regulations 1992 .This present blog seeks to critically analyze the judgment of the SC referred to above in light of the insider trading jurisprudence developed in the U.S.A, by securities fraud scholars, courts, and commentaries. The author then tries to draw home her argument as to why the possession test should be used in determining the liability of the person charged for violating the Act and why the SC’s judgment sets a bad precedent. Analyzing Supreme Courts judgment holding ‘motive’ as an essential element in violating SEBI Act 1992 The brief facts of this case were as follows Mr. Abhijit Rajan was the chairman and managing director of Gammon Infrastructure Projects Limited  GIPL.  and another company Simplex Infrastructure Limited   SIL were awarded separate contracts by the National Highways Authority of India NHAI. However,in 2013, the Board of GIPL passed a resolution authorizing the termination of contracts. The information was communicated to the stock exchange 21 days later. During that period, Mr. Rajan had already sold his shares which became the subject matter of an investigation of insider trading shares by SEBI. The Securities regulator held Mr. Rajan liable for the violation of SEBI(PIT)Regulations, 1992, On appeal, the Securities Appellate Tribunal (Hereinafter as “SAT”) overturned the order of SEBI holding Mr. Rajan not guilty. The SAT order was now appealed before the SC by the SEBI. Two issues arose before the SC, one of which was Does the Sale of Equity Shares by Mr. Rajan, under the compelling circumstances amounts to insider trading? There is no requirement under the SEBI (PIT) Regulations,1992, for SEBI to prove the motive of the insider, only an essential requirement of possession of unpublished price-sensitive information (UPSI) on part of the insider is required to be established by SEBI to prove his liability. Mr. Rajan advanced his arguments by contending that the sale of shares was occasioned by the compelling need to save the bankruptcy of the parent company of GIPL and utilize the proceeds of the share sale towards it rather than making unlawful gains. He further advanced that he had no motive to use the UPSI to defraud the securities market. The SC in its turn went beyond the SEBI Regulations by applying a profit motive test.The Supreme Court observed that Mr. Rajan’s actions were contrary to the arithmetic movement of the Securities market, had the UPSI been disclosed. Based on this analysis, the SC concluded that Mr. Rajan’s actions did not originate from unlawful motives, but from a pressing need to prevent the parent company of GIPL from going into bankruptcy. In view of the Court, the result that is profit/loss from the resulting transaction may not provide an escape route to the insider, but one cannot ignore human conduct. The determining factor is whether the insider has the necessary motive to make unlawful gains and manipulate the securities market. However, one may observe that in holding ‘Motive’ as an essential requirement,both the SC and SAT have deviated from their past rulings. In Chairman, SEBI v Shriram Mutual Fund the SC held that unless the language of the statute otherwise indicates, it is unnecessary to ascertain whether the violation is intentional or not. A similar viewpoint was shared by SAT with SEBI in Hindustan Lever Ltd v SEBI. The Rationale of the Courts in adopting the Possession Test The fundamental provision governing insider trading in the U.S. is SEC Rule 10b-5, etched in the light of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 1934. This Section prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of any security. However, different Circuits have adopted different tests in determining the liability of the insider based on different rationales which are analyzed below. The first case that extensively dealt with this issue was United States v Teicher  in which a lawyer leaked the inside information to the defendant. The defendants argued that he had other reasons to trade such as his fundamental research about the value of the stock. His contention that there could only be a violation when trading was casually connected with the information established by the SEC was rejected by the Second Circuit, which upheld his conviction. Teicher case, therefore, stands for a Pro-Government approach, where a trader is judged for the worst reasons to trade and the reasons for trade are rejected.  The Second Circuit observed that it’s difficult to assume in light of human nature, that the UPSI would not have influenced the behavior of the insider and “Unlike a loaded weapon, ready to use but not used, material information cannot lay idle in the human brain and the Use Standard pose difficulties for the SEC in requiring factual inquires in the state of mind.” Motive Test: A Safe Harbour for the Insiders? The supporters of the Use test primarily argue that adopting the possession test to determine liability would encompass in its punishable net the innocent trader who did not use the UPSI. The innocent trader is no better than the uninformed trader because he did not use that information and no unfair disadvantage accures to the uninformed trader. The Ninth Circuit in United States Vs Smith took this view, in that Smith argued that the jury must prove that there is a causal connection between the information and trade to convict him. The Ninth Circuit accepted his arguments and acquitted him. The burden of proof shifts from the defendant to the SEC. Thus, the Ninth Circuit comes to a very stronger conclusion that if the insider does not use the information, there cannot be any inference of his motive to defraud the market. Why the Possession of

