Author name: CBCL

Analysis of the Proposed Amendments to the IBC

[By Biprojeet Talapatra] The author is a student of Campus Law Centre, University of Delhi. Introduction Economic stability and prosperity in India require an effective insolvency resolution framework. With the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) in 2016, India took a significant step in this direction. IBC was the first comprehensive law in India which addressed the insolvency of Corporate Persons and individuals. However, a law must be restructured over time to keep up with the times, therefore in 2019, rules for insolvency resolution and liquidation for individual insolvency were made applicable to personal guarantors (“PG”) to corporate persons. Following that, a distinct framework for pre-packaged insolvency resolution for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (“MSMEs”) was launched in April 2021. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) has recently released a consultation paper outlining proposed changes to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The purpose of these changes is to improve transparency, reduce delays, and ensure efficient decision-making in insolvency proceedings. This article aims to highlight the key changes proposed in the paper.  Key changes proposed in the consultation paper To simplify the insolvency procedure, the MCA advocated the implementation of an E-platform in Insolvency Proceedings.The MCA believes that implementing an e-platform for insolvency proceedings will lead to a more efficient case management system, automated mechanisms for filing applications with Adjudication Authorities (AAs), notice delivery, and allowing Insolvency Professionals (IPs) to interact with stakeholders, among other benefits. By unifying and making information widely accessible, the e-platform will enable improved supervision of regulators and adjudicating authorities. The MCA advocates a greater dependence on data via Information Utilities (IUs), while also taking applications into account. Sections 7 and 9 of the code now provide that, in addition to the record of default kept by the IUs, further evidence can be provided to prove that a default has happened. It has now been recommended that the code should  be revised to allow the Adjudicating Authority to solely consider the default record from the Information Utilities when reviewing applications under sections 7 and 9 of the Code. Section 7 of the Code allows a financial creditor to apply for the commencement of the CIRP in relation to a Corporate Debtor (CD). The Supreme Court interpreted the usage of the word “may” in section 7(5) to mean that the Adjudicating Authority (hereinafter referred as AA) has the authority to accept or refuse the application despite the presence of a default. It is now recommended that an application submitted under Section 7 “shall” be allowed if a default is proved; the AA is only necessary to be satisfied regarding the existence of a default and the fulfilment of procedural requirements for this specific purpose (and nothing more). When a default is formed, the AA is required to allow the application and commence the CIRP. The proposals aim to give more power to the adjudicating authority by allowing mandatory admission of insolvency applications filed by financial creditors (FCs). The draft proposal also proposes a specialized framework for real estate to provide relief to allottees, as well as to broaden the scope of the pre-packaged bankruptcy scheme beyond MSMEs. The ministry also proposed that the 14-day timeframe in section 7 be read to apply exclusively to the ascertainment of default. However, it is also meant to apply to the AA’s decision under section 7(5) to admit or reject the application. As a result, it is proposed that a suitable adjustment be made to clarify the timeline’s application. The MCA has proposed removing the Corporate Debtor’s right to designate an Insolvency Resolution Professional (IRP). The draft proposal recommends that the IRP be appointed by the Adjudicating Authority (AA) based on the IBBI’s recommendations. As a result, this proposal seeks to limit the CD’s ability to propose an IRP.  The AA is now planning to have the power to penalize people who file frivolous or vexatious applications or fail to comply with the terms of the Code or any rules or regulations imposed thereunder. Furthermore, the AA’s minimum punishment for the aforementioned violations should not be less than one lakh rupees per day, with the maximum penalty being three times the damage incurred or illicit gain, whichever is greater. To ensure that corporate debtor promoters comply with their obligations and to prevent them from committing repeated or significant violations, the MCA has considered amending Section 29A of the Code to allow the AA to bar such a promoter from being a resolution applicant and submitting a resolution plan in the CIRP of any CD. During the liquidation process, Section 33 (5) of the Code prohibits the CD from instituting actions or legal processes against it without the permission of the AA. It does not, however, preclude the continuation of any ongoing action or legal procedure after the moratorium imposed during the CIRP is lifted. As a result, it is suggested that Section 33 (5) may be revised to restrict any legal procedures during liquidation, except for those authorized under Section 52. (i.e., Secured creditor in liquidation proceedings). To continue any legal processes involving a CD in liquidation, the AA’s consent should also be necessary. Changes recommended in the requirements for the Pre-Packaged Insolvency Resolution Process The 66 per cent requirement for unrelated FCs might be reduced to 51 per cent. This will allow for faster and more efficient decision-making. The need under section 54C(3)(c) to provide a declaration involving avoidance transactions or unlawful trading is repealed. These transactions are difficult for MSMEs to recognise. Changes in management under section 54J, conversion to CIRP, or liquidation under sections 54O or 54N are to be deleted. The major goal of this suggested adjustment is to ensure that genuine CDs intending to address insolvency through this method are not affected. Proposals for Streamlining the Insolvency Resolution Process The Fast-Track Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“FIRP”) is being considered to allow FCs to lead the insolvency resolution procedure for a CD outside of the judicial process while keeping some involvement of the AA to

