Author name: CBCL

Comparative Analysis of Anti-Profiteering Laws under GST– Lessons for India

Comparative Analysis of Anti-Profiteering Laws under GST– Lessons for India. [Ayushi Singh] The author is a third-year student at National Law University, Jodhpur. Anti-Profiteering[1] in relation to the new Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime ensures that the consumers reap the benefits of the tax reductions and the input tax credits (ITC) claimed by businesses in the form of reduced prices. The provision has caused a storm of paranoia amongst taxable businesses. The structure of the provision consists of undefined terms like “commensurate reduction” and ambiguities regarding which ITC claims are applicable under the provisions. Anti-Profiteering Rules, 2017 were notified by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC), which paved the way for the constitution of the National Anti-Profiteering Authority (NAA).[2] The NAA is duty bound to carry out proper investigations of complaints, identify the aggrieved parties and pass orders against the accused party. Conviction can lead to penalties under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, cancellation of registration and orders which direct the concerned party to repay the amount to the aggrieved,or transfer the same to a Consumer Welfare Fund if the aggrieved party is not identifiable.[3] The NAA has been given the reigns to formulate a methodology which will lay down the foundations for directing how changes in the GST regime will translate into price reductions along with guidelines for implementation of this provision.[4] Inspiration for Section 171: Failures of the VAT Regime The qualms created by the roll-out of the VAT and the GST respectively is similar.  The VAT regime made tax-free goods taxable; the introduction of ITC raised questions as to how the benefits could be passed on in the form of reduced prices; and ambiguities relating to translation of tax changes to price changes are the same issues that experts are concerned about presently. The VAT did not have any mechanism in law to crack down on potential profit maximization. Recommendations to create a commission to check price changes were suggested.[5] Unfortunately, the VAT failed to deliver. In a study conducted by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, the report stated: “Manufacturers did not reduce the MRP after introduction of VAT despite substantial reduction of tax rates. The benefit of Rs. 40 Crore which should have been passed on to the consumer was consumed by the manufacturer and the dealers across the VAT chain.”[6] Hence, this provision is an effort by the Government to rectify the mistakes of the VAT and make businesses accountable to their obligation of providing benefits to the consumer. Post GST inflation has been a trend in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia; by controlling unreasonable price changes, this provision would help to curb the inflationary trends of the GST roll-out. On 10 November 2017, the Finance Minister, Mr. Arun Jaitley, declared a reduction in the GST rates of Restaurants from 18% to 5%. However, the failure of restaurants to pass on the benefits of their ITC in the form of reduced prices led to removal of the same.[7] If the government had formulated a methodology to enforce the Anti-Profiteering provisions, misuse of the ITC by restaurants could have been prevented with harsher punishments. Price Exploitation under Australian GST The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) was legally entrusted with the responsibility of formulating a methodology for defining price exploitation and creating corresponding guidelines. Price exploitation is the act of keeping unreasonably high prices.[8] The ACCC formulated the product-specific dollar margin rule, which simply means that if a tax reduction of Rs. 5 takes place in a commodity, this will translate into an immediate proportional reduction of Rs. 5 in the price of the same commodity. No corresponding changes can be added to the GST component of the price.[9] Collaborative guidelines directed retailers to display changed prices conspicuously or through any other declaration as may be.[10] Awareness camps and educational campaigns worked tangentially to make consumers more aware of possibility of price exploitation. GST price hotlines, websites and information bulletins like “Everyday Shopping Guide” helped consumers remain cautious as to exploitative price tampering. However, the objective of the ACCC was solely to deter price changes, not control of price levels and profit margins.[11] This stems from the understanding that in a market economy, the forces of competition and demand will fluctuate prices. The post GST inflation and the costs involved in adjusting to GST regime i.e. staff training, accounting software overhaul have to be adjusted into the price of the supplied commodities. A price margin of 10% was formulated to bring these price variables into the methodology.[12] As long as the prices were within this defined margin and justifiable through invoices, documents, etc, businesses were safe from penal action. Profiteering under Malaysian GST Profiteering is defined as the act of keeping profits unreasonably high.[13] The Commissioner is empowered to set fixed, maximum and minimum prices of commodities[14] and formulate a methodology to define the tenets of profiteering.[15] The 2014 Regulations laid down a strict formulaic methodology wherein net profit margins of businesses during a set period could not exceed the net profit margin as on 1 January 2015.[16] These Regulations were strongly criticized: mainly because of reliance on numbers rather than percentages in measurement of profit margins. The strict crackdown on any change in profit margin brought fear of increased governmental control in the market. In an advisory by Deloitte Malaysia, the companies were advised to “not to increase prices at any stage” in order to reduce one’s risk profile.[17] The 2017 Regulations diluted the procedural strictness and formulaic problems. The amendments decreased the scope of the Regulations to only food, beverages and household goods and changed the formula wherein the profit margin percentage of the same class or same description of goods in a financial year could not be more than the profit margin percentage on the first day of that year.[18] Despite these dilutions, experts in the country opine that the price fixing and control of profit margins are more effective tools of controlling inflation rather than profiteering.[19] Comparison Australia

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Power of National Courts to Injunct Investment Arbitration Proceedings: The Indian Position

