Contemporary Issues

“Short and Distort,” whether fraud under the SEBI regulations?

[By Srajan Dixit & Abhijeet Malik] The authors are students of Gujrat National Law University.   The alleged overvaluation of stocks dubbed as the ‘‘Largest con in corporate history’’ by the Hindenburg Research may have sustained the scrutiny of courts over time; however, the Adani conglomerate which rose almost 2500% in last 5 years proved to be in-immune to the massive stock plunge when the 413-page report alleging “brazen stock manipulation and accounting fraud scheme over the course of decades” by the US-based infamous short seller firm took the financial markets across the world by storm. The Adani group has reportedly suffered a cumulative loss of $100 Billion post the report’s publication. However, the skeptics have termed the report as a mere financial tactic to deliberately undervalue the Adani entities for the purposes of shorting or short selling. This has prompted the serial litigant Advocate ML Sharma to file a PIL in the Supreme Court of India where he seeks to declare manipulating the stock market for ‘short-selling’ as the offense of fraud sections 420 (Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property) & 120-B (Punishment for criminal conspiracy) of IPC r.w. 15 (HA) SEBI Act 1992 (Penalty for fraudulent and unfair trade practices), in addition to the investigation against the founder of the Hindenburg Group- Nathan Anderson, for “exploiting innocent investors via short selling under the garb of artificial crashing.” What is short selling? To understand ‘Short and distort,’ one must understand ‘short selling’ first. It is defined as a trading strategy where an investor borrows shares of a stock they believe will decrease in value, sells them, and then hopes to repurchase the shares at a lower price to make a profit. The investor profits from the difference between the selling and lower prices when repurchasing the shares. In layman’s terms, Suppose I, an investor, believe (by way of research and other complex tools) that the stock of the company ABC would fall in value in the near future. I will then borrow 100 shares of ABC from a broker and sell the same for Rs.100/share in the market. Suppose, the next day, the share price falls to Rs.90. I would promptly buy back the 100 shares from the market and return them to the broker. In this process, I’ll make a profit of Rs.1000. This whole process is called ‘short selling,’ which is sometimes deemed unethical but is not illegal in India. Legal Regulations Surrounding Short Selling in India The central government is reportedly awaiting a report from the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) on the use of tax havens and concerns about high debt levels by the Adani group. In India, short selling is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) through regulations, guidelines, circulars, and notifications issued from time to time. Short selling was banned in India from September 2008 to March 2009 in response to the global financial crisis but has since been permitted with heavy restrictions under the bundle of regulations such as SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015, SEBI (Issue and Listing of Debt Securities) Regulations, 2008, SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011, SEBI (Stock Brokers and Sub-Brokers) Regulations, 1992. Following are the general regulations which are adjusted from time to time in order to keep up with current economic and commercial trends: Eligible securities: Only specific securities that meet defined criteria are eligible for short selling. The criteria include but are not limited to market capitalization, trading volume, and price of the security. Margin requirements: short sellers must have a margin account with their broker and meet the margin requirements set by SEBI, ensuring that they have sufficient funds to cover any potential losses. Circuit breaker: SEBI has implemented a circuit breaker mechanism for short selling to limit the potential losses from excessive short selling. If the price of a security drops by a certain percentage within a certain time frame, short selling will be restricted or temporarily banned. Reporting requirements: short sellers must report their short positions to SEBI on a regular basis aiding in to monitoring the level of short-selling activity in the market and detect any potential market stability threats. When short selling constitutes fraud? Unethical becomes illegal as per the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the United States counterpart of SEBI, when an individual or group of individuals spreads false or misleading information about a publicly traded company with the intention of lowering its stock price; this market manipulation practice is called ‘short and distort’. The Indian Securities market regulator SEBI,  refers to this scheme by an alternative name, which in itself is not separately categorised as an offense under Indian laws. However, the act of spreading misinformation to gain an advantageous position for the purpose of short selling might fall under the definition of ‘fraudulent or unfair trade practices’ or simply ‘fraud’ as defined under Section 2(1)C of SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003, the section dictates an act intentionally deceptive or not, by an individual or by anyone else with their complicity or by their representative while engaged in securities transactions, with the goal of persuading another person or their representative to participate in securities transactions, regardless of whether there is any unjust enrichment or prevention of any loss is fraudulent.  Furthermore, the definition also attracts sub-section 2(1)(c)(1), 2(1)(c)(2) & 2(1)(c)(8), which categorically declares any acts or omissions, suggestions or false statements which might induce another to act in his detriment, the acts of fraud. Furthermore, under the regulation 9 Code of conduct for Stock Brokers Schedule II of the aforementioned SEBI (Stock Brokers and Sub-Brokers) Regulations, 1992, market manipulation is categorically prohibited. The clause A (3) states that “a stock-broker shall not indulge in manipulative, fraudulent or deceptive transactions or schemes or spread rumors to distort market equilibrium or make personal gains”. Additionally, clause A (4) dictates that spreading rumors to bring down the value of the

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A Statutory Effort to Safeguard Personal Data In India: The Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, 2022