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Evaluating the ESG Framework : The Way Forward

[By Anshika Gubrele & Harsh Khanchandani] The authors are students of Bharati Vidyapeeth New Law College, Pune and Symbiosis Law School, Pune. Introduction Financial considerations have typically dictated investment choices. With the worldwide pandemic, climate change, ongoing depletion of natural resources, and many instances of fraud and scams, investors have become more aware of how environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) factors of a commercial entity may affect its long-term financial performance. This has led to more investor demand and interest in ESG rating, ESG reporting, and ESG-related products by investors. It is in this light that the authors in Part I of this article shall attempt to discuss the Indian legal regime along with the international best practices relating to ESG disclosures and reporting standards. In the second part, the authors shall endeavor to discuss the key issues with the ESG reporting in light of the consultation paper issued by the Security Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”). Indian Framework While various laws for environmental protection[i], overall well-being of employees, equitable treatment,[ii] and corporate governance have been introduced in India at various times, there is no one consolidated law in India that covers all aspects of Environmental, Social, and Governance standards. Different laws exist for different ESG issues, but none covers all of them. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (“MCA“) has been recommending corporations to ensure responsible corporate conduct. It published a set of recommendations known as the National Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct (“NGRBC“), which included a set of nine responsible business conduct principles. These guidelines also specify the structure for corporate responsibility reporting, which includes the disclosures that must be made for each principle. These disclosures were designed to be used internally by businesses to measure their progress towards sustainable business practices. In addition to this, in May 2022, the MCA-established Committee on Business Responsibility Reporting (“BRR Committee“) along with SEBI vide Regulation 34(2)(f) of the Listing Regulations introduced Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (“BRSR“), a more comprehensive reporting framework focusing on all measurable key performance indicators. The Committee has suggested two reporting forms, one comprehensive (for listed and large unlisted firms) and one lite (for smaller enterprises), all of which require disclosures in accordance with the NGRBC standards. While SEBI has issued a circular mandating the top 1,000 listed businesses to submit BRSR, the MCA has yet to provide amendments requiring unlisted entities to file BRSR. In a similar sense, the Indian Companies Act, 2013 (the “Companies Act”) has codified directors’ responsibility to the community and the environment. In specific, section 166 of the Companies Act[iii] compels a director of the firm to “act in the best interest of the community as well as the environment” and Section 135 of the Companies Act & the guidelines developed thereunder comprises a comprehensive code on every company’s corporate social responsibility. In May 2021, a Sustainable Finance Group (“SFG”) was established by the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) to collaborate with other national and international organizations on climate change issues with the intention of coming up with strategies and introducing a legal framework that would require banks and other regulated entities to make appropriate ESG disclosures in order to promote sustainable practices and reduce climate-related risks in the Indian economy. Finally, the Department of Economic Affairs, in January 2021, established a Task Force on Sustainable Finance to offer a thorough framework for India’s financing of sustainable methods. Additionally, it is tasked with creating a methodology for assessing the risk in the financial sector as well as a draught taxonomy of sustainable operations. Other regulatory measures include the constitution of an advisory committee by SEBI on ESG matters, taxonomy and disclosures for green bonds and a consultation paper proposing disclosure norms for mutual funds launching ESG Schemes. International Framework In India, the BRSR framework is being implemented for the purpose of governing ESG reporting. It is noteworthy that compared to systems in other Asian countries, the BRSR framework is commendable. It is important to emphasize that the responsibilities of directors in Indian companies extend beyond the shareholders and encompass other stakeholders as well.[iv] This establishes a robust legal framework for Indian corporations’ ESG reporting and allows for ongoing legislative and regulatory improvement. The move away from optional ESG reporting and towards mandated disclosures is gathering steam. Like India, which has made BRSR compulsory for its largest listed companies, China, Malaysia, and Indonesia have adopted similar regulations. Other Asian countries, like Hong Kong, have a mixed approach, requiring obligatory disclosures for specific ESG concerns but permitting a ‘compliance or explain‘ approach for climate-change issues. Finally, nations such as Singapore and Japan are attempting to migrate from ‘comply or explain‘ to obligatory reporting. In terms of disclosure substance and format certain countries including, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore have released ESG guidelines based on the Global Reporting Initiative standards. Japan’s approach to integrated reporting or mandating ESG disclosures in yearly reports is similar to India’s approach to the BRSR. Companies in Hong Kong are obliged to provide ESG disclosures in their annual report. Singapore, on the other hand, mandates ESG disclosures in a separate sustainability report from its listed corporations. KEY CHALLENGES WITH THE ESG REPORTING Methodological Data issues – There are major problems with the data that is being generated by corporations today,  including lack of verification, differences in the manner in which data is collected by corporations and then subsequently, reported. Generally, it creates a lack of faith by investors in quality of that data therefore, it becomes difficult to make investment decisions. The methodological quality of data is still a fundamental challenge. Lack of standardization – As a norm, companies assess environmental and social information in order to put it into Financial Year (FY) audit reports. To move data into financial reports specifically into financial statements of a report has legal, financial implications. There is relatively less reference to a standard for reporting, disclosure and materiality outside of sustainability reports. In sustainability reports, we observe reference to primarily the Global

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SEBI’s Power to issue Supplementary Show Cause Notices: A Despotic Excessive Delegation of Power?

