Author name: CBCL

Dynamic Jurisdiction in Income Tax Cases: A Recipe for Arbitrariness

[By Sagnik Sarkar] The author is a student at the Tamil Nadu National Law University. Introduction In her 2019 Union Budget speech, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitaram announced the introduction of a ‘faceless e-assessment’ scheme in income tax matters, to curb unsavory practices which arise out of the physical contact traditionally required between the Income Tax Department and taxpayers in assessment proceedings. The highlight of this scheme is the elimination of the human interface through the use of technology: the Assessing Officer and the taxpayer will not interact with each other directly, and the identity of the Assessing Officer will not be revealed to the taxpayer. The scheme was given legislative backing through, amendments to the Income Tax Act, and the subsequent notification of the E-Assessment Scheme, 2019 under the newly inserted Sections of the Act. This scheme was met with widespread approbation and soon became quite successful. The success of the E-Assessment Scheme seems to have prompted the Central Government to extend the core feature of this scheme, the elimination of the direct human interface between the Department and the taxpayer, to other income tax proceedings. Through amendments to the Income Tax Act, and the subsequent notifications of the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2020  and the Faceless Penalty Scheme, 2021 under the newly-inserted Sections of the Act, the Central Government has introduced similar mechanisms for dealing with statutory appeals to Appellate Commissioners and adjudicating penalties imposed under the Act. Now, in the 2021 Union Budget speech, the Finance Minister has made a commitment to introduce a similar faceless mechanism for the adjudication of matters before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). A common, and central, feature of all the faceless mechanisms in question, the system of ‘dynamic jurisdiction’, seems to suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality due to manifest arbitrariness. The New System of ‘Dynamic Jurisdiction’ Until the introduction of the system of ‘dynamic jurisdiction’, assessment proceedings, appellate proceedings before Appellate Commissioners, and penalty proceedings, were required to be conducted by designated Department officials with territorial jurisdiction over the taxpayer in question. [i] The Central Government, by notifying the E-Assessment Scheme, the Faceless Appeal Scheme, and the Faceless Penalty Scheme, has now replaced this requirement with a system of ‘dynamic jurisdiction’. Under the new system, a computerized system randomly allocates every stage of an assessment proceeding, an appeal to the Appellate Commissioner, and a penalty proceeding, to different units across the country. It is no longer necessary for a jurisdictional Department official to conduct the proceedings in question. Hence, by way of example, it is theoretically possible, and quite probable, for the assessment proceeding of a taxpayer resident in Kolkata to commence at a unit in Delhi, continue at a unit in Hyderabad, and conclude at a unit in Chennai. Analogous factual situations can arise in cases of appellate proceedings before Appellate Commissioners, and penalty proceedings, too. This system of dynamic jurisdiction appears to fall foul of the constitutional guarantee of the right to equality before the law in Article 14 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Infirmity of ‘Dynamic Jurisdiction’ Earlier, under Section 256 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, Benches of the ITAT could statutorily refer questions of law arising in matters before it to the territorial High Court for adjudication. Now, decisions of ITAT Benches can be statutorily appealed to the jurisdictional High Court only on substantial questions of law, under Section 260A of the Act. Additionally, there is always the possibility of making a constitutional challenge to every stage of an income tax proceeding before the High Court. This has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in Nagendra Nath Bora (1958). Consequently, income tax proceedings, in various stages, are frequently challenged before the jurisdictional High Courts. This was recognized by the Law Commission in its 115th Report of Tax Courts (1986). Thus, the High Courts frequently express their opinion on diverse questions of Income Tax Law. The decision of a High Court, on a question of Income Tax Law, is binding on the income tax authorities within its jurisdiction: including Assessing Officers, Appellate Commissioners, and the regional Bench of the ITAT. This has been held by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, notably in East India Commercial Co. Ltd. (1962). Similarly, points of law in the decisions of regional Benches of the ITAT, and the Appellate Commissioners, are binding on income-tax authorities subordinate to them in their jurisdiction. This too is a well-established position of law confirmed in a number of cases, notably Kamalakshmi Finance Corporation Ltd. (1991). Thus, in summation, the decision of a High Court on a question of Income Tax Law percolates down and ultimately binds, every income tax authority within its territorial jurisdiction, including the regional Bench of the ITAT. In practice, High Courts frequently take contradictory views on the same, or similar, the question[s] of income Tax Law. This was very astutely recognized by the Law Commission in its 115th Report of Tax Courts (1986). Consequently, income tax authorities in one part of the country are bound to reach a different conclusion compared to their peers in another part of the country, on questions of law in respect of which the territorial High Courts in question differ. This practical reality creates a serious constitutional infirmity in the system of ‘dynamic jurisdiction’. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before law. In E.P. Royappa (1973) and Maneka Gandhi (1978), the Supreme Court has held that equality cannot co-exist with arbitrariness. Thus, it has been held by the Supreme Court in Shayara Bano (2017) and Navtej Singh Johar (2018), when a statutory provision is manifestly arbitrary, it will be unconstitutional. In Shayara Bano, the Supreme Court has recognized that the clinching indicator of manifest arbitrariness, is a distinction made without adequate determining principle. The system of ‘dynamic jurisdiction’ randomly allocates every income tax proceeding, and every stage of them each, to officials across the country. Randomness, by definition, is characterized by the lack of a determining principle. Hence, for no reason at

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Faceless Income Tax Appellate Tribunal: A Shot In The Dark