[By Aayushi Choudhary & Bhanupratap Singh Rathore] The authors are students of Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Three months after the withdrawal of the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill from the Lok Sabha, the government has come up with revamped legislation. This is the fourth time the government has proposed a bill on digital data protection. The first bill was introduced in 2018 based on the recommendations of the Justice BN Srikrishna Committee. After making some modifications, the government introduced the Personal Data Protection Bill in 2019, which was referred to the Joint Parliamentary Committee. The Committee submitted its report along with a draft for 2021 titled “Data Protection Bill, 2021.” After the committee made extensive changes to the draft, the government withdrew the bill. The purpose of the upcoming bill, as mentioned in the draft, is to provide for the processing of digital personal data. This is done in a manner that recognises both the right of individuals to protect their personal data and the need to process personal data for lawful purposes. Some of the highlights of the bill are: Regulatory Body: The proposed regulatory body framework resembles the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation. Although the functions and duties of the board are not clearly explained in the bill, the present Data Protection Board has simpler functions than the earlier bills. Child Protection: Every person below the age of 18 years will be considered as a child under the Act. The bill prohibits the tracking of children or targeting advertisements. The bill provides a penalty up to Rs 200 crore for non-fulfillment of any obligation provided under it. Penalties: In the previous draft, penalties were proportional to the company’s global turnover. It was 4% per breach and 2% per breach for non-compliance with any provision. This is done away with in the proposed draft, which provides a fine up to 500 crore instead. Many experts have expressed reservations about such a high penalty. In reality, it would be in the range of 50 to 500 crores. It would be in proportion to the kind of breach, kind of impact that it can create on the end user, and the involvement of the company. The Data Protection Authority and Board will analyse the breach and determine whether a penalty will be imposed. In fact, these penalties are low for tech giants. For example, if the Board fines Google $500 million, it is a very small sum in comparison to the penalties imposed on it by various jurisdictions around the world. If companies can justify that they have managed data well and, despite all the safeguards, a breach has happened, they will not be penalised because there is a finite probability that despite all the security provisions, a breach can happen. Twitter, for example, can be hacked despite spending billions of dollars on security and adhering to numerous security protocols. There should always be room for improvement, and any such industry should be given flexibility. Difference from previous bill: The previous bill was drawn from the EU General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR), whereas the present bill is drawn from Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Authority. This is a shorter version with only 30 provisions, whereas the earlier draft had 90 or more. The thirty sections cover areas that are needed for the enforcement of the right to privacy and data protection in a holistic way. It keeps the bill short and simple with simple language to make it understandable. The previous bill lost its essence as cumbersome amendments kept on happening. Data portability, which allowed users to view quotes from one platform to another, has been eliminated under the new bill. The earlier draft also included non-personal data, a concept that is not clear even at the global level, hardware certification, or algorithmic accountability. The revised proposal eliminates all of this and focuses solely on personal data regulation. The “right to be forgotten” is likewise not specifically mentioned in the present bill. Cross-border data flow: The bill eliminated previous restrictions on the flow of data from one jurisdiction to another. In any case, the flow of data is restricted to countries that the government has designated as friendly to the flow of data. Therefore, this will apply to all personal information, not just sensitive and critical data. Centre’s uncontrolled power: Placing a large portion of the important functional section of the legislation for future regulation by the national administration and some sections of the act is indicative of the administration’s unrestrained authority. For example, section 19 of the draft mentions the Data Protection Board of India. Under the bill’s rules, the regulator, which will be granted the same control and authority as a civil court, will be established by the government. Instead of that, the regulator should operate separately from the state and be capable of implementing individuals’ basic liberties while safeguarding due process. Moreover, the measure empowers the government to exclude any government institution from it that it considers appropriate. This power will blatantly contradict natural justice principles. Analysis: For the first time, the government has introduced legislation that makes the person providing the data responsible for its accuracy. It is not only the duty of the data processors or those who are keeping the data to protect it; it is also the primary duty of the individuals to provide accurate data and not file frivolous complaints. The Constitution includes a chapter on citizen responsibility, which has yet to be implemented. This bill has made those duties a part of the law. Section 30(2) of the bill proposes an amendment to Section 8(j) of the RTI Act. As per the present Act, information that relates to personal information is exempt from the Act. However, if the Central Public Information Officer finds that it would serve a larger public interest, the exemption can be revoked. If the proposed bill is approved, personal information will be completely exempt, even if the CPIO otherwise finds that disclosure to be consequential

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Funding Winter in the Startup Market: The Effects and Regulatory Reforms

