Author name: CBCL

Whether Consultants like Doctors can be issued ESOPs

[By Arham Anwar & Suvanwesh Das] The authors are students of the National Law University, Jodhpur and the National Law University, Odisha. Introduction We have always seen doctor’s job as a noble profession but with changing times new questions of law have evolved and new dynamics have been added to supposedly simple concepts. This article seeks to address the issue of whether consultants like doctors can be issued ESOPs under provisions of Companies Act, 2013. This question is especially pertinent because after the COVID-19 pandemic the world has seen rapid emergence of companies providing health care and pathological services. Thus, new complexities have arisen as to whether doctors employed by these companies can be treated as an “employee” .Also if they come under the ambit of employees then can they be given all the benefits that employees of any company are eligible to. The article will first discuss the legal provisions pertaining to ESOPs and the definition of employee(s) under different legislations andthen  relevant case laws will also be taken into consideration as to whether doctors can come under the ambit of employee(s) and finally conclude with our findings. Legal Provisions Pertaining to ESOPs Employees Stock option is defined under Section 2(37) of the Companies Act, 2013 as an “option given to the directors, officers or employees of a company or of its holding company or subsidiary company or companies, if any, which gives such directors, officers or employees, the benefit or right to purchase, or to subscribe for, the shares of the company at a future date at a pre-determined price”. Rule 12 of Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 talks about of issue of employee stock options-“A company, other than a listed company, which is not required to comply with Securities and Exchange Board of India Employee Stock Option Scheme Guidelines shall not offer shares to its employees under a scheme of employees’ stock option (hereinafter referred to as “Employees Stock Option Scheme”), unless it complies with the following requirements, namely:-(1) the issue of Employees Stock Option Scheme has been approved by the shareholders of the company by passing a special resolution. Explanation: For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 62 and this rule ‘‘Employee’’ Means a permanent employee of the company who has been working in India or outside India; or a director of the company, whether a whole-time director or not but excluding an independent director; or an employee as defined in clauses (a) or (b) of a subsidiary, in India or outside India, or of a holding company of the company but does not include- an employee who is a promoter or a person belonging to the promoter group; or a director who either himself or through his relative or through any body corporate, directly or indirectly, holds more than ten percent of the outstanding equity shares of the company” As per section 62(1) (b) of the Companies Act, an unlisted private limited company can issue further shares to employees under the scheme of Employees Stock Option (“ESOPs”), pursuant to a special resolution. If we look at Rule 12 of (Share and Debentures) Rules 2014 it clearly says that ESOPs can only be issued to an employee and Rule 12(1) goes on to define who can be called an employee. A plain reading of Rule 12 (1)(c) of the same talks about entities which are not to be counted as an employee and after reading all these provisions we can very well conclude that doctors can come under the ambit of employee under Rule 12 of (Share and Debentures) Rules 2014. If we read Rule 1(4) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021, it specifies that it can be applied to any company whose equity shares are listed on a recognised stock exchange in India ,further Rule 2(i) of the same defines the term “employee “.AlsoRule 4 makes any employee eligible to participate in the schemes of the company as determined by the compensation committee. Here also no bar regarding inclusion of doctors can be observed. In addition to that, SEBI suggested that definition of “employee” should be changed to include non-permanent employees provided that they are designated as employees by their employers and are exclusively working with such company or its group company including subsidiary or its associate company or its holding company in ESOPs benefits as was reflected in SEBI FAQs. It is also important to note that present regulations such as The Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 relating to Professional Conduct of Registered Medical Practitioners don’t contain any explicit restrictions that prevent doctor(s) from being engaged as an employee(s). On top of that Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare launched ICMR/DHR Policy on Biomedical Innovation & Entrepreneurship for Medical Professionals, Scientists and Technologists at Medical, Dental, Para-Medical Institutes/Colleges. According to the policy, medical experts and doctors will be encouraged to explore entrepreneurial endeavours by building start-up firms, accepting adjunct positions in Companies as Non-Executive Directors or Scientific Advisors, or by joining them as Scientific Advisors. The doctors will also be allowed to work alone or through companies on inter-institutional and industry projects, licence technologies to corporations for commercialization, and generate income for their own support as well as the benefit of society. The medical professionals will also be allowed to take a break to translate and commercialise their innovations through the establishment of their start-up companies with the medical institute’s approval in which they may be working. The goal of this policy is to support entrepreneurship growth and the development of Make-in-India products while also promoting interdisciplinary collaboration, innovation, technological development, and skill development. As we look at catena of judgements given by different High Courts, position pertaining to status of doctors as an employee will be clarified. Case Laws In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS), Pune vs. Grant Medical Foundation, the issue of law which arose was

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Need for Wimbledon-like Debentures in India

