Author name: CBCL

Supreme Court on Arbitrability of Insolvency Law Disputes: The Case of Indus Biotech

[By Akshita Totla] Akshita is a 4th year law student at the Institute of Law, Nirma University. Recently, the Supreme Court in Indus Biotech Private Limited v Kotak India Venture (26 March, 2021) (Indus Biotech),[i] elaborately discussed the arbitrability of the insolvency law disputes in India. The SC in this case categorically held that post the admission of petition under section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), the dispute would be non-arbitrable.  In this article, the author examines the position of law in India and other major jurisdictions on arbitrability of insolvency matters and concludes by providing possible alternatives to the approach adopted by the SC. Factual Background A dispute arose between Kotak and Indus Biotech in relation to the valuation of Optionally Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares (OCPRS) while they were being converted into equity shares. On account of failure of Indus Biotech in redeeming OCRPS within the stipulated time, Kotak triggered the IBC by filing an application for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). Before the admission of CIRP application, Indus Biotech filed an application under section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), contending that section 7 IBC petition is not maintainable by virtue of the arbitration clause contained in the agreement. NCLT, Mumbai in 2020 allowed an insolvency dispute to be settled by arbitration by dismissing section 7, IBC application filed by Kotak observing that there is no default. In this backdrop, a Special Leave Petition was filed before the SC. The SC observed that where an application seeking reference to arbitration is filed during pendency of section 7, IBC petition, the adjudicating authority needs to first decide upon the maintainability of CIRP application. And upon admission of section 7 IBC petition, any application under section 8 of the Arbitration Act would thereafter be not maintainable. IBC Proceedings are in rem after CIRP application is admitted The insolvency proceedings are proceedings in rem i.e., having effect on the world at large.[ii] The SC in Booz Allen,[iii] categorically held that insolvency matters are non-arbitrable.  To provide more clarity on this issue, the SC in Indus Biotech divided the proceedings into two stages- pre-admission and post-admission stage. In the pre-admission stage, the insolvency proceedings remain in personam. While post the admission of CIRP application, the proceedings become in rem. The SC while referring to Vidya Drolia v Durga Trading Corporation,[iv]  noted that on admission of Section 7, IBC petition, third party rights are created in all the creditors, and the proceedings will have erga omnes effect. Thus, it is only upon admission that the matter would become non-arbitrable. In pre-admission stage wherein, the petition is filed by a financial creditor, the NCLT is only required to ascertain the existence of default. The Corporate Debtor (CD) cannot either contend that the petition is used as a tool to bypass arbitration proceedings or there is a dispute regarding the debt amount. This highlights a lacuna in the current framework which disallows CDs to raise bona fide disputes. In circumstances like that of present case, where the dispute was regarding the interpretation of a contractual clause, arbitration can be used as mechanism for quantifying debt. This would rather provide more clarity on the amount of financial debt. Foreign Jurisprudence In the UK, insolvency proceeding does not bar a party to proceed with arbitration. This position was established in Fulham Football Club Ltd v Richards (2011),[v] where the court of appeal ruled in the favor of arbitrability of shareholder unfair prejudice claim. The court of appeal also observed that arbitrability of insolvency law disputes would depend on the whether the dispute involves third party rights or not. For instance, disputes relating to a) order for the payment of debts owed by the insolvent company; b) determination of assets of the estate; or c) determination of schedule of claims, would affect the third-party creditors and would not be arbitrable. Recently, in Riverrock Securities Limited v International Bank of St. Petersburg (2020),[vi] the English High Court held that avoidance claims brought under the Russian insolvency law were contractual in nature and are hence, arbitrable. The court also noted that “the presumption that an arbitration agreement should not extend to claims which only arise on a company’s insolvency” would not arise in English Insolvency cases. This judgment demonstrates the pro-arbitration approach of the English courts, even in cases involving foreign insolvency law. The courts of the United States, emphasize on the policy favoring commercial arbitration than the domestic notions of arbitrability as stated by Justice Blackman in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. (1985),[vii] In the U.S., the arbitrability depends on whether the matter involves “core” or non-core” issues of insolvency. “Core” bankruptcy proceeding matters are considered non-arbitrable. These proceedings involve determination of rights created by federal bankruptcy law which could only arise in bankruptcy proceedings or a proceeding that could not have existed outside of bankruptcy. On the other hand, in “non-core” matters the court has to compel arbitration. In In re Electric Machinery Enterprises, Inc. (2007),[viii] the eleventh circuit while ordering arbitration held that dispute regarding contractual claim for the money owed was not a “core” proceeding. Furthermore, even if it was a “core” proceeding, there was no evidence indicating that the arbitration proceedings would have conflicted with the object of the Bankruptcy Code. The above-mentioned judgments suggest that the courts of both UK and US have tried to bring coherence in laws and maintain an approach that is consistent with the legislative policy of their respective arbitration laws. The way forward: Is Reconciliation between the IBC and the Arbitration Act Possible? The legislative intent behind the Arbitration Act is to develop arbitration friendly environment in the country. While the IBC aims to rescue corporate debtor within a specified limit by balancing the interest of all the stakeholders involved. Now, the issue here is whether overriding effect of IBC over an arbitration clause based on the consent of the parties, violates the principle of party

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The Proliferation of Stewardship Codes In India – The Need For Revamp