[By Akshat Shukla and Tanvi Agrawal] The authors are students at the National Law Institute University, Bhopal. I. Funding Winter: Meaning and Overview Funding Winter is a phrase used to describe the phenomena of a downturn in the investor’s confidence in the start-ups leading to a more strategic and curtailed approach towards funding. It often leads to investors avoiding firms without a set path chalked out for profitability. This, in turn, prompts a need to correct the value of the start-up. Further, one of the prominent effects of funding winter is that it requires business owners to reset their priorities in terms of profit maximization. Funding winter is not a new concept but a cyclical effect that happens due to multiple factors which impact the free flow of investments in the market. These factors may either be generically applicable to the entire market such as geopolitical unrests in countries, monetary policies, financial irregularities etc. or may be centric to the relevant sectors. By the way of this article, the authors seek to address the reasons for the funding winter that has descended in the Indian market, its effects and the possible way out for the start-ups to withstand the funding crunch in the coming months. II. Reasons for the Downturn in Investor Confidence There are several reasons for funding winter as aforementioned. A. The Generic Factors Geopolitical situations such as the Russia – Ukraine conflict and other acts of hostilities lead to the stipulation of a slow market by the investors. The world is interconnected in more than one aspect. The reliance of countries on one another further augments in the context of development and sustenance of international trade, flow of investments and exchange of services, etc. For this very reason, the occurrence or non-occurrence of any significant geopolitical event in one part of the world has crucial ramifications on the other. For instance, the standard indices in Indian, South Korean, Japanese and several other Asian markets were disrupted as a direct consequence of the announcement of the military operation by Russia on Ukraine. Financial irregularities and unscrupulous practices by nascent companies shake investor confidence. The classic case of this would be when the closing date of Sequoia Capital’s $2.8 billion India and Southeast Asia (SEA) Fund was delayed as a result of suspected financial irregularities and corporate governance failures at some of its portfolio companies. Monetary policies of the Government and regulators also determine the level of investment inflow of the investors. For instance, the repo rate has been increased by 40 basis points in the latest meeting of the RBI, as it wanted to tighten the policies and curb the relaxations given during the COVID-19 times. It also suggested increments in the Cash Reserve Ratios (CRR) and Statutory Liquidity Ratios (SLR) so as to prevent the banks from lending to the start-ups. B. The Sectoral Factors The product efficiency and viability in the market have a significant impact on the trust of the investors. For instance, the electric vehicles market in India may suffer from a funding crunch owing to the recent explosions that happened in the e-scooters. Some sectors are in demand due to a particular event or cause and in case of a dynamic shift from that phase, the particular sector may face a funding winter. An example of this is the loss suffered by Softbank due to the tech sell-off that occurred after the shift from a virtual to a physical setting. These instances make investors cautious about investing heavily in a particular sector. The funding winter for some sectors may happen because of the different effects of the policies on that sector. For example, deflation may be a cause for funding winter as inflation may be helpful for mid-cap firms in the hospitality or other B2C sectors as these firms have the dominance to pass over the burden of increased pricing to their customers. In the shorter term, there can be an impact on the balance sheets of such firms but in the longer run, these firms benefit as the increased prices do not tend to go down even when prices of raw materials and primary commodities stabilise. Hindustan Lever, Asian Paints and Pidilite are some companies that have established how inflation proved to be helpful for them in maintaining margins. Such factors affect not only the expectations but also the decision of the investors altogether in choosing how and where to employ their funds. Thus, they play a significant role in determining investor confidence and investment growth prospects. III.      Effects of the Funding Winter With the funding winter in place, the start-ups resort to measures which help them save their working capital as the expectations of funding from the investors are minimal. The advertisement expenses, capital expenditure and expansion plans are put to a halt in order to increase the sustainability of the firm. Only the expenditure essential to the survival of the firm is undertaken and all possible steps are put in place to ensure unnecessary expenses. Lastly, the end goal remains to maximize profit harnessing which keeps the firm steady even without the investment inflow. For instance, the statement of the CEO of Unacademy, Gaurav Munjal, highlighted the need to focus on profitability along with the need to work under restricted resource supply. He urged his employees to, “learn to work under constraints and focus on profitability at all costs.” From the perspective of the investor, the funding winter does not mean a complete stoppage of investments by the investors. It infers that the investors become less interested in projects that have certain risk elements even though the same would have been pursued in a normal situation by the investor. IV. The Start-up Market and Need for Regulations Funding winter can have several effects on the economic enterprises and the economy but it essentially disrupts the start-up market. In the context of developmental reforms in India, it is necessary to have a framework which would help start-ups to overcome such downturns

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On The NCLAT’s Veritable War Against Inter-Se Priorities