[By Saaransh Shukla & Isabel John] The authors are the students of the Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies. INTRODUCTION As we all know, share capital is the main source of finance for companies. Since companies may need additional amounts of money periodically, they cannot issue shares every time. However, they can raise money from the public. Around the world, companies, organizations, corporations and other entities raise money from different sources for the purpose of financing. As we all know, share capital is the primary source of funding for businesses. Since businesses may require additional funds on a regular basis, they cannot issue shares every time. They can, however, raise funds from the general public. Companies, organisations, businesses, and other entities all over the world raise funds from various sources in order to finance their operations. In this article, one such means of raising capital, i.e., ‘Wimbledon Debentures’ is considered. With the elucidation of the concept of the Wimbledon Debentures, the proposition is further assessed in relation to the Indian debt market. The paper explores if the Wimbledon Debenture model could be inculcated in the different industries in India, whether such debt financing would be useful and the issues that may occur in its practical application. WHAT ARE WIMBLEDON DEBENTURES? It’s Not A Bond, Not A Stock, Not A Ticket – It’s A “Wimbledon Debenture” The word ‘debenture’ has been derived from the Latin word ‘debere’ which means to borrow. The debenture is a written instrument acknowledging a debt under the common seal of the company. The money raised from the public is a loan that is further divided into units of small denominations. Each unit is called a ‘debenture’ and the holder of such units is called a Debenture holder. Even though the cash raised by debentures turn into a part of the organization’s capital structure, it doesn’t get to be share capital. Therefore, debentures are a widely recognized type of long haul credit that can be taken out by a company. These credits are regularly repayable on a date and pay a fixed rate of interest. Generally, debentures are issued for starting new projects, expansion of the company, refurbishments or improvements of the company, mergers, acquisitions, etc. Swen Lorenz, the author of the blog ‘Undervalued Shares’ claimed that the Wimbledon Debenture is a very quirky security and rightfully so. The Wimbledon Debentures are unsecured but still if we see the last trading price of one debenture was 110,600£, that is huge for an unsecured debt. The Wimbledon Debentures have played a significant role in the history of Wimbledon. The money raised from issuing these Debentures funds the improvements in and around the Wimbledon Grounds solely for the benefit of the esteemed guests. By the purchase of each Debenture, the holder is provided with a premium seat on Centre Court or No.1 Court for the Championships for a period of five years. With the increasing popularity of the sport and the ever-burgeoning public demand, the AELTC raised funds via debentures to purchase and expand their grounds. Presently, the Championships from 2021-2025 are covered under the current series of the Centre Court Wimbledon Debentures. Usually, subscribing to an issue of debentures or bonds requires coughing up a cash investment. But with Wimbledon Debentures, one can pay the cash in phases throughout the duration of the debentures and there is no interest rate payment. Technically speaking, the debentures are zero-coupon debt security that comes with the dividend in the form of ‘tickets’. Then the debenture holders receive access to the best sought-after seats for five years with no additional payment, access to exclusive restaurants and bars, car parking, transferable tickets, etc. As a holder, the daily tickets can either be sold privately or can be transferred to anyone at any price. In April 2018, the Centre Court Wimbledon Debentures (2016-2020) were trading at over £100,000 each. The Wimbledon Debentures model is slightly distinct from the usual debt financing carried out by companies. In comparison to the way debentures are normally issued, the Wimbledon Debentures pay no interest over the life of the security, instead, they are entirely in the form of tickets. As per the prevailing laws, the Debentures are also exempt from the Capital Gains Tax.[1] Looking at the success rate of this form of raising funds, it will be interesting to see if some other companies or corporations engage in debt financing similar to the Wimbledon Debentures model. WIMBLEDON DEBENTURES MODEL – INDIAN PERSPECTIVE According to the Companies Act (2013), the term debenture is defined under Section 2(30). Generally, debentures are issued for starting new projects, expansion of the company, refurbishments or improvements of the company, mergers, acquisitions, etc. Firstly, the Wimbledon Debentures fall within the definition of Qualifying Corporate Bonds (QCBs). In layman terms QCBs are exempted from capital gain taxes. In many countries including India, bonds and debentures are used interchangeably but they have certain differences. Bonds are issued generally by government agencies/large corporations but debentures are issued by companies. Bonds are backed by assets and are thus, secured, unlike debentures which may or may not be backed by assets (secured or unsecured). In debentures, the rates of interest are generally higher when compared to bonds. Additionally, the risk factor is lower for bonds and during repayments, bondholders are given priority over debenture holders. It is pertinent to note that the Wimbledon Debentures are unsecured, but people still purchase them. In the Indian market, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) has made the process of buying and selling secured debentures difficult for the potential holders. Thus, it is assumed that companies may shift to issuing unsecured debentures in the market and making the technical process easier. Under the provisions of the Companies Act (2013) of India, the power to issue debentures can be exercised on behalf of the Company with a meeting of the Board as per Section 179 (3). Section 71 is related to the issuance of debentures along with the penalties for

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Accountability of the COC: Formulating a Standard Code of Conduct

