Contemporary Issues

CCI’s investigation into BookMyShow – Another Call for Tighter Ex-Ante Regulations?

[By Ankita Raghunath] The author is a student at the Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Recently, an inquiry has been directed to BookMyShow under section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 (referred to as “Act”) on the grounds that BookMyShow has entered into anti-competitive agreements with multiplexes and theatres under the provisions of section 3 read with section 4 of the Act which deals with abuse of dominant position. Background of the CCI Order According to Showtyme, the informant in the present case, theatres are unwilling to associate with other online movie ticketing portals due to monetary incentives being provided to them by BookMyShow on zero interest. This is despite the fact that Showtyme charges significantly lower convenience fees in comparison to BookMyShow. Moreover, BookMyShow has engaged in refusal to deal by signing exclusive contracts with these theatres that act as barriers for any new competitors to enter the market. Considering BookMyShow’s dominant position in the market, these agreements effectively allow it to control the market and dictate unfair terms with the business users. BookMyShow, in reply, stated that no monetary incentives were provided to the business. Instead, it was claimed that BookMyShow offers security deposits to adjust ticket prices and revenue share of the theatres. BookMyShow also denied that they have any significant market share and asserted that exclusive agreements are a necessity as BookMyShow is a relatively new entrant to the market. The CCI rejected BookMyShow’s arguments and found that there is a prima facie case of abuse of dominance under section 4 by BookMyShow in its agreements with business users. The Commission found that the terms of the agreements between BookMyShow and the theatres prima facie have the potential to deny market access to competitors as well as potential entrants which can make it anti-competitive under Section 19 (3) of the Competition Act, 2002. The Commission is of the view that the exclusive agreements offered by BookMyShow can restrict the freedom of theatres and multiplexes to contract with competitors of BookMyShow.This limits the consumers’ choices as well. On establishing the existence of a prima facie case, the CCI directed the DG to commence an investigation under Section 26(1) of the Act. Analysis of the case BookMyShow’s capability to induce businesses’ to enter into exclusive contracts with them and adhere to unfair contractual terms, in itself, shows the position of dominance that is enjoyed by the enterprise in the market. This is the main area of concern in the present case. In the e-commerce industry, exclusive contracts can either be agreements where a product is sold exclusively on a single platform or only a single brand is listed in a particular product category. They can drive up the cost of competitors in acquiring business users on their platforms. The CCI in its market study on e-commerce, however, emphasizes that exclusive agreements can generate efficiencies and improve inter-brand competition. Hence, they must be studied on a case-by-case basis. Especially in e-commerce, the number of users already connected to a platform positively affects the value of a network connection for a user. This is otherwise known as network effects. Hence, businesses tend to become dependent on platforms with a large user base like BookMyShow as they significantly widen their access to the market and their potential for growth. The platform, hence, has a higher bargaining power which allows it to set unfair contract terms for businesses and unilaterally revise contract terms. The Commission takes notice of such unfair contracts under section 4 of the Act if the contracting party is a dominant enterprise in the relevant market. In the BookMyShow’s case, there is a need to analyze it from multiple perspectives. Competitors such as the informant have no option of even getting businesses to consider their platform in light of the exclusive agreements. Despite the unreasonable terms in the agreement, from the businesses’ perspective, terminating their exclusive contracts with BookMyShow would cost them more. Notwithstanding the considerable additional cost paid to terminate the contract, they will also not receive the same level of visibility on any other platform. Finally, BookMyShow imposes significantly high convenience fees on their customers, who are also limited in their options. CCI’s Recent Trends in relation to e-commerce The CCI, in connection with P2B contracts in its market study on e-commerce in India, mentions how exclusive contracts in e-commerce raise alarm when they are used to foreclose competition to rivals or impede entry. The market study, however, does not impose any regulations and only makes recommendations. It is left up to the platforms to decide what must be the basic contract terms, penalties imposed for breach, conflict resolution process, etc. The existing jurisprudence in relation to P2B contracts in e-commerce is also lacking. Recently, a few cases involving major e-commerce players have been looked into by the CCI. In January 2020, CCI ordered an investigation into Amazon and Flipkart for preferential listing and deep discounting as well as exclusive agreements. This can affect small sellers on these websites who struggle to gain visibility as well as offline retailers who cannot access the product from anywhere, but the platform. The DG is currently in the process of investigating whether these practices are exclusionary and constitute an AAEC in the market. Following that, in 2021, the CCI touched on the issue of unfair P2B contract terms. The CCI ordered interim relief in favour of two hotel chains that were delisted on MakeMyTrip (MMT) pursuant to an agreement between OYO and MMT. CCI held that there are limits to contractual freedom if it leads to anti-competitive outcomes. Moreover, the hotel chains did not breach any contractual obligations to merit delisting. The CCI found that the agreement between OYO and MMT was exclusionary and created barriers to entry in the market. As recently as 2022, the CCI explored exclusive agreements in conjunction with platform neutrality in the case of Swiggy-Zomato. In addition to low commissions and minimum business guarantees, Zomato offers exclusivity to restaurant partners. The CCI decided it was

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Licensing Fee for Immovable Property: The Expanding Scope of Operational Debt