[By Kartik Kalra] The author is a student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore. The principle of inter-se priority has its roots in equity, having as its core purpose the prevention of the jeopardization of the first charge-holder’s security interests.[1] When multiple persons hold a security over the same indivisible unit of property who then also opt for its liquidation, the order in which the receipt of such liquidation occurs is navigated by inter-se priority. The security-holder who has an earlier security interest is preferred first, and those whose security interest develops later are preferred subsequently.  This principle is present u/s 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TP Act”),[2] and the Court has gone to the degree of pedestalizing it as an aspect of the constitutional right to property in ICICI Bank v. SIDCO Leathers.[3] This principle is applicable to secured creditors, given the subjection of subsequent interests in immovable property to those created priorly.[4] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IB Code”) is an integral component of India’s financial regime and a domain where the operation (and obliteration) of inter-se priorities can be vividly observed. The IB Code aims at the effective resolution or liquidation of Corporate Persons (“CP”),[5] with the mandate for the former conferred upon the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”).[6] In circumstances of a failure of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) due to statutorily stipulated reasons,[7] the Adjudicating Authority (“AA”) may order the CP’s liquidation.[8] Section 53 of the IB Code presents a waterfall mechanism to be followed in the distribution of the proceeds of such liquidation,[9] whose competing interpretations lie at the core of this piece. This piece argues that the abandonment of inter-se priorities in the distribution of liquidation proceeds u/s 53 of the IB Code is akin to a veritable war waged by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) against inter-se priorities, characterized by no fidelity to the law, past precedent, policy considerations or legislative intent. In order to make this argument, I first discuss the present infrastructure of the insolvency regime that necessitates the application of inter-se priority, followed by an evaluation of doctrinal developments concerning inter-se priority in the Companies Act and the IB Code. I then propose that the recent decision in Anil Anchalia is per incuriam, for it ignores long-standing precedent while applying unrelated precedent for incorrect propositions.  I conclude that a continued application of inter-se priorities to the waterfall mechanism u/s 53 of the IB Code is the correct position of the law. Inter-se Priorities and the Text of the IB Code The framework of the IB Code is such that liquidation is undertaken due to a failure to reach an effective resolution.[10] At the stage of resolution, the Resolution Professional invites applicants to submit Resolution Plans (“Plans”) to discharge the CP’s debts through mechanisms other than its liquidation.[11] If the stage of resolution fails due to statutorily stipulated conditions,[12] the AA is entitled to order the CP’s liquidation.[13] In distributing the proceeds of such liquidation, the question of priority arises. Section 53 mandates the priority to be followed in the distribution of proceeds and holds that the dues owed to workmen and the debts owed to a secured creditor shall be pari passu.[14] For a secured creditor, the options of recovery are two: either enforce the security interest on their own u/s 52(1)(b)[15] or relinquish the same and let the Liquidator realize the proceeds and obtain it via their priority u/s 53.[16] Only when the secured creditor elects the latter option, do they qualify as ranking pari passu the workmen u/s 53(1)(b)(ii).[17] When the secured creditor refuses to relinquish their security interest u/s 52(1)(b) and is unable to enforce their interest themselves, they rank below those who relinquished.[18] The question of inter-se priorities arises when there are multiple creditors with security interests over the same units of property who desire its liquidation and the receipt of its proceeds. Does the IB Code have space for inter-se priority among secured creditors, where the interests of subsequent creditors become subordinated to prior ones? The IB Code does not expressly call for any such priority u/s 53(1)(b)(ii) while also containing non-obstante clauses u/ss. 238 and 53(1).[19] It considers the distribution of proceeds obtained via liquidation to “rank equally between and among” the classes mentioned u/s 53,[20] and it can be argued that there shall be no differential priority among creditors of a single class. This might be interpreted to mean a pro-rata distribution of proceeds within each class, with no necessity of the satisfaction of debts owed to secured creditors with prior interests. On the other hand, it may also be interpreted to mean that the IB Code’s omission in expressly abandoning inter-se priority means that it continues to operate via the TP Act. These competing interpretations of the IB Code, along with the presence of Section 48 of the TP Act, mean that a definite answer to the question of inter-se priorities is unavailable in statute.   Pre-IB Code Judicial Treatment of Priority Given such competing interpretations, there has been conflicting doctrine on the availability of priority in supposedly priority-neutral laws. Consider Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956, which ranked workmen’s dues, and the debts owed to secured creditors pari passu in a manner analogous to the waterfall mechanism u/s 53 of the IB Code.[21] The Supreme Court offered an interpretation to the same in Allahabad Bank v Canara Bank,[22] where it held that inter-se priorities must be respected by the Liquidator in the distribution of proceeds unless specific subordination agreements create alternate priorities. The interpretation of Allahabad Bank came before the Supreme Court in ICICI Bank. In this case, the Punjab National Bank (“PNB”) had a subsequent interest in the debtor’s property but still demanded a pro-rata distribution of proceeds from liquidation, dissenting against the inter-se priority-based distribution undertaken by the Liquidator in favour of other banks.[23] PNB relied on the absence of a specific clause establishing inter-se priorities u/s

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Implementation of Bill C-18 Framework in India

[By Ashutosh Chandra] The author is a student at the Jindal Global Law School. Introduction: Recently the Canadian Parliament introduced the Bill C-18. The law aims to bring about fairness in the Canadian digital news ecosystem and make sure that the system can support itself. This is done by regulating commercial interactions between digital intermediaries and news outlets. If the bill is implemented, digital intermediaries will be forced to pay a certain amount for ‘making available’ news content produced by outlets on their platforms. When the law is analyzed in the context of India, there is a pending case before the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) against Google concerning its position of dominance in the news market by the Indian Newspapers Society (“INS”). It is contended that creators of news broadcasted in the digital space are not being provided fair value for their efforts and it is Google, the entity controlling the ad-tech value chain due to its dominant position. Noting the pending case and the Canadian law, the paper would try to understand what the law enacted by the Canadian Parliament would reap if a similar law were enacted in the Indian legislation. Additionally, the paper would also analyze if there were mechanisms that the CCI can use to frame guidelines for the operation of such law. Bill C-18 and other similar laws – purpose and impact: As per Section 2(a) of the Bill, news content or any portion of it is made available when it is reproduced. Even if access to the same is facilitated by “any means”, then the news content is made available. And if this is done in the space of a digital intermediary, then the intermediary must provide compensation to the producer of the news. Again, the purpose behind this is to increase “fairness” in the Canadian digital news market. However, at the stage of the pronouncement of the bill, it is unclear how this will be achieved. Even though “fairness” is proposed, it is firstly contended that compensation to the producer would not automatically guarantee fairness. If anything, the paper argues the same would lead to unfairness between the producers through the depletion of opportunities for the new news business and a decrease in net neutrality. Quantum for Payments It is to be noted that the quantum of payment to the news producers is very low. The intermediary does not even need to publish the news on its platform to provide compensation. Merely, providing access through the method of hyperlinking would do. The “any means” part of the bill ensures the same. Going by the consideration of the provision, intermediaries would need to remove complete access to not pay. Before the implementation of the bill, the news producers produced and posted news through their handles on platforms operated by intermediaries. If the same is considered, the parliament’s purpose of payment for news content with consent serves no purpose. In any case, these news outlets provide their consent for their items to be hyperlinked on intermediary platforms like Facebook, as also denoted through the privacy policy of Facebook. Basis for Compensation Further, the blanket of compensation can be interpreted to extend toward all news producers as per the section. It has no qualitative or quantitative basis on which it is decided whether a news producer is to be paid or not. While there may be contracts that the intermediaries and news outlets enter, the problematic portion is that there are no supervising guidelines for the formation of these contracts. The only requirement is that compensation must be necessarily paid. In such a case, the intermediaries may be forced to use their metrics and then decide the compensation amount as a general practice, provided that the intermediary decides to contract with multiple business outlets. This would open another set of problems – which includes the intermediaries to news outlets that do not generate revenue or serve no purpose, and only enter contractual relationships with news outlets. This would then lead to the elimination of those discarded outlets from mainstream social media. Therefore, the proposed bill is silent on these implications of the provisions and would thin out the competition in news in the online sector. Standard of Journalism The other implication is the standard of journalism. Due to compensation being provided regardless of the quality of news published, a news operator may not be motivated to provide high-quality content. This would result in an overall depletion standard of journalism in online news media. Since online platforms are paramount for news outlets in this age and day, it only follows that newer outlets would not be able to find their footing in the industry, as the intermediaries are not motivated to pay everyone and use everyone’s sources. Therefore, there is a clear detriment to competition. Advertising of News Platforms Then there is the question of digital advertising on operators’ platforms. The model suggested would bring about an end to digital advertising on news, as now the operators will have to pay businesses instead for the news produced, as opposed to them taking money from news businesses to spread reach. This model is structured in such a manner that it would lead to a loss of profits for digital intermediaries. Even so, the news intermediaries have other sources for digital advertising. The model is not going to financially cripple the digital intermediaries, even though it may affect them negatively. However, the larger problem also appears harmful to upcoming and less-known news platforms. Now, news outlets may not partake in the process of digital advertising, as now the intermediaries will have to pay for news. And digital intermediaries cannot be expected to advertise for a news business without getting compensation for it. Therefore, the source for them to grow their business through digital advertising and make people aware of the network no longer works for them. Position in India: In the case pending with the CCI, the relief asked is for a just payment system for news creators on