[By Shraiya Jain & Palak Jhalani] The authors are students at the Institute of Law, Nirma University Background . . CoC as a transient assorted body, consisting of financial creditors is deemed to be the apex body to decide on the matters pertaining to the course of CIRP. Although the RP acts as a key managerial and administrative authority over the business affairs of the CD, however, in reality, it is the CoC who decide on the matters of core functioning of the Corporate Debtor. The CoC is not only entrusted with all the critical decision-making powers in the CIRP under the Code but is also responsible for the conduct of the CD’s business and assessing its viability to determine a way the distress could be resolved.[i] In its legislative guide on insolvency law, UNCITRAL noted that the expansion of committee authority promotes greater accountability in the insolvency system. It states that the CoC should legitimately exercise its authority and not abuse it.[ii] A process for the removal or replacement of any representative or member of the CoC in cases of negligence, incompetence, conflict of interest, or fraud was also advised by the guide for the states to adopt. Many nations have a thorough set of rules to keep an eye on and control the behaviour of different insolvency regime participants. For instance, in UK, to streamline the conduct of insolvency personnel, there is a delegated ‘Statement of Insolvency Practice 15 (SIP)’, which outlines basic set of guidelines for practitioners to follow. It serves as a beacon for the stakeholders and restores their confidence in the dispute settlement procedure.[iii] While the IBBI has proposed a set of guidelines to regulate the conduct of the CoC, the article envisages the need for such a code. In the latter part of the article, the authors have critically evaluated the proposed set of IBBI guidelines, highlighting the major impediments to successful application of the same.  Need for a code of conduct The burden of revival of the company falls upon the CoC based on the role that it performs. To exercise such an exclusive function, it enjoys an upper hand in determining a way to resolve the distress through the application of commercial wisdom in the financial matters of the CD. Such commercial wisdom of the CoC is always prioritized by the judicial authorities as well to uphold the creditor-in-control regime provided under the Code. However, exercising such great power comes with great responsibilities.  Despite a circular issued by the IBBI to elect competent and authorized personnel by the creditors,[iv] numerous questions have been raised against the conduct of CoC. In some cases, the members of the CoC are neither adequately empowered to take decisions on their own nor acquainted with their role. This causes delay and allows depletion of value,[v] which itself goes against the code’s objectives, i.e., timely resolution and maximization of value. In other instances, the tribunals have observed missteps by the CoC such as undertaking adjudication beyond their powers and violating the laws and procedures. [vi]  Discussions & Deliberations  IBBI propounded the necessity for the institutional financial creditors to take necessary steps  ensuring their respective representatives   to act in an efficient and timely manner while discharging their functions. .[vii] The urgency of a professional code of conduct for the CoC, which regulates their decisions due to their importance in the efficacy of the code, has also been reflected in the 32nd report of the Standing committee on finance to the Parliament.[viii]   . Identifying unregulated work environment of CoC, a discussion paper[ix] followed by a proposed  set of guidelines were introduced by IBBI. Again, in the year 2022, the committee recommended IBBI to come up with a standard code of conduct for CoC, for which it proposed to amend Section 196[x] of the Code as required.       . The Committee also examined the possibility of the MCA consulting with relevant financial sector authorities like SEBI and RBI to develop a suitable enforcement mechanism for the code of conduct.[xi]  The Draft Guidelines and its Objections Regardless of explicitly mentioned provisions under the Code directing CoC to work in an efficient manner, the proposed set of code of conduct acts as an icing on the cake. It provides for disclosures, maintaining objectivity in the decision making process, cooperation with other insolvency professionals, neutrality, ensure timeliness, etc. in addition to the basic principles of transparency and accountability in their manner of functioning. The creditor-in-control regime provided by the Code also vests certain duties of public trust and care with such creditors constituting members of the CoC. The implementation of a code of conduct for regulation of CoC imposes challenges to these duties. Conflict with the commercial wisdom of CoC The Apex court highlighted the limited role of the Adjudicating Authority (AA) in approving a resolution plan after it was approved by the CoC, thus, favoring their authority concerning financial decisions over and above anything else.[xii] Such was the case in another landmark judgment whereby the commercial wisdom of the CoC was upheld.[xiii]  Given the fact that CoC has supremacy over commercial wisdom, it would be contradictory in nature if due to a formal and cautious decision-making approach such commercial wisdom is questioned before the AA. The practical consequences of subjecting it to judicial review would only result in increased challenges to the resolution plan by different stakeholders. Inconsistency in regulation As stakeholders from different backgrounds constitute CoC, they are regulated by their respective authorities. A different code of conduct for each of them would be tantamount to discrimination concerning discharging their functions. However, prescribing a set of guidelines applicable to all types of stakeholders irrespective of their nature would result in conflict between these different regulatory authorities and thus, inconsistency in regulation would prevail affecting the entire credit culture of the entity. Increased litigation Moreover, one of the objectives of the Code is the timely resolution of insolvency proceedings for realizing the maximum value of the assets. Judicial scrutiny at various stages of decision-making

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A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF TRANSPARENCY REGULATIONS (SECTION II) UNDER THE INVESTMENT FACILITATION DRAFT 2022