[By KV Kailash Ramanathan] The author is a student at the National University of Advanced Legal Studies (NUALS), Kochi. Recently, the NCLAT in Jaipur Trade Expocentre Pvt Ltd vs M/s Metro Jet Airways examined the issue of whether claims of license fee for the use of immovable property to conduct business, falls within the ambit of ‘operational debt’ under S5(21) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘code’). In doing so, the Appellate Tribunal also had to rule on the legal correctness of earlier decisions in M Ravindranath Reddy, and Promila Taneja which answered the question in the negative. The five-judge bench of the NCLAT, upon reference to it from a smaller bench, decided that the claim of such licence fee arising from a licence agreement for immovable properties would come within the definition of operational debt, thereby overruling earlier judgments to the contrary. The verdict paves the way for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (hereinafter referred to as ‘CIRP’) under section 9 by operational creditors for default of licence fee or rent on immovable properties used for a business purpose. In this piece, the author seeks to analyse the judgment by discussing the key issues dealt with and possible legislative action that can follow as a result. Factual Matrix The Appellant Jaipur Trade Expocentre Private Ltd, had entered into a licensing agreement with the respondent M/s Metro Jet Airways Private Ltd. Under the agreement, the Appellant licensor had granted the licence of a building with requisite fittings and fixtures to the respondent licensee for the purpose of running an educational establishment. The original agreement was to run for five years and the amount fixed as consideration was Rs. 4,00,000 per month lump sum plus government consideration. Initially, a part payment was made by Metro Jet Airways towards the licence fee. The contract however started running into rough weather when the corporate debtor subsequently issued two cheques on different dates in discharge of the outstanding dues, and both were dishonoured. In response to such default, the creditor Jaipur Trade Expocentre sent a demand notice under Section 8 of the Code seeking payment from Metro Jet Airways for the total sum due plus taxes and the interest thereon. No reply was received. Later civil proceedings were instituted by the corporate debtor. As a result of these developments, the creditor filed an application for initiation of CIRP under Section 9 of the Code. The corporate debtor disputed the debt. After perusing submissions from both parties, the adjudicating authority dismissed the application, holding that the claim arising out of the grant of license for the use of immovable property does not fall under the category of goods or services. Thus, the amount claimed in the Section 9 Application was held to not be an unpaid operational debt and therefore, the former was not allowed. Aggrieved by the above order, the creditor preferred an appeal and the matter was referred to a larger bench whose judgment is dealt with in this piece. Issues The crux of the issue is whether a claim of licence fee or rent over an immovable property would qualify as an ‘operational debt’ under S 5 (21) of the code. More specifically whether such an agreement can be considered under the provision of a ‘service’ as specified in the section. Ruling and Analysis Under Section 5(21) of the Code ‘operational debt’ has been defined as “a claim in respect of the provision of goods or services including employment or a debt in respect of the [payment] of dues arising under any law for the time being in force and payable to the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority.” From the aforementioned definition, it is clear that only claims in respect of goods and services can be considered as operational debt. The Code is silent on the definition of services. Therefore, the onus was on the judiciary to interpret the term with due consideration to precedents, reports, and principles of statutory interpretation. The following are the noteworthy considerations from the judgments including but not limited to arguments advanced by the NCLAT for arriving at such a decision. Agreement Providing for Corporate Debtor to bear GST The agreement between the parties explicitly stated that the payments of GST would have to be borne by the corporate debtor. GST is a tax contemplated only on goods and services. Thus, it was evident from the agreement that the corporate debtor bearing the GST was being taxed for services. This was clear by looking at the definition of goods under Section 2(52) of the Goods and Services Tax Act which reads “goods” means “every kind of movable property other than money and securities but includes actionable claim, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before supply or under a contract of supply”. As per such definition, the agreement cannot be considered as being for goods under the GST Act making it conclusive that the levy was for a service. Therefore, the contention of the Corporate Debtor that the agreement by nature does not provide for service was dismissed. Definitions of Service presented under Other Statutes In Anup Sushil Dubey v. National Agriculture Co-operative Marketing Federation of India ltd. and Anr. , one of the questions the Tribunal dealt with was whether dues, if any, arising from the Leave and License agreement can be construed as an ‘Operational Debt’? Reliance was placed on Schedule II of the CGST Act 2017 which classifies lease of building as a service, and Section 2 (42) of the Consumer Protection Act, under which an inclusive definition of ‘service’ has been made out to include the provision of facilities connected to a host of commercial activities. The Tribunal held that subject lease rentals arising out of use and occupation of a cold storage unit for Commercial Purpose is an ‘Operational Debt’ as envisaged under Section 5(21) of the Code. The stated principle has

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A Critique On CCI’s Discretion to Vitiate an Inquiry