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Determining the Applicable Law: Case of Non-Signatory to Arbitration Agreement

[By Tanish Gupta and Shubham Gandhi] The authors are students at the National Law University, Jabalpur. In an intriguing case of Lifestyle Equities CV v Hornby Streets (MCR) Ltd., the English Court of Appeal, in addition to other issues, was called upon to decide the applicable law in determining the binding effect of the arbitration agreement on a non-signatory, arising out of a trademark assignment,  viz. the law governing the arbitration agreement or the law governing the assignment of the trademark. While the majority ruled in favour of the former, Snowden LJ, in his dissent, found the latter to be the applicable law since the contractual consensus of the parties to the agreement does not answer the issue raised. In this article, the authors aim to elucidate the controversy, the cogent dissent of Snowden LJ, and the inadequate analysis provided in the majority opinion. Facts of the Case The present suit has been instituted against the alleged infringement of the registered trademark by Santa Barbara Polo & Racquet Club (“Respondent”). Lifestyle Equities C.V. (“First Appellant”) and Lifestyle Licensing B.V. (“Second Appellant”) is the registered proprietor and licensee, respectively, of the concerned trademarks, which include the figurative mark – the “Beverly Hills Logo” and a wordmark – “Beverly Hills Polo Club” in the UK and the EU. The above-stated trademarks were originally owned by a California-based company, BHPC Marketing Inc. After many assignments in 2007 and 2008, the concerned trademarks were ultimately assigned to the first appellant in 2009. The respondent owns and uses the “Santa Barbara Logo,” similar to the appellants. Given the similarity between the two logos, a dispute arose between the original owner and the respondent in 1997, and to resolve the same, both parties entered into a co-existence agreement. The agreement, in its Clause 7, provided for an arbitration clause and laid out the Californian law as the governing law: “Any controversy, dispute or claim with regard to, arising out of, or relating to this Agreement, including but not limited to its scope or meaning, breach, or the existence of a curable breach, shall be resolved by arbitration in Los Angeles, California, in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association. Any judgment upon an arbitration award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction over the parties.” In 2015, the first appellant obtained a consent letter from the respondent to register the concerned trademarks in Mexico. The Reasoning of Lower Court The Appellants, earlier reached the courts of the United Kingdom and the European Union, praying for relief for infringement of their trademarks by the respondents. The arguments advanced by the appellants in support of their claim were that they were not parties to the 1997 Agreement, that they were not aware of its existence at the time of undertaking assignments of trademarks, and that they were not bound by the arbitration agreement by virtue of Article 27(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 on the EU Trade Mark, and Section 25(3)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1994. The provisions state that until the agreement is registered, it would remain “ineffective as against a person acquiring a conflicting interest in or under the registered trademark in ignorance of it.” On the other hand, the respondent presented an application for a stay and referred the matter to arbitration, pursuant to Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The respondent, while relying on Californian law and the doctrine of equitable estoppel in regard to the 1997 Agreement to obtain the consent letter in 2015, contended that the 1997 Agreement bound the appellants as assignees of the trademarks. In light of the arguments of both parties, Hacon J, who delivered the Lower Court’s judgment, decided to stay the claim and reasoned that under English law, the appellants had become parties to the 1997 agreement by virtue of having dealt with the respondent in 2015. Alternatively, with the application of the governing law, i.e., the Californian law, the parties were bound by the 1997 agreement as it was a burden attached to the trademark assignment and thus passed with it. Lastly, the doctrine of equitable estoppel precluded the appellants from disputing the binding effect of the 1997 Agreement on them. The Judgment of the Court of Appeal The three-judge Bench, though while granting a stay, disapproved of the reasoning of Hacon J. with regard to the first issue. The Bench affirmed that since neither party had argued on the matter of the appellants being parties to the 1997 Agreement under English law, the Judge should not have decided on the same. On the issue of equitable estoppel, the Bench agreed that reliance on the doctrine was misplaced since the appellants did not rely on the 1997 agreement but rather on the consent letter, and their conduct was not “inextricably intertwined with the obligations imposed by” the 1997 Agreement. The second issue pertained to whether the parties were bound by the 1997 Agreement on account of the applicability of Californian law. It is at this point that the Bench had divergent opinions. Though the Bench agreed that the issue was not of ‘interpretation’ of the arbitration agreement, the majority characterized the issue of whether a non-signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement “as an aspect of the scope of the agreement.” Referring to Kabab-Ji SAL v Kout Food Group (“Kabab-Ji”), wherein the U.S Supreme Court held that the governing law of arbitration agreement also governs the question of who are parties to the agreement, the majority opined that the logical corollary would be that the question of who is bound by the arbitration agreement is governed by the governing law as well. The Compelling Dissent of Snowden LJ Snowden LJ’s dissent is premised on the distinction between the issues, namely, who is a party to an arbitration agreement and who is bound by it. The questions pertaining to ‘interpretation’ and ‘scope’, which deal with matters covered under the arbitration agreement, are to be resolved based on consensus between the parties to the agreement. The parties’