[By Yash Jain and Jaskaran Singh Saluja] The authors are students at the Institute of Law, Nirma University, Ahmedabad. Introduction The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (“ITAT”) is referred to as the ‘Mother Tribunal‘ for being the oldest tribunal in the country. For years the ITAT has been discharging its role admirably and effectively. In view to transforming the taxation regime, the Commissioner of Income Tax (“CIT”) was made faceless. Subsequently, to reduce the cost of compliance, increase transparency and utilize resources efficiently, the Finance Bill, 2021 (“Bill”) proposes a National Faceless ITAT Centre. Clause 78 of the Bill shall be inserted by the Central government to dispose of appeals by the ITAT. The said clause seeks to amend Section 255 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“Act”) that provides for the powers and procedure of the ITAT. The amendment will impart greater efficiency, transparency, and accountability to eliminate the interface between the ITAT and related parties. That means all procedures relating to ITAT shall now be carried out electronically. The faceless ITAT could broadly accelerate the rate at which disputes are settled. Apart from saving time and expenses, this system will bring more transparency and speedy justice to the litigants. However, a deeper analysis reveals flaws in the design and implementation of the new arrangement. The Bill heralds in the appearance of the supposed faceless Tribunal. The faceless ITAT raises certain legal ambiguities and concerns for the taxpayers regarding the nature and working of the structure. In this article, the authors will discuss numerous incongruities enduring while the proposition of faceless ITAT comes into the picture. These inconsistencies include the violation of the fundamental rule of conducting oral hearings in ITAT, transgression of natural justice principle and ITAT being the final fact-finding authority. To conclude, the authors believe that such the proposition of establishing faceless ITAT is a serious attack against the autonomy of the judicial capacity. Discrepancies in the Proposition of Faceless ITAT a)    Oral Hearing as a Fundamental Canon The legal apparatus over the world are broadly categorized into two types, i.e., Common law system and Civil law system. The Common Law Nations emphasize oral hearings and evidence and rely on cross-examination of witnesses, whereas, the Civil Law Nations emphasize written communication and evidence during the proceedings. As traced from the evolution of the Indian legal society, India has embraced the Common law system from the pre-independence era, which consequently affirms the strong rationale and opinion of the Indian judiciary to prevail the oral hearing and cross-examination over the written procedure. The same is also held by the Supreme Court in the case of Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India & Ors. Further, the faceless evaluation has an intrinsic issue of one-sided communication and the absence of interaction. It is apposite to say that written communications are made with a few presumptions that the receiver would comprehend what is tried to be told by the sender, as everybody evaluates his response based on his own grasp. This may create huge misunderstandings merely because of the inability to effectively explain a point of fact, whereas, in the case of oral hearings, it can be clarified through open discussions and thereby, consuming lesser time. Numerous landmark judicial pronouncements have upheld the significant value of oral hearing as a fundamental standard in our Indian legal system. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, the Constitution bench of nine judges of the Supreme Court has well-settled that “all the cases brought before the courts, whether civil, criminal, or others, must be heard in open court. A public trial in open court is undoubtedly essential for the healthy and fair administration of justice and also serves as a powerful instrument for creating confidence of the public in the fairness of Indian judiciary”. The bench further held that “public confidence in the administration of justice is of such great significance that there can be no two opinions on the broad proposition that in discharging their functions as judicial tribunals, courts must generally hear causes in open and must permit the public admission to the court-room”. The Apex court has also relied on the same rationale while passing the judgment in the matter of Pradyuman Bisht v. Union of India & Ors., wherein the court peculiarly directed the learned Additional Solicitor General to take up the matter pertaining to the installation of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras in the tribunals such as ITAT, where the open hearing takes place in the same manner as it happens in courts because the Tribunals stand tantamount to courts as far as the object of installing CCTV cameras is concerned. Moreover, in the P. N. Eswara Iyer v. The Registrar, Supreme Court of India, the observations of the Supreme court are a jewel in the crown. The court strongly affirmed that oral hearing is a judicial process in the Indian legal system that is actively functional when there is the presence of viva-voce and it weakens if presented in written or printed form. Therefore, the orality in proceedings cannot be offered a permanent holiday. Notably, Rule 29 of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2017, clearly denotes that the suits before the tribunal shall be heard in open court and it’s on the discretion of the Tribunal to decide that the proceedings in the exceptional situation will not be heard in an open tribunal. However, by the introduction of faceless ITAT, what was earlier the exception will now be the rule. However, the proposed initiation of the national faceless ITAT has completely deviated from the well-established concept of the oral hearing in the Indian judiciary which will be rendered as a departure from the Common law tradition of the Indian legal system. b)    Contravention of Natural Justice Principle One of the most celebrated principles of natural justice is audi alteram partem i.e. no one will be judged without ‘fair hearing’. It has two facets: firstly, an opportunity to make a representation must be given,

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Revisiting the Second Proviso to Section 7(1), IBC, 2016: In Re Manish Kumar Ruling