Power of National Courts to Injunct Investment Arbitration Proceedings: The Indian Position. [Chandni Ghatak] The author is a fourth-year student of National Law University, Jodhpur. The article has been authored under the guidance of Mr. Kartikey Mahajan, an Associate at Kirkland & Ellis LLP. International arbitration works on a sentiment of non-restraint which domestic courts ought to exhibit in relation to such proceedings. However, parties to international treaties containing arbitration clauses often resort to domestic courts to obtain anti-arbitration injunctions, impeding the arbitration process. This post critically analyses one such judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court recently in the case of Union of India v. Vodafone Group PLC United Kingdom & Anr.[1] The Court granted an anti-arbitration injunction against arbitral proceedings initiated by Vodafone Group against Union of India in relation to the provisions contained in the India-UK Bilateral Investment Promotion & Protection Agreement [BIPPA]. These proceedings were initiated because of the retrospective application of taxation laws, causing huge losses to Vodafone. Vodafone International Holdings BV, a subsidiary of the Vodafone Group[2] had, prior to the proceeding being discussed, initiated arbitration proceedings on similar claims under the India and Kingdom of Netherlands BIPPA.[3] In the forthcoming sections, the author shall illustrate the errors in the judgment and  how such practice, if gone unopposed, could threaten India’s aim of emerging as a leading hub of international arbitration. The Rarity of Anti-Arbitration Injunctions in matters concerning Bilateral Investment Treaties International arbitration does not depend on national courts for legitimacy; this recourse is made as a matter of right based on the agreement of the parties.[4] In Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain[5], the international character of the obligations in these treaties called for the Tribunal to retain the ultimate right to ascertain the scope and meaning of these obligations.  Investment treaties are specifically worded, establishing unambiguously the intent of the parties to be bound by such terms. To allow its frustration due to intervention by national courts would defeat the very purpose of such treaties.[6] Thus, as a matter of general practice, anti-arbitration injunctions are rarely granted. The Occasional Recourse to Anti-Arbitration Injunctions There are a common set of grounds based on which such an order may be passed, such as the existence of oppressive and vexatious arbitration proceedings,[7]  extent of likelihood of parties suffering irreparable harm if such injunction is not granted, and the like.[8] These grounds have been accepted in India as well in the case of Louis Dreyfus[9] [LD] by the Calcutta High Court, which is the only other Indian case to discuss investment treaties at length. The LD case also reinforces the principle of non-interference, which is enshrined even in Indian arbitration law under section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Abuse of Process – What & How? The Delhi High Court observed that the arbitration proceedings culminated into a type of abuse of process due to the presence of multiplicity of proceedings initiated by a single economic entity along with the emergence of parallel proceedings. Heavy reliance was placed on the case of Orascom v. Algeria[10]  [Orascom] to argue that entities forming part of the same vertical chain, controlled by the same management could not proceed with multiple arbitrations for the same claim.[11] However, this argument may be refuted by analysing the decision of the ICSID Tribunal inAmpal-American Israel Corporation v. Arab Republic of Egypt.[12] The Tribunal therein found that although the claims made by the parent company before one tribunal and the ones made by a 100% owned subsidiary in the parallel arbitration proceeding amount to a double pursuit of the same interest, this exercise is reasonable if the jurisdiction of both the approached forums is unclear. Once jurisdiction is confirmed, only then can the abuse of process argument be made.[13] Therefore, it can be argued that not only has such form of proceedings been accepted to a certain extent, it certainly is not a ground to grant an anti-arbitration injunction. Problems with the Delhi High Court Judgment The risk of causing ‘due process’ paranoia Due process paranoia is understood as a perceived reluctance by tribunals to act decisively in certain situations for fear of the award being challenged based on a party not having had the chance to present its case fully.[14] In SGS v. Pakistan[15], wherein after a series of adverse judgments rendered by the Pakistan Supreme Court, when arbitration proceedings ultimately continued, one of the arbitrators exited, considering his inability to ignore the past injunction passed on the said proceedings by the concerned national court.[16] Even in the instant case, the arbitration had witnessed several procedural impediments such as resignation of the Indian arbitrators in the past,[17] and pleas made by the Indian Government to change the arbitrators[18]. Therefore, it may be argued that this intervention by the domestic court could lead to the tribunal adopting such an overly cautious approach. Improper reliance on Modi Entertainment A major argument used to justify the passing of such an injunction has been the proving of India as a ‘natural’ jurisdiction.[19] The case of Modi Entertainment Networks,[20] was relied on as a landmark Indian judgment laying down the principles on natural jurisdiction. This is an incorrect position, considering that in the aforesaid judgment, the Court did not have to ascertain such principle in keeping with the presence of an arbitration clause.[21]  Despite an express arbitration clause in the India-UK BIPPA,[22] by using the aforesaid principles, the Hon’ble High Court is creating a license to disregard arbitration clauses. Taxation as a subject is not excluded under the India-UK BIPPA A ground for granting such injunction has been that taxation as envisaged under the Indian Constitution is a subject of sovereign concern, thereby disallowing its arbitrability.[23] This is erroneous since the scope of the concerned BIPPA has not laid down any express exclusion as to matters concerning taxation being out of the scope of the Treaty.[24] If India wished to exclude such matter, it would have been done by way of the provisions of the BIT itself as it has done in the past in, for instance, the India-Austria BIT. The arbitral claims in the instant case deal specifically with