[By Sanket Das & Shrey Srivastav] The authors are students at National Law University Odisha. Introduction Successful investment facilitation strategies are built on a solid foundation of transparency and information. By transparency, it is meant that the investors should have knowledge about the pertinent laws which influence their investment decisions. [1] Further, investors should also be apprised of the administrative procedures of the nation they are going to invest in. [2] The survey found transparency and information to be “very significant” in their role as an investor. The vast majority of respondents ranked “very significant” the publication of relevant laws and regulations influencing foreign direct investment, such as those provided on an Institute for Portfolio Alternatives (IPA) website[3]. The people who took the survey analysed that investment application timelines and expenses must be made public[4]. According to information on investment facilitation measures at the country level, the majority of the 86 countries included in the Investment Facilitation Draft have implemented measures relating to the disclosure (publication of laws and regulations), accessibility of measures , the lack of fees for information access, and specifics on authorisation processes & payments[5]. Transparency as a component under Investment Facilitation Draft Transparency and information are fundamental to easing the process of making investments. In order to make an informed investment decision, investors need access to knowledge about administrative procedures, laws and other issues that could affect their enterprise. Transparency of investment incentives Members must be transparent about the laws, regulations, policies, and processes that control investment incentives. Information on all investment incentives must be published regularly (preferably in English) and made publicly available without prejudice. Investment incentives facilitate Investments in a nation and induces to increased stability and reduced  possibility of rent-seeking. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) who may have fewer resources for internationalisation and fewer resources to find information will find this material particularly useful. Incentives inventories are being published online by many economies to attract investment. Providing incentives for people to work toward Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can be quite helpful. Dispute between International Investment Agreement (IIA) & Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFD) Each dispute settlement mechanism used to implement an IFD Agreement and an IIA is distinctive. Given the likelihood of an IFD Agreement being a multilateral or plurilateral agreement under WTO, the disputes under these agreements shall be subject to the exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction of WTO as mentioned under the Dispute Settlement Understanding[6]. The consensus among nations on a certain issue may be indicated by how frequently it appears in IIAs. However, Investor-State Arbitration (ISA) is permitted in many IIAs. It is now the most common route to an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). About one thousand ISA lawsuits have been filed with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) so far. Given the similarities between an IFD Agreement and an IIA, a state regulatory measure on investment facilitation might fall under both purviews. Thus, parties alleging different treaties could file the same matter to ISA dispute settlement, WTO dispute settlement, or both. As things stand, a number of possibilities exist[7]. Dispute scenarios For instance, a relief claim is filed with ISA under the IIA and the IFD Agreement. In this hypothetical, we explore if and how an ISA tribunal may handle a challenge brought before the WTO. The well-known instance which best demonstrates this is of Philip Morris Asia vs. Australia.[8] Tobacco Plain Packaging Act was passed in Australia in 2011 to reduce tobacco use for public health reasons. Several lawsuits were filed against Australia after the Act was passed. The investor argued that Australia should uphold its commitments under the Australia-Hong Kong BIT Model and  the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Agreement on TRIPS, and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). WTO accords include both TRIPS and the TBT pact. Australia first argued that to import obligations owed by Australia to other states under other treaties the BIT’s umbrella clause could not be used and then argued that the BIT’s dispute settlement provision cannot assert “roving jurisdiction” that would allow a BIT tribunal to start making a broad series of determinations that could conflict with the determinations of the agreed dispute settlement bodies under the nominated multilateral treaty. This is especially true when those organisations have sole authority. Transparency, simplifying & expediting of administration procedures There should be a push to streamline and speed up the application and approval processes for investment projects at all levels of government. Members should also think about instituting silent consent administrative processes to make investments easier. Where the competent authority fails to act within the time period needed under its laws and regulations, authorization is automatically granted to investors under the idea of “silent consent”, unless investors have been advised otherwise.[9] Investments with little risk can be approved with minimal scrutiny, while those with higher risk require more time and attention from the administration. Section II: Transparency of Investment Measures of Investment Facilitation Draft 2022. Publication and availability of measures and information In order to make investors, interested parties, and other members become familiar with any relevant general application measures linked to matters falling within its scope, each member is required to disclose or make it readily accessible. The member state is obligated to publish any international agreements to which it is a party.[10] However, this provision can be waived in the case of an emergency situation. Once a member publishes the text of a law or regulations, there should be a reasonable amount of time before investors to comply.[11] The member shall make every effort to announce in advance the aim and objective of a new legislation or regulation or amendments that are relevant with the legal framework for adopting measures.[12] The Member shall maintain electronically accessible information for investors.[13] Information relevant to investing in its domain includes the laws and regulations pertaining to FDI[14], details regarding which sectors are open, limited, or prohibited, and any other such data[15]. The information on how to start a company and get it registered, as well as how to

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Whether Non-Member Director can Approach NCLT for Acts of Oppression and Mismanagement

[By Amarpal Singh & Abhishek Attri] The authors are students at UPES Dehradun. INTRODUCTION A person can be appointed as an additional or alternate director in the company without being a member (“non-member director”) as per Section 161 of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Companies Act”). Further Section 169 of the Companies Act provides the procedure for the removal of directors. In case the non-member director is illegally removed from the company, traditionally, the remedy available to him would have been to approach the civil court.  Au contraire, after the establishment of the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), it has been conferred with exclusive jurisdiction over all company matters under Section 430 of the Companies Act. Further, the jurisdiction of the civil courts has been barred. In a situation where an application is made by a member under Section 241, provided the requirements stated in Section 244 of the Companies Act must be satisfied, the NCLT has the power to regulate the affairs of the company under Section 242 of the Companies Act.  In case, a non-member director is illegally removed from the company, he cannot approach the NCLT under Section 241 considering he is not a member of the company. In addition, he will be rendered remediless since the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred under Section 430. The above question of law is pending before the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) in the case of Manish Kumar v. Topworth Urja & Metals Limited. The courts have expressed divergent views on the aforementioned proposition which has led to certain confusion. This article aims to provide an analysis of the above proposition of law.  Facts Two persons were appointed as additional directors of Topworth Urja & Metals Limited. Manish Kumar (“Appellant”) alleged that the appointment of additional directors was done in contravention of provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, and the Article of Association of the company. He alleged that the appointment was done without his knowledge and by passing a resolution at the purported board meeting. Subsequently, the appointment was ratified by passing a special resolution in the Annual General Meeting. The Appellant aggrieved by the irregularities had filed a suit before the civil court seeking the appointment of directors as illegal and void ab initio. The civil court denied the relief claimed by the Appellant along with a direction to approach NCLT in view of Section 430 of the Companies Act.  The Appellant instead of approaching the NCLT had filed an appeal before the Bombay High Court (“HC”). He contended that he cannot approach the NCLT for seeking relief under Section 241 of the Companies Act as the right rightfully available to the member as per Section 242 of the Companies Act. The Appellant did not fall under the definition of the member as prescribed by Section 2(55) of the Companies Act, 2013. Therefore, the following issue arose before the HC.  Issue Whether a non-member director can approach the civil court for seeking relief against the oppressive acts of the company?  Decision The Bombay HC relied on the decision of the Madras HC in the case of Chiranjeevi Rathnam v. Ramesh and held that the word “any member” used in Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013 should not be interpreted in a confined way as it may lead to abuse in regards to the process of law. Any person who is interested in the management of the company should not be restricted to approach the NCLT because of the words employed in Section 241 i.e., “any member”. Under Section 242, the NCLT is expected to exercise its power upon an application preferred by any member of the company.  It was further held by the Bombay HC that Section 430 of the Companies Act has to be read along with Section 241. Section 430 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of any matter which the NCLT or the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) is empowered to determine by or under the Companies Act. The word “any matter” used in Section 430 is of the widest amplitude and includes all company matters. Therefore, the HC dismissed the appeal.  ANALYSIS In the case of Jithendra Parlapalli v. Wirecard India (P) Ltd., the same question arose before the NCLT Chennai bench i.e., whether a non-member director can file a petition for oppression and mismanagement. The applicant relied on the decision of Madras HC in the case of Chiranjeevi Rantham v. Ramesh and contended that the word “any member used in Section 241 of the Companies Act should not be read in a confined way. The NCLT distinguished the case of Chiranjeevi by giving detailed reasoning and held that in the case of Chiranjeevi the judgment was passed by the Madras HC by taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of that particular case. Further, it was held that the case of Chiranjeevi included intermingled issues of a member director adopting a non-member director. Consequently, it was held by the NCLT that a non-member director cannot file an application for oppression and mismanagement as the legislature in its wisdom has granted the right to file an application alleging acts of oppression and mismanagement only to the “members” of the company. If non-member directors are allowed to file an application alleging acts of oppression and mismanagement the intention of the legislature will be defeated and it would lead to torrent of litigation. Therefore, due to the divergent views of the courts, the position of law is still not clear leading to confusion. Illegal removal/ appointment of a director is an act of oppression and mismanagement The NCLAT in the case of Vijaya Hospital C. Kity & Resorts & Ors v. Sibi C.K & Ors.,  held that appointment of a Chairman and Managing Director without holding a board meeting is in non-compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act. Therefore, it amounts to an act of oppression. Similarly, in the present case, the appointment of additional directors was done in