[By Mathangi K ] The author is a student at the Gujarat National Law University. Introduction The idea of a Stewardship Code has gained prominence across the world, with the UK adopting the world’s first Code for its domestic financial market in 2010.[i] The principal objective behind the UK’s adoption of the Stewardship Code was to incentivize its ‘rationally passive’ shareholders to monitor the company’s management, thus helping them become responsible and actively engaged shareholders. Soon after the UK adopted the Code, such Codes proliferated throughout Asia; India followed suit with the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI), the nodal agency for regulating the insurance sector, enacting a set of stewardship guidelines for the insurers in 2017.[ii] This was followed by the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority’s (PFRDA)guidelines for pension funds in India in 2018,[iii] followed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India’s (SEBI)guidelines for mutual funds and alternative investment funds in 2019.[iv]The most recent development is the enactment of procedural guidelines for proxy advisories in India by the SEBI in August 2020.[v] This article aims to explain why the Code will have a minimal impact and may not bring a considerable difference in the Indian corporate governance regime. It traces through the poor implementation and redressal mechanism of the various codes and suggests suitable measures with a view to improving the same. The Problem of Enforcement However, even after the enactment of these Codes, they have been at the center of the debate over their effectiveness and implementation. Globally, the most critical verdict on the Code’s implementation was featured in the FRC’s Kingman Review 2018, which commented that ‘the Code remains simply a driver of boilerplate reporting, serious consideration should be given to its abolition’.[vi] In terms of its enforcement mechanism, the Stewardship Code in India differs largely from the UK’s idea of ‘soft law instrument’. Firstly, there is a lack of a single code in the form of soft law, but instead, several mandatory guidelines have been issued by the regulatory agencies for their respective stakeholders. This extreme fragmentation of codes in India leads to contradictions, both in theory and the enforcement of these codes. For instance, the code issued by the IRDAI is based on the ‘comply-or-explain’ basis. On the other hand,  the code by the PFRDA lays down that the pension funds ‘shall follow’ and the code by SEBI for mutual funds and alternative investment funds lays down that the funds ‘shall mandatorily follow’ the code.  Lastly, the procedural guidelines for proxy advisories lay down that these advisories ‘shall comply’ with these guidelines. Secondly, while these codes lay down the principles, none of these adequately provide for a redressal mechanism or lay down the consequences of violation or non-compliance to the principles indicated in the guidelines. The Feasibility of the Comply-or-Explain Approach The IRDAI’s guidelines for the insurers work on the basis of the ‘comply-or-explain’ approach; wherein, the insurers are required to indicate reasons and justifications for the deviation or non-compliance to the principles enshrined in the guidelines. On the face of it, the comply-or-explain approach has the inherent advantage of tailoring the principles to the unique characteristics of individual companies, thus appearing to be better than the “one size fits all” approach. At the same time, the effectiveness of this approach presupposes the presence of various institutional conditions such as the ownership and control structure, transparency of financial operations of the company, the ability of the shareholders to assess the behavior of companies. All of these factors are an extremely costly as well as challenging task in an emerging economy like India. This approach has proven to be ineffective even in a developed economy such as the United Kingdom; for instance, a study of compliance behavior of firms belonging to the FTSE350 companies in the UK between 1998 to 2004 reports that more than 50% of the companies that did not comply with the corporate governance codes and failed to deliver specific explanations, while more than 15% failed to provide any kind of explanations at all.[vii]This lack of compliance of the entities with the codes and subsequent failure to provide explanations, exposes the little initiative taken by companies for fine-tuning their governance policies since there was hardly any movement towards providing adequate explanations. Further, in this approach, there are two judges to the alternative proposal structures or explanations provided by the insurers- the market and the regulator. Firstly, the market, which encompasses the shareholders, is a costly way of enforcement. The ultimate sufferer due to the fall in the shares’ price is the shareholders themselves, thus becoming counter-intuitive to the purpose for which it was created. Secondly, for the regulator to be the judge can be a challenging task, in an emerging economy like India. The market regulators in India are still in the process of framing governance standards and therefore do not have well established and tested benchmarks against which the sufficiency of the explanations provided by the insurers can be judged. The Lack of an Enforcement Mechanism While the PFRDA’s and SEBI’s guidelines for mutual and alternative investment funds introduce a far more stringent approach to ensure compliance, these fail to lay down a concrete enforcement mechanism. Until today, the consequences faced by an institutional investor upon failure to comply with the code remains a grey area. Consequently, these guidelines will fail to translate into action unless accompanied by a well-established enforcement mechanism. Contrary to these guidelines, the SEBI’s latest guideline for the proxy advisories lays down a concrete enforcement mechanism by adopting specific provisions for establishing a grievance redressal forum. Failure to Regulate International Proxy Advisories The problem with the guidelines for proxy advisories is not its enforceability but rather its exclusion. By way of the code, the regulatory agency seeks to bring only the homegrown proxy advisories under its purview, thus excluding the foreign proxy advisories that continue to play a significant role in the Indian market. For instance, two international proxy advisories – Institutional Shareholder

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Equalization Levy: Concerns Over Taxation on Digital Economy

