Author name: CBCL

RBI Guidelines on Digital lending – A boon to the digital borrowers?

[By Sahana R] The author is a student at the School of Law, Christ University, Bangalore. Introduction The process of providing loans on an online platform is termed to be digital lending. The distinction between digital lending and traditional lending methods would be using digital technologies regarding loan approval, repayment, and service. According to a study, there has been a significant rise in the number of apps in the Indian Digital Lending Market where the value of the market has increased from USD 33 Billion in FY15 to USD 150 Billion in FY20.[i]  The need for credit and the hassle-free approval of loans are the catalysts behind the growth of digital lending platforms on the internet as well as mobile phone apps. However, on the other hand, there exist certain banes with these platforms mainly because they were not regulated by the RBI or any other regulatory body and they would charge a very high rate of interest to the consumers. Therefore, there was a need for regulation of such lending service providers. This article provides an overview of the current digital lending situation and how the RBI has made an effort to regulate this online market. Why was this regulation the need of the hour? During the COVID-19 pandemic as people required money instantly, they resorted to using these mobile apps where instant loans were provided without verification of various documents. However, the downside to such loans was that the interest rates were very high and it was for a very short period. Additionally, other charges such as service charges, processing fees, etc. are levied on the consumers. In the case of Dharanidhar Karimoji v Union of India[ii], the petitioner filed a Public Interest Litigation requesting for the appropriate authority which is the RBI to regulate these mobile apps. The petitioner stated that there are more than 300 such apps on the play store and they charge about 35-45% of the loan money as processing fees. If the payment is not done within the time-period of the loan, then the agent will call the contacts of the borrower as the borrower would have provided various permissions including permission to access the contact list. Thus, there was a requirement for regulation. Working group on digital lending The RBI in January 2021 set up a working group on digital lending[iii] under the chairmanship of Shri Jayant Kumar Dash to assess the consumer issues and lending business of the platforms due to the outburst of many digital lending platforms. The report mainly focuses on protecting consumers from exorbitant interest rates and, at the same time, encouraging innovation in the digital lending sphere. The key takeaways from this report were as follows: The group suggested that an independent body named Digital India Trust Agency (DIGITA) must be set up. The lenders are allowed to deploy only those apps verified by DIGITA. A Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) is to be set up which would include all the Regulated Entities, Digital Lending Apps, and Lending Service Providers. The working group has also suggested a separate enactment to prevent illegal digital lending. The very important suggestion of the group was that the data can only be collected only after prior and informed consent of the users, and these data can be stored only by Indian servers. Lastly, the SRO, in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India, must come up with a Code of conduct for these apps.[iv] Analysis of the RBI Guidelines on digital lending The RBI has provided guidelines on consumer protection and conduct requirements, Technology, and data requirements, and the regulatory framework.[v] In this regard the RBI defines three parties namely, Regulated Entities (RE), Digital Lending Apps/Platforms (DLAs), and Lending Service Provider (LSP). The RE’s include all Commercial, cooperative banks as well as Non-Banking Financial Institutions. The LSP on behalf of the RE carry out functions of the lender such as customer acquisition, monitoring, recovery, etc. The DLAs are websites or mobile applications that provide loans to their users and this will include the applications owned by the RE as well as LSP for the credit facility. The RBI stated that the lenders will directly disburse the loan to the borrower’s account, and no third party will be involved in the transaction. The Lending platform must create a Key Fact Statement which must include all necessary information, details of grievance redressal, and any charges. If the charges or fees are not mentioned, they cannot be levied on the borrower. Every regulated entity of the RBI will have to appoint a nodal grievance redressal officer, which must be prominently displayed on the website and available to consumers. The jurisprudence of consumer law began with the Consumer bill of rights in the United States, which the Supreme Court widely accepts. US President John Kennedy in 1962, introduced the ‘Consumer Bill of Rights’ which emphasized on various rights of the customers such as right to safety, right to be informed, right to education, right to be heard, and so on. Additionally, Section 2(9) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 recognizes the various consumer rights and includes the right to be informed, right to be protected, right to be assured, right to be heard, right to redressal and consumer awareness. Therefore, Every consumer has the right to information an about the service or the product, and he also has the right to seek redressal in case of any grievance. Thus, the guidelines by the RBI satisfy the requirements of Consumer protection law. The RBI has stated that borrowers’ data must be taken only if needed and with consent. It has been made clear that lending platforms cannot access mobile data such as contact lists, calls, etc. The platforms can store only minimal data, such as the name and address of the borrower. The registered entities must prescribe a policy to the lending platforms concerning data storage and create a comprehensive privacy policy. This adheres to the principle of data minimization as laid down in the Puttaswamy case[vi], which states

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RBI’s Shield for Borrowers against Digital Lending