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Asset Reconstruction Companies as Resolution co-applicant – Interplay of SARFAESI and Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code

[By Aritra Mitra] The author is a student at National Law University, Odisha.   Introduction In the recent judgment of Puissant Towers India (P.) Ltd. v. Neueon Towers Ltd., the Chennai bench of the NCLAT overturned the order of the Adjudicating Authority and held that ARCs (hereinafter “Asset Reconstruction Companies”)  can act as Resolution Co-Applicant in an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) resolution process, even without the permission of RBI. It observed that the Adjudicating Authority ought not to have placed reliance on Section 10(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as Section 238 of the IBC would prevail over the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, if there was any inconsistency with any provisions of the IBC. But the conundrum arises because ARCs are regulated under the SARFAESI Act and ARCs intending to perform any activity other than securitisation, reconstruction, and statutorily allowed functions, prior approval of the RBI is a must. Hence, even though there have been judicial precedents that state that IBC will override other conflicting other acts, but permitting ARCs to act as Resolution co-applicant without RBI approval creates issues, which the NCLAT has failed to consider before passing the order, and which the author shall discuss  in the following paragraphs. ARC as Co-Resolution Applicant – Beyond objectives under SARFAESI ARCs were introduced with the objective of helping banks and financial institutions manage their stressed assets by reducing the non-performing assets on their books. Whereas IBC was introduced to perform the function of reorganisation and resolution of insolvent entities. Since both IBC and SARFAESI perform a similar objective of reconstruction of bad loans, there are chances of inconsistencies and overlaps. The petitioners relied upon ARCIL v. Viceroy Hotels Limited, Manish Kumar v. Union of India, and the Delhi HC judgment in UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Union of India, where it was clearly held that ARCs have to take RBI approval. But the appellate authority completely rejected the submissions of the appellants. But by passing such judgment it failed to discuss certain points which should have been considered before passing such a decision. The legal and regulatory design of ARCs is primarily focused on recovery of debt from the borrower and not on resolution of the borrower’s insolvency. Under Section 2(1)(ba) of the SARFAESI Act, ARCs are set up solely for the purpose of asset reconstruction or securitisation, or both. Further restrictions have been provided in Section 10(1) in the form of business that ARCs are allowed to perform. There is no mention of resolution applicant. Furthermore, Section 10(2) of the SARFAESI restricts ARCs from performing any business without prior RBI approval. It clearly denotes the specific purpose of ARCs. Allowing ARCs to act as resolution applicant without RBI approval seems to go against the provisions of SARFAESI. Also, Section 12(2) lays out the RBI’s power to issue directions to ARCs. And the implied meaning of those directions cannot go beyond the business provided in the SARFAESI Act. Section 15(4) of the SARFAESI Act states as following: “if any secured creditor jointly with other secured creditors or any asset reconstruction company or financial institution or any other assignee has converted part of its debt into shares of a borrower company and thereby acquired controlling interest in the borrower company, such secured creditors shall not be liable to restore the management of the business to such borrower.” Thus, there is no such obligation on the ARC to return the business to the borrower where it has already acquired a controlling interest in the entity. This goes against the very objective of the Code and should have been considered before allowing ARC to act as resolution applicant without RBI approval. Beyond Legislative Intent The idea of establishing ARC was recommended for the sole purpose of performing recovery of NPAs of banks. The Expert Committee for Recommending Changes in the Legal Framework concerning Banking System, and the BLRC Report, 2015 had clearly demarcated the functions of the ARC to reconstruction and securitisation. There was no mention of roles in insolvency resolution. It was clearly explained that the intent and objective of an ARC is to ‘realise the dues’ and reposition the borrower, and not ‘rescue’. The NCLAT also failed to consider the legislative intent behind establishing the ARCs. Allowing them to act as resolution professional in IBC would effectively go beyond the purpose of the ARCs. This may Furthermore, the resolution of stressed assets under IBC is expensive. the resolution applicant has to burn cash for an elongated timeline before being able to derive profits from these assets. However, ARCs are required to