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The Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2017: Understanding the Significant Changes Proposed in the Corporate Law Regime

The Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2017: Understanding the Significant Changes Proposed in the Corporate Law Regime. [Muskan Agrawal] The author is a third-year student of National Law Institute University, Bhopal. On July 27, 2017, the Lok Sabha passed the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as “the Amendment Bill”).  If passed by the Rajya Sabha, it would add a string of changes in the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), thereby introducing many crucial nuances in the Act having significant impact on the manner in which Indian companies function. The Amendment Bill aims at improving overall corporate governance standards and investor protection.[1] The major amendments pertain to relaxation of pecuniary relationship of directors,  rationalization of related party provisions, omission of provisions relating to forward dealing and insider trading, doing away with the requirement of approval of the Central Government for managerial remuneration above prescribed limits, making the offence for contravention of provisions relating to deposits as non-compoundable,  and requiring holding of at least 20% voting rights instead of share capital by investors to constitute significant influence. The following part discusses few of the changes proposed. Independent Directors An independent director in relation to a company means a director who has or had no pecuniary relationship with the company, its holding, subsidiary or associate company, or their promoters, or directors, during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year.[2] The Amendment Bill seeks to relax this pecuniary interest provision. In the definition of independent director, the term ‘pecuniary relationship’ is proposed to be replaced by ‘pecuniary relationship, other than remuneration as such director or having transaction not exceeding ten percent of his total income or such amount as may be prescribed.’[3] In other words, the limit of ten percent is provided under the Amendment Bill for benchmarking the independence of a director. This expands the scope of independent directors and gives firms more flexibility to pursue their professional relationship with independent directors who are practicing other professions as well. The 2005 JJ Irani Report on Company Law also recommended that the concept of ‘materiality’ be defined and 10% or more of recipient’s consolidated gross revenue or receipts for the preceding year form a material condition affecting independence.[4] However, this was not incorporated in the Act. Significant Influence in Associate Company The Act provides that to constitute significant influence, a holding of at least 20% total share capital is mandatory.[5] The amendment ties the concept of significant influence to total voting power instead of total share capital.[6] Further, the definition includes control or participation in business decisions. Control under Section 2(e) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as “Takeover Regulations”) is defined as the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner. The term is similarly defined under Section 2(27) of the Act. On March 14, 2016, SEBI sought comments from public on the bright line test for determining control by way of its discussion paper in which it enumerated certain rights which should not be considered as control.[7] For instance, veto rights not amounting to acquisition of control may be protective in nature rather than participative in nature i.e. such rights may be aimed with the purpose of allowing the investor to protect his investment or prevent dilution of his shareholding and not otherwise. In other words, the investor does not have power to exercise control over management of the business and policy making in relation thereto. On the other hand, the Amendment Bill provides that an investor will have significant influence in the company if he has control of at least 20% of total voting power, thus not completely incorporating the said bright line test. However, it must be noted that on September 8, 2017, SEBI scrapped the discussion paper and decided to continue with the current position of ascertaining acquisition of control as per the existing definition in the Takeovers Regulations which is in consonance with the Amendment Bill and the Act.[8] Related Party The Amendment Bill expands the scope of related party by including, among the other things, an investing company or venturer of the company under a related party.[9] An investing company or venturer will mean a body corporate whose investment in the company would result in the company becoming an associate company of the body corporate.[10] In the Act, the word ‘company’ is used instead of ‘body corporate’ which results in the exclusion of foreign MNCs. For instance, any transaction between the parent MNC International Business Machines (IBM) with its Indian subsidiary IBM India Private Limited is not regarded as a related party transaction and therefore completely left out under the Act. This, it is submitted, was not the intent of the legislature. The legislative intent is proposed to be met through the Amendment Bill by explicitly including investing companies within related party. The Amendment Bill also makes the definition of related party in concurrence with SEBI regulations. In the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements)  Regulations, 2015, both investing and investee companies are covered under related parties,[11] whereas in the Act, only the investee company as a related party of the investing company is included and not vice versa. While the Amendment Bill meets its objective of improving overall corporate governance standards and investor protection by providing more clarity, the burden of heavy compliance still continues. The penalty rigour in realistic terms will ensure that the compliances are appropriate and not just apparent. Nonetheless, many aspects of the bill are in line with global best practices. [1] Lok Sabha passes bill to amend companies law, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, (July 28, 2017), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/lok-sabha-clears-bill-to-amend-companies-law/articleshow/59794867.cms. [2] Section 149(6)(c), the Act. [3] Section 149, the Amendment Bill. [4] Report on Company Law, Expert Committee on Company