[By Ashutosh Rajput] The author is a student at the Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. The Draft Competition Amendment Bill, 2020 (Draft Amendment) proposes the insertion of clause (2A) to Section 26 of the Competition Act, 2002 (Act). The proposed amendment reads “The Commission may not inquire into agreements referred to in section 3 or into conduct of an enterprise or group under section 4, if the same or substantially the same facts and issues raised in the information or reference from Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority has already been decided by the Commission in previous orders”. In a nutshell, this proposed amendment allows the Competition Commission of India (CCI/Commission) to do away with the inquiry into agreements pursuant to Section 19(3) of the Act and into the conduct of an enterprise or group pursuant to Section 19(4) of the Act, which talks about inquiry into certain agreement and dominant position of enterprise, respectively. The author argues that with the changing period, the market conditions also change. Therefore, it would not be prudent if, on the same or substantially same facts and issues, the Commission chooses not to inquire into the contravention. Commission’s power to inquire under the Act: A primer Pursuant to Section 19(1) of the Act, the Commission can inquire into any contravention relating to Section 3(1) or Section 4(1) of the Act either on its own motion or on receipt of any information or on a reference made to it by the Central or State Government. Further, Section 26 of the Act lays down the procedure for carrying out such an inquiry. While carrying out an inquiry into contravention of Section 3(1) of the Act, the Commission has to give due regard to the factors such as the creation of barriers to new entrants, foreclosure of competition, and so forth. Similarly, while carrying out such an inquiry for the contravention of Section 4(1), the market share, economic power, entry barriers, market structure, and size of the enterprise has to be taken into consideration. In addition, factors such as regulatory trade barriers, national procurement policies, and consumer preferences, end-use of the product will also have to be considered while delineating the relevant market. These all factors are bound to change with the changing circumstances. It is interesting to note that the proposed amendment does not in toto vitiate the Commission’s power to vacate the inquiry, rather discretion has been imposed on the Commission in accordance with the term ‘may’ appearing in Section 26(2A) of the Draft Amendment. However, Commission cannot vitiate inquiry even at its discretion if the case is being inquired suo moto which is nonetheless, a step in the right direction. Changing market dynamics in competition law analysis The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in its research paper titled “Using Market Studies to Tackle Emerging Competition Issues” has rightly observed that the market structure changes due to public policy interventions, technological innovations and so forth. Moreover, the change in market circumstances can very well be ascertained from the case of Indian National Shipowners’ Association (INSA) v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC). In this case, INSA levied allegations of abuse of dominant position against ONGC for unilaterally terminating the contract. The Director General (DG) noted that since there was a fall in crude price, the Opposite Party (OP) was justified in terminating the contract. The commission, by supporting DG’s report, noted that “It is unambiguously established by the evidence on record that the conduct of ONGC was driven solely in response to an exceptional change in market conditions.” The change in market dynamics can also be ascertained in circumstances where the same party is again being tried before the Commission. It would allow comparative analysis for the assessment of market dynamics. One such instance is the case of Amit Mittal v. DLF Limited and Another (DLF Case), wherein the Commission found DLF Limited, the opposite party, not to be dominant in the relevant market. The Commission took note of the fact that in Belaire Owner’s Association v. DLF Limited, the Commission had found DLF Limited to be dominant in the relevant market, however, due to the changing market dynamics the market structure has been changed. It further noted that the primary distinguishing factor is the period of assessment. In the present case, the allegation of abuse was booked in the year 2011-12 whereas in the previous case, such allegation was booked in the year 2006-2009. By considering the time period of contravention to be the essence of assessing market dynamics, the Commission concluded that DLF Limited is not dominant in the relevant market. Another such instance is the case of Mr. Ajit Mishra v. Supertech Limited, wherein there was a substantial increase in the construction price, which resulted in depriving the original allottees of the flats for claiming the allotments in the agreed price, rather they were made to pay more price than the agreed price. The Commission made out a case of abuse of dominant position against Supertech Limited by noting that the facts and circumstances of the case are more or less similar to the case of Shivangi Agrawal & Anr. v. Supertech Ltd. Noida. Interestingly, unlike the DLF Case, the contravention in the present case occurred in the same year. Hence, undisputedly this case supports the ratio decidendi laid down in the DLF Case that the time period of contravention is the essence of assessing market dynamics.  Furthermore, in Rajiv Kumar Chauhan v. M/s BPTP Ltd., the Commission by relying on the case of M/s BPTP Ltd & Ors., noted that since there is no change in circumstances, BPTP Ltd., the opposite party, cannot be said to be in a dominant position. This was again reiterated by the Commission in the case of Mr. Ravinder Pal Singh v. BPTP Ltd & Ors. A comparative reading of BPTP cases as mentioned above, illustrates that the contravention took place in the year 2009-10, which led the

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Reviewing Merger Control Regime and Analysing Competition in the Aviation Industry: Tata-Air India Case Study