[By Pranav Karwa and Gaurav Karwa] Pranav is a student at the National Law University, Jodhpur and Gaurav is a student at the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences. Recently, in the case of Manish Kumar v Union of India (“Manish Kumar Ruling”), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of all the provisos added to Section 7(1) of the IBC, 2016 (“Code”) via the  IBC Amendment Act, 2020 (“the Amendment”). The second proviso to Section 7(1) of the Code introduced a new threshold for filing an application to initiate CIRP by Home-Buyers. As per the proviso, the allottees under a real estate project can apply to initiate the CIRP process only if not less than 100 allottees file it under the same real estate project or one-tenth of the total number of allottees under the same real estate project, whichever is lower. Various writ petitions were filed by real-estate creditors challenging the constitutionality of the Amendment, including the provisos added to Section 7(1) of the Code. The primary allegation in these petitions was that the Second and Third proviso to Section 7(1) violates Article 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. It was also alleged that the impugned provisos are in clear violation of the Supreme Court verdict in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. and Anr v. Union of India as in that case, it was observed that Home-Buyers are deemed financial creditors without any restriction imposed on them for initiating CIRP. The authors highlight the key observations by the Supreme Court in Manish Kumar Ruling and in the backdrop of this decision, examine the utility of the Second Proviso to Section 7(1). The authors conclude by suggesting certain better alternatives which comprehensively address the mischief sought to be resolved by the Second Proviso to Section 7(1). Manish Kumar Ruling While setting aside the petitioners’ arguments in the Manish Kumar Ruling, the Supreme Court observed that there is no real discrimination against Home-Buyers. The Court opined that an intelligible differentia exists between Home-Buyers and other financial creditors as there is the heterogeneity, numerosity, and individuality in decision-making in the case of Home-Buyers. In the Court’s view, the Second Proviso to Section 7(1) of the Code acts as a deterrent for individual homebuyers filing frivolous claims before the NCLT. Thus, the Apex Court held that the Second Proviso to Section 7(1) of the Code is constitutionally valid and just because the proviso causes some inconvenience and difficulties to the Home-Buyers is not reason enough to strike it down. Overall, the Manish Kumar Ruling is a major setback for Home-Buyers who want to initiate a CIRP under Section 7(1) of the Code, individually or in small groups. However, on a positive note, the Court has clarified that not all the Home-Buyers, applying under Section 7(1), must have pending dues against real-estate project developers. It will be enough if the total dues satisfy the threshold limit of ₹1 crore. Examining the Utility of Second Proviso to Section 7(1) It is the view of the authors that the Second Proviso to Section 7(1) of the Code was not necessary in light of the already existing safeguards in the Code which prevent initiation of CIRP by frivolous claims Various concerns of the project developers could have been addressed by alternate mechanisms, which were not taken into account by the Court in the Manish Kumar Ruling. There are safeguard mechanisms already existent under the Code to ensure that there is a check on mala fide applications, where a single home buyer intends to change the real estate developer’s management. For instance, penalties ranging from ₹1 lakh to ₹1 crore on fraudulent or malicious initiation of proceedings are provided under Section 65 of the Code. Further, as held in Naveen Raheja v Shilpa Jain & Ors, the NCLT also reserves the power to impose additional costs on such mala fide applications. Moreover, Section 75 of the Code envisages a penalty ranging from ₹1 lakh to ₹1 crore in the scenario where the financial creditor under Section 7(1) omits to disclose any material fact in the application. Thus, merely the fact that a single real estate allottee is filing a complaint does not mean that the Code is being used as a debt recovery mechanism, as there already exist sufficient safeguards to ensure that the NCLT does not entertain the malicious application. Furthermore, an observation by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Urban gives more power and discretion to the NCLT to filter patently frivolous and malicious applications; the Court said that “when a home buyer makes an application, the NCLT’s satisfaction will be with both eyes open – the NCLT will not turn Nelson’s eye to genuine defenses raised by real estate developers.”  Moreover, it was also observed by the Supreme Court that as soon as the tribunal admits an application, it becomes a proceeding in rem from a proceeding in persona. Therefore, after the initiation of the proceeding, the entire matter goes out of the individual allottees’ control and becomes a collective action. In this light, the fear that an individual Home-Buyer may use the Code to force the real estate developer’s liquidation is unfounded and without any backing. This is because, after the constitution of the Committee of Creditors, the issue of whether liquidation or corporate restructuring is to take place is decided collectively by voting in the Committee of Creditors. Lastly, the Second Proviso is not an unambiguous provision free of all anomalies. For instance, that the Amendment, introducing the Second Proviso to Section 7(1), does not clarify as to whether the prescribed limit of 100 or 10% of the total number of allottees, whichever is less, is to be satisfied only at the stage of initiation of CIRP or whether it must be maintained throughout the proceedings. The consequence of such ambiguity is that the real-estate developers will take advantage of the same and may strike an out-of-court settlement with one or more allottees, rendering the proceedings infructuous.

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Enlarging the Judicial Blanket: Analysis of the Consumer Protection Act 2019