[By Devansh Jain and Vishal Marakana] The authors are students at the Institute of Law, Nirma University. In 2017, the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) came up with an action plan to tax the companies which operate digitally in any country without having any actual physical presence in that country. The main aim was to tax the companies which transact digitally and avoid tax in the host country. Since, there was no appropriate mechanism, the concept of Equalization levy was introduced in India through the Finance Act of 2016, which targets companies operating digitally.  Although the Finance Act, 2016 (‘the Act’) introduced Equalization Levy only to target and tax the specified payments pertaining to online digital advertisements, in 2020, an amendment was made to the Act which expanded its scope immensely The broadened concept of Equalization Levy under this amendment stated that the consideration received/receivable by the E-commerce provider from services or products rendered by digital means will be taxed at 2%. The 2020 amendment was obscure and wide in scope, for which the parliament brought in various clarifications in the 2021 budget. However, those clarifications ramified the concerns over the amendment furthermore. In this article, we have discussed the issues with these clarifications to the amendment. Extensive and Inexplicit Clarifications The clarification regarding the ambit of equalization levy stated that the consideration received/receivable from E-commerce supplies or services shall include the consideration for the sale of goods or services irrespective of whether the non-resident E-Commerce Operator owns or provides them. This clarification crucially affects the non-resident E-commerce operators since now they are required to pay tax on the entire value of the goods or services, instead of the commission which they actually receive. Let us understand this with an illustration, an E-Commerce Operator based outside India is a platform to book movie tickets, which deducts 10% commission on each transaction. Now, a person books a ticket for a movie shown at PVR cinemas and pays INR 200 for the same. In this scenario, E-Commerce Operator’s commission is INR 20 and the Equalization Levy which is to be charged on the entire transaction value is INR 4. Hence, the E-Commerce Operator is charged with 20% of the commission earned by it. From the illustration made above it can be observed that the E-Commerce Operator is not exactly earning 10% commission from the transaction. This makes it burdensome for the E-Commerce Operator which merely acts as an intermediary between the customer and the service provider. Rationally, the charge on the entire value of goods or services provided through the E-Commerce Operator seems preposterous. Ideally, the Equalization Levy shall be levied only on the commission received by the E-commerce operator, rather than on the entire transaction value. The clarification is so ambiguous that the wording of provision “consideration received/receivable” creates a deeming fiction on the E-Commerce Operator to pay 2% of the Equalization Levy which might turn out to be unwarranted. In a situation where a transaction is made between two parties via a third-party application (messaging app/email), even if the third-party application is only acting as a communication channel and does not charge any commission, it would be liable to pay Equalization Levy on the transaction value. Ambiguity Regarding Approach to the Authority for Advance Ruling The Authority for Advance Ruling aids a non-resident in arranging his operations which are subject to payment of tax and facilitates in assessing the tax liability on future transactions. However, the Finance Act 2016, does not provide any provision regarding the Authority for Advance Ruling in the context of Equalization Levy. The clarification which amended Section 10(50) of the Income-tax Act, provides that, when tax is paid in the form of Equalization Levy, the assessee is exempted from paying any other tax under the Income Tax Act. Now under Section 10(50), a party might approach the Authority for Advance Ruling to determine whether it can claim an exemption under Section 10(50) or is subject to the provisions of Equalization Levy. On the contrary, Authority for Advance Ruling does not have any authority to adjudicate on the matters relating to Equalization Levy. Possibility of Double Taxation The provisions of the Equalization Levy were brought under the Finance Act, instead of the Income Tax Act, so that the party cannot claim benefits of the accommodating provisions of either the Income Tax Act or the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements.  However, this action of the parliament has its own consequence; the claim for deduction against the tax obligation of Equalization Levy might be denied in a resident country of non-resident E-Commerce Operator, which would result in payment of double taxation by the E-Commerce Operator. Potential to Hinder Extra-territorial Operations The ambit of Equalization Levy is vast enough that it covers all the transactions which take place through an Indian IP address.  Cases wherein a non-resident transact through a non-resident E-commerce Operator using an Indian IP address can also fall within the ambit of Equalization Levy. Conclusion The Covid-19 pandemic has caused a huge disruption on the business entities, adding onto that, the extra burden of the Equalization Levy tax compliance will lead to the shifting of onus by the operators to customers. The Equalization Levy was introduced by OECD as a measure to collect the tax which was otherwise not collected, to formulate a system in which there are fewer deviations and fewer compliance costs, but due to lack of proper guidelines and clarifications, this has become nothing but an additional compliance cost for the E-Commerce operators. On one side, the Government wants to reel in foreign investment for which it has proposed various incentives, such as Special Economic Zones, exemption on the duty of import, income tax, and VAT exemptions, etc, on the other side, the Government has introduced Equalization Levy to charge tax on non-resident E-commerce Operators which is arduous, flawed and terribly irregular.

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Swiss-Challenge Model under Pre-Packs: The Position of Operational Creditors