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Authorized Person to Issue Demand Notice under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Authorized Person to Issue Demand Notice under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. [Jai Bajpai] The author is a third-year student of School of Law, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code”) arrived at a critical stage where the banking industry was facing credit financing problems and had been looking for an efficient time-bound solution to the same. Having ushered in a new regime, the Code, enacted with the primary objective of compiling laws relating to insolvency, re-organization, liquidation and bankruptcy as regards companies and individuals, is witnessing an evolving jurisprudence in relation to its provisions. Recently, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) pondered upon the question of the elements that constitute a “demand notice” on behalf of an operational creditor under section 8(1) of Code, which provision deals with the initiation of the insolvency resolution process by an operational creditor. The NCLAT has paid heed to the fact that the provisions of the Code are being casually used and applied by lawyers and chartered accountants. The pertinent question before the NCLAT was whether a demand notice, drafted and sent by a lawyer, could be regarded as a demand notice under section 8(1) of the Code. This question was answered in the case ofMacquarie Bank Limited v. Uttam Galva Metallics[1], wherein it was held that if any person who issues a demand notice on behalf of the operational creditor is not authorized in this behalf by the operational creditor and does not stand in or with relation to the said creditor, the concerned notice would not be termed as a demand notice under section 8(1). Again, in Centech Engineers Private Limited & Anr v. Omicron Sensing Private Limited,[2] the NCLAT made similar observations with regard to a demand notice. In this case, it was brought to the notice of the tribunal that the demand notice was not issued by the operational creditor, but by the Advocates Associates. It was observed that a demand notice not issued in consonance with the requirements enumerated in the Macquarie Bank Limitedcase would deem the notice to be a lawyer’s or a pleader’s notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. A demand notice is necessary if an operational creditor wishes to initiate the corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor. Along with the said notice, the operational creditor is required to deliver an invoice pertaining to the defaulted amount. Moreover, under rule 5(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules, 2016 (“Rules”), it has been provided that the demand notice can only be sent by an operational creditor or a person authorized by him. Therefore, the language of section 8 of the Code could not interpreted in a manner that goes against rule 5(1). Accordingly, in this case, the NCLAT held that the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority appointing an insolvency resolution professional and declaring moratorium was illegal and liable to be set aside. The purpose of the demand notice under section 8 of the Code is to convey to the corporate debtor the consequences that would follow upon non-payment of the operational debt. On the other hand, a legal notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 is to notify the other party about the initiation of the legal proceedings against it. The corporate insolvency process is distinct from a normal legal process, as a case filed for claiming debt under section 9 of the Code cannot be disputed by a corporate debtor until there is existence of a prior dispute before the sending of notice under section 8. Thus, a demand notice under section 8 stands different from a legal notice as stipulated under section 80. There have been many instances where the Code has catered to the needs of the creditors but has suffered from ambiguity while doing so. The above-mentioned cases were two such instances where the tribunal interpreted the law so as to give effect to the aim of the legislation. [1] Macquarie Bank Limited v. Uttam Galva Metallics Limited, III (2017) BC 10. [2] Centech Engineers Private Limited and Ors. v. Omicron Sensing Private Limited, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 132 of 2017.

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Passage to Cheap Internet: A Case Study on Competition Commission’s decision in Airtel v. Reliance