[By Mainak Mukherjee] The author is a student of National Law University and Judicial Academy, Assam. Introduction Delegated legislation acts as a tool for the legislature to reduce the burden from its shoulder. However, considering the thin line that separates delegated legislation from excessive delegation of power, it is pertinent for the legislature to exercise more control over the executive even when legislative powers have been delegated. Moreover, delegated legislation can often lead to a lack of transparency and accountability as the administrative bodies are not subjected to a similar level of scrutiny and debate as laws made by the legislature. One such example of excessive delegation of power is the Securities and Exchange Board of India’s (SEBI) power to issue Supplementary Show Cause Notices at any given point of a proceeding. SEBI undertakes quasi-judicial proceedings based on the principle of natural justice, and notices serve an essential function to heed natural justice as it allows the other side to know the charges that are being labeled against them. That being said, the question still beckons: if there should be a regulatory framework for SEBI to issue Supplementary Show Cause Notices—after a show cause notice has already been issued—especially when the statute remains silent about the same. In this article, the author will first discuss SEBI’s power to arbitrarily issue Supplementary Show Cause Notices at any given point of a proceeding. In the latter half of the article, he will analyze how the Parliament has not conferred SEBI with the power to issue Supplementary Show Cause Notices and why a properly laid-down framework for the same is the need of the hour. The curious case of Supplementary Show Cause Notices issued by SEBI Nemo judex causa sua and Audi alteram partem are essentially two essential principles of any quasi-judicial proceeding. As mentioned earlier, issuing a notice—in this case: Supplementary Show Cause Notices—to the concerned person, informing them about the charges framed, and the actions to be taken is sine qua non of a fair hearing. Nevertheless, not having a proper regulatory framework on Supplementary Show Cause Notices—as in, when it can be served—can go against the very principle of natural justice. For example, when a matter has already gone before adjudication based on the Show Cause Notice, and the noticee has prepared their defense, and suddenly they get hit by a Supplementary Show Cause Notice adding new facts to the case. Power can often transform into misusage. In this scenario, the power to issue Supplementary Show Cause Notices, without a just regulatory framework, can be used as a tool by SEBI to post facto improve its case. Further, a Supplementary Show Cause Notice can also defeat the explanations put forth by the noticee in their reply to the Show Cause Notice. The same arguments were raised by the noticees in Adjudication Order in respect of NSE in the matter of Karvy Stock Broking Limited. The noticees argued that SEBI uses the Supplementary Show Cause Notice at a later stage of a proceeding to improve its case, which defeats the purpose of the show cause notice. SEBI, in its order, stated that additional facts were found and went on to justify the issuance of the Supplementary Show Cause Notice under the garb of natural justice in a quasi-judicial proceeding. SEBI has, on multiple occasions, taken the defense of natural justice whenever noticees have raised an issue on SEBI’s power to issue Supplementary Show Cause Notices. For example, in both, Adjudication Order in the matter of Fixed Maturity Plans Series 127, 183, 187, 189, 193, and 194 of Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund and Order in the matter of GDR issue of Morepen Laboratories Ltd, SEBI passed an order stating: “supplementary show cause notice is an inbuilt requirement in any quasi-judicial proceedings as a part and parcel of principles of provided for in the legislation.” Further, the order against Morepen Laboratories Ltd. was later appealed to the Hon’ble Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT). SAT’s order—in the appeal—throws out of the window SEBI’s power of issuing notices at any time as “the SEBI Act, 1992 (SEBI Act) is not time-barred”. SAT, in its order, stated that although there is no period of limitation prescribed in the SEBI Act and other regulations, the issuance of notices for the completion of adjudication proceedings must be done within a reasonable period of time to avoid inordinate delay. Reliance was placed on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in Adjudicating Officer, Securities, and Exchange Board of India vs. Bhavesh Pabari[1]. Not only did this SAT order impose restrictions on SEBI’s boundless power of issuing notices, but it also acted as an antithesis to SEBI’s notion: that if something is not covered under its laws, then it is not bound by those laws—in the present case, the concept of time-barred limitation. Further, this SAT order also becomes relevant in the context of Supplementary Show Cause Notices. It poses two big questions: does SEBI have the power to issue Supplementary Show Cause Notices in a proceeding just because anything contrary to this has not been mentioned in any of its laws? If yes, then is this power absolute without any restrictions? In arguendo: Parliament has conferred other agencies with the power of issuing Supplementary Show Cause Notices In the context of the argument raised against the nature of SEBI’s power to issue Supplementary Show Cause Notices, it becomes relevant to mention that whenever the Parliament has thought of conferring any agency with the power of issuing Supplementary Show Cause Notices, the legislature has explicitly so provided. For example, the Finance Act 2018 amended the Customs Act 1962 to include Supplementary Show Cause Notices under the legislation; however, nothing was done for the SEBI Act. Further, Sections 28(7A) and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 outline the circumstances under which “a proper officer” can issue a supplementary notice. Additionally, the erstwhile Income Tax Act 1869 also contained Section 23, which gave power to the Collector to issue a fresh notice when he “has reason to believe that, in assessing any person under the Act, any

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Fractional Share Investing: A Possibility for the Indian Stock Market?