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Significance of Prior Contract under Operational Debt: The Recent Conundrum

[By Soumya Sinha & Bhabesh Satapathy] The authors are students at the National Law University, Odisha. INTRODUCTION The birth of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) in India has not only alleviated the pain of Financial Creditor (“FC”) but also Operational Creditor (“OC”). By various judgments and amendments the scope of operational debt defined under section 5(21) of the IBC has been augmented. In many recent rulings, various authorities and courts have talked about the scope of advance payment for the goods and services under the umbrella of the operational debt. The recent National Company Law Appellate Tribunal’s (“NCLAT”) decision in Chipsan Aviation  Limited v. Punj Llyod Aviation Limited has created a debate concerning the significance and necessity of a prior contract on the basis of which an operational debt is considered u/s 5(21) of the IBC. NCLAT through its ruling held that advance payment for goods and services without a prior valid contract can still be considered as an operational debt under IBC. This stance has sparked more confusion regarding the prerequisites of an operational debt under IBC. In this article, the authors seek to critically analyze the Chipsan Aviation case and argue on the necessity of a valid contract to transfer goods or services in an operational debt under IBC. BACKGROUND                               The appellant, Chipsan Aviation Private Limited (“Operational Creditor”) had advanced an amount of Rs. 60 Lakhs to the respondent, Punj Lloyd Aviation Limited, the Corporate Debtor (“CD”) for aviation related services. However, the services were not rendered by the CD. In addition, the advance payment made by the appellant was also not refunded. But an advanced payment was reflected in the respondent’s balance sheet as a current liability. The circumstances led to an issuance of demand notice under Section 8 of the IBC and filing of a petition under Section 9 of IBC, seeking initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) against the CD over the default. The plea by the appellant was rejected by NCLT Delhi. It was held that advance payment would not come under the ambit of operational debt. However, establishment of operational debt would be dependent on the contract. The stance taken by NCLT was appealed by the OC before the NCLAT. The NCLAT had given its decision in favor of the appellant allowing advance payments to be termed as operational debt u/s 5(21) of the IBC. Further, it was held that even in the absence of any contract between the OC and CD, the advance payment would still constitute operational debt. It had put reliance on the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Construction Consortium Ltd v. Hitro Energy Solutions Pvt. Ltd, where it was held that Section 5(21) of IBC needs to be interpreted in a broad manner covering all aspects of advance payment. UNDERSTANDING OPERATIONAL DEBT U/S 5(21) Section 5(21) of the IBC expound operational debt as “A claim in respect of the provisions of goods or services”. Moreover, the word claim has been defined under the Section 3(6) as either “a right to payment or a right to remedy for breach of contract”. Here, if Section 5(21) is read with Section 3(6) then it is deduced that operational debt requires a claim for the payment of goods or services which implicitly has a nexus with a valid contract for the providing the same. This stance has been reaffirmed in the case of Mr. Harrish Khurana v. M/S One World Realtech Private and Construction Consortium Ltd v. Hitro Energy Solutions Ltd where it was held that “An operational debt should include only those debts which are arising from a contract in relation to the supply of goods or services from the corporate debtor”. Thus, the essentials of an operational debt are that there must be a debt in respect to which a claim arise which should be either for the remedy for breach of an underlying contract between OC and CD for providing goods or services, or for the payment of the goods or services which have already been supplied under a valid contract. CONTRACT NOT ESTABLISHED – DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO OPERATIONAL DEBT UNDER THE IBC The foremost requirement for a debt to be termed as operational debt is the existence of a valid contract. This has been elucidated in numerous judgments, the most notable of which is Tejas Industries v. Gujarat Machinery (P.) Ltd in which the court emphasized upon the relationship of the operational creditor and corporate debtor. In this case it was established that for a claim to be considered as operational debt, the existence of a formal contract between OC and OD is a prerequisite.  Further, in the case of Ms. Rohita v. All That Hype Media (P.) Ltd. the NCLT while rejecting the CIRP petition ruled that there should be a valid and enforceable contract between the parties under the operational debt. Under the  Indian Contract Law, 1872, the essentials of a valid contract are outlined. A valid contract requires the establishment of an offer by one party and acceptance by the other. The term ‘offer’ is defined in Section 2(a)  as “when one person will signify to another person his willingness to do or not do something (abstain) with a view to obtain the assent of such person”. Further, under Section 2(b), “when an assent is granted to the offer and the same is conveyed to the offeror, it is termed to be accepted”. However, in the present case the Draft Agreement was forwarded by the OC to the CD, which the CD never signed. It can be concluded that no acceptance of the offer was made. Thus, no valid contract was formed in the present case. Further, in order to prove an operational debt in a CIRP, the OC is provided with an option between an invoice demanding payment of goods supplied to the CD or a contract for supply of goods or services as per Regulation 7(2)(b)(i) and (ii)  of the CIRP Regulations 2016 .  Moreover,