[By Varda Saxena] The author is a student at the Jindal Global Law School. Introduction The Consumer Protection Act (CPA) of 1986 was established to fulfill the obligations entailed under the General Assembly’s resolution[i] to adopt consumer protection regulations across signatory countries. Certain amendments to the Act were being deliberated in the parliament since 2014, and it was only in 2020 that the amendment bill came into force.[ii] The Act entails eight chapters covering the provisions related to consumer rights, consumer protection councils, central consumer protection authority, consumer dispute redressal commission, mediation, product liability, offenses and penalties, and powers of Central Government and State Government to make rules and powers of the Central Authority and National Commission to make regulations. The new Act decreases the threshold for sellers and has emphasized caveat venditor. However, various conundrums arise as to the applicability of the provisions on healthcare and the legal profession. Even though the Act does not negate the relevance of the judicial enunciations in Indian Medical Association v V.P. Shantha, the article analyses the repercussions of the amendments and the possible benefits which can be accrued from the same. New Changes in the Act One of the much-needed benefits which a complainant seeks is expeditious redressal of complaints. Section 13 (3A) of the Act provides for disposal of cases within 90 days where no analysis or lab testing of the products is required. Where testing of products is needed, the disposal of the case can be done in 150 days. In reality, cases run for many years, and this clause is often breached. According to the Consumer Protection Act amendment in 2002, adjournments should be allowed in exceptional circumstances, and if given, the court should record the reasons for it in writing and justify it.[iii] The table presented in Kapoor’s research entails a lack of presiding officers and disposal of cases in the previous years. By expanding each commission’s jurisdiction, it is apprehended that a significant loosening will be witnessed in the redressal system. The Act increases the pecuniary jurisdiction of District commissions from 20 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore, State Commission’s jurisdiction from Rs. 1 Crore to 10 Crores, and the National Commission’s jurisdiction above Rs. 10 Crore, according to Sections 34, 47, and 58 of the Act. The insertion of these provisions clarifies the ambiguity created by the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla v. Ferrous Infrastructure. The judgment stated that the jurisdiction must be determined based on the aggregate value of goods and services and used an illustration to buttress the same. The court stated that if an apartment costing Rs. 1 crore has defects worth Rs. 5 Lakhs only, then the value allocated will be Rs. 1 Crore and not Rs. 5 lakh for labeling the jurisdiction. However, this judgment allowed complainants to skip stages of various forums which resided in conflict with Section 14 of the CPA. The Section envisages that the Central Authority has powers to monitor procedures for transaction of its business and allocate such business to the Chief Commissioner and other such Commissioners. Further, the Chief Commissioner has the powers to delegate work related to the administration of the Central Authority and is responsible for matters of general superintendence.  Therefore, the computation of goods’ value has to be based on defects only, not their aggregate value.[iv] Further, the case would have proved to be a better precedent if a reference was made to Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, according to which the value of the suit is determined according to the court fees. Section 7 of the Court Fees Act and Section 34 of the CPC would have aided the bench in setting out the interest amount. However, the new law is based on the consideration paid and not the aggregate value of goods, clearing the confusion surrounding pecuniary jurisdictions. Protection from Puffery The amendments introduced in the Act of 2019 also include a widened definition of a consumer, e-filing of complaints, establishment of central consumer protection authority, safeguards upholding privacy, alternate dispute redressal mechanisms, and penalties for misleading advertisements. Recently, the manufacturers of Dhathri Hair Oil and actor Anoop Menon were penalized for advertising that the hair oil guarantees hair growth within six weeks of usage of this oil.[v] A comparison can be drawn with Carbolic Smoke Ball Company’s case. It was held that such a statement would not amount to a puff, but a valid offer, which, if accepted by any individual, would bind the offeror. In cases such as these, the Act has envisaged a provision for class action suits as well, within Section 18 and 19 of the Act. Apart from tricking consumers in the garb of puffs, the Act also ensures protection against differential or discriminatory pricing done by e-commerce websites. To bolster the Act, Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (NDI Rules), also prohibit such differential pricing under S. No. 15.2.3 of Schedule 1 of the NDI Rules. The Enforcement Directorate registered the case of Telecom Watchdog v Union of India against Amazon and Flipkart due to the same, and such differential pricing could also be adjudicated under Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002. Rule 4(11) of the e-commerce Rules should be read alongside Section 2 (41) of the Consumer Protection Act as differential pricing and discriminatory behavior is a restricted trade practice under the Act. The Act has made the usage of a customer’s electronic footprint to charge different costs[vi] an offense under the Act. However, profiling to monitor behavioral patterns for customized advertising and product display has not been interfered with. Such profiling techniques are used by tech giants such as Instagram and Facebook to compile metadata and prepare efficient algorithms for mapping user experience and commodifying the time spent by them using the application.[vii] Increased Threshold for Practitioners The CPA may have avoided the issue of profiling but has overall intended to be overtly and covertly consumer-friendly. Such a statute has also increased the threshold of the standard of

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Out of Touch with Realty: The Tale of Union Budget & Circle Rate Reforms