[By Damini Chouhan and Vinisha Jain] The authors are fourth-year students at the Institute of Law, Nirma University, Ahmedabad. Introduction The Indian Insolvency Law Committee (hereinafter “ILC”) believes that pre-pack models must be introduced as an alternative to Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (hereinafter “CIRP”) to ease the insolvency process. ILC formed the Sub-Committee of the Insolvency Law Committee on Pre-packaged Insolvency Resolution Process (hereinafter “sub-committee”). This sub-committee proposed a pre-pack model to the government in October 2020. A pre-packaged insolvency resolution process can be encapsulated as follows. First, it will be available for insolvency resolution as a supplementary method along with CIRP but it shall not run parallel to it. Second, the process commences when the promoters submit a base plan after completion of other formalities. In order to upgrade the value of the Corporate Debtor (hereinafter “CD”), a model of Swiss Challenge has been introduced wherein the base plan submitted by the promoters may or may not be opened to a bid. To begin with, the base plan will have to be necessarily opened to Swiss Challenge if it does not propose to pay the Operational Creditors (hereinafter “OCs”) of the CD in full. On the contrary, if the base plan proposes to pay the OCs in full, the Committee of Creditors (hereinafter “CoC”) is free to decide according to its commercial wisdom whether or not this base plan shall be opened to a Swiss Challenge. Evidently, the optional approaches of the Swiss Challenge are the deciding factors for the outcome of the entire process. These approaches in turn are dependent on the payment proposed to be made to the OCs. Though protection has been imparted to OCs, the protection is hinged upon certain assumptions. This article, therefore, analyzes this provision in light of its probable fallouts and the importance of OCs. The Proposed Swiss-Challenge Model Swiss Challenge is a bidding process where each applicant makes a better offer than the existing one,  to secure the contract. It would now be introduced to the insolvency resolution process as well. As mentioned above, the proposed provision which is based on the payment to the OCs presents a binary approach with respect to the Swiss Challenge. The CoC has been made responsible to act in this respect according to the following two situations: first where the base plan proposes to pay the OCs in full and second where the base plan does not propose to make good the entire claim of the OCs. In the first scenario, the CoC has the choice to decide whether or not the base plan will be opened to Swiss Challenge and if CoC feels that it suffices in terms of value, CoC may accept the base plan and not open it to Swiss Challenge. On the other hand, if it feels that the base plan does not give the best value, the CoC applying its commercial wisdom may open it to the Swiss Challenge. Hence, in either case, the entire claim of OCs is protected irrespective of whether the base plan is opened to Swiss Challenge or not. In the second scenario, where the base plan does not propose to make good the entire debt owed to the OCs, the CoC has to mandatorily open the base plan to Swiss Challenge. A single round of bidding would take place and the plan that offers the best value shall proceed further in the process. The promoters shall be given a chance to match their base plan to such a competing plan. It is not necessary that the value escalation in the plan that is finally accepted reaches a stage where the entire claim of OCs is covered. Nevertheless, the OCs have to be paid the minimum liquidation value or no plan will be accepted and the pre-pack would close without consequence. Scope of Improvement In both scenarios, payment of at least the liquidation value to OCs is guaranteed incongruity with the existing CIRP Regulations.[i] Sadly, the liquidation value is generally way too less than what is owed to the OCs. The case of Maharashtra Seamless Limited v. Padmanabhan Venkatesh & Ors is an illustration of such situations where the liquidation value is not even close to the claimed amount. ILC acknowledged this issue in its 2018 Report, but it did not suggest any amendments due to the following reasons. First, even though the liquidation value is the mandate, it was observed that what the OCs actually receive is way above the liquidation value in most cases. Second, when the OCs receive a very less amount, it is in cases where the stress on the CD is extremely high. Third, no representations or evidence that suggest otherwise could be found. Hence, it decided to continue with the status quo, despite the fact that current law provides an inherent scope to the CoC and Resolution Applicants to lawfully leave the OCs with only a meager payout. It seems like ILC is turning a blind eye to a bomb just because it has not exploded. Similarly, just because there is no prima facie evidence of inequitable treatment, does not mean that such treatment is not there. Therefore, even if the faith of ILC in the maturity of CIRP is to be relied upon, the same cannot be said for pre-packs. It would be unwise to continue with the same position of law for the pre-packs regime as well, presuming that pre-packs would work out the same way as CIRP. Moreover, given the role of OCs as suppliers of working capital, in order for a CD to continue as a ‘going concern’, the aim should not just be to protect the OCs but also to incentivize them. Conclusion & Suggestions In both the scenarios of the Swiss Challenge model, the position of the OCs can be further strengthened or they will remain aloof from the value escalation or additional benefits that pre-packs offer. An express provision mandating equitable payouts to all the creditors in cases of abnormal profits or

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Dynamic Jurisdiction in Income Tax Cases: A Recipe for Arbitrariness