[By Divya Khanwani and Suneel Kumar] The authors are students at the National Law School of India University, Bengaluru. Introduction On January 27, 2022, Talace acquired 100% equity share capital and sole control over the management and operations of Air India and AIXL, and 50% equity share capital and joint control over the management and operations of AISATS. The transaction meets the threshold for activating a requirement of notifying the CCI under s6(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 (‘The Act’) because two prerequisites are fulfilled. First, the notification (S.O. 988E), extended for 5 years on 16.03.2022, exempts any enterprise being acquired (target) having (i) assets less than INR 350 crore, or (ii) turnover less than INR 1000 crore, from notifying the CCI. The combined turnover of the target (Air India, AISATS and AIXL) far exceeds the required limits. Name of the Parties Assets (as of 31st March 2021) (INR crore) Turnover (for FY 2020-21) India (INR crore) Air India 63,317.23 8,224.19 AIXL 4,529.50 920.66 AISATS 213 730 Combined 68,059.73 9847.85   Therefore, the transaction cannot avail the benefit of the exemption. Second, if the transaction classifies as a combination under s5 of the Act, it needs to be notified to CCI under s6(2) of the Act. Name of the Parties Assets (as on 31st March 2021) (INR crore) Turnover (for FY 2020-21) India (INR crore) Talace 0.08 unavailable Tata Sons  102,969.01 9,460 Combined (Target) 68,059.73 9847.85 Combined 1,71,028.82 19,334.85 s5(a)(i)(A) In India, parties to jointly have  assets > 2000 INR crore Total assets =1,71,028.82 INR crore Condition fulfilled Effect: The transaction is a combination under s5(a)(i), and therefore, needs to be notified under s6(2) of the Act. s5(a)(i)(B) In India, parties to jointly have a turnover> 6000 INR crore Total turnover (India) = 19,334.85 INR crore Condition fulfilled   Consequently, the merger notification was filed by Talace on November 30, 2021,[i] which was approved by the CCI under s31(1) of the Act on December 20, 2021. This post argues that the acquisition of Air India by Tata Sons causes an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in the relevant market, and therefore, should not have been approved by CCI. Substantial Overlaps The transaction will result in significant overlaps in horizontal,[ii] and non-horizontal relevant markets. Vistara and AirAsia, subsidiaries of Tata Sons, operate in international and domestic passenger air transport on nine and ninety-one overlapping origin-destination routes respectively with the Target. After the fruition of the transaction, Vistara and AirAsia will also share business with the Target in international and domestic cargo services, charter flight services and ground and cargo handling services. With respect to vertical/complementary relationships, AISATS provides ground handling services to airlines at the Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Delhi, Thiruvananthapuram and Mangalore airports, while AirAsia India provides passenger air transport services in all these airports and Vistara provides passenger air transport services at all these airports except Mangalore airport. AISATS provides cargo handling services to airlines at the Bengaluru airport, while Vistara and AirAsia India provide passenger air transport services at the Bengaluru airport. Taj SATS and its wholly-owned subsidiary Taj Madras provide in-flight catering services to airlines in India, while Air India and AIXL provide passenger air transport services in India. Plummeting Competition in the Aviation Industry S20(4) lays down the factors, which the CCI shall have due regard while determining whether a combination would have an AAEC in the relevant market. This section seeks to analyse the Tata- Air India combination through the lens of the factors mentioned in s20(4) of the Act. Changing Market Composition in the domestic market In 2021, the domestic passenger air traffic market share for Air Asia and Vistara was 13.2% and for the Target was 12%. The total market share of Tata-Air India enterprise will be 25.2% [in reference to s20(4)(h)]. The combination along with the three major competitors [Indigo (54.8%), Spice Jet (10.5%) and Go Air (8.8%)] occupies more than 99% of the market share. The current composition indicates a highly concentrated market, which becomes more obvious in a comprehensive HHI analysis. HHI CALCULATION- DOMESTIC PASSENGER TRAFFIC- 2021 Market shares Square before merger Square after merger Acquirer (and its affiliates) (combined) 13.2 174.24 Target (combined) 12 144 Total Combined 25.2 635.04 Indigo 54.8 3003.04 3003.04 Spice Jet 10.5 110.25 110.25 Go Air 8.8 77.4 77.4 HHI (Total) 3,509.26 3,826.09   An HHI of 2500 or greater is indicative of highly concentrated market. In this market, even before acquisition, the HHI was of 3509, which implies very low competition. As a general rule, mergers or acquisitions that increase the HHI between 100- 200 points in highly concentrated markets raise antitrust concerns, as they are assumed to create barriers to entry for potential competitors [s20(4)(b)] and to increase the likelihood drive out the existing competitors [s20(4)(c)]. Hence, it goes without saying that this acquisition will exacerbate anti-competitiveness in the market and will drive the market towards a more oligopolistic structure. Explicating Ripple Effect The incident of Tata-Air India enterprise occupying a share of more than 25% in the domestic passenger traffic market, has consequences and ramifications beyond this market. A larger share enables the combination to exercise significant influence in other relevant markets. For instance, it enables Tata Sons to secure favourable ground handling and in-flight catering service contracts. Another relevant example is that the transaction will provide Tata Sons control over 22% share in the domestic cargo air transport market instead of the previous acquisition share of 13%. This will provide Tata Sons an upper-hand in the cargo handling services, thereby creating unfair hardships for existing enterprises providing similar services. Aggravating factors The dominance in market share will enable Tata Sons to acquire the benefits of economies of scale. However, the anti-competitive impact of the transaction does not stop at the effects of the increased market share. The peculiar features of the aviation industry enable the acquisition to be an extremely powerful tool for driving out potential competitors. Consequent to the transaction, Tata Sons will enjoy the benefits of ‘grandfathering rights’ in slot

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PVR-INOX merger: Necessitating CCI To Be Empowered to Review Non-Notifiable Mergers