[By Rajeev Dadhich] The author is a student at the Institute of Law, Nirma University. The Digital Lending route has acquired prominence, which raised Reserve Bank of India’s  (“RBI”) concerns over the unbridled engagement of third parties, mis-selling, breach of data privacy, unfair business conduct, charging of exorbitant interest rates, and unethical recovery practices. To curb these concerns, on November 18, 2021, RBI released the Report of the ‘Working Group on digital lending including lending through online platforms and mobile apps’ (“the Report”), which targets the enhancement of customer protection and making the digital lending ecosystem safe and sound while encouraging innovation. Moving a step forward, on August 10, 2022, RBI issued a Press Release ‘Recommendations of the Working group on Digital Lending’ (“the Press Release”), which targets implementing the recommendations the Working Group gave. Against the backdrop, this article provides the scope of the Press Release and analyze the recommendations. Further, this article provides a detailed discussion on key factors of the Press Release like the cooling-off period, data privacy, reporting mechanism, and framework on FLDG. Lastly, the article provides concluding remarks and suggestions. Scope of the guideline issued The guideline comprises three Annexures which broadly illustrate three types of entities included in the digital lending process: Annexures I: Entities regulated by the RBI and permitted to carry out lending business; Annexures II: Entities authorized to carry out a lending as per other statutory/regulatory provisions but not regulated by RBI; and Annexures III: Entities lending outside the purview of any statutory/ regulatory provisions. First, the recommendation envisaged under Annexure I is implemented with immediate effect. This guideline will regulate not only Regulated entities (“REs”) but also the Lending Service Providers (“LSPs”)/ Digital Lending Apps (“DLAs”) engaged by REs to extend various permissible credit facilitation services. The entities included in the ambit of REs have been defined under Regulation 3 of KYC Direction, 2016. Second, in furtherance of Annexure II, the respective regulator/ controlling authority still requires some deliberations before implementing them. The non-regulated entities are defined in question 4 of FAQ published by RBI as stock exchange, and housing finance companies. Third, with respect to Annexure III, the Working Group has suggested specific legislative and institutional interventions for consideration by the Central Government. Recommendations implemented with immediate effect Operational Conduct and Customer Protection The disbursement of the loan, repayment of loan, etc. shall directly take place between REs and borrowers, and there shall be no intervention of any third party viz LSPs in transferring the loan or repayment amount. LSPs will operate as an agent of RE and will carry out functions like customer acquisition, underwriting support, pricing support, etc. RE shall monitor the activities of LSPs and be accountable for the same. Further, REs shall be liable to pay any fees applicable to LSPs, and no fees can be directly charged on borrowers by LSPs. Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”): The APR is required to be disclosed to the borrowers. The APR means all-inclusive cost and margin including the cost of funds, processing fee, maintenance charges, etc., except contingent charges like penal charges, late payment charges, etc. The borrowers should be provided with a cooling-off/ look-up period, which means an exit opportunity without the levy of any penalty for a certain period by just paying the principal and APR amount. A Grievance Redressal Officer (“GRO”) should be appointed who will be dealing with borrowers’ complaints regarding FinTech and digital lending. The details of the GRO shall be published on the website of the RE, its LSPs, and on DLAs. The responsibility of engaging GRO lies on REs. Key Facts Statement (“KFS”) is required to be disclosed. KFS includes a recovery mechanism, cooling-off/ look-up period, details of grievance redressal, and APR. Further, the consent of the borrower is required to increase the credit limits. Data Protection of the borrowers DLAs should obtain absolute consent from the borrowers before collecting any data with an option to accept or deny the consent and a right to be forgotten. LSPs are prohibited from storing any personal data of borrowers except the primary data viz name, address, contact details of the customer, etc. REs will be held accountable for data privacy and security of the customer’s personal data. Regulatory framework In cases where REs is extending credits through new digital products such as ‘Buy Now Pay Later’ (“BNPL”) need to report to CIC and adhere to outsourcing guidelines issued by individual Banks. Analysis This guideline is just the first installment in a three-series process. Till further instructions, the present Press Release will be the operative guideline for Res, LSPs, and DLAs. Cooling-off/look-up period As stated above, the Press Release provides the borrower with the option of a cooling-off/ look-up period. However, it does not specify the timeframe allowed to borrowers under this period, and the same has been left on the deliberation of the board approval policy. It is noted that a cooling-off period is a right of the borrowers to save them from paying the entire interest for the facility period, and the same should be reasonable. Inference can be drawn from Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Transfer of Loan Exposures) Directions, 2021, which state that a cooling period shall not be less than 12 months from the date of such transfer. Therefore, a similar timeframe should be allowed for the borrowers in the present digital lending regime. Data Privacy The Report highlights an exponential increase in complaints regarding the operations of DLAs. The Report explained DLAs as mobile and web-based applications with an interface that facilitate borrowing by a financial consumer from a digital lender. Subsequently, on December 23, 2020, RBI through Press Release cautioned borrowers regarding illegal players, excessive interest rates, hidden charges, breach of data privacy, and regressive recovery process by DLAs. Moreover, DLAs largely being mobile application poses a potential threat to data stored in mobiles viz sensitive personal data, etc. For instance, the recent data breach of CashMama leaked the personal information of thousands of people bearing

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A Case for Regulatory Sandboxes for Cryptocurrencies: Regulatory Theory and Lessons from Foreign Jurisdictions