[By Samridhi] The author is a student at Law Centre-1, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. The Union Budget 2021-22 has brought with itself a further increase in the safe harbour limit provided to the real estate in instances where a sale is affected under the value which, as per Section 43CA and Section 50C, is ‘adopted, assessed or assessable by any authority of a State Government’ in order to pay the assigned stamp duty on the sale. Such a value ‘adopted, assessed or assessable’ is also known as circle rate or guideline rate. This is the Government’s third attempt to boost the real estate sector. The first such increase in the safe harbour was enacted by Finance Act 2018 by providing a safe limit of 5% through the amendments of Section 43CA and Section 50C. Finance Act 2020 increased it to 10% and the Finance Act 2021 has increased it further to 20%. Though the real estate sector is joyous at this gift from the Central Government but the celebration remains short-lived as the abovementioned safe harbour limit will only last until June 2021. The Government’s explanation behind bringing forth such increases is to provide an incentive to the middle class to invest in the real estate sector, hence, the cap of Rs. 2 crores have been imposed. But in such circumstances, it remains pertinent to analyse whether such amendments will truly bring forth the change expected in the short span of time or will it remain an empty promise. Background Section 43CA was brought forth by Finance Act, 2013, in effect since April 1, 2014. It provided that if an immovable property is sold below the circle rate for the purposes of stamp duty valuation, then the sale will be considered to be at the circle rate for computation of income under ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’. On the other hand, Section 50C was enacted through Finance Act, 2002, and in effect since April 1, 2003. This section provides a legal fiction whereby if an immovable property is sold below the circle rate then for the purposes of stamp duty valuation, the circle rate will be deemed to be the value of the sale. Both the sections were enacted by the government with an agenda of curbing the involvement of black money in the real estate sector, which continued to be in circulation through practices such as undervaluation of property and to seek an increase in revenue collection from the real estate sector. Given the volatile and diverse nature of the real estate sector, the State Governments were given the liberty to decide on the valuation of the property for the purposes of arriving at the circle rate, which is the minimum rate at which the property must be sold in a given area. This liberty has been exploited by the State Governments to invent their own formulas through Valuation Officer for deciding the circle rate and the ‘fair market value’, which remains the current market value for a property. This practice provided a huge disparity between the ‘fair market value’, decided by a Valuation Officer to be the actual market rate, and the ‘assessed value’. In some areas, the circle rate far exceeded the actual market rate while in some areas the circle rate remained far below the actual market rate. Though the liberty given to the State Governments was done in an attempt to accommodate the volatility of the real estate sector but the practice of reviewing such rates at a period of 3 to 5 years has led to the stagnancy of the real estate sector. Thus, in an attempt to energize the sector that the government initiated the reform in 2018 by providing a ‘safe harbour limit’. The limit denotes the breathing space to the sector as it provides them the much-needed elbow space to negotiate with the buyers. Analysis But the sections remain riddled with several other ailments which have led to an increase in litigation and undue hardships. A sale of immovable property involves a factual matrix that remains unique to each and every case. This uniqueness finds no accommodation in the provisions. It is a usual circumstance in our country where for the purposes of marriage or to relieve the debt on a family, the property is sold at any rate available to the seller. This provides the seller with a double whammy, as not only he is forced to sell the property at a lower price but, as per Section 43CA, he also bears the burden of being taxed for the differential sum between the circle rate and the transaction amount that he never earned. While Section 56(2)(x), which was enacted through Finance Act 2017, provides the same burden on the buyer, where the tax is levied on the notional value when the immovable property is acquired on a price below the fair market value price. The rigidity of the sections was noted by the Delhi High Court in CTA Apparels Pvt. Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi Collector of Stamps, where the High Court stated that the circle rate is only a guidance and not the sole factor for determining the value of the property. Moreover, the circulation of black money in the real estate sector has not been curbed by these reforms/ This is due to the huge disparity in the market rate and the circle rate. For instance in the case of Delhi, the rates in areas such as Panchsheel Park, Vasant Vihar, et al remain below the circle rate and in other areas the rates remain far above the circle rate. The State governments such as Delhi & Maharashtra are beginning to take steps to help provide some leeway to the real estate sector by bringing in much-needed reforms through reduction of the circle rate or reduction in stamp duty value. This disparity in the prices in the same State only provides further evidence to the fact that the reforms have been

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Excessive Taxing Ambit of the Executive & Quasi-Judicial Authorities

[By Samridhi] The author is a student at Law Centre-1, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. Status Quo On 24 November 2020, the Allahabad High Court delivered a judgment on an issue involving the revocation of the registration certificate by the Assistant Commissioner because the assessee had failed to file the returns for a period of six months. The Court while ruling in favour of the assessee noted that the administration of quasi-judicial functions by the people ‘who do not have a legally trained mind’ had led to discharging of the functions in an arbitrary manner. The Court found that the Commissioner’s failure to verify the assessee’s claims that the returns were filed and the Appellate Authority’s admission that the averments made by the assessee could not be verified at the appeal stage was ‘manifestly arbitrary’ and ‘militates against the whole purpose of a statutory appeal’. The Court granted the assessee a cost of Rs. 10, 000 to compensate for the unnecessary harassment and wastage of financial resources. These observations merit serious consideration in the backdrop of the Government’s increasing inclination to expand the powers of quasi-judicial authorities and the Executive. This has led to an increase in the litigation at the doors of High Courts due to arbitrary orders being passed by such authorities which remain incongruent with established legal principles. This is evident through several High Court judgments where the lack of application of legal mind leads to a frequent overturning of the orders issued. A recent example can be noted through the Kerala High Court’s judgment in the matter involving the validity of the proceedings initiated under Section 130 of the Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”). The Court discovered that the notice issued by the Income Tax Department (“Department”) against Veer Pratab Singh did not show anything which could have suggested an intention to evade taxes. Despite the lacunae in the notice, the authorities rejected Mr. Singh’s contentions and confiscated the goods. The High Court found that the proceedings initiated by the Department were legally unsustainable as there was no evidence through Mr. Singh’s act or omission that could provide grounds for establishing an intention to evade taxes. This highlights the dismal failure of the Department’s proceedings and rulings. Deloitte had calculated that the Department is successful in only 11.5% of appeals, while the global average is at 65%. The resultant chaos in implementation of taxation statutes has made the assessees vulnerable to such arbitrary actions initiated by the Department under the boundless power which operates outside the purview of the Legislature. The vulnerability is demonstrated from the increasing arrests of the assessees under the CGST Act where the ambit of Section 69, which grants the power to arrest, has been exploited by the Commissioners to establish ‘reasons to believe’. It was reflected in the judgment pronounced by the Bombay High Court that a mere paraphrasing of the requirements of Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for the situations when such power to arrest may be exercised, will not be sufficient to form ‘reasons to believe’ and effectuate an arrest. While the lackadaisical approach towards constituting the GST Tribunal has robbed the assesses of an opportunity to avail a judicial mind on the validity of the orders. It compels the aggrieved assessee to go to the High Court which continues to suffer from a logjam thereby leading to prolonged pendency, to challenge the orders. Need for Review of the Executive Powers It is contended that the economic offenses are distinct in nature and a separate mechanism needs to be developed for their regulation. Moreover, the delegated functions to the Executive are necessary for a nation where legislative proceedings are repeatedly disrupted. Moreover, there is an urgent need to boost economic growth and attract investments to facilitate post-lockdown recovery and implementation of government schemes and initiatives. It is a well-established fact that the collection of taxes in the government’s coffers reflect economic prosperity. This prosperity can be achieved by providing certainty with respect to taxation provisions in order to attract investment and instill confidence in the minds of the assessees to pursue economic growth and profits without fear of harassment. The same has been reiterated by the Supreme Court through Justice Chandrachud where he stated that, “There is a significant value which must attach to observing the requirement of consistency and certainty. Individual affairs are conducted and business decisions are made with the expectation of consistency, uniformity, and certainty. To detract from those principles is neither expedient nor desirable.” But the Executive has been known to detract to principles which have been found to be undesirable, and such principles have found the assent of the appellate authorities in several instances where a wrong interpretation leads to a decision either in favour of the Department or a dismissal. In either circumstance, the assessee has to go to the High Court. A recent example can be found in the Allahabad High Court’s judgment which pronounced that a bare reading of Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act provides that a show-cause notice is mandatory to be served before determining the leviable tax on ‘deemed supply’ and the orders and arbitrary penalty amount were set aside. Besides, the disruption of legislative proceedings or the distinction of economic offenses cannot provide a ground for the Legislature to abdicate its responsibility of being diligent in executing its legislative functions and employ ambiguous and equivocal terms to provide a wide ambit of powers to the Executive to implement unclear legislative intentions. The interpretation of such statutory provisions only leads to a surge in the judicial burden as it increases the number of cases filed to seek clarification and resolution of disputes with respect to incorrect assessment. Moreover, tax certainty cannot be provided by ousting the inclusion of law members at the frontline through the establishment of the Board for Advance Ruling (‘Board’) in place of the Authority of Advance Ruling (‘Authority’). This initiative by the