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RBI Guidelines on Digital lending – A boon to the digital borrowers?

[By Sahana R] The author is a student at the School of Law, Christ University, Bangalore. Introduction The process of providing loans on an online platform is termed to be digital lending. The distinction between digital lending and traditional lending methods would be using digital technologies regarding loan approval, repayment, and service. According to a study, there has been a significant rise in the number of apps in the Indian Digital Lending Market where the value of the market has increased from USD 33 Billion in FY15 to USD 150 Billion in FY20.[i]  The need for credit and the hassle-free approval of loans are the catalysts behind the growth of digital lending platforms on the internet as well as mobile phone apps. However, on the other hand, there exist certain banes with these platforms mainly because they were not regulated by the RBI or any other regulatory body and they would charge a very high rate of interest to the consumers. Therefore, there was a need for regulation of such lending service providers. This article provides an overview of the current digital lending situation and how the RBI has made an effort to regulate this online market. Why was this regulation the need of the hour? During the COVID-19 pandemic as people required money instantly, they resorted to using these mobile apps where instant loans were provided without verification of various documents. However, the downside to such loans was that the interest rates were very high and it was for a very short period. Additionally, other charges such as service charges, processing fees, etc. are levied on the consumers. In the case of Dharanidhar Karimoji v Union of India[ii], the petitioner filed a Public Interest Litigation requesting for the appropriate authority which is the RBI to regulate these mobile apps. The petitioner stated that there are more than 300 such apps on the play store and they charge about 35-45% of the loan money as processing fees. If the payment is not done within the time-period of the loan, then the agent will call the contacts of the borrower as the borrower would have provided various permissions including permission to access the contact list. Thus, there was a requirement for regulation. Working group on digital lending The RBI in January 2021 set up a working group on digital lending[iii] under the chairmanship of Shri Jayant Kumar Dash to assess the consumer issues and lending business of the platforms due to the outburst of many digital lending platforms. The report mainly focuses on protecting consumers from exorbitant interest rates and, at the same time, encouraging innovation in the digital lending sphere. The key takeaways from this report were as follows: The group suggested that an independent body named Digital India Trust Agency (DIGITA) must be set up. The lenders are allowed to deploy only those apps verified by DIGITA. A Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) is to be set up which would include all the Regulated Entities, Digital Lending Apps, and Lending Service Providers. The working group has also suggested a separate enactment to prevent illegal digital lending. The very important suggestion of the group was that the data can only be collected only after prior and informed consent of the users, and these data can be stored only by Indian servers. Lastly, the SRO, in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India, must come up with a Code of conduct for these apps.[iv] Analysis of the RBI Guidelines on digital lending The RBI has provided guidelines on consumer protection and conduct requirements, Technology, and data requirements, and the regulatory framework.[v] In this regard the RBI defines three parties namely, Regulated Entities (RE), Digital Lending Apps/Platforms (DLAs), and Lending Service Provider (LSP). The RE’s include all Commercial, cooperative banks as well as Non-Banking Financial Institutions. The LSP on behalf of the RE carry out functions of the lender such as customer acquisition, monitoring, recovery, etc. The DLAs are websites or mobile applications that provide loans to their users and this will include the applications owned by the RE as well as LSP for the credit facility. The RBI stated that the lenders will directly disburse the loan to the borrower’s account, and no third party will be involved in the transaction. The Lending platform must create a Key Fact Statement which must include all necessary information, details of grievance redressal, and any charges. If the charges or fees are not mentioned, they cannot be levied on the borrower. Every regulated entity of the RBI will have to appoint a nodal grievance redressal officer, which must be prominently displayed on the website and available to consumers. The jurisprudence of consumer law began with the Consumer bill of rights in the United States, which the Supreme Court widely accepts. US President John Kennedy in 1962, introduced the ‘Consumer Bill of Rights’ which emphasized on various rights of the customers such as right to safety, right to be informed, right to education, right to be heard, and so on. Additionally, Section 2(9) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 recognizes the various consumer rights and includes the right to be informed, right to be protected, right to be assured, right to be heard, right to redressal and consumer awareness. Therefore, Every consumer has the right to information an about the service or the product, and he also has the right to seek redressal in case of any grievance. Thus, the guidelines by the RBI satisfy the requirements of Consumer protection law. The RBI has stated that borrowers’ data must be taken only if needed and with consent. It has been made clear that lending platforms cannot access mobile data such as contact lists, calls, etc. The platforms can store only minimal data, such as the name and address of the borrower. The registered entities must prescribe a policy to the lending platforms concerning data storage and create a comprehensive privacy policy. This adheres to the principle of data minimization as laid down in the Puttaswamy case[vi], which states