[By Saima Khan] The author is a student of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow. Introduction: During the Covid-19 pandemic, the Indian Stock Market witnessed a massive rise in the number of retail investors with remarkable participation from millennials and Gen-Z. According to the National Stock Exchange, retail shareholding in Indian companies reached a 15-year high in June 2022. This is indeed good news for our country’s economy. However, retail investor participation in India still has a long way to go.  The legal and regulatory framework of the Indian Capital markets is such that it disincentivizes investors from participating in the market. For instance, the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “CA-13”) does not permit investors to purchase or hold fractional shares. A fractional share refers to a unit of stock that is less than one full share. Fractional shares make the world of investment more accessible to retail investors. For instance, one MRF share is currently priced at around Rs. 90,000. Now, let’s say a college student with limited savings wants to purchase this share. Since the existing regime does not allow shareholders to hold less than a whole share, it would be impossible for them to buy even one share of MRF. On the contrary, if fractional share investing were allowed in India, such investors could easily buy a fraction of the share, for example, 1/30th part of the share amounting to Rs. 3,000. Thus, Indian market participants are pitching for changes in the current framework, enabling them to buy fractional shares of the companies of their choice.  Pursuant to their demands, the Company Law Committee (hereinafter referred to as “CLC”), in its report dated March 21, 2022, has recommended certain amendments to the CA-13 to pave the way for fractional share investing in India. Through this article, the author attempts to examine the impact of these recommendations on the present regime while discussing the future course of fractional share investing in India by providing a detailed comparison between the operation of stock trading in the USA and India. Recommendations Of The Committee: The CLC has, inter alia, proposed the amendment of  Section 4(1)(e)(i) and paragraph 4 of Table F – Schedule 1 of the CA-13 which restrict the issuance and holding of fractional shares in India. Section 4(1)(e)(i) creates a bar on the holding of fractional shares by stating that the amount of share capital to which the subscribers to the Memorandum of Association agree to subscribe shall not be less than one share. Notwithstanding the above restrictions, corporate actions such as stock splits, mergers and acquisitions may give rise to fractional shares in India. However, in practice, fractional shares resulting from such actions are not allotted to the shareholders. In stock splits, a company divides its shares into smaller units to lower the price per share and make the company’s stock more attainable for investors. Similarly, in the case of mergers, the share value is redefined and the shares held by the investor are converted into shares of the new entity formed by the merger, in a specific ratio, say 1:4. So, if an investor holds 17 shares of the company, 16 of his shares will be converted into 4 shares of the new entity. The remaining one share will result in 4 ¼  shares. In such cases, the resultant fractional shares are either converted into a whole number of shares or a trustee is appointed by the Board of the company, who buys back the fractional shares and credits the proceeds to the linked bank account. The Report of the CLC has not only recommended the holding of fractional shares, but also their issuance and transfer. Once these recommendations are implemented, shareholders would be entitled to hold fractional shares resulting from such corporate actions. Furthermore, the buying and selling of fractional shares would also become possible. Fractional Share Investing: A Boon For Investors?  The introduction of fractional shares would open the floodgates for retail investing in India owing to their inherent advantages. In the above example, we have seen how fractional shares enable small investors to buy shares of the companies which offer their shares at high prices. Further, owning fractional shares when one has a low capital to invest can help one maintain a diversified portfolio. As the saying goes, “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket”. Hence, it would be prudent for an investor with Rs.10,000 to invest Rs.1,000 by purchasing fractional units of ten different companies rather than buying a single share of one company for Rs. 10,000. Fractional shares also enable investors to receive dividends which are proportionate to the shares held by them. However, the other side of the coin is that fractional shares do not confer voting rights to investors. To tackle this problem, several brokers offering fractional shares have come up with proxy voting rights wherein the broker votes on behalf of the shareholders by aggregating the votes and reporting the results to the shareholders. Another drawback of fractional shares is the excessive fees charged by the brokers which makes it unfeasible to invest in them. Fractional Share Trading In The USA: A Comparative Analysis In the USA, Interactive Brokers set the ball rolling for fractional trade investing by offering investors the option to sell or purchase fractional shares. In response, other prominent brokers such as Schwab, Robinhood and Fidelity jumped on the bandwagon by announcing fractional share trading on their platforms. Similarly, brokers in Canada and Japan have also introduced fractional share trading. The popularity of fractional shares in these countries has inspired the CLC to recommend fractional share investing in India. However, in its report, the CLC has overlooked the fundamental differences between the working of the Indian and the US Stock markets. In India, brokers act as agents of investors. They collect the orders from investors and send them to the exchanges for execution. Thus, in the present system, shares are not held by brokers but by depositories such as Central Depository