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K. Paramasivam v. The Karur Vysya Bank- Are Corporate Guarantors equivalent to Corporate Debtors

[By Keerthana Rakesh] The author is a student at the Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Introduction Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC”) came under discussion due to the confusion that arose as to whether the proceedings can be initiated against the Corporate Guarantor under the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”). The apex Court in K. Paramasivam v. The Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. & Anr., has attempted to provide clarity on the same. Section 7(1) of IBC states that: “(1) A financial creditor either by itself or jointly with other financial creditors may apply for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor before the Adjudicating Authority when a default has occurred.” The appeal came before the Supreme Court challenging the decision of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT), whereby the tribunal admitted the application under Section 7 of IBC filed by the Financial creditor, Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. against Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts Private Limited (“Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts”). The ground for appeal was that Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts is neither a Corporate Debtor according to Section 3(8) of IBC nor a Corporate Guarantor as per Section 5(5A) of IBC. They are excluded from the ambit of Section 7 of IBC since the borrowers were not Corporate Debtors. Through this post, the author seeks to analyze the above case law and to see whether the Supreme Court’s judgement aligns with the object behind IBC, which is to relieve distressed corporate entities and provide a means of recovery to creditors. Factual Background Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts is a Company registered under the Companies Act, of 1956. The financial creditor, Karur Vysya Bank Ltd., had extended credit facilities to three entities: Sri Maharaja Refineries, Sri Maharaja Industries, and Sri Maharaja Enterprises. Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts became the guarantor of the loans availed by the entities. The borrowers failed to repay their debts to the financial creditor, resulting in the Financial Creditor applying Section 7 of IBC before the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), Chennai, to initiate the CIRP proceedings against Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts. The application was filed on the ground that Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts, being the guarantor of the borrowers is liable to repay the debt. Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts objected to the contention of the Financial Creditor and argued that they do not fall within the purview of the Corporate Debtor as defined in Section 3(8) of IBC. Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts also contended that they are not Corporate Guarantors according to Section 5(5A) of IBC since the borrowers are not Corporate Debtors. However, the adjudicating authority admitted the application under Section 7 of IBC and initiated the CIRP proceedings against Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts. They challenged the order of the NCLT and appealed before the NCLAT. The NCLAT upheld the position of the NCLT and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the decision of NCLAT, Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under Section 62 of IBC against the order issued by the NCLT and NCLAT. Issue The issue which came before the Court was whether the liability of the Corporate guarantor is co-extensive with that of the Principal Borrower i.e., whether Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts is a corporate guarantor as mentioned under Section 5(5A) of IBC and is responsible for the payment of debts to the Financial Creditor. Ruling and Analysis The court upheld the findings of NCLT and NCLAT and found no grounds to interfere with their decision to admit the application filed by the Financial Creditor and that Maharaja Theme Parks and Resorts is a Corporate Guarantor as per Section 5(5A) of IBC. While addressing the issue, the apex Court delved into the aspects of Corporate Debtor and Corporate Guarantor as defined in the IBC and took a liberal approach towards Section 7 of the IBC. The Court mainly relied on its decision in the case of Laxmi Pant Surana v. Union Bank of India and Another (“Laxmi Pant Surana”) and emphasized that the financial creditor has the cause of action to proceed against the principal borrower as well as the guarantor in equal measure in the cases of default. The bench referred to Section 5(8)(i) of IBC which stated that the claim of the financial creditor also includes the liability of the person who gave the guarantee to the corporate debtor. The intention of this legislation was perceived by the apex court whereby the corporate guarantor is equally held liable as the corporate debtor for the failure of due payment to the financial creditor. It also looked into the contractual nature of the transaction and highlighted that the liability of the guarantor is coextensive as per Section 128 of the Contract Act. A broad approach was adopted by the Court where they extended the meaning of Corporate Debtor provided under Section 3(8) of the Act to include the Corporate Guarantor. This includes “corporate person” as defined under Section 3(7) of the Code. They further held that the principal borrower can be a Corporate or non-corporate entity, thus, giving a greater scope of relief to the financial creditor and preventing the Corporate guarantor or debtor to escape from its financial obligations. Referring to the Laxmi Pant Surana judgement, the Court held that a financial creditor can directly apply to Section 7 of IBC for the initiation of CIRP proceedings against a corporate guarantor without previously suing the principal borrower. It can be inferred from the present case that the corporate guarantor steps into the shoes of the principal borrower regardless of whether the borrower is a corporate entity or not. The Court held that the purpose of Section 7 is not to provide a remedy for financial creditors but to reorganise and provide insolvency resolution to the corporate debtor who is not in a position to repay the debt. However, the author contends that along with providing a resolution process for the corporate debtor,