redeem SR’s within a period of maximum 8 years, meaning that ARCs cannot burn holes in their pocket and are required to recover their dues within a tight timeline. Accordingly, the luxury of a long gestation period is not available with ARCs making them unsuitable for resolution of stressed assets under IBC. Inefficiencies in RBI notification Now even though the NCLAT did not even discuss it, but RBI on 11th October, 2022 came out with a new notification ‘Review of Regulatory Framework for ARCs’, which permits ARC to act as Resolution Applicant under IBC. But even such permission is conditional upon fulfilment of certain grounds. The NCLAT did not even consider whether the ARC has a minimum Net Owned Fund of ₹1,000 crore and a committee, consisting mostly of independent directors, to make decisions about proposals for the submission of a resolution plan under the IBC. Since the RBI notification was not considered to grant permit to the ARC, the NCLAT made another error in granting permit without even considering whether the statutory requirements were fulfilled. Furthermore, the RBI notification also mandates that ARCs cannot exert significant control over the acquired insolvent entity and has to dilute such control within five years of the date of approval of the resolution plan. This ultimately means that a situation may arise where the ARC will look to sell the insolvent entity at a high price instead of reviving it. This

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Omission of Interim Moratorium from CIRP : A Dark Cloud Looming over Indian Insolvency Regime

[By Mohak Agarwal & Hemang Mankar] The authors are students at National Law University, Jodhpur.   GoFirst Insolvency: A tug of war with the lessors The recent case of GoFirst Airlines’ Insolvency has highlighted certain significant issues in the Indian Insolvency law regime. The tug of war between the airline and the lessors commenced on May 2, 2023, when GoFirst filed for voluntary insolvency proceedings under Section 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code [“Code”]. As soon as the insolvency application was filed, certain aircraft lessors terminated the lease agreement in order to seek repossession of the leased aircrafts. Subsequently, on May 5, the lessors invoked the Irrevocable Deregistration and Export Request Authorization [“IDERA”] and applied to Directorate General of Civil Aviation [“DGCA”] for deregistration and repossession of the leased aircrafts. IDERA confers an exclusive right on the lessors to effect deregistration of the aircraft and its export from India. It is a part of the Cape Town Convention [“CTC”], to which India is a signatory. The entire process has to be completed within 5 working days. However, before the elapse of 5 working days, the Adjudicating Authority [“AA”], on May 10, admitted the application and declared a moratorium under Section 14 of the Code. This led to a situation wherein though the lease agreement was terminated before the declaration of moratorium, the possession of the planes remained with GoFirst since the deregistration process could not be completed. The question of whether the possession of the leased planes would rest with the Corporate Debtor [“CD”] or with the lessors is still a debatable proposition and largely depends on the interpretation of Section 14(1)(d) of the Code that prohibits the recovery of property by the lessor which is in the possession of the CD. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that had the AA been late even by a couple of days, the lessors would have succeeded in securing repossession of the aircrafts and would have severely impacted the revival prospects of GoFirst. This threat has been averted, at least for now. However, this incident raises serious concerns over the present Insolvency regime and the possibility of the creditors rushing to secure their assets in the period between the date of filing and the date of admission, thus potentially trapping the CD in an irrecoverable state. Absence of Interim Moratorium: An Achilles Heel? The absence of an Interim Moratorium in the Indian insolvency regime raises significant concerns and poses a troubling scenario akin to an impending storm that threatens to disrupt the insolvency process of distressed companies. Although the Code stipulates that the AA should admit a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process [“CIRP”] application within 14 days of its filing (Section 7(4), 9(5), and 10(4) of the Code), the pre-admission stage is often plagued by substantial delays. According to the 2021 IBBI Survey on CIRP Timelines, the AA took an average of 133 days to make a decision from the filing date of a CIRP application. This protracted delay is troubling as it incentivizes syphoning off assets by promoters and/or encourages creditors to rush and enforce their debts, undermining the collective and value-maximising insolvency resolution process envisioned by the Code. In cases such as NUI Pulp and Paper Industries, and F.M. Hammerle Textiles, the Appellate Tribunal granted an interim moratorium when there was a reasonable apprehension of asset misappropriation. This underscores the pressing need for the incorporation of an interim moratorium into the Code through an amendment. Such an amendment is crucial to prevent a scenario where a distressed company’s assets are syphoned off even