[By Sarthak Virdi] The author is a student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore. Introduction Regulatory Sandboxes (RS) are artificial environments used to test innovations and have been relied on in the fintech sector. The RBI defines them to be testing environments with regulatory relaxations, the purpose of which is to gauge the viability of products by estimating benefits and risks. The benefits of RS have generally been that first, they help in foreseeing the risks of emergent technologies and the appropriate legal strategies to contain them; second, they are cost-efficient methods of testing products before a market roll-out and third, they enable financial inclusion and help regulators maintain control. The current literature on RS analyses their viability from two perspectives – first, the role of regulators as promoters of innovation or ‘opportunity-based regulation’[1] and second, the shift towards a principles-based regulation instead of a rules-based regulation.[2] However, there is a dearth of literature addressing RS in the Indian fintech market, especially in the context of cryptocurrencies. This paper fills this gap by arguing for RS for cryptocurrencies by first, taking the two perspectives to show that RBI is already operating with an opportunity-based and a principle-based regulatory approach. Second, it shows that across the RS models employed worldwide, the legalization of cryptocurrencies is not a prerequisite to promoting innovation in cryptocurrencies through RS, while protecting consumers. India by not allowing RS for cryptocurrencies and conflating the question of legalisation with experimentation can miss out on a big opportunity in the fintech market. Regulatory Approaches Opportunity-Based Regulation & Experimental Legal Regimes The role of regulators is generally understood to not be one that engages in active promotion of innovation and supporting entrepreneurs, but rather one that controls market disruption.[3] RS problematize this conception by making them active participants in the creation and promotion of market disrupters.[4] The benefits of RS however make it worthwhile for regulators to engage with them. They activate and increase the inflow of venture capital while simultaneously reducing the regulatory uncertainty and risk that can arise as a result of disruptive technology. The success of RS in kickstarting innovation has been well-documented, especially in the context of the UK, where RS have increased average venture investment amounts by 6.6 times.[5] The RBI has already made a shift towards opportunity-based regulation by promoting competition in Payments and Settlement Systems in India through sandboxes. It recognized the role sandboxes can play in promoting innovation while avoiding systemic risks. In the absence of any principled opposition to such an approach to regulation, the justification for not excluding cryptocurrencies from RS lies in a mistrust of the technology in itself. However, the question of the legality of cryptocurrency as a form of legal tender needs to be separated from the promotion of blockchain technology, for as Imelda Maher argues, competition has entered regulatory domains and the role of regulators has shifted to that of ‘steering’ from that of ‘rowing’[6] and the RBI must not miss the opportunity of experimentation. Rules-Based Approach v. Principles-Based Approach Strict, rule-based regimes post compliance costs that act as barriers to entry and thus discourage innovation, which is highly disadvantageous because fintech can drive growth in other industries while simultaneously addressing concerns like financial inclusion.  Principle-based regulation, which implies adherence to broader principles instead of hard rules, provides regulatory flexibility which reduces compliance costs while creating a collaborative relationship between regulators and private firms. RS employ the principle-based approach, for regulators exempt them from adherence to legislation while agreeing on principles they must comply with. Principle-based regulation helps contain the disruptive effects of unanticipated innovations for it provides regulators sufficient exposure to the technology to develop a legal framework to respond to it, instead of completely distancing themselves from emerging technologies. Further, given that innovations in fintech are fast-paced, RS create temporary regulatory frameworks that can help contain disruptive effects, instead of disincentivizing innovation. In the context of RS, the principles regulators generally require adherence to include consumer protection, market competition, and investor protection.[7] The table below summarizes the approach worldwide to show a move towards opportunity-based regulation, with regulators involved in promoting disruptive technologies, even cryptocurrencies. Further, the principle-based approach employed in RS does not lead to ignorance of consumer interests, for as shown, all jurisdictions build strong measures to protect consumer interests. Jurisdiction Conditions to Apply for Inclusion in a Regulatory Sandbox Is the regulator promoting disruptive technologies? Is Cryptocurrency a part of the RS Program? Legal status of cryptocurrency Protection of Consumer Interests Hong Kong Innovative technologies need to be utilized along with an increase in the range and quality of products. Yes Yes No law to regulate cryptocurrency; not accepted as legal tender. Compensation for financial losses and the option to exit the trail lies wits consumers.[8] United Kingdom The product must support businesses in the financial services market or any regulated activity, it must significantly differ from existing products and must produce consumer benefits.[9] Yes Yes Cryptocurrency exchanges are legal. Compensation for losses and the business must prove adequacy of capital to cover the losses. Australia The product must be new in itself or an adaptation or an improvement of an existing service or product. Applies the Net Public Benefit Test and the Innovation Test. Yes Yes Cryptocurrency exchanges are legal. Consumers are to be compensated for losses.[10] Singapore The financial service should include a new or emerging technology or use the present technology in an innovative way while bringing some benefits to consumers. Yes Yes Not accepted as legal tender, but can be legally exchanged. Boundary conditions are to be clearly defined in order to protect consumer interests. Arizona, United States of America The product must be innovative and should be based on an emerging technology or be a reimagination of existing technology. Yes Yes Not accepted as legal tender, but can be legally exchanged. Arizona consumer protection laws remain applicable and laws relating to consumer lending are incorporated within the RS.[11] Lessons From Foreign Jurisdictions This

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Recovery of Indirect Taxes and Duties Post Imposition of Moratorium: Resolving the Legal Quagmire