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THE JET AIRWAYS JUDGMENT AND NEW RAY OF HOPE FOR WORKMEN AND EMPLOYEES

Swarnendu Chatterjee and Anwesha Pal. [The authors are Advocate-On-Record, Supreme Court of India and PhD Scholar and Teaching Assistant at the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata (WBNUJS) respectively.]   Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “Code”), since its enforcement in December 2016, has been somewhat successful in the resolution of bad debts/loans of the erring debtors and has tightened the noose on erring companies as well as fly by night companies. The legislative intent of the Code, was to simplify and fast-track the resolution process of the loans/credit facilities which were taken by the defaulting companies. The defaulting companies/corporate debtors in the pre-IBC era had an opportunity to drag the process under The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFEASI ACT 2002) and it was quite a time taking process which was resulting in increase of bad loans/Non-Performing Assets (NPA). .” The creditors/financial institutions after the enactment of the Code, used the legal recourse of filing application under Section 7 of the Code before the National Company Law Tribunals (NCLTs). The creditors generally adopt the route under the Code, as it is time-bound and the object of the Code, being resolution by keeping the corporate debtor as a going-concern. The concept “Going-Concern” means that after admission of the application by the NCLTs, the Resolution Professional appointed by the NCLTs in the capacity of the administrator performs duties as specified under the Code and makes every endeavour to keep the business/functions of the corporate debtor running as usual and ensure that the workmen and the employees do not lose their employment. Resolution as a going-concern as mentioned in Regulation 38 of the IBBI (CIRP) Regulations, 2016 and as per the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Committee of Creditors, Essar Steel limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta[1] (hereinafter referred to as “Essar Judgment”) envisages that every endeavour should be made that the workmen and employees do not lose their respective employments. The Supreme Court in the Essar Judgment, however, did not specify the quantum of payment including the statutory dues of workmen/employees in cases of resolution and left it to the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors. However, even if the Successful Resolution Applicant does not want to retain all employees and workmen, then as per Regulation 38 (as referred above) all the dues of the workmen/employees and other operational creditors shall have to be paid upfront. The question which arose in the Jet Airways matter[2] related to whether non-payment of statutory dues like Provident Fund and Gratuity (even if the provision was made and was actually never deposited) by the Successful Resolution Applicant would have amounted to breach of Section 30(2)(b) and (e) of the Code? The law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Essar Judgment[3] had clearly laid down that every resolution plan has to conform to the mandate under Section 30(2) especially sub-sections (b) and (e) which, in other words shall mean that it has conform to the statutory provisions in force as on date and as applicable. The argument of the respondents regarding the effect of overriding /non-obstante clause under Sec. 238 of the Code was also scrutinized and answered by the Bench. The Hon’ble NCLAT in the judgment of Jet Airways made it amply clear, which the authors in this article/paper shall discuss in detail, is that, non-payment of statutory dues like provident fund and gratuity and subsequent non-inclusion in the resolution plan shall result in infringement of Section 30(2) (e) of the Code.  Further, the Hon’ble NCLAT held that, the welfare legislations which provided for the payment of  provident fund and gratuity does not run counter to the Code and therefore the non-obstante clause; i.e. Section 238 of the Code, shall have no bearing on the payment of provident fund and gratuity . The authors shall delve into the detailed analysis of how the Hon’ble NCLAT, within the limited parameters of judicial scrutiny of a resolution plan under Section 31 of the Code, proved that the role of the judiciary in passage of a resolution plan is not a mere rubber-stamp or a post office job. Instead the NCLAT shall minutely scrutinize the plan as to whether the laws of the land including the social welfare legislations do not run counter to Section 238 of the Code. The judgment has resulted in a new interpretation of Section 30(2)(e) of the Code, which is important for the Resolution Professionals and the Resolution Applicants to comply with in the future.The Jet Airways case being the first case of resolution of giant airline company, the judgment renders clarity as to how a resolution plan should conform to the mandate of Section 30(2) (e) of the Code, in addition to Section 30(2)(b) of the Code and also whether the ratio of the Essar Steel Judgment is proving to be a boon to the resolution applicants. The arguments which were raised by the Respondents (Successful Resolution Applicant / Jalan-Kalrock, Committee of Creditors and the Resolution Professional) were that in a case of resolution, the statutory dues of provident fund and gratuity get covered within the term “workmen dues” as mentioned in Explanation II of Section 53(1)(b) of the Code. Section 326 of the Companies Act, 2013 defines the term “workmen dues”. This definition includes gratuity and provident fund. Therefore, the fulcrum of the argument was that the gratuity dues and provident fund dues shall be covered within the term “workmen dues” and be restricted to twenty-four months only as mentioned in Section 53 of the Code. The respondents drew such an interpretation as Section 36(a)(4) (iii) of the Code which refers to a situation of liquidation and mentions the word “fund” along with the terms – gratuity and provident fund. The word “dues” are not a part of Sec. 36 of the Code, hence cannot be referred in cases of resolution. The Hon’ble NCLAT rejected the aforesaid argument of the