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Confluence of the Impact Approach and Stakeholder Theory of CSR

[By Digvijay Ravindar Singh] The author is a student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore. The concept of CSR differs between developing countries and developed countries with respect to its definition as well as implementation. Additionally, there is no comprehensive, “one size fits all” global corporate governance or CSR system based on western codes and regulations that can be implemented in emerging markets. As per several writers, the rationale behind the concept of CSR also varies in developed and developing countries. In this paper, the researcher shall dissect the rationale/theory behind CSR in India, compare it with another theory called the “Stakeholder Theory”, and subsequently, suggest a confluence between both these theories using which certain reforms can be brought about in the Companies Act [“the Act”]to ensure maximum social benefit. The thesis of the paper is that amending the Companies Act through the introduction of a confluence of two different theories of CSR will result in maximum social impact. Trend of “impact approach” in India In the present time, the COVID-19 pandemic has depleted the finances of the Government. The Government anticipated such costs, and consequently:- Declared, through the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), that the funds spent on COVID-19 management would be treated as eligible CSR activity. The order stated that the CSR funds can now be used for promoting preventive care healthcare infrastructure and disaster management. The MCA notified that the items under Schedule VII will be broadly and liberally interpreted in the wake of the crisis. Amended the CSR norms to include research and development (R&D) spending on new vaccines and drugs related to COVID-19. The caveat being that such research and developmental activities should be carried out in collaboration with any of the institutions mentioned in item (ix) of Schedule VII of the Act. The reason behind such directions and amendments was solely to redirect the CSR funds for COVID-19 relief. It can, therefore, be seen that the Government is trying to direct CSR funds to sectors that can translate it to a greater impact on society in the present time. Mitra has observed that in a developing country like India, it is in the best interest of both the stakeholders (the Government and the governed) that the Government and the Corporations work together to develop the human capital of the country to bring about a glorious future. This is the rationale behind the development of CSR in developing countries. It is to aid the Government in funding sectors where it cannot invest due to budgetary constraints. Various authors state that CSR should be used for benefiting society in a form of a shared social responsibility as this maximizes social welfare and reduces the negative externality in the largest amount. This approach can therefore be termed as the Impact Approach. With the COVID-19 pandemic ravaging the country, resulting in loss of life and livelihood, it will not be a wrong assumption to make that the Government is following the Impact Approach of CSR usage, by opening up avenues for companies to invest their CSR allocations for COVID-19 eradication efforts to maximize social welfare. Offsetting of negative externality Another approach to CSR is ‘offsetting of negative externality’ or the Stakeholder Theory which differs from the ‘Impact Approach’.The term ‘Negative Externality’ has been defined as the harm that the business transaction of a corporation does to a third party. ‘Offsetting of Negative Externality’ is, therefore, the lessening or the removal of the harms caused to stakeholders of a corporation due to its actions. This approach is governed by the idea that while corporations should invest their CSR for social welfare, at the basic level they are still accountable to their stakeholders first. Hence, the CSR amount should be invested such that the stakeholders, which consist of parties directly and indirectly affected from the working of the company, are benefited. Proposal for the maximum benefit to stakeholders It is proposed that, for the maximum benefit to the stakeholders of a corporation, there must be a confluence between the two principles of impact approach and offsetting of negative externality such that the offsetting of the negative externalities of a corporation can take place with the maximum impact. This resultantly means that a corporation must identify its most negative externality and then, using the impact approach, the company should use the CSR amount where the society can have the greatest welfare. For instance, the most negative externality of a tobacco company would probably be the number of deaths that its product causes by oral cancer. By using the confluence between the Impact Approach and the Stakeholder Theory at this stage, the possible sectors for investment will be considered and the sector where social welfare will be maximized will be invested in. In this case, it will probably be the investment of the CSR amount in an oral cancer institute. The confluence between the two principles will, therefore, help achieve the maximum social welfare while offsetting the corporation’s greatest negative externality.  My proposal for the confluence of the two principles mentioned above is:- There must be an independent impact assessment firm that evaluates the business transactions of a corporation and traces its most negative externality. The corporation must be incentivized to invest in offsetting its most negative externality such that the rationale behind the CSR concept can be realized and the corporation can cause maximal positive impact to the interests of its stakeholders. Proposal for incentivizing corporations and its effect on criminality As mentioned in the previous section, corporations need to be incentivized for investing to offset their greatest negative externality. This can be achieved through the following ways- Double CSR credit (the amount invested will be counted as double for the CSR requirement) should be provided for incentivizing the investment of the corporation to offset its most negative externality. A detailed report regarding the same must be attached to the company’s annual report as prepared by an independent impact assessment firm each year. The cost for hiring