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Re-evaluating the need for a Code of Conduct for the Committee of Creditors- An Analysis of Kalinga Allied Industries

[By Satwik Mohapatra] The author is a student of National Law University, Odisha. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), in Kalinga Allied Industries India v. CoC of Bindals Sponnge Industries Limited (Kalinga Judgment), set aside the order of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). The Tribunal ruled that the Committee of Creditors (CoC) cannot consider the new Resolution Plan outside the scope of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) and withdraw their approval of the first Resolution Plan. Additionally, a plan that is submitted to NCLT  with  requisite majority is irrevocable and binding between the CoC and the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA). This judgment sheds light on the unrestricted power of the CoC to make decisions under the ambit of “commercial wisdom” and highlights the need for a standard practice code for the CoC amidst the recent ongoing debate to regulate them. The author  has discussed the facts of the case and analysed tribunal’s verdict in the light of Insolvency Bankruptcy Board of India’s (IBBI) suggestions  Brief Facts An application for the initiation of CIRP was admitted against the Corporate Debtor (CD), Bindals Sponnge Industries Ltd., and Expression of Interest was issued, pursuant to which Kalinga Allied Industries submitted its Resolution Plan. After many discussions, Kalinga Allied Industries submitted a revised Resolution Plan, which obtained the approval of the CoC with the requisite majority. Following which, an application under Section 30(6) of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code 2016 (Code) was filed before the NCLT for the approval of the Resolution Plan. During the pendency of the application, Hindustan Coils Ltd., a third-party that was not a part of CIRP, filed an application before the NCLT seeking consideration of the Resolution Plan submitted by them. Their plan offered a value 12% higher than the value offered by Kalinga Allied Industries, the SRA. The NCLT allowed the CoC’s application that sought direction to reconsider the resolution plan of Hindustan Coils or any other entity and approve a suitable plan. The SRA objected to this order and filed an appeal under Section 61 of the Code. Tribunal’s Verdict The Appellate Authority chalked out the issue in question as being whether the CoC, having already consented to a resolution plan, can seek direction to consider a third-party resolution plan that was not part of CIRP and withdraw their approval after more than 2 years. NCLAT had previously directed that an application by a person outside the ambit of CIRP will not be entertained and remanded the matter to the Adjudicating Authority. This was never challenged by the CoC and has since been final. Furthermore, the Appellate Authority rejected the CoC’s argument that their decisions are based on “commercial wisdom” and are therefore non-justiciable and supreme, as stated in K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank & Ors., and observed that the issue pertains to NCLT’s authority to direct CoC to consider a resolution plan outside the scope of CIRP and the binding value of the resolution plan. The Appellate Authority relied on the Ebix Singapore Pvt Ltd  v. CoC of Educomp Solutions Ltd & Anr (Ebix Judgment) to answer the first question that NCLT has residuary jurisdiction under Section 60(5). Furthermore, NCLT cannot do what the Code specifically does not give it the power to execute. Moreover, allowing any sort of withdrawal or modification to the Resolution Plan would defeat the objective of the Code and result in unnecessary delay. Furthermore, the NCLAT stated that the effect of the CoC withdrawing an approved revival plan would be similar to the effect of the SRA withdrawing a resolution plan, as specifically discussed in the Ebix Judgement. NCLAT laid down that the current framework of the code lacks any scope for modification or withdrawal of the plan, which has received the requisite majority approval of the CoC. Furthermore, once submitted to the Adjudicating Authority, the resolution plan is binding and irrevocable. Moreover, belated submissions cannot be considered even if they provide for a higher value, as the same would have a detrimental effect on the timelines laid down in the Code as well as the already approved resolution plan. Analysis of Tribunal’s Verdict The precedent that had been set by the Ebix Judgment was that a Resolution Plan that has been presented before the Adjudicating Authority and received majority approval cannot be withdrawn from consideration  by the SRA. The apex court held that such withdrawal is not only not permitted under the framework of the Code but also defeats the time bound objective of the code. The Kalinga Judgment acts as an extension to the Ebix Judgment by holding that a Resolution Plan that has received the assent of the CoC cannot be withdrawn after it has been presented to the Adjudicating Authority, as the same has binding value. Withdrawal of the plan by the CoC would have the same consequences as those discussed by the Apex Court. As has been laid down in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Amit Gupta, a delay in the completion of the insolvency proceedings diminishes the value of the debtor’s assets and hampers the prospects of a successful reorganization. Therefore, CIRP cannot be allowed to continue for an indefinite period. Moreover, the withdrawal of the plan submitted to the Authority with the necessary requirements would result in another level of negotiations. The decision of CoC to withdraw its approval will not just affect the SRA but other stakeholders too. The purpose of an insolvency resolution process is to collectively address the claims of all stakeholders including secured and unsecured creditors, employees, other claimholders, etc. For instance, in the insolvency resolution of a big conglomerate with thousands of workmen depending on the company for their wages, such workmen and their dues would be delayed and would result in them being in a disadvantageous position due to unnecessary delays in approving the resolution plan. Apart from timely approving the resolution plan, the CoC is also tasked with the revival of the CD as a going concern. Being in the driver’s seat,