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RBI’s Shield for Borrowers against Digital Lending

[By Rajeev Dadhich] The author is a student at the Institute of Law, Nirma University. The Digital Lending route has acquired prominence, which raised Reserve Bank of India’s  (“RBI”) concerns over the unbridled engagement of third parties, mis-selling, breach of data privacy, unfair business conduct, charging of exorbitant interest rates, and unethical recovery practices. To curb these concerns, on November 18, 2021, RBI released the Report of the ‘Working Group on digital lending including lending through online platforms and mobile apps’ (“the Report”), which targets the enhancement of customer protection and making the digital lending ecosystem safe and sound while encouraging innovation. Moving a step forward, on August 10, 2022, RBI issued a Press Release ‘Recommendations of the Working group on Digital Lending’ (“the Press Release”), which targets implementing the recommendations the Working Group gave. Against the backdrop, this article provides the scope of the Press Release and analyze the recommendations. Further, this article provides a detailed discussion on key factors of the Press Release like the cooling-off period, data privacy, reporting mechanism, and framework on FLDG. Lastly, the article provides concluding remarks and suggestions. Scope of the guideline issued The guideline comprises three Annexures which broadly illustrate three types of entities included in the digital lending process: Annexures I: Entities regulated by the RBI and permitted to carry out lending business; Annexures II: Entities authorized to carry out a lending as per other statutory/regulatory provisions but not regulated by RBI; and Annexures III: Entities lending outside the purview of any statutory/ regulatory provisions. First, the recommendation envisaged under Annexure I is implemented with immediate effect. This guideline will regulate not only Regulated entities (“REs”) but also the Lending Service Providers (“LSPs”)/ Digital Lending Apps (“DLAs”) engaged by REs to extend various permissible credit facilitation services. The entities included in the ambit of REs have been defined under Regulation 3 of KYC Direction, 2016. Second, in furtherance of Annexure II, the respective regulator/ controlling authority still requires some deliberations before implementing them. The non-regulated entities are defined in question 4 of FAQ published by RBI as stock exchange, and housing finance companies. Third, with respect to Annexure III, the Working Group has suggested specific legislative and institutional interventions for consideration by the Central Government. Recommendations implemented with immediate effect Operational Conduct and Customer Protection The disbursement of the loan, repayment of loan, etc. shall directly take place between REs and borrowers, and there shall be no intervention of any third party viz LSPs in transferring the loan or repayment amount. LSPs will operate as an agent of RE and will carry out functions like customer acquisition, underwriting support, pricing support, etc. RE shall monitor the activities of LSPs and be accountable for the same. Further, REs shall be liable to pay any fees applicable to LSPs, and no fees can be directly charged on borrowers by LSPs. Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”): The APR is required to be disclosed to the borrowers. The APR means all-inclusive cost and margin including the cost of funds, processing fee, maintenance charges, etc., except contingent charges like penal charges, late payment charges, etc. The borrowers should be provided with a cooling-off/ look-up period, which means an exit opportunity without the levy of any penalty for a certain period by just paying the principal and APR amount. A Grievance Redressal Officer (“GRO”) should be appointed who will be dealing with borrowers’ complaints regarding FinTech and digital lending. The details of the GRO shall be published on the website of the RE, its LSPs, and on DLAs. The responsibility of engaging GRO lies on REs. Key Facts Statement (“KFS”) is required to be disclosed. KFS includes a recovery mechanism, cooling-off/ look-up period, details of grievance redressal, and APR. Further, the consent of the borrower is required to increase the credit limits. Data Protection of the borrowers DLAs should obtain absolute consent from the borrowers before collecting any data with an option to accept or deny the consent and a right to be forgotten. LSPs are prohibited from storing any personal data of borrowers except the primary data viz name, address, contact details of the customer, etc. REs will be held accountable for data privacy and security of the customer’s personal data. Regulatory framework In cases where REs is extending credits through new digital products such as ‘Buy Now Pay Later’ (“BNPL”) need to report to CIC and adhere to outsourcing guidelines issued by individual Banks. Analysis This guideline is just the first installment in a three-series process. Till further instructions, the present Press Release will be the operative guideline for Res, LSPs, and DLAs. Cooling-off/look-up period As stated above, the Press Release provides the borrower with the option of a cooling-off/ look-up period. However, it does not specify the timeframe allowed to borrowers under this period, and the same has been left on the deliberation of the board approval policy. It is noted that a cooling-off period is a right of the borrowers to save them from paying the entire interest for the facility period, and the same should be reasonable. Inference can be drawn from Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Transfer of Loan Exposures) Directions, 2021, which state that a cooling period shall not be less than 12 months from the date of such transfer. Therefore, a similar timeframe should be allowed for the borrowers in the present digital lending regime. Data Privacy The Report highlights an exponential increase in complaints regarding the operations of DLAs. The Report explained DLAs as mobile and web-based applications with an interface that facilitate borrowing by a financial consumer from a digital lender. Subsequently, on December 23, 2020, RBI through Press Release cautioned borrowers regarding illegal players, excessive interest rates, hidden charges, breach of data privacy, and regressive recovery process by DLAs. Moreover, DLAs largely being mobile application poses a potential threat to data stored in mobiles viz sensitive personal data, etc. For instance, the recent data breach of CashMama leaked the personal information of thousands of people bearing