[By Sagnik Sarkar] The author is a student at the Tamil Nadu National Law University. Introduction In her 2019 Union Budget speech, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitaram announced the introduction of a ‘faceless e-assessment’ scheme in income tax matters, to curb unsavory practices which arise out of the physical contact traditionally required between the Income Tax Department and taxpayers in assessment proceedings. The highlight of this scheme is the elimination of the human interface through the use of technology: the Assessing Officer and the taxpayer will not interact with each other directly, and the identity of the Assessing Officer will not be revealed to the taxpayer. The scheme was given legislative backing through, amendments to the Income Tax Act, and the subsequent notification of the E-Assessment Scheme, 2019 under the newly inserted Sections of the Act. This scheme was met with widespread approbation and soon became quite successful. The success of the E-Assessment Scheme seems to have prompted the Central Government to extend the core feature of this scheme, the elimination of the direct human interface between the Department and the taxpayer, to other income tax proceedings. Through amendments to the Income Tax Act, and the subsequent notifications of the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2020  and the Faceless Penalty Scheme, 2021 under the newly-inserted Sections of the Act, the Central Government has introduced similar mechanisms for dealing with statutory appeals to Appellate Commissioners and adjudicating penalties imposed under the Act. Now, in the 2021 Union Budget speech, the Finance Minister has made a commitment to introduce a similar faceless mechanism for the adjudication of matters before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). A common, and central, feature of all the faceless mechanisms in question, the system of ‘dynamic jurisdiction’, seems to suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality due to manifest arbitrariness. The New System of ‘Dynamic Jurisdiction’ Until the introduction of the system of ‘dynamic jurisdiction’, assessment proceedings, appellate proceedings before Appellate Commissioners, and penalty proceedings, were required to be conducted by designated Department officials with territorial jurisdiction over the taxpayer in question. [i] The Central Government, by notifying the E-Assessment Scheme, the Faceless Appeal Scheme, and the Faceless Penalty Scheme, has now replaced this requirement with a system of ‘dynamic jurisdiction’. Under the new system, a computerized system randomly allocates every stage of an assessment proceeding, an appeal to the Appellate Commissioner, and a penalty proceeding, to different units across the country. It is no longer necessary for a jurisdictional Department official to conduct the proceedings in question. Hence, by way of example, it is theoretically possible, and quite probable, for the assessment proceeding of a taxpayer resident in Kolkata to commence at a unit in Delhi, continue at a unit in Hyderabad, and conclude at a unit in Chennai. Analogous factual situations can arise in cases of appellate proceedings before Appellate Commissioners, and penalty proceedings, too. This system of dynamic jurisdiction appears to fall foul of the constitutional guarantee of the right to equality before the law in Article 14 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Infirmity of ‘Dynamic Jurisdiction’ Earlier, under Section 256 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, Benches of the ITAT could statutorily refer questions of law arising in matters before it to the territorial High Court for adjudication. Now, decisions of ITAT Benches can be statutorily appealed to the jurisdictional High Court only on substantial questions of law, under Section 260A of the Act. Additionally, there is always the possibility of making a constitutional challenge to every stage of an income tax proceeding before the High Court. This has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in Nagendra Nath Bora (1958). Consequently, income tax proceedings, in various stages, are frequently challenged before the jurisdictional High Courts. This was recognized by the Law Commission in its 115th Report of Tax Courts (1986). Thus, the High Courts frequently express their opinion on diverse questions of Income Tax Law. The decision of a High Court, on a question of Income Tax Law, is binding on the income tax authorities within its jurisdiction: including Assessing Officers, Appellate Commissioners, and the regional Bench of the ITAT. This has been held by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, notably in East India Commercial Co. Ltd. (1962). Similarly, points of law in the decisions of regional Benches of the ITAT, and the Appellate Commissioners, are binding on income-tax authorities subordinate to them in their jurisdiction. This too is a well-established position of law confirmed in a number of cases, notably Kamalakshmi Finance Corporation Ltd. (1991). Thus, in summation, the decision of a High Court on a question of Income Tax Law percolates down and ultimately binds, every income tax authority within its territorial jurisdiction, including the regional Bench of the ITAT. In practice, High Courts frequently take contradictory views on the same, or similar, the question[s] of income Tax Law. This was very astutely recognized by the Law Commission in its 115th Report of Tax Courts (1986). Consequently, income tax authorities in one part of the country are bound to reach a different conclusion compared to their peers in another part of the country, on questions of law in respect of which the territorial High Courts in question differ. This practical reality creates a serious constitutional infirmity in the system of ‘dynamic jurisdiction’. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before law. In E.P. Royappa (1973) and Maneka Gandhi (1978), the Supreme Court has held that equality cannot co-exist with arbitrariness. Thus, it has been held by the Supreme Court in Shayara Bano (2017) and Navtej Singh Johar (2018), when a statutory provision is manifestly arbitrary, it will be unconstitutional. In Shayara Bano, the Supreme Court has recognized that the clinching indicator of manifest arbitrariness, is a distinction made without adequate determining principle. The system of ‘dynamic jurisdiction’ randomly allocates every income tax proceeding, and every stage of them each, to officials across the country. Randomness, by definition, is characterized by the lack of a determining principle. Hence, for no reason at

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Faceless Income Tax Appellate Tribunal: A Shot In The Dark

[By Yash Jain and Jaskaran Singh Saluja] The authors are students at the Institute of Law, Nirma University, Ahmedabad. Introduction The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (“ITAT”) is referred to as the ‘Mother Tribunal‘ for being the oldest tribunal in the country. For years the ITAT has been discharging its role admirably and effectively. In view to transforming the taxation regime, the Commissioner of Income Tax (“CIT”) was made faceless. Subsequently, to reduce the cost of compliance, increase transparency and utilize resources efficiently, the Finance Bill, 2021 (“Bill”) proposes a National Faceless ITAT Centre. Clause 78 of the Bill shall be inserted by the Central government to dispose of appeals by the ITAT. The said clause seeks to amend Section 255 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“Act”) that provides for the powers and procedure of the ITAT. The amendment will impart greater efficiency, transparency, and accountability to eliminate the interface between the ITAT and related parties. That means all procedures relating to ITAT shall now be carried out electronically. The faceless ITAT could broadly accelerate the rate at which disputes are settled. Apart from saving time and expenses, this system will bring more transparency and speedy justice to the litigants. However, a deeper analysis reveals flaws in the design and implementation of the new arrangement. The Bill heralds in the appearance of the supposed faceless Tribunal. The faceless ITAT raises certain legal ambiguities and concerns for the taxpayers regarding the nature and working of the structure. In this article, the authors will discuss numerous incongruities enduring while the proposition of faceless ITAT comes into the picture. These inconsistencies include the violation of the fundamental rule of conducting oral hearings in ITAT, transgression of natural justice principle and ITAT being the final fact-finding authority. To conclude, the authors believe that such the proposition of establishing faceless ITAT is a serious attack against the autonomy of the judicial capacity. Discrepancies in the Proposition of Faceless ITAT a)    Oral Hearing as a Fundamental Canon The legal apparatus over the world are broadly categorized into two types, i.e., Common law system and Civil law system. The Common Law Nations emphasize oral hearings and evidence and rely on cross-examination of witnesses, whereas, the Civil Law Nations emphasize written communication and evidence during the proceedings. As traced from the evolution of the Indian legal society, India has embraced the Common law system from the pre-independence era, which consequently affirms the strong rationale and opinion of the Indian judiciary to prevail the oral hearing and cross-examination over the written procedure. The same is also held by the Supreme Court in the case of Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India & Ors. Further, the faceless evaluation has an intrinsic issue of one-sided communication and the absence of interaction. It is apposite to say that written communications are made with a few presumptions that the receiver would comprehend what is tried to be told by the sender, as everybody evaluates his response based on his own grasp. This may create huge misunderstandings merely because of the inability to effectively explain a point of fact, whereas, in the case of oral hearings, it can be clarified through open discussions and thereby, consuming lesser time. Numerous landmark judicial pronouncements have upheld the significant value of oral hearing as a fundamental standard in our Indian legal system. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, the Constitution bench of nine judges of the Supreme Court has well-settled that “all the cases brought before the courts, whether civil, criminal, or others, must be heard in open court. A public trial in open court is undoubtedly essential for the healthy and fair administration of justice and also serves as a powerful instrument for creating confidence of the public in the fairness of Indian judiciary”. The bench further held that “public confidence in the administration of justice is of such great significance that there can be no two opinions on the broad proposition that in discharging their functions as judicial tribunals, courts must generally hear causes in open and must permit the public admission to the court-room”. The Apex court has also relied on the same rationale while passing the judgment in the matter of Pradyuman Bisht v. Union of India & Ors., wherein the court peculiarly directed the learned Additional Solicitor General to take up the matter pertaining to the installation of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras in the tribunals such as ITAT, where the open hearing takes place in the same manner as it happens in courts because the Tribunals stand tantamount to courts as far as the object of installing CCTV cameras is concerned. Moreover, in the P. N. Eswara Iyer v. The Registrar, Supreme Court of India, the observations of the Supreme court are a jewel in the crown. The court strongly affirmed that oral hearing is a judicial process in the Indian legal system that is actively functional when there is the presence of viva-voce and it weakens if presented in written or printed form. Therefore, the orality in proceedings cannot be offered a permanent holiday. Notably, Rule 29 of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2017, clearly denotes that the suits before the tribunal shall be heard in open court and it’s on the discretion of the Tribunal to decide that the proceedings in the exceptional situation will not be heard in an open tribunal. However, by the introduction of faceless ITAT, what was earlier the exception will now be the rule. However, the proposed initiation of the national faceless ITAT has completely deviated from the well-established concept of the oral hearing in the Indian judiciary which will be rendered as a departure from the Common law tradition of the Indian legal system. b)    Contravention of Natural Justice Principle One of the most celebrated principles of natural justice is audi alteram partem i.e. no one will be judged without ‘fair hearing’. It has two facets: firstly, an opportunity to make a representation must be given,