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Bringing Mutual Funds under PIT Regulations: SEBI’s slip on Front-running

[By Praveen Sharma & Sakshi Nalawade] The authors are students of Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai. On 8th July 2022, the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) released a consultation paper seeking the opinion & comments of the public on its desire to extend the scope of SEBI Prohibition of Insider Trading (PIT Regulations), 2015 to include the dealings in the units of mutual funds. It is vital to take note of the fact that this move has come after the  Axis Mutual Fund Front Running Controversy and  Franklin Templeton case. In this blog, the authors argue that this move by SEBI might be too hard on mutual funds. While the issue needs immediate attention, simply putting mutual funds under the umbrella of PIT Regulations could be onerous for the mutual fund industry Background Currently, the PIT Regulations regulate dealings in securities of listed companies or proposed to be listed, when in possession of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI) and it explicitly excludes the transactions in mutual funds. The objective sought to be fulfilled is to harmonize the regulations governing trading in securities and mutual funds, while one is in possession of UPSI. There have been instances wherein officials from the mutual funds’ investment regulating the industry, for instance, employees of Asset Management Companies (AMC(s)) and Trustees of mutual funds have redeemed their holdings in mutual funds schemes being privy to Price Sensitive Information not made public i.e., information not known to the unit holders. Thus, by taking undue advantage of their position they either saved themselves from loss or incurred huge profits. In the Axis Bank Front Running controversy, two of the executives were sacked by Axis Mutual Fund on the accusation of front-running. This resulted in a huge blow to the market as the fund was 7th largest mutual fund in India and such instances at a large fund definitely bought out the lacuna in the mutual fund industry. The case of  Franklin Templeton primarily further might have triggered this harmonization by the SEBI. Vivek Kudva, head of Franklin Templeton’s Asia Pacific, an International Asset Management Company, and his wife Roopa Kudva withdrew an investment of Rs. 30.70 crores from six debt funds of the company before they were shut for redemption. This withdrawal was after it was decided to wind up these six debt schemes as they were not performing well and before the actual date of winding up. Kudva also redeemed his mother’s investment from these schemes. Accordingly, he saved himself and his family members from loss in MF by using UPSI. The Proposal by SEBI The paper has defined the terms ‘Insider’, ‘Connected Person’, and ‘Designated Persons’ concerning mutual fund transactions and has laid down conditions to which these people will be subjected while dealing in mutual fund schemes. Essentially, the person coming under the purview of ‘Designated Persons’, their ‘immediate relative’, and ‘any person from whom such designated person takes trading decisions’ must report their trading of mutual fund units to the Compliance Officer. Further, AMC will disclose their details of holdings in the units of mutual funds on an independent platform as specified by SEBI quarterly. In addition, during the ‘Closure Period,’ a period during which the above-mentioned people can reasonably be expected to have possession of UPSI will be entirely restricted from dealing in the mutual fund units. And when such a closure period is not applicable, they are to take a pre-clearance from the compliance officer to make transactions. It defines UPSI as any information about a scheme of a mutual fund that is not yet generally available and which could materially impact the Net Asset Value or materially affect the interest of unit holders, certain instances of the same have been particularly mentioned. Analysing the move While it is certain that SEBI is strengthening itself when it comes to market regulation and is being as precise as possible. With the SEBI circular already covering insider trading provisions, this move is an extra attempt by SEBI to curb insider trading. SEBI has previously imposed limitations on fund managers and staff members of AMCs for dealing in the securities market through several circulars. At first, there were only restrictions on trading listed securities, but in 2021, through a circular dated October 28, 2021, employees, AMC directors, trustee board members, and access persons (as defined in the said Circular) were also forbidden from engaging in any scheme while in possession of certain sensitive information. It is possible to argue that SEBI’s recent decision to include mutual funds under the ambit of the Insider Trading Regulations is nothing more than an effort to greatly consolidate the previously existing regulation. But this action is unprecedented and unethical (disproportionate). As correctly pointed out by Mr. Sandeep Parekh (Securities Lawyer and Ex-ED at SEBI), in ET blog, SEBI in its paper seeks to add ‘two new classes of people under the ‘connected persons’ category namely, the people working with the mutual fund executives like lawyers and research analysts and unconnected people trying to avoid insider trading allegations by dealing in mutual funds like judges and accounting firms. He correctly brings out the lacuna in this process as it further complicates the enforcement process for SEBI. For the former, just doing their jobs would make them a connected person, further, if they invest in that company’s shares having no access to any UPSI and it happens to make good quarterly numbers, this will open them to criminal charges. Accordingly, years after their association with any mutual fund deal, they might face allegations associated with it and might be put in a position where they must rebut the ‘presumption of guilt’ so formed. Additionally, the definition of UPSI includes many instances of routine changes which would make any piece of information affecting daily transactions in mutual fund sensitive information. Following this, every person who has some knowledge about the routine changes such as ‘change in accounting policy’, which are not even material and has relations with an MF