before the commencement of a moratorium, which would ultimately defeat the fundamental objectives of the Code. Therefore, it is imperative to address this gap in the Indian insolvency regime promptly to safeguard the integrity and effectiveness of the insolvency resolution process. Fixing the loophole: A global perspective The GoFirst case has highlighted a prominent issue in the Indian Insolvency regime that warrants attention. If the leading foreign jurisdictions are perused, majority of them provide for an interim moratorium at the time of filing the insolvency application. For instance, in Singapore, Section 64(14) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 [“IRDA”] imposes an automatic 30-day moratorium as soon as an application for Judicial Management is filed. Within these 30 days, the Court schedules a first hearing in order to review the status of the moratorium. Even before the passing of IRDA, Section 227C of the Companies Act, Singapore provided for a moratorium beginning from the date of filing of the application. In the UK, Section 44(1) of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act, 1986 provides for an interim moratorium from the time of making the administration application till the time a decision is made with regards to the appointment of an administrator. Similarly, in the USA, Section 362 of the US Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic moratorium upon the filing of a Chapter 11 petition. The purpose behind these provisions is twofold: (i) to prevent individual creditors from taking action against the CD and hampering its prospects of revival; (ii) to prevent the CD’s management from siphoning off its assets. Thus, the existence of an interim moratorium ensures that none of the stakeholders maliciously work towards securing their own welfare and protects their collective well-being by keeping the restructuring and revival prospects of the CD alive. These regimes have also taken the interests of creditors into consideration. This is important because during the pre-admission stage, the control is still vested in the CD’s erstwhile management which creates an exorbitant room for misuse. In the USA, the automatic moratorium could be lifted upon the application by secured creditors for appropriate cause, including the case wherein the debtor company has not ‘adequately protected’ the property interests of the creditor during the moratorium period. Even in the UK, sufficient power has been granted to the court to lift the moratorium in order to check the misuse. The Saga of Interim Moratorium: Tracing the history Let’s look back at the

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GoFirst’s Insolvency Enigma: Untangling Complex Issues and Examining Future Ramifications

[By Biprojeet Talapatra] The author is a student of Campus Law Centre, University of Delhi.   Introduction Leasing-in of aircrafts by aviation businesses is extremely prevalent across the world, and according to projections, about half of the commercial aircrafts that fly the world’s skies are leased by the companies. Aviation companies enjoy considerable operational flexibility and financial advantages through aircraft leasing. In India, approximately 80% of the commercial fleet is obtained through leasing, a significantly higher percentage compared to the global average of 53%. According to a February 2021 report on ‘Aircraft leasing in India: Ready to take off,’ auditing major PwC said the size of the global aircraft leasing industry was estimated to be $290.07 billion in 2019. Aircraft lessors have seen their share in the total commercial fleet grow globally from 25 percent in 2000 to 48.9 percent in 2020. In light of this context, the recent decision of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) has triggered alarm signals among international lessors. In the case of SMBC Aviation Capital v. Interim Resolution Professional of Go Airlines (India), Abhilash Lal, the NCLAT rendered its verdict, affirming the National Company Law Tribunal’s (NCLT) decision to admit the application under Section 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (Code), granting defaulters the ability to initiate voluntary insolvency proceedings. As part of this ruling, the NCLT also imposed a moratorium, marking a critical turning point with far-reaching consequences for the aircraft leasing landscape in India. Background Go Airlines (India) Limited, which has since been rebranded as GoFirst, operated as a low-cost airline. However, the company faced significant financial challenges, resulting in defaults in payments to aircraft lessors, amounting to a staggering INR 2,660 crores. In response to the mounting financial strain, the corporate debtor (CD), GoFirst, opted to file for voluntary insolvency under Section 10 of the Code with the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). Operational creditors, representing the aircraft lessors, opposed the insolvency application, asserting that it was driven by fraudulent and malicious intent. Moreover, the creditors expressed concern over the absence of prior notice, depriving them of the opportunity to object to the application. The NCLT held that no specific law requires creditors to be notified when filing an application for voluntary insolvency. Furthermore, when ruling on the matter of opposing the application under Section 65 of the