[By Swetha Somu and Sanigdh Budhia] The authors are students at the Gujarat National Law University. Mergers and acquisitions that fall below a certain threshold are not required to be disclosed to the Competition Commission of India (CCI) for prior clearance under the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act). This exemption, granted by the Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), is based on certain de-minimis thresholds enshrined under Section 5 and Section 6 of the Act. Transactions in which the target’s assets are valued at less than INR 350 crore; or the target’s turnover is less than INR 1,000 crore (Small Target Exemption) are exempted from the CCI’s approval requirement. First introduced on 27 March 2017, the MCA extended the applicability of the Small Target Exemption for another five years, till 27 March 2027, through a notice dated 16 March 2022. Recently, PVR Limited (PVR) and INOX Leisure Limited (INOX) announced their intention to merge. Post the merger (PVR-INOX Merger), INOX shareholders will get shares of PVR at the approved share swap agreement as a result of the transaction. While existing PVR and INOX screens will retain their current branding (i.e., ‘PVR’ or ‘INOX,’ respectively), new cinemas that open after the merger will be labelled as ‘PVR-INOX Ltd.’ With a combined network of over 1,500 screens, i.e., nearly 50% of the total screens in the country, the PVR-INOX Merger is intended to bring together two of India’s top multiplex companies. Normally, a deal of this nature would have necessitated prior permission from the CCI. However, this merger comes at a critical time as COVID-19 has adversely impacted multiplex businesses across the country due to fierce competition from over-the-top media service or OTT platforms. According to the financial documents of the fiscal year ending 2020-21, PVR’s revenue was INR 280 crore and INOX’s revenue was INR 106 crore. However, the PVR-INOX Merger is exempt from seeking CCI’s mandatory approval given that their post-merger turnover falls below the Small Target Exemption requirement (i.e., being below INR 1000 crores), In view of this, this article analyses the potential negative consequences of CCI’s inability to review non-notifiable mergers that prima facie seem to be anticompetitive in nature. The article further delves into existing international jurisprudence on merger reviews of non-notifiable mergers.  The authors then acknowledge the differences in the objectives and legislations between different jurisdictions, thus, finally concluding by recommending changes to the Indian framework on competition law. An Anti-Competitive Post-Merger Scenario and The Consequences Of the CCI Being Unable To Review Horizontal Mergers The CCI’s inability to review the PVR-INOX Merger may have severe implications on the promotion and sustenance of competition in India’s multiplex market as mentioned under the Act’s primary objectives. This is due to the fact that CCI is not empowered to review transactions that are exempted. Since the proposed merger is estimated to have a combined market share of 42%, there is a high possibility of the creation of a dominant position in the multiplex market. Whilst under the Act, being the dominant entity in a market is not per se unlawful; however, the abuse of that dominant position is strictly regulated under Section 4 of the Act. In addition to this, all anti-competitive agreements with or without abuse of such a dominant position will be subject to regulation under Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 and Section 4 of the Act will become applicable only at the post-merger stage. One of the key issues with post-merger regulation is the costs incurred by the parties to the transaction. A merger involves a change in the organisational structure. Given In the present scenario, both PVR and INOX may very well have invested large amounts into ensuring the legal and financial aspects of the PVR-INOX Merger are kosher. Moreover, horizontal mergers such as the PVR-INOX Merger eliminate one main competitor in the market thus reducing the competitive pressure (to reduce service prices) amongst them and the remaining non-merging firms as well. Consequently, this might result in a unilateral price increase or a coordinated price increase in the market. In both scenarios, the customers stand to lose due to increased prices and a smaller number of substitutes in the market. These anticompetitive post-merger scenarios could be avoided if CCI, like in the EU, the US or the UK, was empowered to review and regulate non-notifiable mergers that raise concerns. Although there are provisions under Indian law to regulate anti-competitive practices which arise post-merger, the late regulation of false-negative mergers incurs heavy costs. These costs have a negative take on the merged entities, their customers, the economic market structure and the consequences arising from it. The Reawakened Article 22 Of the European Union Merger Regulation (EUMR): An Inspiration  Article 22 of the EUMR has been reinvigorated through a new guidance issued by the European Commission (EC), (EUMR Guidance). The guidance allows the EC to review mergers falling under the national merger threshold through referrals raised by the member states. The condition for a referral by a European Union member state (Member State) is that “the concentration must: (i) affect trade between the Member States; and (ii) threaten to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State or States making the request.” The EUMR Guidance is designed to encourage Member States to approach the EC for the review of such mergers which are proved prima facie to be anticompetitive. This was brought in the light of a rise in ‘killer acquisitions’. A ‘killer acquisition’ is the acquisition of a small, nascent company by a large established entity. It has the potential to hamper effective competition by reducing the number of competitors while growing its own market share through such acquisitions. The guidance was brought to address this gap in enforcement, as the turnover of a small entity falls under the prescribed national threshold. Similarly in the United States, Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914  provides for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or Department of Justice (DOJ) to prohibit

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Issues pertaining to Broadcasting in Indian Premier League – A Way Forward

[By Manvee] The author is a student at Chanakya National Law University, Patna. Introduction Recently Indian Premier League became the world’s 2nd richest league and the reason behind this was that BCCI saw the auction of IPL media rights for more than 48,000 crores for the year 2023-27 cycle. IPL since its inception has proved to be beneficial in monetary aspects for the BCCI as well as the Indian Economy and this was possible because of the selling of media rights, auctions of the teams, and selling of the IPL merchandise, Advertisements of different-different products in the IPL matches. We are untouched by the fact that how Internet penetration rate has seen a drastic increase in the last 5 years, especially during the times of pandemic when the world was under lockdown and everyone was binge-watching web series on their smartphones and smart TVs. During the Pandemic India saw a 60% increase in paid OTT subscribers and today in the year 2021 India has 70-80 million paid OTT subscribers. Hence, one should not be much surprised seeing the data that Viacom 18 purchased the digital rights for IPL for a hefty amount of Rs. 23,758 crores. In fact, for the cycle of 2018-22, Star India won the IPL media rights for a bid of Rs. 16,347 which comprised both Digital and TV rights, as OTT platforms got popular and people became much more aware of the OTT & Digital Platform, this time we saw an increase of 3 times in IPL media rights. It is evident from the data only that how popular OTT platforms have become during these days that the digital rights only got sold for Rs. 23,758 crores for the cycle 2023-27 whereas both TV & Digital rights for the cycle 2018-22 were sold for Rs. 16,347 Crores and this data was only for Indian Subcontinent whereas if we talk about the World Rights for TV & Digital then it got sold for a sum of Rs. 1,057 crores to Times Internet & Viacom 18 combined. Coming to the TV rights for the Indian Subcontinent it got sold for Rs. 23,575 crores to Disney-Star for the 2023-27 cycle. Since we have discussed the rights sold at such a large amount now, we need to look at the laws governing the broadcasting regime in IPL followed by the issues which are arising in this broadcasting regime and what lies ahead followed by how the issues arising can be resolved. Issues Arising in Broadcasting Segment of IPL As time evolved, we have seen how the Indian Sports Industry has turned from One Sport Industry to a multisport Industry. The industry started its commercialization with Cricket two decades back which today has extended its feet in other major segments like Kabaddi, Badminton, and Football leagues for commercial purposes. Whereas if we look into the commercialization of cricket then it has two sides to coin, if cricket is contributing monetarily heavily to the BCCI as well as the Indian Economy then it has a couple of issues arising sidewise with commercialization. Like in terms of broadcasting we can see several problems arising out and they are as follows: Monopolization of one broadcaster, Ambush marketing in the event by other broadcasters, the broadcaster in the dominant position could make the smaller broadcasters dependent on themselves either by Acquisitions or by the mergers as we saw in the case of Ten Sports where it was put to sell itself to Sony Pictures networks. And it is evident that Sony Pictures Network is one of the major broadcasters of the Indian Subcontinent and also the former broadcasting rights holder for IPL before the 2018 cycle. 1. Monopoly of Broadcasters One of the major issues with the broadcasting regime in IPL is the Monopoly of the Broadcasters over the media rights. Star India has enjoyed the monopoly of IPL media rights for more than half a decade. The issues which consumers usually face due to the monopoly of one broadcaster may be further sub-categorized into the following: More Advertisements Broadcasters who are in a dominant position earn handsome revenue from advertising longer commercial breaks in the telecast of matches and these breaks not only affect the telecast scenario but also affect the real-time sports were to suit the needs of the broadcasters they have to move on accordingly. Here the broadcaster is in a dominant position just because of its bargaining power. One of the examples of this could be in an IPL match where the commercial breaks get an expansion to spoil the experience of real-time viewers of the match who are watching the match in the stadium due to longer breaks between 2 overs to accommodate the higher number of advertisements for a longer duration. Excessive Pricing Sporting events are considered to be natural monopolies, one the broadcaster is able to eliminate the other key players of the market then it becomes the sole entity to supply the required event to the general public or the viewers at a large. Once the broadcaster is in a monopolization position then it may raise the subscription charges of the channels for the Cable & DTH operators as well as the OTT platforms and consequently any operator who wishes to telecast the particular sporting event, irrespective of the excessive pricing has to subscribe to that channel necessarily. Leveraging the Promotion of New Ventures or Startups The broadcasters in the dominant position may use the sports program as an aid for the promotion of startups or new ventures in the market by running their advertisements. The best example of the same could be during the TATA IPL 2022, three startups were promoted rigorously they were Byju’s – The Learning App, Dream 11 & Fogg Deodorants. Majorly these 3 brands saw the promotion across the season and these promotions have contributed a lot to their revenue generation as 2 of them turned unicorns recently. Dream 11 & Byju is getting promoted for the last 4-5 years constantly and