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Revisiting the Second Proviso to Section 7(1), IBC, 2016: In Re Manish Kumar Ruling

[By Pranav Karwa and Gaurav Karwa] Pranav is a student at the National Law University, Jodhpur and Gaurav is a student at the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences. Recently, in the case of Manish Kumar v Union of India (“Manish Kumar Ruling”), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of all the provisos added to Section 7(1) of the IBC, 2016 (“Code”) via the  IBC Amendment Act, 2020 (“the Amendment”). The second proviso to Section 7(1) of the Code introduced a new threshold for filing an application to initiate CIRP by Home-Buyers. As per the proviso, the allottees under a real estate project can apply to initiate the CIRP process only if not less than 100 allottees file it under the same real estate project or one-tenth of the total number of allottees under the same real estate project, whichever is lower. Various writ petitions were filed by real-estate creditors challenging the constitutionality of the Amendment, including the provisos added to Section 7(1) of the Code. The primary allegation in these petitions was that the Second and Third proviso to Section 7(1) violates Article 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. It was also alleged that the impugned provisos are in clear violation of the Supreme Court verdict in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. and Anr v. Union of India as in that case, it was observed that Home-Buyers are deemed financial creditors without any restriction imposed on them for initiating CIRP. The authors highlight the key observations by the Supreme Court in Manish Kumar Ruling and in the backdrop of this decision, examine the utility of the Second Proviso to Section 7(1). The authors conclude by suggesting certain better alternatives which comprehensively address the mischief sought to be resolved by the Second Proviso to Section 7(1). Manish Kumar Ruling While setting aside the petitioners’ arguments in the Manish Kumar Ruling, the Supreme Court observed that there is no real discrimination against Home-Buyers. The Court opined that an intelligible differentia exists between Home-Buyers and other financial creditors as there is the heterogeneity, numerosity, and individuality in decision-making in the case of Home-Buyers. In the Court’s view, the Second Proviso to Section 7(1) of the Code acts as a deterrent for individual homebuyers filing frivolous claims before the NCLT. Thus, the Apex Court held that the Second Proviso to Section 7(1) of the Code is constitutionally valid and just because the proviso causes some inconvenience and difficulties to the Home-Buyers is not reason enough to strike it down. Overall, the Manish Kumar Ruling is a major setback for Home-Buyers who want to initiate a CIRP under Section 7(1) of the Code, individually or in small groups. However, on a positive note, the Court has clarified that not all the Home-Buyers, applying under Section 7(1), must have pending dues against real-estate project developers. It will be enough if the total dues satisfy the threshold limit of ₹1 crore. Examining the Utility of Second Proviso to Section 7(1) It is the view of the authors that the Second Proviso to Section 7(1) of the Code was not necessary in light of the already existing safeguards in the Code which prevent initiation of CIRP by frivolous claims Various concerns of the project developers could have been addressed by alternate mechanisms, which were not taken into account by the Court in the Manish Kumar Ruling. There are safeguard mechanisms already existent under the Code to ensure that there is a check on mala fide applications, where a single home buyer intends to change the real estate developer’s management. For instance, penalties ranging from ₹1 lakh to ₹1 crore on fraudulent or malicious initiation of proceedings are provided under Section 65 of the Code. Further, as held in Naveen Raheja v Shilpa Jain & Ors, the NCLT also reserves the power to impose additional costs on such mala fide applications. Moreover, Section 75 of the Code envisages a penalty ranging from ₹1 lakh to ₹1 crore in the scenario where the financial creditor under Section 7(1) omits to disclose any material fact in the application. Thus, merely the fact that a single real estate allottee is filing a complaint does not mean that the Code is being used as a debt recovery mechanism, as there already exist sufficient safeguards to ensure that the NCLT does not entertain the malicious application. Furthermore, an observation by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Urban gives more power and discretion to the NCLT to filter patently frivolous and malicious applications; the Court said that “when a home buyer makes an application, the NCLT’s satisfaction will be with both eyes open – the NCLT will not turn Nelson’s eye to genuine defenses raised by real estate developers.”  Moreover, it was also observed by the Supreme Court that as soon as the tribunal admits an application, it becomes a proceeding in rem from a proceeding in persona. Therefore, after the initiation of the proceeding, the entire matter goes out of the individual allottees’ control and becomes a collective action. In this light, the fear that an individual Home-Buyer may use the Code to force the real estate developer’s liquidation is unfounded and without any backing. This is because, after the constitution of the Committee of Creditors, the issue of whether liquidation or corporate restructuring is to take place is decided collectively by voting in the Committee of Creditors. Lastly, the Second Proviso is not an unambiguous provision free of all anomalies. For instance, that the Amendment, introducing the Second Proviso to Section 7(1), does not clarify as to whether the prescribed limit of 100 or 10% of the total number of allottees, whichever is less, is to be satisfied only at the stage of initiation of CIRP or whether it must be maintained throughout the proceedings. The consequence of such ambiguity is that the real-estate developers will take advantage of the same and may strike an out-of-court settlement with one or more allottees, rendering the proceedings infructuous.