Code, which deals with fraudulent insolvency initiation, the NCLT found that the same may be dealt with once the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was initiated. As a result, the CD was subject to the moratorium established by Section 14 of the Code. In response to the lessors’ appeal, the appellate body NCLAT issued held that there is an established legal precedent and legislative provisions that the NCLT is obligated to allow the application if the NCLT is persuaded that there is a debt and default and if the Corporate Applicant has completed the conditions stipulated in Section 10(3). Before the application is approved, the Corporate Applicant is not required to issue notice to creditors and allow them to express their concerns with the NCLT. As a result, the NCLAT correctly affirmed the NCLT’s ruling. Exploring the Dynamics of Aircraft Leasing in the Context of Insolvency Aircraft leasing is characterized by a significant volume of cross-border transactions, necessitating the implementation of principles that safeguard the rights of lessors. The Cape Town Convention (CTC), officially titled the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, stands as a pivotal international agreement specifically focused on regulating aircraft leasing and related matters. Its provisions are designed to ensure the protection and interests of lessors in such transactions. Within the Aircraft Protocol of the Cape Town Convention (CTC), Article XI introduces essential provisions that offer creditors two viable options. Firstly, they may reclaim possession of the aircraft after the waiting period expires. Alternatively, the insolvency administrator can decide to either surrender the aircraft or continue utilizing it while fulfilling lease payments as per the existing lease agreement. Moreover, both the debtor and the administrator are obligated to uphold the equipment’s value. These measures have been established to ensure the protection of creditors’ rights without imposing any orders or actions that could hinder the creditors’ exercise of remedies. The two alternatives presented to creditors under Article XI enhance the flexibility and efficiency of dealing with leased aircraft during insolvency proceedings. This allows for a balanced approach that safeguards both creditors’ interests and the continued operation of aircraft assets. Analysis of the Verdict The moratorium was imposed, which is intended to protect the assets of the debtor and maintain the status quo while the insolvency proceedings are underway. The imposition of a moratorium implies that aircraft lessors are prohibited from repossessing the leased aircraft for a minimum period of six months, which may potentially extend further. Unfortunately, such delays in resolving debt-ridden companies can lead to a depreciation in the value of the aircraft. Moreover, during this period, the aircraft will remain grounded and unused, preventing them from being leased to more financially robust airlines. This delay in resolution has a well-established impact on diminishing the value of the corporate debtor’s (CD) assets and obstructing successful resolution efforts. Additionally, creditors, aside from the lessors, may also seize the aircraft to recover their outstanding dues. In the case of Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Mr. Amit Gupta & Ors., the Supreme Court has established a significant precedent. The court ruled that terminating a contract solely due to a company entering insolvency proceedings, which could potentially lead to the demise of the corporate debtor, should not be allowed. It emphasized that such terminations must be prohibited to safeguard the interests of the corporate debtor during insolvency. It is important to note a distinguishing aspect in the current case where lease agreements were terminated before the initiation of the CIRP against the Corporate Applicant. These terminations were made in anticipation of the probable initiation of insolvency proceedings and the subsequent enforcement of the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency

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Taxation of Cryptocurrencies as Rewards from Online Gaming

[By Tanya Verma] The author is a student of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University.   INTRODUCTION In the Budget 2022, the Finance Minister introduced a provision to impose income tax at a rate of 30% on profits obtained from the transfer of virtual digital assets (VDAs), although a clear provision still lacks, an attempt to shed clarity on VDAs and their exchange has been made. To that, this piece provides an in-depth analysis of the tax implications surrounding direct and indirect taxation, specifically focusing on the complexities involved in determining the taxable nature of winnings, including digital assets such as bitcoins and tokens, that are received as rewards from online games. Further, the article explores legal literature surrounding the skill-chance dichotomy inherent in online gaming and contributes to the existing discourse around technology driven transactions as rewards. VDAs UNDER INCOME TAX ACT Previously, income earned from cryptocurrencies was taxable based on the nature of the activity. Individuals involved in cryptocurrency investment were taxed under Income from Capital Gains or Income from Other Sources, as