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Vallal Rck v. Siva Industries: Decision in the right direction?

[By Avik Sarkar] The author is a student at K.L.E. Society’s Law college, Bengaluru. Introduction In order to boost the investment regime in the country, the Government of India has introduced various enactments and amendments. Among them, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘the Code’) was one such enactment. It was introduced in order to bring the insolvency regime under one umbrella so that the investors could salvage their invested amount without much delay in case of any defaults. The code brought about a paradigm shift in the regime from the existing ‘debtor-in-possession’ to a ‘creditor-in -control’ model. However, the key highlights of this particular code were the fact that it had come with a promise of minimal judicial intervention. In its recent decision of Vallal Rck V M/s Siva Industries and Holdings Limited, the apex court of the country has reaffirmed its already crystallized position with regards to the sanctity of the Committee of creditors’ (‘CoC’) wisdom. The court in the present case held that NCLT and NCLAT cannot sit in appeals over the commercial wisdom of the CoC. Factual Matrix In the present matter, IDBI bank limited had filed a Section 7 application under the code for the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’) against Siva Industries (Corporate Debtor). And consequently, the application was admitted and the CIRP process was initiated.  During the resolution process, a bid of M/s Royal PartnersInvestment Fund Limited was submitted by the resolution professional. However, due to inadequacy in sufficient number of votes by the CoC, the plan could not be passed. Following this, the resolution professional filed for liquidation before the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) under section 33(1)(a) of the Code. It was during this time when the Vallal Rck (‘Promoter’) of Siva Industries filed an application under section 60(5) of the Code for the proposal of a one-time settlement plan (‘OTS’). After a series of discussions and meetings by the CoC, it was decided to accept the OTS offer of the promoter by a sweeping majority of 94.23%. Therefore, once the OTS deal was accepted, the resolution professional filed to the NCLT for withdrawal of CIRP under Section 12A of the Code. However, NCLT rejected the OTS deal based on the reasoning that it seemed more like a Business Restructuring Plan than a settlement plan. Aggrieved by the decision of the NCLT, an appeal was filed to the National Company Appellate Tribunal (‘NCLAT’) by the promoter. However, NCLAT dismissed the appeal. Consequently, miffed by the decision of NCLAT, the promoter further appealed to the Supreme Court of India. Apex Court Dictum Firstly, the court referred to Section 12A of the Code which allowed the withdrawal of insolvency application filed under Sections 7, 9 and 10, provided that, 90 percent of the CoC members through voting agree to withdraw the insolvency application. Further, on perusing regulation 30A of the Code, one would get a succinct idea of the procedure for filing a withdrawal application under section 12A of the Code. Therefore, in order to have a complete understanding of section 12A, it should always be read in juxtaposition with Section 30A Secondly, the court referred to paragraph 29 of the Insolvency Committee Report (March 2018) where it has been clearly  stated that there is nothing in the Code that allows withdrawing insolvency application post-admission. However, the report refers to the objective of the Code enshrined under the BLRC report which states that all stakeholders shall participate and assess the viability of the proposed plan in order to withdraw the insolvency application. Also, it must be ensured that the stakeholders are actively willing to restructure their liabilities. Thirdly, the court referred to Swiss Ribbon Private Ltd Vs Union Of India which upholds the validity of section 12A of the Code. Based on the above deliberation the court held that if 90 percent of the CoC members after due deliberations, “find that it will be in the interest of all the stake­holders to permit settlement and withdraw CIRP, in our view, the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority cannot sit in an appeal over the commercial wisdom of CoC.” Conclusion This particular judgment by the apex court has reaffirmed its already crystallized position that CoC’s wisdom cannot be meddled with and therefore NCLAT/NCLT cannot sit over appeals from it. This decision of the apex court is said to be in the right direction considering the fact that it is in line with the ‘least judicial interference’ principle. However, the author would like to posit a different view. In the recent past, there has been clamour concerning the conduct of the CoC. The author is of the view that giving such plenary power to the CoCs can have detrimental effects in the future which can affect the efficiency of the Code. Now, the latest report released by the Insolvency Bankruptcy Board of India (‘IBBI’) for the quarter of January to March has come up with harrowing revelations.  It has been found that the value of the assets that are with creditors against which they have granted loans to various entities are lesser than the liquidation value of the entities themselves. This means that during the insolvency process, the creditors will tend to opt for liquidation than passing a resolution plan as it would help them salvage the majority of their borrowings. Therefore, in such scenarios, if the CoC is granted plenary powers, the majority of insolvency proceedings would lead to liquidation which would be against the objective of the Code i.e., to revive a distressed entity from its current state. Further, in the past, there have been various instances where the conduct of the CoC has been highly contentious.  During the resolution process of Bhushan Steel Pvt Limited, the resolution professional had paid Rs 12 crore towards the fees of the legal counsel of the lender. However, as per a circular released by IBBI on 12.02.2018, the inclusion of legal fees has been clearly prohibited. It can be easily construed that