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Constructing parent company liability in the Indian Competition Jurisprudence

[By Rahul Taneja] The author is a student of Hidayatullah National Law University. Introduction ‘Parent company liability’ refers to the liability of the parent or the holding company for illegal acts of its subsidiary. In the context of the Indian competition law, such illegal acts can be the act of an anti-competitive agreement, abuse of dominance or the formation of a cartel. However, when examining jurisdictions with advanced antitrust laws, it is observed that this issue has been a source of contention for both researchers and industry professionals. The author’s goal is to assess the jurisprudence in India, contrast it with established precedents in other jurisdictions, and offer a path forward from this inevitable dilemma that the regulating body must confront itself with. The doctrine of parent company liability in India is still at a nascent stage and there is a dearth of case laws surrounding this jurisprudence. The developing jurisprudence in India Owing to its nascency, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) has faced comparatively lesser cases involving the claims of parent company liability under the Competition Act of 2002. The definition of an enterprise under the Competition Act, 2002 under Section 2(h) read with the proviso clause to section 27 gives the prima facie impression that the statute has empowered the tribunal to embark on a fact-based finding to impute liability upon the parent company in case of its contribution to an anti-competitive agreement or an abuse of dominance proceeding. It is notable that the CCI is yet to come up with a straitjacket formula for assessing the liability of the parent company, there is also a dearth of cases surrounding this particular jurisprudence. However, it is not appropriate to say that this question has no relevance to contemporary competition jurisprudence. Recently, in the Re: Updated Terms of Service and Privacy Policy for WhatsApp Users (“WhatsApp Privacy Policy case”), Facebook (parent entity) was attached as an appropriate party to the antitrust proceeding initiated against WhatsApp based on its 2021 Privacy Policy in the prima facie order under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act. The CCI commented that since Facebook was a direct beneficiary of the policy, it is a proper party to the proceedings along with WhatsApp. This stand taken by the tribunal comes with a lot of accompanying disastrous consequences, fixation of liability only on this sole ground would lead to every company under the sun being held accountable for the subsidiary’s actions. This stand is all the more problematic in cases where the subsidiary’s economic activities are independent of interference from the parent company Apart from the WhatsApp case, the question of parent company liability has come up before in the case of Kapoor Glass v. Schott Glass India Private Limited. In this case, the Director General (“DG”) recommended that the fine for anti-competitive discounts offered by the subsidiary must also lie upon the holding company, the CCI refused to pass any order to this effect and limited the liability to the contravening subsidiary without delving on to this point in detail. The European Experience In the European Union, competition law is governed by the provisions of the Treaty of the European Union (“TFEU”). As per Article 101 of the aforementioned treaty, liability for infringements falls upon ‘undertakings’, which is a startling contrast from other jurisdictions wherein liability is imposed upon legal entities. The concept of an undertaking is distinct from the concept of a legal entity. The former focuses more on the economic functions whereas, the latter focuses more on the legal or corporate status. This means that multiple legal entities can form part of the same economic undertaking.  This is also known as the ‘single economic entity doctrine’, it entails that multiple entities form part of the same undertaking wherein a parent can be held liable for the infringing actions of the subsidiary and according to recent decisions of the court, even vice versa. The landmark decision where liability was imputed upon the parent company is the case of Akzo Nobel NV v Commission, wherein, the ECJ affixed joint and several liability upon Akzo Nobel NV for the illegal price-fixing agreements of its subsidiary. In this case, the court read the concept of a single economic entity viś-a-viś what is now known as the ‘doctrine of decisive influence’ and reasoned that the parent and subsidiary form part of the same economic undertaking wherein the former exercises considerable influence over the latter’s decisions and thus the onus of liability can be affixed upon the holding company without proving the direct liability of the same. The doctrine of decisive influence works on a rebuttable presumption that the two entities forming part of a single undertaking are liable and it is upon the entities to adduce any additional economic or legal evidence to prove the contrary. The doctrine of decisive influence, first articulated in the Akzo Nobel Case, has since been applied in numerous subsequent cases in the EU as well as in other jurisdictions such as Singapore. The European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) strict reading of the presumption has resulted in the culpability of the parent firm in the majority of cases, despite the corporations presenting extensive evidence to avoid liability. In the Arkema case of ECJ, the parent company argued that it is a purely financial holding that does not intervene in the subsidiary’s commercial policies; similarly, in the Legris Industries case, an argument was advanced that the subsidiary company was only a small part of the conglomerate and that Legris had no say in its commercial policies. The ECJ flatly rejected the arguments in both cases. This archaic practice of the ECJ has made it seem like an almost quasi-irrebuttable presumption. US Jurisprudence As opposed to the EU wherein parent company liability is the norm, the general rule in the United States is that the parent company will not be held liable for the actions of the subsidiary, this difference is all the more surprising because of the normally converging nature of the

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A Statutory Effort to Safeguard Personal Data In India: The Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, 2022