[By KV Kailash Ramanathan] The author is a student at the National University of Advanced Legal Studies, Kochi. Introduction In recent years, the legal fraternity has witnessed a befuddling tug-of-war between tax authorities on one hand and the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process on the other. The battle runs for the recovery of taxes and dues payable by the corporate debtor. Taxation statutes like The Customs Act. 1962 provide for a recovery mechanism under the very legislation. Whereas under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ( “IBC” or “the Code”) once a moratorium is imposed, all other proceedings are suspended and recovery of debt can be done only by filing a claim with the resolution professional after which the process under the code will commence ending in liquidation or approval of the resolution plan. Through its recent ruling in Sundaresh Bhatt, Liquidator ABG Shipyard vs Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, the Supreme Court decisively upheld the precedence of the IBC over The Customs Act in the recovery of dues post imposition of moratorium. The ruling although made in the context of customs duty is likely to have a similar effect in its application to other tax statutes and pari materia provisions. In this piece, the author seeks to analyse the ruling, and legislative intent behind the scope provided to the moratorium and explore the implications it is likely to have on the collection of taxes. The scope and extent of authority that shall henceforth be available to tax authorities post imposition of the moratorium shall also be discussed. Factual Matrix ABG Shipyard (“Corporate Debtor”) was a shipbuilding company prior to the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). As a part of its operations, the company imported goods that were used in the construction of ships to be exported. The corporate debtor stored some of these goods in the container freight stations in Maharashtra and custom-bonded warehouses in Gujarat. At the appropriate time, bills of entry for warehousing were submitted. The Corporate Debtor additionally benefited from an Export Promotion Capital Commodities Program (EPCG Scheme) and received an EPCG License for the aforementioned warehoused goods under the said scheme. Later, the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) accepted a petition for initiation of CIRP against the corporate debtor and imposed a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC. The Appellant was appointed as the Interim Resolution Professional. The Appellant then wrote to the respondents seeking custody of the corporate debtor’s goods in their warehouse asking them not to dispose of it. Upon receiving such communication from the Appellant, the Respondents sent notices to the Corporate Debtor for the first time regarding the non-fulfillment of export obligations in terms of the EPCG license and demanding customs duty of Rs. 17,13,989/- with interest. Later, the NCLT passed an order commencing liquidation against the Corporate Debtor under Section 33(2) of the IBC. A fresh direction was also passed under Section 33(5) of the IBC prohibiting the institution of any suit or legal proceeding against the Corporate Debtor. Further, the NCLT also appointed the Appellant as the liquidator vide the same order. The liquidator filed an application under Section 60(5) of the IBC seeking direction to the respondents to release the warehoused goods. The key question of law that is dealt with in this piece failed to receive the NCLAT’s consideration Issues The following issues were framed by the Court after considering the factual scenario of the case- Whether the provisions of the IBC would prevail over the Customs Act, and if so, to what extent? Whether the Respondent could claim title over the goods and issue notice to sell the goods in terms of the Customs Act when the liquidation process has been initiated? Ruling and Analysis The court pored through the provisions of both the Customs Act and IBC to determine which one would prevail over the other. The fundamental question involved here was that whether the charge over the goods for non-payment of customs duty, could be claimed and realized in accordance with the Customs Act, when a moratorium is in effect and order for liquidation under the code has already been made. The scheme of the IBC provides that once an order for liquidation is made, all creditors are required to realize their claims only as per the waterfall mechanism envisaged under Section 53 of the code. The mechanism explicitly provides for the order of priority in which different classes of creditors are repaid. In case of insufficient liquidation proceeds, repayment occurs to the complete exclusion of a lower-ranking class of creditors until the higher-ranking creditors’ claims are fully settled.  Some of the aspects considered by the court are discussed below. Proceedings under Customs Act precluded post-imposition of moratorium While the Customs Act under Section 72 provides for a recovery mechanism, it is critical to note that the department had issued notice to the corporate debtor only after the imposition of moratorium under Section 14. Further, the moratorium continues as per Section 33(5) after the order for liquidation is made. The Court held that initiating such proceedings is in gross violation of the moratorium imposed. When such a conflict exists the non-obstante clause under Section 238 of the IBC being the later provision applies and gives the code primacy over any other legislation. Harmony between Section 142A of the Customs Act and the IBC’s Non-obstante clause The overriding effect of the IBC over the customs act has been provided in the customs act itself. Section 142A of The Customs Act clearly notes that The Custom Authorities would have the first charge on an assessee’s assets under the Customs Act, with the exception of circumstances covered under, inter alia the IBC 2016. The NCLAT sidestepped Section 142A of the Customs Act and Section 238 of the Code by referring to the Calcutta High Court’s judgment in Collector of Customs v. Dytron (India) Ltd., which laid down that customs duty carry the first charge even during the insolvency process under Section 529

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Defending RBI’s MD-PPI On Buy-Now-Pay-Later Lending: A Case For Regulatory-Proportionality