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Now or Never: Exigency to Remedy latent Cons under the (Cons)umer Protection Act

[By Subodh Asthana and Madhur Bhatt] The authors are students at Hidayatullah National Law University. The definition of a “Consumer” under section 2(7) of the Consumer Protection Act (“Consumer Act”) 2019 seeks to exclude any transaction consummated for “commercial purpose” with an exception afforded to the purchase of goods for self-employment. Conversely, Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Act 1986 after the Amendment Act of 2002 did provide an exception of Self Employment to any person engaging in buying goods and services. The authors in the first section of this blog would argue that such exclusion of services from the exception of self-employment in the Consumer Act 2019 is devoid of any reasonable classification by the Legislature. Furthermore, in the second section of this piece, the authors would critically analyse the recent judgment of the Supreme Court (“SC”) in Shrikant G. Mantri v. Punjab National Bank (“PNB Case”). Although the SC in this case did consider buying of goods and hiring of services at the same pedestal but fallaciously held the impugned transaction for the hiring of services between the Appellant and the Respondent as a Business to Business (“B2B”) transaction, thereby ignoring the established precedents on the exception of commercial purpose under the statutory provisions of the erstwhile act (Consumer Act 1986). Making a Case against Unreasonable Exclusion Although the SC in the PNB Case applied the wrong reasoning except for the observation of treating purchase of services and goods at the same pedestal. This exclusion in the Consumer Act 2019 is clearly in clear contravention of the 2002 Amendment. It is pertinent to note that through this amendment, the legislature widened the scope of the “self-employment” exception by including hiring of services as well. Thus, the exclusion of services from the self-employment exception in the Consumer Act 2019 is devoid of any reasonable classification particularly when the Legislature did not explain its intention for such ostracism. Moreover, given the outburst of the service sector including the E-Commerce space in the contemporary era where the businesses and traders engage at a higher bandwidth sometimes at a personal level. The exclusion of these services from the self-use exception would leave a major chunk of traders without any remedy under the Consumer Act. It is pertinent to note that the legislature intended to only exclude the commercial transactions that are usually done at a large scale by the Corporations. The rigours of the same cannot be attracted to the traders carrying out the business for self-employment. The SC in the case of Internet and  Mobile  Association of India   v. Reserve Bank of India (“RBI Case”) held that no business can thrive without availing of any service by the service sector. It is not the submission of the authors that all B2B transactions must be excluded but when the SC itself has demarcated the boundaries of commercial transactions, then such exclusion by the Parliament seems baffling. Even in Australia, certain protections for businesses have been conferred under the Australian Consumer Law when buying goods or services for personal consumption. The same practice is prevalent in other common law countries as well. Therefore, we assert that hiring of such services must be included in the self-employment exception as the service sector provide a lifeline for any business, trade or profession. The Parliament must take the necessary steps to fill out the void through an amendment. In the following section, the authors would be highlighting the anomaly created by the SC in the PNB Case by giving a narrower connotation to the term “self-employment”. The Decision in the PNB Case In the present matter, the Appellant was engaged as a stockbroker. The petition was filed by the appellant before the SC alleging deficiency of services on the part of the Respondent-Bank under the Consumer Act. However, the bank objected to the maintainability of the petition by stating that the Appellant being a stockbroker is not a consumer under the provision of the Act and had availed the services of the bank for the commercial purpose. The SC in the instant matter took a hysterical view of the dispute and held that the services of the bank were availed by the Appellants to increase their business profits and therefore labelled the impugned arrangement as a B2B transaction for carrying out commercial objectives. We would be arguing that the Division Bench of SC completely disregarded the exception of “Self-Employment” and principles envisaged by the court in established precedents in the following segments of this piece thereto. Myopic View of the Dispute: The Scuffle Begins We assert that the judgement in the PNB Case suffers from the patently fallacious view taken by the SC in interpreting the exception of self-use (inclusion of goods and services). Now given the similar treatment of goods and services, as observed by the SC in the PNB Case; the principles and interpretation to the same were simply overlooked by the Court in the PNB case and therefore we would be applying the same principles established in previous precedents to supplement our case. Recently, a division bench of the SC in the case of Sunil Kohli and Ors. v. Purearth Infrastructure Ltd. held that “if the commercial exploitation of goods is being done by the purchaser of the goods himself for the exclusive purpose of earning his livelihood employing self-employment”, such a purchaser would come within the ambit of the Act and would be considered as a consumer under the Act. Although it is evident from the above proposition that the SC and parliament have carved out an exception for self-employment in the ambit of consumer purpose and therefore every transaction carried out for the motive of the profit cannot be labelled as a B2B transaction. The SC in Cheema Engineering vs Rajan Singh (“Cheema Engineering Case”) r/w Laxmi  Engineering Works vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, held that the test of self-employment is a matter of evidence that can be claimed by a person who is acting individually for offering personal services. Hence, if

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Twitter Deal: Stakeholders’ Interest in the shadow of Shareholders’ Supremacy?