Passage to Cheap Internet: A Case Study on Competition Commission’s decision in Airtel v. Reliance. [Anmol Gupta] The author is a second-year student of National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata. On September 1, 2016, the Reliance Industries under the aegis of Mukesh Ambani launched a new subsidiary Reliance Jio (‘Jio’) in the telecom sector. Jio, unlike its competitors- Airtel, Idea and Vodafone- offered Volte services to its customers, and the media soon termed Mukesh Ambani as a game changer. However, its competitors described Jio and Reliance Industries’ actions as predatory in nature. Following its claims, Airtel filed a complaint against Jio before the Competition Commission of India (“Commission”). In its decision,[1] the Commission rejected Airtel’s complains and held Jio’s activities to be a legitimate exercise of competitive pricing. The following note offers an insight into the decision. Competitive or Predatory Pricing? For a policy to be predatory in nature, the following conditions must exist: the company must be a dominant market player in the relevant market, the prices offered must be lower than the cost of production of such goods, and such lower prices must be coupled with an intention of driving out competitors and recovering the losses in the long term.[2] It is submitted that at the time of decision, Jio was the only company to provide free calling and SMS services to its customers. Ignoring the cost which Jio had to incur on Jio-to-Jio services, Jio still would have been required to pay a 14- paise per minute cost to other networks.[3] This shows that Jio charged for services at a rate lower than its cost of production. Further, Jio had intention to drive out competitors and recover market losses gradually. It is submitted that the Commission has wrongly interpreted the free calling and internet services offered by Jio to be part of fair competition. The Commission, ignoring Jio’s high share in the market and its presence since September 2016, held Jio to be new entrant in the market.[4] Further, the Commission failed to consider merger of Jio with Reliance Communications- another player of the relevant market.[5] Reliance Communications, prior to its merger with Jio, had already made plans for merger with Aircel and Sistema in the year 2017;[6] such move, if considered, would have been enough to establish Jio’s intention to reduce competition. As per section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, for a pricing policy to be classified as predatory, the company must have a dominant position in the relevant market. Further, as per section 19(4), dominant position can be determined by seeing the size and resources, the economic power, the source of such position along with the consumer dependence on the company. Hence, the Commission should have focused only on the market share of Jio while determining its position in the market. Airtel presented two key submissions before the Commission. First, Reliance Industry, being a parent company of Jio, had given Jio full access to its funds for its development purposes, and second, Jio’s offers such as Jio Welcome Offer were predatory in nature aimed at taking away Airtel’s customers. However, both of these contentions were rejected by the Commission on the certain grounds. For the first contention, the Commission noted that the relevant market of the concerned parties was characterized by presence of ‘entrenched players’ like Tata in a well-developed telecom market. However, the Commission’s reply did not answer the possibility of the parent company’s money injection into its subsidiary; further, as per the Commission, a company can only be liable for predatory pricing when it enjoys a dominant position in an under developed market. For the second contention, the Commission observed that Jio’s Welcome offer was a legitimate strategy to attract new customers in order to strengthen its position in the market. It is submitted that the issue was not the legality or illegality of the offer but the effect of the offer on the market. Although the telecom giants such as Airtel and Idea were able to ward off the effects of the strategies, the same had not been possible for the middle and lower-class businessmen who had only two options- to switch or to resign. In the decision, the Commission denied the possibility of Jio being a dominant player on grounds of it being a new entrant in the market. However, it can be argued that Jio as of the date of decision did have a dominant position. Interpreting section 4 of Competition Act, 2002 and the Commission’s decisions, for a company to be charged for predatory pricing, such company must have a dominant market position. This being the established Indian position, a new entrant irrespective of being loaded can never be held to be holding a dominant position. The same was showcased in this case; however, Jio was not a new entrant. It is submitted that Jio entered the market in September 2016, which gave it a substantial incubation period. As of August 2017, the time when the case was heard, Jio had one-third of India’s consumer base and 85% of Indian mobile data network market.[7] Despite such facts, the Commission held Jio to be a new entrant in the market. Not Pricing but Predatory Behaviour and Intention The Commission had ruled in favour of Jio on grounds of it being a new entrant in a well- developed competitive telecom sector and its pricing having no ‘tainted anti-competitive objective.’ The following part analyses predatory intention and predatory behavior of Jio. Predatory Intention For predatory pricing, the company through its actions and policy must signify a predatory intention. Jio’s predatory intention could be inferred from the facts given below. Reliance Industries being the financial muscle Reliance Jio is a subsidiary of Reliance Industries, the latter being a dominant player in other markets. The unlimited investments made by the latter were a clear breach of section 4(2)(e) Competition Act, however, Commission while linking predatory pricing with the dominant position in the same relevant market stated otherwise. By way of its decision, the Commission implicitly allowed subsidiaries with strong financial backing to

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Employee of a Party Allowed as Arbitrator: Analyzing Aravali Power v. Era Infra Engineering

Employee of a Party Allowed as Arbitrator: Analyzing Aravali Power v. Era Infra Engineering. [Akshita Pandey] The author is a third-year student of National Law Institute University, Bhopal.] The preamble to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, “1996 Act”) states that it is an Act to amend and consolidate the law relating to domestic arbitration. The 1996 Act is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 and the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, 1980. Though a marked improvement compared to its predecessor, the legislation has witnessed several issues and challenges in its implementation. One of the contentious issues relates to the appointment of an employee as an arbitrator in the arbitration proceedings. On the one hand, concerns as to the impartiality and independence of the arbitrator arise and, on the other hand, the question as to the extent of a court’s interference with the arbitration procedure agreed upon by the parties is also to be considered. The following discussion delves into aforementioned issues by analyzing the latest Supreme Court decision in the case ofAravali Power Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Era Infra Engineering Ltd..[1] Facts of the Case The construction work of a permanent township for Indira Gandhi Super Thermal Power Project at Jhajjar, Haryana was awarded to the Respondent-M/s. Era Infra Engineering Ltd. A contract consisting of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) was signed, clause 56 of which contained the arbitration clause. The relevant portion of the clause is as follows: “There will be no objections, if the Arbitrator so appointed is an employee of NTPC Limited (formerly National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd.), and that he had to deal with the matters to which the contract relates and that in the course of his duties as such he had expressed views on all or any of the matters in disputes or difference.” Due to failure to complete the work on the scheduled time, the Appellant-Aravali Power Company Pvt. Ltd. cancelled the remaining works. The Respondent alleged that the delays were not attributable to them and invoked arbitration, further stating that the arbitrator be a retired High Court judge. The Chief Executive Officer of the Appellant was appointed as the sole arbitrator by the Appellant pursuant to the GCC. The arbitrator fixed the date of hearing wherein the Respondent sought an extension of one month. It was after that that the Respondent objected to the appointment of the arbitrator. The arbitrator rejected the objection on the ground that the Respondent had participated in the previous arbitral proceedings without any protest. The Respondent approached the High Court of Delhi where the arbitration proceedings were stayed and the appointment of the arbitrator was set aside. The decision of the High Court was challenged by the Appellant. Issue before the Court The issue involved in the case, therefore, was whether naming an employee of one of the parties as an arbitrator before the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (hereinafter, “Amendment Act”) came into force, renders such appointment invalid and unenforceable. The Decision The division bench of the Supreme Court undertook an analysis of the statutory provisions and the judgments dealing with the appointment of an employee of a party to the arbitration agreement as an arbitrator. Section 12(1) of the 1996 Act requires an arbitrator to disclose in writing any circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality. Section 12(3) states that the appointment of an arbitrator can also be challenged on this ground. The general rule is that courts should give effect to the provisions of the arbitration agreement.[2] But where the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator is in doubt, the court has the power to make alternative arrangements.[3] Thus, referring the dispute to the named arbitrator shall be the rule and nominating an independent arbitrator an exception.[4] In its previous decisions, the Supreme Court has held that no provision of the 1996 Act suggests that any provision in an arbitration agreement naming the arbitrator will be invalid if such named arbitrator is an employee of one of the parties to the arbitration agreement. However, a situation may arise where there is a justifiable apprehension of the independence or impartiality of the employee arbitrator. This is possible (i) if such person was the controlling or dealing authority in regard to the subject contract, or (ii) if he is a direct subordinate (as contrasted from an officer of an inferior rank in some other department) to the officer whose decision is the subject-matter of the dispute.[5] In the instant case, the Court considered both the scenarios where the appointment of employee as an arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts with respect to his independence or impartiality. With respect to the first ground, the Court held that in light of the facts placed before it, the arbitrator in the present matter cannot be said to be a dealing authority in regard to the contract. Further, the arbitrator held the position of the CEO and was in no way subordinate to the officer whose decision is the subject matter of dispute. In fact, the decision, which could be a subject matter of dispute, was that of his subordinates. Hence, there was no justifiable apprehension as to the independence or impartiality of the named arbitrator and his appointment was valid. Dealing with the question of the applicability of the Amendment Act, the Court held that the arbitration proceedings were invoked on 29.07.2015 and the amendment to the 1996 Act was deemed to have come into force on 23.10.2015 and, therefore, the instant case would be governed by the pre-amendment Act. The Court also clarified that in post-amendment cases, if the appointment of the arbitrator is contrary to the amended provisions, it would be illegal, notwithstanding the fact that it is in conformity with the arbitration clause. Analysis The Supreme Court has once again upheld the validity of an arbitration clause providing for the appointment of an employee of one of the parties as an arbitrator. Generally, the provision of an employee arbitrator is found in