[By Sukarm Sharma] The author is a student at the National Law School of India University, Bengaluru. Introduction Buy-Now-Pay-later (“BNPL”), as the name indicates, is a point-of-sale credit mechanism, where consumers can purchase a product immediately, and pay it off in various installments. This is enabled by a third-party fintech firm. The fintech firm pays for the product to the merchant (like Amazon, Zomato, etc.) through a pre-paid instrument (“PPI”) and gets repaid by the consumer in installments. Although generally no interest is levied on the credit, the profit for the fintech BNPL firm is primarily through consumer default fees and merchant fees. BNPL is one of the fastest growing fintech industries in India, overtaking UPI with a growth of 637% in 2021, reaching a market size of 6.3 Billion USD. Through a notification on 20 July 2022,[i] the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) clarified that non-bank entities would not be allowed to ‘load credit lines’ as per the Master Directions on Pre-Paid Instruments (“MD-PPI”). This caused major BNPL fintech credit providers like Lazypay, EarlySalaryetc. to halt their service since post-notification it was clear that the MD-PPI did not permit them to issue credit through PPIs. Consequently, the MD-PPI was criticized to be disproportionate, since it disallowed BNPL firms from issuing credit, even when tied to banks/Non-Banking Financial Companys (“NBFC”). Questions were also raised as to whether this regulation was a “flex move” by the banks in to reduce competition in the lucrative credit card market. Moreover, this degree of regulation was considered to be disproportionate to the risks posed by BNPL since they engage in micro-lending and enhance financial inclusion. The MD-PPI is therefore under question on the grounds that it restricts financial innovation and places a disproportionate burden on fintech payment platforms by preventing them from loading their PPIs. Although this has not been hitherto applied to Indian fintech regulation, the traditional model to assess proportionality in fintech regulation as per current literature involves gauging whether the necessity for regulation is commensurate to the stringency of regulation[ii] with regards to the three core objectives of regulation: (I) fair competition, (II) market integrity and (III) financial stability.[iii] This article argues that the MD-PPI provision which prevents BNPL fintech firms from issuing PPIs is proportionate in meeting the aforementioned core objectives. The original contribution of this article is that it introduces the concept of regulatory-proportionality in Indian fintech regulation using the example of BNPL and the MD-PPI by engaging Amstad, Restoy, and Lehmann on fintech regulatory theory. To this end, three arguments are made. First, the MD-PPI promotes fair competition by highlighting that since they engage in veiled balance-sheet lending without the license to lend rather than as payment systems, the MD-PPI is not unfair in restricting BNPLs from issuing credit. Second, relying on regulatory theory to argue that the information asymmetry and other market integrity concerns extant in the BNPL credit market justify the relatively stricter regulation as per the MD-PPI. Third, that fintech balance-sheet lending in BNPL poses a sufficient threat to financial stability, meriting regulatory intervention proportionate to the MD-PPI. Regulatory Fairness, Protecting Competition, and the ‘Duck’ Principle Simply put, the ‘Duck’ principle dictates fintech institutions performing the same functions must be regulated in the same way.  The Duck principle rests on regulatory fairness, i.e., in so far as institutions entail similar risks and activities, they shall be regulated with proportional stringency, as to not unfairly advantage one fintech domain over the other.[iv] It is based on the principle of activity-based regulation vis-à-vis entity-based regulation. This means the legal nature of the entity (for example, whether it is a payment gateway or a bank) is less important than the actual activity it engages in.[v] This is pertinent in the context of BNPL service providers. The MD-PPI targets only those who engage in credit lending under the fig leaf of acting as payment gateways. This is because the exposure for the loans is on the BNPL provider and not the banks/NBFC they are partnered with. For example, the fintech firms Slice and Uni are partnered with the State Bank of Mauritius and the RBL bank respectively for a ‘first loss default guarantee’ scheme. Here, the third-party bank acts to mitigate risks in cases of default but does not itself lend. This association proves useful to the fintech BNPL firms since banks/NBFCs are authorized under the PPI-MD to pre-fund the PPIs. However, as noted by the RBI’s Working Group on Digital Lending, (para. 5.3.1.5) the risk of issuing credit is not borne by the banks/NBFCs since they don’t issue credit in PPIs. The lending and concomitant exposure are instead from the balance sheets of the unregulated fintech firms rather than by the licensed and regulated partner banks. Consequently, even though the fintech firms are payment gateway entities on paper, their activity is that of lending (even if masked through ‘rented’ NBFCs/Banks). The risks of fintech balance-sheet (FBS) lending without regulation and licensing have been acknowledged as a risk to financial stability and market integrity.[vi] Since the fintech BNPL firms do not possess the license and the concomitant regulation of credit issuing, their debarment from loading credit lines is proportional to the risk entailed, and in line with the objectives of Duck-type regulation. Market Integrity, Information Asymmetry, and Consumer Safety: Justifying Tighter Regulatory Scrutiny on BNPLs Another essential element of proportionate regulation is that the stringency of regulation should be correlated to the threats to the market integrity of the domain being regulated.[vii] A greater risk to consumers would permit proportionately closer scrutiny by the regulators. This is rooted in an understanding of regulation theory, that regulation functions for the public interest, which requires the elimination of information asymmetries since they lead to market inefficiencies and consumer detriment.[viii] The potential counter-argument to the MD-PPI being proportionate is that BNPL is a convenient, user-friendly, and quick way to access credit typically at 0% interest rates. In that light, questions arise as to why BNPL firms should comply with similar restrictions as credit-card

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Poison that Indian Corporates Need: About Time to Bring ‘Poison-Pill’ in India?