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The Billion Dollar Mistake: An Insight into the Citibank Wire Transfer Case

[By Raj Shekhar and Krati GuptaI] Raj is a student at the National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi and Krati is a student at the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab. The US District Court in the Southern District of New York on 16th February 2021 declared that In the Re Citibank Wire Transfers case, the “discharge-for-value” principle stands applicable and the defendants (the lenders for Revlon Inc.) in the case were entitled to retain funds sent by the plaintiff (Citibank) under a credit facility to which the defendants were a party. The present judgment finds its roots in the precedent established in the 1991 case of Banque Worms v. Bank America International[i] which also involved a similar question of a wire transfer worth $2 million. However, a lot of hue and cry surrounds the matter as the overall reasoning behind the judgment and the potential impact are unclear to the public at large. In light of the above judgment, this article tries to analyze the questions of law involved, the reasoning behind the judgment, and its potential impact on the banking industry wherein the principles deliberated upon in the case are expected to set precedents. The Citibank Case: Background and Factual Matrix In August 2020, Citibank (“the bank”) acted as an administrative agent for a syndicated term loan taken by Revlon, Inc. had intended to wire $7.8 million in interest payments to Revlon’s lenders. However, owing to a human error, the bank not only wired the $7.8 million which constituted Revlon’s interest but along with it the bank also wired an additional amount of nine hundred million dollars ($900 million) of its own money as well. Co-incidentally, the total amount received as a result of such wire transfer was equivalent to the total amount (principal and the incurred interest) which Revlon owed to its lenders. The bank put on the defence that the money was transferred as a result of human error and believing it, some lenders co-operated by returning the money. However, one of the lenders believed that the transfer was intentional and hence, declined to return the money wired to them by the bank. Aggrieved by the denial to return the wired funds, the bank approached the New York Court which to the bank’s dismay ruled in the favour of the lenders. Justifying its stance, the court held that the amount wired “by mistake” was to be held as “final and complete transactions, not subject to revocation” and under no condition can be returned as it was barred under the principle of “discharge-for-value-defence“, which provides that in case of accidental transfers, the lenders can keep the money if it discharges an existing liability and they didn’t know it was an accidental transfer. The New York Court’s Ruling: Understanding ‘discharge-for-value’ Principle The discharge-for-value principle that was used in the case is generally operational in cases where a claim for unjustified enrichment has been made. It discharges the liability of returning the mistaken credit when the beneficiary receives money to which it is entitled, in this case, the principal plus the incurred interest on money lent to Revlon amounted to the wired sum, and hence, has a bonafide belief that it is entitled to such amount and should retain the funds. The beneficiary should not be expected to consider what has to be done with the funds but is expected to consider the transfer of funds as a final transaction. This principle finds its roots in the case of Banque Worms v Bank America. Along with this, Citibank, a leading financial institution in the world, could make a mistake of billions was quoted by the court to be borderline irrational to assume and so the lender cannot be held liable for handling the money with a mala fide intent. The “Unjust Enrichment” Conundrum: What do the Indian Laws Say? As per Section 72 of the India Contract Act, a person to whom a commodity has been delivered or money has been paid by mistake is bound to repay or return it to the person who transferred it mistakenly. In the famous case of Kelly v. Solari[ii], it was held that in cases where the money is paid to another under a mistake of fact that made the transferor believe that the transferee was entitled to the money and the same would not have been paid if the transferor would have known that the fact was a mistaken belief, then there would be a legally valid ground for instituting a suit towards the recovery of such amount as it would be against conscience as well as the law to retain it. In such cases, however careless the party paying may have been, omitting due diligence to inquire into the fact a valid ground for recovery of such money would still stand true. The same precedent was followed in the case of the Imperial Bank of Canada v. Bank of Hamilton[iii]. Further, in the case of Kleinwort v. Dunlop Rubber Co[iv], it was held that if money is paid under a mistake of fact and is re-demanded from the person who received it the same shall be payable to the person demanding such a refund. The Calcutta High Court in Jagdish Prosad Pannalal v. Produce Exchange Corporation[v] had clarified the stance and stated that even though the sum paid under the mistake of fact is recoverable, the same is not true for all cases. In some cases owing to circumstances, a plaintiff may be disentitled by estoppel or other related factors. In other cases of mistaken credit like Union Bank of India v. Surana Bangles, S. Kotrabasappa v. Indian Bank[vi], Ganesh Cotton Traders v. General Manager[vii], UCO Bank, etc. the courts have always ruled in the favour of returning the mistaken credit. However, there has been an exception, and in the case of Metro Exporters (P.) Ltd. v. State Bank of India[viii], where the Apex Court even though it appreciated the right to recover the money