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Application of Natural Justice in Arbitral Proceedings

Application of Natural Justice in Arbitral Proceedings. [M. Koshy Mammen] The author is a third-year student of Jindal Global Law School. Since arbitration is increasingly being favoured over litigation, it is imperative that the principles of natural justice which guide the judiciary should also be followed by arbitration when giving an award. This article examines whether the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”) mandates the arbitral tribunal or the arbitrator to follow the principles of natural justice when adjudicating upon a matter. The first part discusses why it is essential that arbitration proceedings must follow the principles of natural justice. The next part deals with the principle audi alteram partem and whether it is observed in arbitrations. And the final part explores whether the principle nemo judex in sua causa is adhered to in arbitrations in India. There are three major reasons why the principles natural justice must be followed in arbitration proceedings. Firstly, the award of an arbitral tribunal is final and binding and cannot be challenged like a court decision (save for certain situations). For appealing an order,[1] there are even more limited grounds and it is not ordinarily allowed. Hence, it is essential that the principles of natural justice are followed when adjudicating upon a matter and giving an award for the first time. Secondly, not all the countries have a sophisticated arbitration system like Singapore or London. Modern seats of arbitration may have flaws since they do not have a history of arbitration culture. This lets arbitrators and the parties take advantage of the system and use it to their benefit. One instance is the arbitrator giving an award in favour of the influential and more powerful party so that they may be reappointed again for arbitrations later. There may be an instance where the parties are at unequal bargaining power, or where one of the parties may be lured into the arbitration, or where one party is unknowingly invited to arbitrate or is not aware of its rights. Thirdly, more often than not, the arbitrator appointed is skilled only in a particular area of knowledge and does not know the manner in which judges must conduct themselves. One cannot reasonably expect arbitrators to behave in the same standard as the judiciary. Therefore, it is essential that principles of natural justice are set as the minimum benchmark to adhere to in order to make certain that the adjudication happens in a fair manner. In an arbitration agreement, after a breach, if one party refuses to appear in front of the arbitral tribunal, the tribunal can go ahead with the proceedings[2] and give an award not in favor of that party and the Courts would not entertain a challenge on the ground that he was not provided with a chance to present his case. However, the case is not the same when a party not mentioned in the arbitration agreement is forced to become a party in an arbitration he did not agree to. If the non-signatory refuses to come before the tribunal, the tribunal may still go ahead and give an award in the absence of one party. One needs to examine if this process complies with the principle of audi alteram partem. One can argue that the non-signatory had the chance to present his case but deliberately rejected it and hence must face the outcome but this argument is flimsy considering the fact that audi alteram partem is the cornerstone of principles of natural justice and it is a clear violation of it. The law in India regarding forcing non-signatories to be bound by arbitration is unsettled. In Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya[3], the Court stated that arbitration was a viable option only as against some of the parties and the Act did not confer any power on the judiciary to add non-signatories to arbitration agreements. The case Indowind Energy Ltd. v. Wescare (I) Ltd.[4] upheld the Sukanya Holdings judgement. Both the cases did not allow a non-signatory to be added to the arbitration proceedings. Following these judgments, in Sumitomo Corporation v. CDS Financial Services,[5] the Court refused to refer non-signatories to the arbitration stating that arbitration strictly needs to be between parties mentioned in the agreement, as per section 2(1)(h) of the Act. One can observe that until this judgement, the Court was cautious not to violate the rule of audi alteram partemin arbitral proceedings. However, in Chloro Controls India Pvt. Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc.,[6] the Court reversed this position and expanded the scope of arbitration agreements. This landmark judgement extended arbitration agreements to non-signatories as well. Taking a cue from this judgment, the Amendment Act of 2015 amended section 8 of the Act to include ‘any party claiming through or under such party.’[7] Therefore, with this amendment, arbitration agreements may be extended to non-signatories in both domestic arbitrations and in international arbitrations seated in India. If a non-signatory is asked to present himself before a tribunal and he refuses to do so, the tribunal can make an award in his absence. Therefore, this might trigger the principle of audi alteram partem. No matter how cautious the tribunal may be to anticipate the arguments which may be put forward by the absent party, it will not be sufficient. Section 18 states that the arbitral tribunal shall give each party the opportunity to present its case.[8] This provision may seem to incorporate the principle of audi alteram partem. However, it was held by the Court that section 18 by itself is not a ground for challenging an award.[9] To the casual eye, the provisions seem to be in compliance with the hearing rule; however, a careful examination has shown otherwise. As regards the question whether the rule of nemo judex in sua causa is adhered to in arbitrations in India, it is pertinent to examine section 13 which lays down the procedure to challenge an arbitrator in order to remove him. Section 13(3) states that the arbitrator who is being challenged can himself determine his own competence as an arbitrator.[10] This is a clear violation of the principle of nemo judex in causa