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Enlarging the Judicial Blanket: Analysis of the Consumer Protection Act 2019

[By Varda Saxena] The author is a student at the Jindal Global Law School. Introduction The Consumer Protection Act (CPA) of 1986 was established to fulfill the obligations entailed under the General Assembly’s resolution[i] to adopt consumer protection regulations across signatory countries. Certain amendments to the Act were being deliberated in the parliament since 2014, and it was only in 2020 that the amendment bill came into force.[ii] The Act entails eight chapters covering the provisions related to consumer rights, consumer protection councils, central consumer protection authority, consumer dispute redressal commission, mediation, product liability, offenses and penalties, and powers of Central Government and State Government to make rules and powers of the Central Authority and National Commission to make regulations. The new Act decreases the threshold for sellers and has emphasized caveat venditor. However, various conundrums arise as to the applicability of the provisions on healthcare and the legal profession. Even though the Act does not negate the relevance of the judicial enunciations in Indian Medical Association v V.P. Shantha, the article analyses the repercussions of the amendments and the possible benefits which can be accrued from the same. New Changes in the Act One of the much-needed benefits which a complainant seeks is expeditious redressal of complaints. Section 13 (3A) of the Act provides for disposal of cases within 90 days where no analysis or lab testing of the products is required. Where testing of products is needed, the disposal of the case can be done in 150 days. In reality, cases run for many years, and this clause is often breached. According to the Consumer Protection Act amendment in 2002, adjournments should be allowed in exceptional circumstances, and if given, the court should record the reasons for it in writing and justify it.[iii] The table presented in Kapoor’s research entails a lack of presiding officers and disposal of cases in the previous years. By expanding each commission’s jurisdiction, it is apprehended that a significant loosening will be witnessed in the redressal system. The Act increases the pecuniary jurisdiction of District commissions from 20 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore, State Commission’s jurisdiction from Rs. 1 Crore to 10 Crores, and the National Commission’s jurisdiction above Rs. 10 Crore, according to Sections 34, 47, and 58 of the Act. The insertion of these provisions clarifies the ambiguity created by the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla v. Ferrous Infrastructure. The judgment stated that the jurisdiction must be determined based on the aggregate value of goods and services and used an illustration to buttress the same. The court stated that if an apartment costing Rs. 1 crore has defects worth Rs. 5 Lakhs only, then the value allocated will be Rs. 1 Crore and not Rs. 5 lakh for labeling the jurisdiction. However, this judgment allowed complainants to skip stages of various forums which resided in conflict with Section 14 of the CPA. The Section envisages that the Central Authority has powers to monitor procedures for transaction of its business and allocate such business to the Chief Commissioner and other such Commissioners. Further, the Chief Commissioner has the powers to delegate work related to the administration of the Central Authority and is responsible for matters of general superintendence.  Therefore, the computation of goods’ value has to be based on defects only, not their aggregate value.[iv] Further, the case would have proved to be a better precedent if a reference was made to Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, according to which the value of the suit is determined according to the court fees. Section 7 of the Court Fees Act and Section 34 of the CPC would have aided the bench in setting out the interest amount. However, the new law is based on the consideration paid and not the aggregate value of goods, clearing the confusion surrounding pecuniary jurisdictions. Protection from Puffery The amendments introduced in the Act of 2019 also include a widened definition of a consumer, e-filing of complaints, establishment of central consumer protection authority, safeguards upholding privacy, alternate dispute redressal mechanisms, and penalties for misleading advertisements. Recently, the manufacturers of Dhathri Hair Oil and actor Anoop Menon were penalized for advertising that the hair oil guarantees hair growth within six weeks of usage of this oil.[v] A comparison can be drawn with Carbolic Smoke Ball Company’s case. It was held that such a statement would not amount to a puff, but a valid offer, which, if accepted by any individual, would bind the offeror. In cases such as these, the Act has envisaged a provision for class action suits as well, within Section 18 and 19 of the Act. Apart from tricking consumers in the garb of puffs, the Act also ensures protection against differential or discriminatory pricing done by e-commerce websites. To bolster the Act, Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (NDI Rules), also prohibit such differential pricing under S. No. 15.2.3 of Schedule 1 of the NDI Rules. The Enforcement Directorate registered the case of Telecom Watchdog v Union of India against Amazon and Flipkart due to the same, and such differential pricing could also be adjudicated under Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002. Rule 4(11) of the e-commerce Rules should be read alongside Section 2 (41) of the Consumer Protection Act as differential pricing and discriminatory behavior is a restricted trade practice under the Act. The Act has made the usage of a customer’s electronic footprint to charge different costs[vi] an offense under the Act. However, profiling to monitor behavioral patterns for customized advertising and product display has not been interfered with. Such profiling techniques are used by tech giants such as Instagram and Facebook to compile metadata and prepare efficient algorithms for mapping user experience and commodifying the time spent by them using the application.[vii] Increased Threshold for Practitioners The CPA may have avoided the issue of profiling but has overall intended to be overtly and covertly consumer-friendly. Such a statute has also increased the threshold of the standard of