[Priyanshi Jain and Nehal Misra] The authors are students of Institute of Law, Nirma University.   Introduction Elon Musk, governing the tech fiefdom, has recently signed a deal to buy Twitter. The deal has been closed at $44 billion.  Since the finalization of deal a contrasting relationship has been developed between the tech mogul and Twitter. To begin with, he has criticized Twitter’s board over past performances and has even trolled its CEO and lawyers, it is evident that musk is trying to veto the deal in every possible way. Initially, Elon sent an unsolicited offer to acquire Twitter. Pursuant to this, Twitter’s board came up with one of the strongest combative strategies known as the ‘‘poison pill’’. However, the board of Twitter, in a complete reversal of its initial hesitation, has now accepted the bid.  The question which remains unvoiced is how the board of the target company, in one fell swoop accepted the bid while giving little regard, if any, to the interests of the stakeholders other than shareholders which includes employees, creditors, and the community at large. The American corporate governance regime has mainly been shareholders-oriented and thus revolved around maximizing the shareholders’ value. However, in recent years, this doctrine has faced feuds as the focal point of this doctrine is the shareholders, even at the expense of each and every other stakeholder. But the broad spectrum other than that of shareholders also have an intrinsic value and their interest cannot be neglected under the guise of shareholders’ supremacy. That said, the deal may benefit the shareholders as the target board has placed its reliance on value certainty and financing but the fate of Twitter’s other stakeholders is still riddled with ambiguity. In this post, we will examine how the stakeholders’ are not protected in the Twitter’s deal. Firstly, we will unwrap the factors that have significantly contributed to neglecting stakeholders’ interests. Secondly, we will state the possible recourse which could have been adopted along with a few recommendations. A Premier on Shortcomings of the Musk-Twitter Deal Elon Musk’s takeover of Twitter is all the rage. However, whether Musk’s takeover is, in reality, as tempting as he claims it is, is yet to be analyzed. While the board of Twitter assures the protection and promotion of the existing shareholders, the interests of the other stakeholders in the company remain neglected. Employees: The takeover of Twitter has fiercely impacted the employees. While Twitter’s current CEO, Parag Aggarwal, insists that there would be no layoffs, Musk is rumored to be cutting positions to increase Twitter’s profitability. During negotiations with banks, the Tesla CEO reportedly stated that after he takes over, he intends to slash employment at Twitter to boost the company’s bottom line. According to sources close to the company, Musk might not make any decisions on employee cutbacks until he takes control of Twitter. The Community at large: There was no mention of Twitter’s other stakeholders- users and employees, or its critical role in public discourse. Acquiring a media house is rarely about the well-being of the community but a marketing tool for the company. Twitter is no different and often used as a publicity branch. Additionally, musk’s tweets are known for disrupting the normal functioning of the market. The fluctuations observed in the case of Bitcoins, Dogecoin, etc. are evident of how markets can be move. Hence, if the Tech mogul acquires Twitter, then it will surely have a devastating effect on the community at large. The interests of the community will stand neglected due to the compromised position of the global platform in the buy-out of Twitter. Elon Musk, in a press release, supported free speech. While Musk’s actions have not always aligned with his thoughts, it is evident that Americans are willing to trust him. Musk’s detractors, on the other hand, are concerned that the billionaire’s control of the platform will silence their voices, given that he has frequently blocked opponents from his account. Although propagation of free speech is quite appealing, boundless freedom at the stake of hate speech, violent threats, or misinformation seems insignificant. Shareholders: The Tesla shareholders are an overlooked group in the enthusiasm around Musk’s Twitter takeover. Tesla shareholders seem to be stuck in a war zone devoid of any ammunition. They have no say in the Twitter deal, and it’s safe to assume that the Musk fan club, which includes the company’s non-executive directors, will remain silent. Tesla’s shares dropped 12% when Musk purchased Twitter, wiping out $126 billion in market capitalization. Meanwhile, according to Fortune, Musk issued a blanket personal guarantee on the entire $12.5 billion loans secured by his Tesla shares. This demarcates that the interests of the shareholders of Tesla have been compromised at the price of Musk’s ambition. While Musk refuses to back down from taking over Twitter, Tesla’s shareholders’ lack of trust in its executive poses a great concern for the company’s future. Easiest Expedient that could have been adopted Having stated all the above, the deal is dampening the interests of all the stakeholders. In that regard, the best possible recourse which could have been adopted is as follows: First, it is a well-established fact that when employees are doing good, then the corporation as a whole is rewarded. Employees have a fiduciary duty towards their employer, but employers are not bound by any such duty towards their employees. Similarly, corporations have an obligation towards shareholders, but such an obligation is not extended to employees. This contrasting relationship is often disputed before the Delaware Court of Chancery. In the case of Unocal vs Mesa Petroleum, the interest of the stakeholders (employees) has been placed in pari passu with that of the shareholders. However, the recent Twitter debacle justifies the contention that corporations have not exercised fiduciary duties toward their employees. Therefore, in this regard, a few recommendations are, firstly, productivity gains should be shared amongst employees and shareholders equally and, secondly, a mechanism for wealth maximization of employees as well as shareholders should be in place. Second, studies have shown that there is a need for a significant change in a corporation’s approach. A paradigm shift from short-term vision goals to long-term business and societal goals

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