[By Shaurya Singh and Sanya Goel] The authors are students at the Jindal Global Law School, Sonipat. The shareholder rights plan, commonly known as the ‘Poison-pill’ is a strategy used to defend against a hostile takeover by issuing new shares at discount to the existing shareholders other than the acquirer. This dilutes the shareholding of the acquirer while providing an opportunity to the other shareholders to raise their holdings at a discounted price. Therefore, the cost of acquisition significantly rises which would make the target company less attractive to the acquirer considering its higher price. Hence, deterring the hostile acquirer to complete the acquisition and pull out of the deal. This defense strategy has proven its mantle by breaking the jaws of some of the biggest corporate sharks over the years in the US. However, a series of regulations make the poison pill illegal in India. This article stresses the need for importing the poison pill to safeguard Indian companies and points out the fault in the current regulations which freely facilitate hostile takeovers. The Paramount of Defence: There have been several instances where this strategy has proved its effectiveness by saving well-known companies from non-consensual takeovers. Yahoo, acquired the poison pill in 2001 to save itself from being acquired by Microsoft. Along the same lines, Netflix, the current largest streaming service used the strategy as a defence against Carl Icahn’s takeover. Hence, the viability of the Poison Pill is very evident but especially when being used as the only defence strategy it might not guarantee complete safety from the takeover. Swallowing the pill: Poison-pill on paper makes up for a very robust strategy, however, there might be some cases where the acquirer has enough resources to complete the deal regardless, especially when the acquisition is happening without keeping profitability at the centre. In such cases, the acquirer would not care if the profitability of the venture is being compromised or not. Hence, the higher cost of acquisition is less likely to create a deterrence making the poison pill useless. For instance, Elon Musk’s bid for Twitter was not motivated by profits but was rather being done to save the freedom of speech of individuals on the internet. According to Musk, Twitter being one of the most influential social media platforms, was not fully allowing individuals to express free speech and he wished to acquire it to allow free expression. He pitched an offer of 43 billion dollars which was more than entire the market capitalisation of Twitter (37 billion USD). Here, Twitter did initially deploy the poison pill to avoid acquisition but the board later did accept the Musk’s Bid considering the value of the offer. The offer was withdrawn later, but the pill would not have saved Twitter given the amount of money Musk was ready to spend on the deal. A key take away from the said case is that if the acquirer has enough resources, is willing to pay the high cost of acquisition, and can directly or indirectly influence the board of the company, then the target company would not be able to defend itself only by relying on the pill. However, the case of Twitter itself is an exceptional scenario as a majority of the hostile takeovers are motivated by profitability. Therefore, a higher cost of acquisition due to the poison pill can save the target company in most cases. Additionally, the presence of a staggered board of directors comprised of firm individuals adds to the effectiveness of the pill. The Staggered Aegis: The provision for a staggered board of directors has been introduced in India through the Companies Act, 2013. While Section 169 of the Companies Act, 2013 allows for the removal of a director from the company before their period in office expires given that they are given a fair chance to be heard, exceptions to the same are provided in Section 242 and Section 163. A director appointed by the NCLT under Section 242 is not subject to the provisions of Section 169. Similarly, the provisions of Section 169 do not apply in a situation where the company has availed the option to appoint two-thirds of the total number of directors in compliance with the principle of proportional representation of Section 163 which basically translates to the existence of a staggered board. The staggered board complements the pill and these two together make a very viable defence. Theoretically, the acquirer could fire the entire current board and exert control over the newly elected board, thereby dismantling the pill. The staggered board prevents that. Therefore even in the presence of multiple resisting shareholders, the acquirer would not gain control over the board for a long time. The introduction of the staggered board is indeed a positive step but to fully utilize its defensive aspect poison pill is needed, which is restricted by a series of regulations framed by SEBI. The Fault in Our Codes Considering the regulations that regulate takeovers, it is safe to claim that India is a takeover-friendly country. This may not necessarily be a negative thing, given that the legislation has also been flexible enough to permit M&A transactions with minimum intrusion. But that does not mean that the law should freely allow hostile takeovers. The SEBI (Substantial Acquisitions of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 or the ‘Takeover Code’ mandates the acquirer to make a public announcement once it obtains 25% of the shares and this is the only major obligation for the acquirer to undertake a takeover. On the other hand, 26(c) of the takeover code prohibits poison pills, as it states that the target company can not issue any securities which entitle the holder to voting rights. Also,26(d) refrains the target company to “implement any buy-back of shares or effect any other change to the capital structure”. Additionally paragraph 13.1.2 chapter 13 SEBI (Disclosure and Investor Protection) Guidelines, also restricted a company from deploying the poison pill as it did not allow for discount warrants less than the

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Mandatory Nature of Pre-show Cause Notice- A Silver lining For Tax Reforms?

[By Priyanshi Jain] The author is a student at the Institute of Law, Nirma University. Introduction A show-cause notice consists of a prima facie opinion by the tax department with respect to the offence made out against a taxable person. The aim of pre-show cause notice is to reduce the burden of unnecessary litigation before issuing the final show-cause notice. The need for the same was initially highlighted in the First Report of the Tax Administration Reforms Commission, wherein it was held that a vertical dispute mechanism for pre-show cause consultation should be set up; this shall ensure that preventable and unwanted disputes do not take much time of the tax department. Following these recommendations, through a circular published on December 21, 2015[i], the Central Board of Excise & Customs (‘CBIC’) made the “Pre-notice Consultation” mandatory in all cases comprising a demand of Rs. 50 lakhs or more. Recently, in the case of Gulati Enterprise vs Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs & Ors[ii], the Delhi High Court emphasized the mandatory nature of the pre-show cause consultation notice. It negated the substitution of this statutory notice with a voluntary statement. Section 74(1) of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017, read with rule 142(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Service Tax Rule, aims to establish the above-said principle by offering an opportunity to the assessee on a pre-show cause notice stage. The blog puts weight on the High Court decision by reiterating the necessity of a ‘pre-show cause consultation notice’ to eliminate the unnecessary burden of litigation by promoting voluntary compliance. The blog also aims to highlight the existing face-off between the department and the taxpayer in accordance with pre-show-cause consultation. Unnecessary Burden of Litigation The First Report of the Tax Administration Reform Commission (‘TARC’)[iii] advised the department to avoid disputes in cases where a collaborative effort can render an effective solution. The present Indian Tax Regime is filled with procedural complexities, ultimately leading to unreasonable delays and hefty expenses. Prolonged litigation in matters related to taxation and the overall hassle of reaching an amicable solution has created a perception that the current tax system is unfavorable to taxpayers. This issue is placed on the centre stage when a substantial amount of revenue is blocked in disputes, which could benefit the Indian economy if the dispute is settled amicably. Hence, in such a scenario, it becomes imperative to introduce a system by which the head-to-head approach can be rationalized in three precise steps first, effective case management; second, preventing procedural formalities and third, providing multiple opportunities for settlement and alternative dispute resolution. In order to implement the above-said system into practice, through a circular published on December 21, 2015, the CBIC made the “Pre-notice Consultation” mandatory in all cases comprising a demand of Rs. 50 lakhs or more. Such an administrative mechanism may be instituted to resolve tax disputes prior to the notice stage by creating a forum for open dialogue between the taxpayer and the department. The forum promotes a bilateral discussion to articulate and scrutinize their positions on the present matter. The possibility of an amicable resolution increases when both parties resolve the dispute through a consensus. The Delhi High Court in Amadeus India Pvt. Ltd. vs Pr. Commissioner, C.Ex, ST & CT (2019)[iv], while reiterating the mandatory nature of pre-show cause consultation notice, highlighted that if the process of such notice is followed in a proper spirit, it shall reduce a significant number of disputes. However, it should be noted that the process is not indefectible since it is subject to failure in case a mutual agreement is not reached. The Tax Administration Reform Commission (‘TARC’) further recommended that tax officers should not be permitted to fall back on coercive methods for facilitating recovery during the pre-consultation process. The report advises three essential guidelines for the department to follow for promoting the above-said forum for discussion and open communication: first, only the officer competent to issue a notice shall be allowed to take part in such consultation; second, the tax officer shall adopt a receptive and open vantage point; third, the tax officer shall provide full consideration to the views of the taxpayer before reaching to a conclusion. The above-mentioned guidelines aim to narrow down the contentions made by any party if a legal action arises thereof. The contentions on which an agreement has been reached shall not be contested further by either party. Therefore, the pre-show-cause consultation mechanism aims to achieve a more effective and efficient dispute resolution system. This, in turn, reduces the unwanted burden of litigation in the Indian indirect tax regime. Tax Payer vs The Department  It is imperative to note that the process of pre-show-cause consultation is not a statutory procedure but rather a procedure meted out by the Central Board with the objective of increasing compliance and decreasing the need to issue show-cause notices. The overall conclusion is that any procedure developed by the CBIC to balance the interests of the assessee and the revenue should be given due consideration. Unfortunately, the department, in several instances, has failed its obligation to grant an adequate opportunity for consultation to the taxpayer, completely disregarding the instructions provided by the CBIC through their circulars. It was observed in the case of M/s Dharamshil Agencies vs Union of India (Gujarat High Court) Special Civil Application No. 8255 of 2019[v] that it was the department’s responsibility to issue a pre-show cause consultation notice immediately after the final audit report was published. The court held that an ‘illusionary’ pre-show cause notice, in its essence, is arbitrary and against the very object and purpose of the Master Circular. The Central Board’s circulars bind the department, and it cannot simply disregard the numerous circulars issued by the CBIC regarding the said consultation or issue show cause notices on its own. In a situation where we accept that the department has issued the pre-show-cause notice in accordance with the circular published by the CBIC, the taxpayer cannot be completely