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THE CONUNDRUM OF RECALLING AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL POST-TERMINATION

[By Arjit Mishra] The author is a student at the Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. INTRODUCTION On 12th October 2022, the Delhi HC in Vag Educational Services v. Aakash Educational Services opined that an arbitral tribunal cannot recall the proceedings if its mandate has been terminated under S. 32 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter ‘The Act’). However, it is to be noted that in various judgements the Supreme Court has held that if an arbitral proceeding is terminated under S. 25 of the Act, the terminated proceedings can be recalled. In this blog, I’d provide the existing jurisprudence regarding the possibility of recalling an arbitral proceeding and the flaws present in the same. VAG EDUCATIONAL SERVICES V. AAKASH EDUCATIONAL SERVICES: WEIGHING PRECEDENT OVER RATIONALE In this case, on 21st Sept 2019, the arbitral tribunal terminated its mandate as the respondent, as claimant, withdrew from the arbitral proceeding. However, an affidavit was filed by the respondent-claimant asserting that the Counsel had unintentionally withdrawn from the arbitral proceedings, as her instructions, from her Senior Counsel, were to withdraw another arbitral proceeding pending before the same arbitral tribunal. This affidavit was duly accepted by the tribunal and in its order dated 18th January 2020, it restored the arbitral proceedings. The impugned order was challenged before the Delhi HC under Article 227 of the Indian Constitution. With regards to the maintainability of the petition, the respondent, while placing reliance on SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Anr. & Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam, asserted that the Court cannot adjudicate on an interlocutory order passed by the arbitral tribunal. The Court negatived this contention by opining that the current case’s circumstances are unique from those in the respondent’s cited cases. In the current case, the Court must decide whether an arbitral tribunal that has declared the arbitration proceedings to be discontinued may later consider a request to rescind that order and restore the arbitration. Withrespect to the question that whether an arbitral proceeding can be recalled post-termination, the Court remarked that a tribunal’s mandate is considered as terminated if the claimant withdraws its claimant. under S. 32(3) of the Act, 1996. This provision is only subject to S. 33 and S. 34(4). When a party asks an arbitral tribunal to fix a specific category of errors or when the parties ask the arbitral tribunal to interpret a particular clause or section of the award that it has delivered, Section 33 is applicable. According to Section 34(4), the arbitral tribunal has the authority to eliminate any grounds that the court that hears a challenge to the arbitral decision under Section 34 might use to overturn the award it has issued. Notably, neither the exigency mentioned under S. 33 nor the condition provided under S. 34 applied to the present case. Hence, the arbitral tribunal became functus officio and didn’t have any power to pass any kind of order after the termination of its mandate. POWER TO RECALL PROCEEDINGS UNDER S. 25: ‘JUDICIALLY’ CREATED DISTINCTION WITH S. 32 It was observed above that if an arbitral tribunal’s mandate is terminated under S. 32 of the Act, 1996, no order of recalling the proceedings could be passed. Interestingly, this position of law doesn’t apply to the termination of an arbitral proceeding under S. 25 of the Act, 1996. In compliance with section 25 of the Act, the arbitrator has the authority to end an arbitration if the claimant fails to submit his statement of claim in conformity with S. 23(1) without demonstrating good cause. The Supreme Court noted in the case of SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited v. Tuff Drilling Private Limited that the situation described in Section 32 of the Act will only occur if the proceeding is not terminated under Section 25(a) of the Act and continues to be adjudicated. Since Section 25 of the Arbitration Act does not include the phrase “mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate” it must be interpreted in the context of Section 32 of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, an order to recall the arbitration proceedings may be issued if the claimant can provide adequate justification. The SC later heard an appeal against a termination order given in accordance with Section 32 of the Act in Sai Babu v. M/S Clariya Steels Private Limited. The Supreme Court decided that no recall request would be encased in cases provided by Section 32(3) of the Arbitration Act due to the difference crafted in the SREI case between both the mandate terminating under Section 32 and the proceedings that came to an end under Section 25 of the Arbitration Act. FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS PRESENT IN THE JURISPRUDENCE The Arbitration Act, of 1996 provides the arbitral tribunal certain exemplary powers to allow it to carry out its functions smoothly and with minimum court intervention. However, the striking difference drawn between termination orders passed under S. 25 & S. 32 of the Act poses a roadblock to allowing the arbitral tribunal to decide on its conduct, particularly regarding its ‘mandate’. It is observed that the Courts have had an unwarranted rigid approach by not allowing recall of an arbitral proceeding if its mandate is terminated under S. 32 of the Act. The stated ‘rigid’ approach prevents the arbitral tribunal to recall its proceeding if there exist genuine and satisfactory reasons for doing the same. Even in the Vag Educational case, the Court ignored the bonafide mistake made by the Counsel of signing the wrong withdrawal sheet and proceeded to hold, in consonance with precedents, that the arbitral tribunal proceeding can’t be recalled. It also caused unjustified harm to the party because of its Counsel’s unintentional mistake. Furthermore, Section 32(2)(c) of the Act provides that if the arbitral tribunal believes that the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary and impossible, it can terminate its proceeding.. This provision construed with the ‘rigid’ approach upheld by courts makes the tribunal’s power rampant as it will have no sort of accountability for the reasons it provides for

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