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Innoventive Industries v. ICICI Bank: A Creditor-Friendly Approach in Insolvency Law

Innoventive Industries v. ICICI Bank: A Creditor-Friendly Approach in Insolvency Law. [Sakshi Dhapodkar] The author is a fourth-year student of National Law Institute University, Bhopal. The Supreme Court on August 31, 2017 delivered its first substantive ruling under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the “Code”). In the case of Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank Ltd.,[1] the Supreme Court rejected a determined challenge to the insolvency proceedings put forth by the corporate debtor (Innoventive), and ruled in favour of the financial creditor (ICICI Bank). In doing so, the Court re-emphasized the creditor-friendly nature of the Code. After Innoventive entered into financial difficulties due to labour problems, it agreed upon a corporate debt-restructuring plan with the creditors. On December 07, 2016, ICICI Bank initiated a corporate insolvency resolution process (the “CIRP”) under the Code, and to that response, the corporate debtor took shelter under the Maharashtra Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 (the “Maharashtra Act”) under which Innoventive’s liabilities were suspended by way of moratorium. The National Company Law Tribunal (the “NCLT”) admitted ICICI Bank’s application initiating the CIRP by holding that the Code would prevail over the Maharashtra Act in view of the non-obstante clause under section 238 of the Code. The NCLT also declared a moratorium as obligatory by the Code. On appeal, although the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (the “NCLAT”) did not disturb the findings of the NCLT, on the point of law, it did not find any repugnancy between the Code and the Maharashtra Act. It is against the order of the NCLAT that Innoventive appealed to the Supreme Court. The main question before the Supreme Court was whether there was any conflict between the Code and the Maharashtra Act. Innoventive argued that given the moratorium already placed under the Maharashtra Act, there was no debt payable and the provisions of the Code will not be applicable. The Court hence focused on the issue of repugnancy and analyzed the case of Deep Chand v. State of UP[2] under article 254 of the Constitution. The Court observed that the Maharashtra Act derives its power from Entry 23, List II (State List)[3] in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution whereas the Code is attributable to Entry 9, List III (Concurrent List).[4] This made it crystal clear that by giving effect to the earlier State law, the scheme which may be adopted under the Parliamentary statute will directly be barricaded and/or obstructed to that extent in that the management of the relief undertaking, which, if taken over by the State Government, would directly impede or come in the way of the taking over of the management of the corporate body by the interim resolution professional (IRP) prescribed under the Code. It was also stated that the moratorium imposed under section 4 of Maharashtra Act would clash with the moratorium imposed under sections 13 and 14 of the Code to such an extent that the insolvency resolution procedure under the Code might not move forward. The second issue in question was whether Innoventive was under an obligation to pay and, if yes, whether the debt payable was conditional upon infusion of funds by the creditors (which infusion was stipulated in the master restructuring agreement). The Supreme Court observed that the plea of failure to pay on account of non-release of funds was raised in the second application filed by Innoventive, clearly indicating that the argument was an after-thought. Further, the plea was raised beyond the 14-day period, the time prescribed under the Code for determining existence of a default. Substantively, upon analysis of the said restructuring agreement, the Court found that the payment obligations of Innoventive were unconditional and not subject to the infusion of funds by the creditors. Another question before the Court was whether a director of a sick management could bring an application of CIRP under the Code. The Court explained that once the insolvency proceeding was admitted by the NCLT and the moratorium declared, the directors of the company are no longer in management. Hence, it is likely that the directors would have to file objections in their individual capacity as interested “aggrieved persons” rather than as directors of the company. Although the Supreme Court indicated its stand, it did not decide on this specific corporate insolvency perspective. Examining the policy and background of the Code, the Supreme Court adopted a credit-friendly approach. The Supreme Court’s assertion of the creditor-orientation of the Code will arguably strengthen the hands of creditors, whether financial or operational, and incentivize them to take more companies into the insolvency process. At the same time, the question remains whether creditors now have more power to abuse. With reference to the other incidental question pertaining to the 14-day period for determination of default, it must be noted that the Supreme Court has time and again reemphasized on the strict application of time periods prescribed in the Code. As regards the last issue as to who can challenge the proceedings, the Supreme Court made a stand that if the challenges are brought from the corporate debtor’s side, they must be in the name of former directors and in their individual capacity. This judgment provides assurance that there would be stricter compliance of the Code and more credit-friendly decisions in future. [1] Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank Ltd.,  2017 (11) SCALE 4. [2]Deep Chand v. State of UP,  1959 Supp. (2) SCR 8. [3] Entry 23, List II: Social Security and Social Insurance; Employment and Unemployment. [4] Entry 9, List III: Bankruptcy and Insolvency.