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Supreme Court Settles Jurisdictional Conundrum for Appeals from ITAT Orders

[By Harshit Joshi] The author is a student at the Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies. An appeal was brought before the Supreme Court in which both the Delhi High Court and the Punjab & Haryana High Court refused to have territorial jurisdiction over the dispute due to a difference of opinion and dismissed appeals filed before them. The Supreme Court solved the conundrum concerning appellate jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’) in its judgment dated 18 August 2022 in the case of Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Chandigarh v. M/s. ABC Papers Limited. Another question that the Supreme court resolved is the jurisdiction of the High Court consequent upon an administrative decision transferring a “case” under Section 127 of the Act from one Assessing Officer to another Assessing Officer (‘AO’) located in a different State. The court ruled that the jurisdiction of the High Court stands on its own foundation and cannot be susceptible to the executive power of transferring a matter. The Apex Court also overturned the finding rendered by the High Court of Delhi in CIT v. Sahara India Financial Corporation Ltd. and CIT v. Aar Bee Industries Ltd. holding they do not lay down the correct law. In this post, we shall dissect and analyze the judgment of the Supreme Court. Factual Background The Appellant M/s. ABC Papers Ltd. (‘Assessee’) is a company engaged in the manufacture of writing and printing paper and filed its income tax returns before AO, New Delhi in 2008. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (‘DCIT’), New Delhi, issued a notice of assessment under Section 143 (2) of the Act and followed it up with an order dated 30.12.2010. Aggrieved by that order, the Assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (‘CIT’) (Appeals) – IV, New Delhi who by order dated 16.02.2012, allowed the appeal. Against this appellate order of CIT, the Revenue carried the matter to Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (‘ITAT’), New Delhi. The ITAT, New Delhi, by its order dated 11.05.2017, upheld the order of the CIT (Appeals) – IV, New Delhi, and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. Meanwhile, by an order of transfer dated 26.06.2013 passed under Section 127 of the Act, the CIT (Central), Ludhiana, centralized the cases of the Assessee and transferred the same to Ghaziabad. The DCIT, Ghaziabad, passed another assessment order on 31.03.2015. Aggrieved by that order, the Assessee filed an appeal which came to be allowed by the CIT (Appeals) – IV, Kanpur, on 20.12.2016. Against this appellate order, the Revenue preferred an appeal to ITAT, New Delhi which was also dismissed by its order dated 01.09.2017. The cases of the Assessee were re-transferred under Section 127 of the Act to the DCIT, Chandigarh, w.e.f. 13.07.2017. Revenue decided to file appeals, being ITA No. 517 of 2017 (against the order of the ITAT dated 11.05.2017) and ITA No. 130 of 2018 (against the order of the ITAT dated 01.09.2017) before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The High Court of Punjab & Haryana by its judgment dated 07.02.2019, disposed of both the appeals by holding that, notwithstanding the order under Section 127 of the Act which transferred the cases of the Assessee to Chandigarh, the High Court of Punjab & Haryana would not have jurisdiction as the AO who passed the initial assessment order is situated outside the jurisdiction of the High Court. The Revenue also filed an appeal, ITA No. 515 of 2019 before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court of Delhi had taken a view that when an order of transfer under Section 127 of the Act is passed, the jurisdiction gets transferred to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the situs of the transferee officer is located and dismissed the appeal. The question came up before the Supreme court to resolve the issue as to which High Court would have the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against a decision of a Bench of the ITAT exercising jurisdiction over more than one state. Analysis of legal provisions Given that each state has its own High Court and that ITATs are designed to exercise jurisdiction over multiple states, the question of which High Court is the appropriate court for filing appeals under Section 260A emerged. The question arose because Section 260A is open-textual and does not specify the High Court before which an appeal would lie in cases where Tribunals operated for a plurality of States. The structure established in Article 1 of the Constitution is not followed by the jurisdiction the ITAT Benches exercise. Benches are sometimes constituted in a way that their jurisdiction encompasses territories of more than one state. The Allahabad Bench, for example, comprises areas of Uttarakhand. The Amritsar Bench has jurisdiction over the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir. An AO is given the authority and jurisdiction over anyone conducting business or exercising a profession in any area that has been assigned to them by virtue of Section 124. A “case” may be transferred from one AO to another AO under Section 127 at the discretion of a higher authority. These clauses are all located in Chapter XIII of the Act and exclusively relate to the executive or administrative authority of the Income Tax Authorities. The issue regarding the appropriate High Court for filing an appeal is well settled since when it fell for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi way back in 1978 in the case of Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta v. Commissioner of Income Tax. It was held that the “most appropriate” High Court for filing an appeal would be the one where the AO is located. This was held so that the authorities would be bound to follow the decision of the concerned High Court and has been followed and abided in subsequent judgments of the High Court of Delhi. However, the question in the instant case is in the context of an order