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Out of Touch with Realty: The Tale of Union Budget & Circle Rate Reforms

[By Samridhi] The author is a student at Law Centre-1, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. The Union Budget 2021-22 has brought with itself a further increase in the safe harbour limit provided to the real estate in instances where a sale is affected under the value which, as per Section 43CA and Section 50C, is ‘adopted, assessed or assessable by any authority of a State Government’ in order to pay the assigned stamp duty on the sale. Such a value ‘adopted, assessed or assessable’ is also known as circle rate or guideline rate. This is the Government’s third attempt to boost the real estate sector. The first such increase in the safe harbour was enacted by Finance Act 2018 by providing a safe limit of 5% through the amendments of Section 43CA and Section 50C. Finance Act 2020 increased it to 10% and the Finance Act 2021 has increased it further to 20%. Though the real estate sector is joyous at this gift from the Central Government but the celebration remains short-lived as the abovementioned safe harbour limit will only last until June 2021. The Government’s explanation behind bringing forth such increases is to provide an incentive to the middle class to invest in the real estate sector, hence, the cap of Rs. 2 crores have been imposed. But in such circumstances, it remains pertinent to analyse whether such amendments will truly bring forth the change expected in the short span of time or will it remain an empty promise. Background Section 43CA was brought forth by Finance Act, 2013, in effect since April 1, 2014. It provided that if an immovable property is sold below the circle rate for the purposes of stamp duty valuation, then the sale will be considered to be at the circle rate for computation of income under ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’. On the other hand, Section 50C was enacted through Finance Act, 2002, and in effect since April 1, 2003. This section provides a legal fiction whereby if an immovable property is sold below the circle rate then for the purposes of stamp duty valuation, the circle rate will be deemed to be the value of the sale. Both the sections were enacted by the government with an agenda of curbing the involvement of black money in the real estate sector, which continued to be in circulation through practices such as undervaluation of property and to seek an increase in revenue collection from the real estate sector. Given the volatile and diverse nature of the real estate sector, the State Governments were given the liberty to decide on the valuation of the property for the purposes of arriving at the circle rate, which is the minimum rate at which the property must be sold in a given area. This liberty has been exploited by the State Governments to invent their own formulas through Valuation Officer for deciding the circle rate and the ‘fair market value’, which remains the current market value for a property. This practice provided a huge disparity between the ‘fair market value’, decided by a Valuation Officer to be the actual market rate, and the ‘assessed value’. In some areas, the circle rate far exceeded the actual market rate while in some areas the circle rate remained far below the actual market rate. Though the liberty given to the State Governments was done in an attempt to accommodate the volatility of the real estate sector but the practice of reviewing such rates at a period of 3 to 5 years has led to the stagnancy of the real estate sector. Thus, in an attempt to energize the sector that the government initiated the reform in 2018 by providing a ‘safe harbour limit’. The limit denotes the breathing space to the sector as it provides them the much-needed elbow space to negotiate with the buyers. Analysis But the sections remain riddled with several other ailments which have led to an increase in litigation and undue hardships. A sale of immovable property involves a factual matrix that remains unique to each and every case. This uniqueness finds no accommodation in the provisions. It is a usual circumstance in our country where for the purposes of marriage or to relieve the debt on a family, the property is sold at any rate available to the seller. This provides the seller with a double whammy, as not only he is forced to sell the property at a lower price but, as per Section 43CA, he also bears the burden of being taxed for the differential sum between the circle rate and the transaction amount that he never earned. While Section 56(2)(x), which was enacted through Finance Act 2017, provides the same burden on the buyer, where the tax is levied on the notional value when the immovable property is acquired on a price below the fair market value price. The rigidity of the sections was noted by the Delhi High Court in CTA Apparels Pvt. Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi Collector of Stamps, where the High Court stated that the circle rate is only a guidance and not the sole factor for determining the value of the property. Moreover, the circulation of black money in the real estate sector has not been curbed by these reforms/ This is due to the huge disparity in the market rate and the circle rate. For instance in the case of Delhi, the rates in areas such as Panchsheel Park, Vasant Vihar, et al remain below the circle rate and in other areas the rates remain far above the circle rate. The State governments such as Delhi & Maharashtra are beginning to take steps to help provide some leeway to the real estate sector by bringing in much-needed reforms through reduction of the circle rate or reduction in stamp duty value. This disparity in the prices in the same State only provides further evidence to the fact that the reforms have been

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