per IRS provisions. On the other hand, individuals engaged in cryptocurrency trading were taxed under Income from Business/Profession. However, this classification changed with the introduction of the Finance Bill, 2022.The author believes, considering the unique characteristics of online gaming in India and the necessity for specific regulations regarding taxation, the government has taken steps to address this, however a clear framework still lacks. In terms of income tax, if an individual sells bitcoins received as gaming rewards, the resulting gains would be taxable. The tax treatment of these gains can vary depending on the intent of the individual, whether they classify the gains as business income or capital gains. Previously, there was no dedicated provision for the taxation of online gaming. Instead, Section 194B of the Income Tax Act (ITA) was applied, which dealt with TDS deduction by person who is “responsible for paying to any person any income by way of winnings from any lottery or crossword puzzle or card game and other game of any sort in an amount exceeding ten thousand rupees.” Additionally, Section 194BB covered TDS deduction for horse racing and wagering. Furthermore, Section 115BB of the Act imposed a 30% tax rate on winnings. Though these provisions existed, it failed to provide an exact framework involving technology driven transactions or a settled position of earnings from games, be it that of skill or of chance. The Finance Bill 2023 introduces two new sections under ITA to regulate winnings from online gaming: Section 115BBJ: This section states that net winnings from online games will be subject to a 30% tax rate, effective from April 1, 2023. Section 194BA: This section mandates the deduction of tax at source at a rate of 30% on winnings from online games, effective from July 1, 2023. Together, these provisions signify the government’s intent to establish a comprehensive framework for taxing and regulating winnings from online gaming. The introduction of specific tax rates and the requirement of tax deduction at source aim to facilitate better monitoring, compliance, and revenue generation in the evolving landscape of online gaming, primarily under direct taxation provisions. VDAs UNDER GOODS AND SERVICES TAX (GST) GST Act lays no specific definition for cryptocurrencies or digital assets, new provisions provide that VDAs cannot be classified as money or securities and are considered as goods for GST purposes. Additionally, the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) has opined that cryptocurrencies are not treated as currency but rather as goods or services, which is important to note as currency is not taxable under the same, while goods and services are subject to taxation under different slabs. Crypto-related activities, including mining, exchange services, wallet services, payment processing, barter systems, and other transactions, require classification as either goods or services to determine the appropriate treatment. However, for determination of tax rates, there is no specific Harmonized System of Nomenclature (HSN) code for digital assets. However, HSN code 960899, which pertains to other miscellaneous articles, is often used with an applicable GST rate of 18%, the highest in that category. To understand how this is implemented, it is important to delve into the skill versus chance discourse. In a significant development last year, the Online Gaming Industry faced a major upheaval when the Department issued a Show Cause Notice to Gameskraft, demanding an extraordinary sum of Rs. 21,000 crores taxing as Goods at a rate of 28%, however, the Karnataka High Court delivered a landmark judgment addressing the concerns related to the key questions in the GST-related litigation for the Online Gaming Industry are: Skill-based or chance-based: Are the games considered skill-based or games of chance (betting/gambling)? Taxable amount: Should GST be levied on the full amount pooled by players or only on the platform fee charged by Online Gaming Platforms? Addressing the first prong, the Supreme Court established that competitions requiring a significant degree of skill are not considered gambling. If a game is primarily based on skill, even if it involves an element of chance, it is classified as a game of ‘mere skill.’ The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment and determined that Dream11’s fantasy sports predominantly rely on users’ superior knowledge, judgment, and attention, making it a game of skill rather than chance. Similarly, the Bombay High Court analysed Dream11’s Fantasy Games and concluded that they do not involve betting or gambling since the outcome is not dependent on the real-world performance of any particular team on a given day. Rajasthan High Court reached a similar conclusion and dismissed a Public Interest Litigation, stating that the issue of treating the game ‘Dream11’ as involving betting or gambling has already been settled. As for the second limb, the target of taxation, in the context of GST, can vary depending on the specific circumstances and regulations of a particular jurisdiction. However, in general, both players and the platform can be subject to GST. Players may be liable to pay GST on

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Project Wise Insolvency under IBC: Analysing SC’s Decision in Supertech Ltd.