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Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited v. Datawind Innovations Private Limited: A Critique

Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited v. Datawind Innovations Private Limited: A Critique. [Shaalini Agrawal] is a third-year student of Gujarat National Law University. The seat of arbitration has various internal and external implications for the arbitral proceedings. One such implication is that the administration and control over the arbitration is done by the courts of the country where the seat is located. Such courts have the power to regulate the conduct of arbitration and hear application challenging the arbitral award.[1] Where the seat of arbitration is designated, expressly or by implication, by the parties as India, the courts in India will have supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and Part 1 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”) will apply. In case of domestic arbitration where parties have chosen a neutral city as the seat of arbitration, the question that arises for consideration is which courts in India will have the jurisdiction- courts of seat of arbitration or court which has the subject matter jurisdiction under sections 16-20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (“Code”). There have been conflicting judgements of various High Courts and the Supreme Court on this issue. Most recently, the Supreme Court in Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited v. Datawind Innovations Private Limited[2] (“Indus Mobile”) has held that the designation of seat in the arbitration agreement is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. It means that when the parties have chosen a particular place as the seat of arbitration, the courts of that place will have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the arbitral proceedings. This is irrespective of where the cause of action arose or where the parties or the subject matter of dispute is located. This case comment argues that the judgement in Indus Mobile was erroneous because firstly, it completely ignored the wording of section 2(1)(e) of the Act and secondly, it ignored the judicial precedents of over 70 years that interpreted section 2(1)(e) to confer jurisdiction only on the courts that have territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter of the arbitration according to sections 16-20 of the Code and misplaced reliance on Bharat Aluminium Co v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services[3] (“BALCO”). Facts of the Case In this case, Respondent no. 1 was engaged in the manufacture, marketing and distribution of mobile phones and tablets with its registered office at Amritsar. An agreement was entered into between the Appellant and the Respondent no. 1 where the latter would be the former’s retail chain partner. Respondent no. 1 was supplying goods to the Appellant from New Delhi to Chennai. Dispute arose between the two parties. Respondent no. 1 sent a notice to the Appellant stating the default of outstanding dues of Rs.5 crores with interest on the part of the latter and called upon it to pay the outstanding dues within 7 days. Appellant failed to pay and the arbitration clause in the agreement was invoked by the Respondent No. 1. Clause 18 of the agreement provided that the “…dispute shall be finally settled by arbitration conducted under the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 by reference to a sole Arbitrator which shall be mutually agreed by the parties. Such arbitration shall be conducted at Mumbai, in English language.” Clause 19 of the agreement further provided that “all disputes & differences of any kind whatever arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of Mumbai only.” Respondent no. 1 then filed two petitions under sections 9 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court disposed of both the petitions holding that since no part of the cause of action arose in Mumbai, only the courts of Delhi and Chennai (from and to where goods were supplied), and Amritsar (which is the registered office of the appellant company)  could have jurisdiction over the matter. This is so irrespective of the exclusive jurisdiction clause as the courts in Mumbai would have no jurisdiction in the first place. Since the court in Delhi was the first court that was approached, it would have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Appellants approached the Supreme Court where they argued that even if no part of the cause of action arose at Mumbai, yet courts in Mumbai would have exclusive jurisdiction over all the proceedings as the seat of the arbitration is at Mumbai. Respondents supported the Delhi High Court judgement by stating that one of the tests prescribed by section 16-20, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to give a court jurisdiction over the matter must at least be fulfilled and merely the designation of seat as Mumbai would not give exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings to the Mumbai courts. Decision of the Supreme Court and its Analysis The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Delhi High Court in the following words: “..the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to ‘seat’ is a concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction – that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Section 16 to 21 of the CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment ‘seat’ is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties.” However, the Supreme Court in the above paragraph upheld two conflicting propositions. Firstly, it held that “On the facts of the

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