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Are Pre-closing Covenants Anti-Competitive?: Separating Gun Jumping from Pre-closing Covenants

[By Pranay Agarwal] The author is a student at the Gujarat National Law University. Introduction The process of merger and acquisition is not consolidated in India and still remains a practical aspect influenced more by the business practices and the consensus between the entities. One of the important aspects of this process is the Share Purchase Agreements (SPAs) where the shares of the seller are legally transferred to the buyer to give effective control to the buyer over the target. Though the practice of drafting an SPA before any takeover is common in the country, the threat of gun jumping always prevails due to the exercise of control over the target before the transaction is complete. The threat of gun jumping becomes even larger from the inclusion of pre-closing covenants in the SPAs in which the buyer entity has decisive control over the various aspects of the operations of the target entity in the ordinary course of business before the merger transaction is completed. However,  at the same time, such pre-closing covenants ensure fair competition in the market balancing the rights of both the target and the buyer. In this article, the pre-closing covenants are given a legal explanation in light of the existing competition laws of the country and it is tried to separate them from the gun jumping and necessitates the need to understand the fine line between them to safeguard the interests of the entities and ensure healthy competition in the market. What are Pre-closing Covenants? Pre-closing covenants are signed during the time period ranging from the execution of the SPA to the actual transfer of the shares or closing of the takeover transaction in order to confer some control to the buyer over the actions and conduct of the target entity. In other words, the pre-closing covenants set out those actions which the seller entity is permitted to carry out in the ordinary course of business. The ordinary course of business, in this case, should be ascertained from the commercial perspective and not from a general perspective. Therefore, it is pertinent to look into the objects clause of the Memorandum of Association of the entity to get a clear picture of the activities conducted by the entity in the ordinary course of business. However, the Memorandum of Association should not only be the criteria to decide such activities and the term should be given a purposive construction depending on the policy or transactions of the entity with related parties. Nevertheless, due to the prevailing business practices on the pre-closing covenants, buyers are given rights on fixing the actions which can be freely carried on by the target entity, and such control is even extended to capping the monetary value of the transactions of the target. While this may seem to be giving effective control to the buyer over the conduct of the target before the actual takeover, the pre-closing covenants are included with the sole purpose of ensuring the position or image of the target entity in the market in the interim period does not differ from that at the time of the agreement in order to prevent unjust losses to the buyer due to conduct of the target meanwhile. Decisive influence in Pre-closing covenants The apprehension of gun jumping due to the pre-closing covenants is majorly influenced by the excessive control that it gives to the buyer over the conduct of the target. If seen from one perspective, the pre-closing covenants through conferring extensive control to the buyer over the target, at times transcend its boundaries to significantly influence the actions of the target entity before the closing of a merger or takeover transaction. ‘Decisive influence’ in this context has to be construed in the light of the gun jumping laws of the country. The test of ‘decisive influence’ was given in Hindustan Colas v. CCI, where the Competition Commission of India (CCI) held that the decisive influence by the buyer over the target constitutes the implementation of the combination, violative of section 43A of the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act). While the decisive influence test as was also reiterated in the Etihad Airways case properly defines the practice of gun jumping, the test has to be seen more from the perspective of ‘effective control’ than the decisive influence to practically fulfill the test. The term has been given a proper definition from the mergers and acquisitions perspective in Regulation 2(1)(c) of the SEBI Regulations, 1997 where the control has been given a broad definition of not only relating to the voting of the directors but also management or policy decisions of the entity. The definition though gives an enlarged view of the control of the company, it is possible that the pre-closing covenants are misused under the guise of preservation of the value of the target to exercise excessive control and thus, decisively influence the actions of the target; thus effecting the combination before the completion of stipulated time and procedure. Nonetheless, such presumption may do more harm than good by damaging the sacrosanct line between gun jumping and pre-closing covenants, making it necessary to clearly distinguish between them. The Dissonance between Gun Jumping and Pre-closing Covenants Gun jumping has been a major concern during the merger process. While the term has got its origins in the European competition laws, the CCI in Ultratech Cement case tried to give an indigenous view on the same. The important factor which has to be taken into account is the conduct of the parties to the combination which results in the consummation of the combination before the orders of CCI under section 31 of the Act or when the standstill obligation is still in force. The pre-closing covenants inherently confer powers to the buyer to exercise some control over the seller’s conduct, thus hinting toward the high chances of gun jumping in such agreements. However, the incidences of gun jumping have to be recognized in matters of pre-closing covenants on a case-to-case basis by the Indian watchdog in order

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