[By Yash Arjariya] The author is a student at Hidayatullah National Law University.   Introduction In a series of cases like Chitra Sharma v. Union of India, Bikram Chatterji v. Union of India, etc., the Supreme Court (“SC”) has been tasked with adjudicating the claims and rights of house owners in the real estate sector as against the processes of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC”). The adjudications have been favourable to the house owners, with their rights elevated to a safer pedestal, providing representation of their interests in the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”) formed for the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) of the Corporate Debtor. However, the introduction of the concept of reverse CIRP, now moulded in the form of project-wise CIRP after the decision of the SC in Indiabulls Assest Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Ram Kishore (“Supertech Ltd.”), has added a new nuance to the insolvency processes in the real estate sector. Reverse CIRP, as propounded by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) in Flat Buyers Association Winter Hills-77 v. Umang realtech Private Limited (“Umang Realtech”), accords an opportunity to the promoter of a real estate entity to revive the entity and act as lender or financial creditor by fusion of finances. The SC in Supertech Ltd. has furthered the reverse CIRP as a project-wise CIRP, i.e., there is fundamental participation of the promoter in the CIRP, but such a CIRP does not operate over all the projects of the corporate debtor but only a specific project. This first part of this article identifies the basis of the judgement given in Supertech Ltd. and then goes on to comment on the utility of such a process in insolvency in the real estate sector. Furthermore, the legality of reverse CIRP is then tested on the statutory principles laid out by the IBC. This piece then concludes as a critical note on the processes of reverse CIRP and project-wise CIRP while remaining speculative about the future jurisprudence on this issue. Factual Underpinnings in the Insolvency Regime: The Vidarbha Effect? The recent judgement of the SC in Supertech Ltd., upholding the NCLAT’s rationale, has nuanced the reverse corporate insolvency resolution process, in effect turning the corporate insolvency resolution process into a project-wise insolvency process. The constitution of the committee of creditors was restricted only to a single project of the corporate debtor, precluding any impact on the several ongoing projects of the real estate entity. It may be argued that the concept of project-wise insolvency is alien to the IBC; however, the court fortified the tenability of the scheme by balancing convenience and practical viability. Visualising a contrary landscape, the court opined that allowing the CIRP against the corporate debtor as a whole will compromise and prejudice other ongoing projects of the debtor, and more importantly, greater inconvenience would be weighed upon the homebuyers as the efforts of the debtor to ensure continuous flow of funds into the project through personal undertaking would cease. This creative culmination of practical utility and viability into a new beginning of project-wise insolvency schemes in the Indian Insolvency landscape can be said to be a corollary effect of the Vidarbha Industries v. Axis Bank Limited (“Vidarbha’) judgement. Though the judgement related to the discretionary power of the adjudicating authority to admit applications by financial creditors under Sec. 7 of the IBC, it necessarily opened a new epoch of factual underpinnings in the Indian insolvency landscape. The judgement vacated enough room as an example for the courts to mould the insolvency process to ensure that parties are not prejudiced if the factual matrix warrants otherwise. The SC in Vidarbha fathomed the factors of feasibility of initiation of CIRP,  financial health of the stakeholders, viability of the corporate debtor, etc. with respect to CIRP. Much akin to the same understanding, the SC in its recent judgement devised a new scheme, not contemplated by the IBC but on account of facts warranting the same. The test of circumstances: Utility of Reverse CIRP The NCLAT, in its ruling in Umang Realtech, appropriately acknowledged that homebuyers, in contrast to other financial creditors, lack the commercial acumen to make informed judgments about which resolution plan would be most advantageous to them. The Reverse CIRP effectively addresses this concern by maintaining the existing management structure of the company while guaranteeing that the promoter mobilizes financial resources to successfully complete the project. Even the SC in Supertech Ltd. explained that reverse CIRP does not create any additional rights in favour of ex-management. Reverse CIRP involves oversight by the Insolvency Resolution Professional (“IRP”) coupled with efforts made for the infusion of funds with the active assistance of the ex-management, as in Supertech Ltd. Hence, the reverse CIRP offers an opportunity for real estate company promoters to revive a project without automatically removing them from the operational aspects of the company. Moreover, the project-focused approach ensures that only the assets associated with that particular project are brought into resolution, thereby preventing any undue burden on the company and averting potential uncertainties surrounding other projects. Further, the Reverse CIRP process, or project-wise CIRP, propounded by the SC is one that is shaped by the facts of the case. As a result, it cannot be considered an ideal model for all other instances of real estate insolvency. The decision of whether or not to employ the Reverse CIRP will hinge on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. The Reverse CIRP can be likened to a trial-like resolution process. Even in Supertech Ltd., the NCLAT in the impugned order was experimental, suggesting that project-wise resolution may be started as a test to find out the success of such resolution. Thus, as a logical conclusion, on failure of resolution by the Reverse CIRP, the NCLAT would proceed with the normal CIRP process. Testing Waters: The Legality of Reverse CIRP Section 29A of the IBC bars the promoter of the entity (the corporate debtor) from being the resolution applicant. The purport of this provision is to forbid the

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