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Corporate Governance in Banks: Need for RBI to Engage Proactively

[By Sourav Kumar and Jyotshna YashaswiI] Sourav is a student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore and Jyotshna is a student at the Chanakya National Law University, Patna. Introduction In the previous few years, the country has witnessed several banks facing an extreme crisis due to the ballooning Non-Performing Assets (NPAs). In 2018, a fraud of almost $2 billion was discovered at the Punjab National Bank. PMC Bank, Yes Bank, and Lakshmi Vilas Bank have almost collapsed, necessitating an intervention from the RBI to control the situation. Although the reasons for these crises are different, there is one common point among all of them, i.e., lack of internal control. In this article, I argue that the overlap between the board of directors (Board) and the management of the bank deteriorates the corporate governance standards in a bank. This overlap may be in a formal sense (through numbers), or in a factual sense (through influence). I will support my claim by proving that recent bank crises in India were a result of the failure of corporate governance caused by an overlap between the Board and the management. I further argue that prevention of such failure of corporate governance requires the RBI to establish an internal pressure mechanism for all banks by appointing nominee directors to the board of banks, in addition to the external regulatory mechanism that RBI exercises currently through various regulations. Failure of Corporate Governance in the Recent Past In March 2020, an excessively large amount of NPAs and constant failure to secure fresh funding prompted the RBI to take over the charge of Yes Bank and supersede its Board. The bank was put under moratorium and the RBI formulated a bailout plan led by the SBI. This crisis at the Yes Bank had been plaguing the bank since 2015 and was concealed from the RBI.  The former CEO of the bank Rana Kapoor engaged in aggressive lending to entities like Reliance Industries, Essel Group, DHFL, etc. which were already stressed and could not secure credit from other banks.[i] This aggressive lending resulted in a large amount of NPA, which was flagged for the first time in 2017-18. In the case of Lakshmi Vilas Bank, directors having substantial shares interfered with the management leading to the granting of loans to the likes of Jet Airways, Religare, CCD, Nirav Modi, etc.[ii] who were already financially stressed. This resulted in the burgeoning of NPAs at the bank, leading to the crisis. In the case of PMC Bank, more than 70% of the loan amount was given to a single entity, HDIL, whose financial credibility was already in question.[iii] All these crises were a result of a very large amount of NPA. The NPA was accumulated as a result of the unethical lending by the banks without properly accounting for the risk factor involved in such lending. The risk appetite of a bank is decided by the Board, and the management runs the bank in line with the risk approach decided by the Board. Therefore, it is clear that such unethical risk-prone lending can only be possible if the corporate governance structure has collapsed. This collapse of corporate governance structure in Yes Bank could be understood from the fact that one of the independent directors of the bank Uttam Prakash Aggarwal had resigned from the board citing corporate governance failure. He stated that there was a complete failure of corporate governance at the Bank as the bank was being run by the managers and not the Board.[iv] The Problem of Overlap between the Board and the Management: Various directors appointed to the Board of a company are also senior management officials of the company. This overlap between the Board and the management allows the executive directors to control or influence the functioning of the board, which was also the case with Yes Bank. Rana Kapoor used his influence to control the independent directors of the Board. On the contrary, in the case of Lakshmi Vilas Bank, the flow of this influence had reversed, where the directors interfered with the management. With respect to PMC Bank, there is no concrete proof to show such influence. However, it is highly improbable for the management to extend 70% of its loans to a single entity without effectively controlling the Board. An overlap, either in a formal or a factual sense, between these two separate organs of a company contradicts the basic principles on which corporate governance of banks is based. The RBI attempts to ensure corporate governance standards in the banks through various regulations. The most important principles on which the RBI regulations are based are ‘Transparency and Disclosure’.[v] Accordingly, the management of a bank should disclose all material information to the Board and maintain transparency. However, if the Board and the management overlap significantly in any manner, then this principle is rendered futile leading to a collapse of the corporate governance structure. The Need for Proactive Engagement by the RBI According to Section 149(4) of the Companies Act, one-third of the directors on the Board of a listed public company should be independent directors (IDs). This requirement for the composition of the Board may be changed by the central government for special classes of companies. The RBI in a recent discussion paper has proposed to tackle this problem of overlapping in a formal sense by proposing that the majority of Board members should be independent directors. It also proposes that the Audit Committee and the Risk Management Committee, the two most important committees of a bank, should comprise of at least two-thirds of independent directors. This proposal will certainly reduce the influence of the management over the Board and its important committees. However, the independence of the Board cannot still be ensured as there would still be some scope to influence the independent directors. This is because the director’s duties are often followed only in letter and not in spirit. The Yes Bank episode is a perfect example to show

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