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A Case for Regulatory Sandboxes for Cryptocurrencies: Regulatory Theory and Lessons from Foreign Jurisdictions

[By Sarthak Virdi] The author is a student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore. Introduction Regulatory Sandboxes (RS) are artificial environments used to test innovations and have been relied on in the fintech sector. The RBI defines them to be testing environments with regulatory relaxations, the purpose of which is to gauge the viability of products by estimating benefits and risks. The benefits of RS have generally been that first, they help in foreseeing the risks of emergent technologies and the appropriate legal strategies to contain them; second, they are cost-efficient methods of testing products before a market roll-out and third, they enable financial inclusion and help regulators maintain control. The current literature on RS analyses their viability from two perspectives – first, the role of regulators as promoters of innovation or ‘opportunity-based regulation’[1] and second, the shift towards a principles-based regulation instead of a rules-based regulation.[2] However, there is a dearth of literature addressing RS in the Indian fintech market, especially in the context of cryptocurrencies. This paper fills this gap by arguing for RS for cryptocurrencies by first, taking the two perspectives to show that RBI is already operating with an opportunity-based and a principle-based regulatory approach. Second, it shows that across the RS models employed worldwide, the legalization of cryptocurrencies is not a prerequisite to promoting innovation in cryptocurrencies through RS, while protecting consumers. India by not allowing RS for cryptocurrencies and conflating the question of legalisation with experimentation can miss out on a big opportunity in the fintech market. Regulatory Approaches Opportunity-Based Regulation & Experimental Legal Regimes The role of regulators is generally understood to not be one that engages in active promotion of innovation and supporting entrepreneurs, but rather one that controls market disruption.[3] RS problematize this conception by making them active participants in the creation and promotion of market disrupters.[4] The benefits of RS however make it worthwhile for regulators to engage with them. They activate and increase the inflow of venture capital while simultaneously reducing the regulatory uncertainty and risk that can arise as a result of disruptive technology. The success of RS in kickstarting innovation has been well-documented, especially in the context of the UK, where RS have increased average venture investment amounts by 6.6 times.[5] The RBI has already made a shift towards opportunity-based regulation by promoting competition in Payments and Settlement Systems in India through sandboxes. It recognized the role sandboxes can play in promoting innovation while avoiding systemic risks. In the absence of any principled opposition to such an approach to regulation, the justification for not excluding cryptocurrencies from RS lies in a mistrust of the technology in itself. However, the question of the legality of cryptocurrency as a form of legal tender needs to be separated from the promotion of blockchain technology, for as Imelda Maher argues, competition has entered regulatory domains and the role of regulators has shifted to that of ‘steering’ from that of ‘rowing’[6] and the RBI must not miss the opportunity of experimentation. Rules-Based Approach v. Principles-Based Approach Strict, rule-based regimes post compliance costs that act as barriers to entry and thus discourage innovation, which is highly disadvantageous because fintech can drive growth in other industries while simultaneously addressing concerns like financial inclusion.  Principle-based regulation, which implies adherence to broader principles instead of hard rules, provides regulatory flexibility which reduces compliance costs while creating a collaborative relationship between regulators and private firms. RS employ the principle-based approach, for regulators exempt them from adherence to legislation while agreeing on principles they must comply with. Principle-based regulation helps contain the disruptive effects of unanticipated innovations for it provides regulators sufficient exposure to the technology to develop a legal framework to respond to it, instead of completely distancing themselves from emerging technologies. Further, given that innovations in fintech are fast-paced, RS create temporary regulatory frameworks that can help contain disruptive effects, instead of disincentivizing innovation. In the context of RS, the principles regulators generally require adherence to include consumer protection, market competition, and investor protection.[7] The table below summarizes the approach worldwide to show a move towards opportunity-based regulation, with regulators involved in promoting disruptive technologies, even cryptocurrencies. Further, the principle-based approach employed in RS does not lead to ignorance of consumer interests, for as shown, all jurisdictions build strong measures to protect consumer interests. Jurisdiction Conditions to Apply for Inclusion in a Regulatory Sandbox Is the regulator promoting disruptive technologies? Is Cryptocurrency a part of the RS Program? Legal status of cryptocurrency Protection of Consumer Interests Hong Kong Innovative technologies need to be utilized along with an increase in the range and quality of products. Yes Yes No law to regulate cryptocurrency; not accepted as legal tender. Compensation for financial losses and the option to exit the trail lies wits consumers.[8] United Kingdom The product must support businesses in the financial services market or any regulated activity, it must significantly differ from existing products and must produce consumer benefits.[9] Yes Yes Cryptocurrency exchanges are legal. Compensation for losses and the business must prove adequacy of capital to cover the losses. Australia The product must be new in itself or an adaptation or an improvement of an existing service or product. Applies the Net Public Benefit Test and the Innovation Test. Yes Yes Cryptocurrency exchanges are legal. Consumers are to be compensated for losses.[10] Singapore The financial service should include a new or emerging technology or use the present technology in an innovative way while bringing some benefits to consumers. Yes Yes Not accepted as legal tender, but can be legally exchanged. Boundary conditions are to be clearly defined in order to protect consumer interests. Arizona, United States of America The product must be innovative and should be based on an emerging technology or be a reimagination of existing technology. Yes Yes Not accepted as legal tender, but can be legally exchanged. Arizona consumer protection laws remain applicable and laws relating to consumer lending are incorporated within the RS.[11] Lessons From Foreign Jurisdictions This

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