[By Aayushi Choudhary & Bhanupratap Singh Rathore] The authors are students of Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Three months after the withdrawal of the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill from the Lok Sabha, the government has come up with revamped legislation. This is the fourth time the government has proposed a bill on digital data protection. The first bill was introduced in 2018 based on the recommendations of the Justice BN Srikrishna Committee. After making some modifications, the government introduced the Personal Data Protection Bill in 2019, which was referred to the Joint Parliamentary Committee. The Committee submitted its report along with a draft for 2021 titled “Data Protection Bill, 2021.” After the committee made extensive changes to the draft, the government withdrew the bill. The purpose of the upcoming bill, as mentioned in the draft, is to provide for the processing of digital personal data. This is done in a manner that recognises both the right of individuals to protect their personal data and the need to process personal data for lawful purposes. Some of the highlights of the bill are: Regulatory Body: The proposed regulatory body framework resembles the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation. Although the functions and duties of the board are not clearly explained in the bill, the present Data Protection Board has simpler functions than the earlier bills. Child Protection: Every person below the age of 18 years will be considered as a child under the Act. The bill prohibits the tracking of children or targeting advertisements. The bill provides a penalty up to Rs 200 crore for non-fulfillment of any obligation provided under it. Penalties: In the previous draft, penalties were proportional to the company’s global turnover. It was 4% per breach and 2% per breach for non-compliance with any provision. This is done away with in the proposed draft, which provides a fine up to 500 crore instead. Many experts have expressed reservations about such a high penalty. In reality, it would be in the range of 50 to 500 crores. It would be in proportion to the kind of breach, kind of impact that it can create on the end user, and the involvement of the company. The Data Protection Authority and Board will analyse the breach and determine whether a penalty will be imposed. In fact, these penalties are low for tech giants. For example, if the Board fines Google $500 million, it is a very small sum in comparison to the penalties imposed on it by various jurisdictions around the world. If companies can justify that they have managed data well and, despite all the safeguards, a breach has happened, they will not be penalised because there is a finite probability that despite all the security provisions, a breach can happen. Twitter, for example, can be hacked despite spending billions of dollars on security and adhering to numerous security protocols. There should always be room for improvement, and any such industry should be given flexibility. Difference from previous bill: The previous bill was drawn from the EU General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR), whereas the present bill is drawn from Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Authority. This is a shorter version with only 30 provisions, whereas the earlier draft had 90 or more. The thirty sections cover areas that are needed for the enforcement of the right to privacy and data protection in a holistic way. It keeps the bill short and simple with simple language to make it understandable. The previous bill lost its essence as cumbersome amendments kept on happening. Data portability, which allowed users to view quotes from one platform to another, has been eliminated under the new bill. The earlier draft also included non-personal data, a concept that is not clear even at the global level, hardware certification, or algorithmic accountability. The revised proposal eliminates all of this and focuses solely on personal data regulation. The “right to be forgotten” is likewise not specifically mentioned in the present bill. Cross-border data flow: The bill eliminated previous restrictions on the flow of data from one jurisdiction to another. In any case, the flow of data is restricted to countries that the government has designated as friendly to the flow of data. Therefore, this will apply to all personal information, not just sensitive and critical data. Centre’s uncontrolled power: Placing a large portion of the important functional section of the legislation for future regulation by the national administration and some sections of the act is indicative of the administration’s unrestrained authority. For example, section 19 of the draft mentions the Data Protection Board of India. Under the bill’s rules, the regulator, which will be granted the same control and authority as a civil court, will be established by the government. Instead of that, the regulator should operate separately from the state and be capable of implementing individuals’ basic liberties while safeguarding due process. Moreover, the measure empowers the government to exclude any government institution from it that it considers appropriate. This power will blatantly contradict natural justice principles. Analysis: For the first time, the government has introduced legislation that makes the person providing the data responsible for its accuracy. It is not only the duty of the data processors or those who are keeping the data to protect it; it is also the primary duty of the individuals to provide accurate data and not file frivolous complaints. The Constitution includes a chapter on citizen responsibility, which has yet to be implemented. This bill has made those duties a part of the law. Section 30(2) of the bill proposes an amendment to Section 8(j) of the RTI Act. As per the present Act, information that relates to personal information is exempt from the Act. However, if the Central Public Information Officer finds that it would serve a larger public interest, the exemption can be revoked. If the proposed bill is approved, personal information will be completely exempt, even if the CPIO otherwise finds that disclosure to be consequential

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Extent of Judicial Intervention in IBC: Unwrapping the Conundrum around Commercial Wisdom of CoC

[By Prakriti Singh] The author is a student of Hidayatullah National Law University.   Introduction The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was enacted to provide a speedy debt resolution mechanism and ensure value maximization of assets. The Code has provided legal recognition to the fact that business failures are normal and there should be effective remedies to rescue the Corporate Debtor. The Code brought an end to the prior existing defaulters’ paradise in India, introduced the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) which provides a sound procedure for different stages from admission of default to the approval of resolution plan. The Code has brought a regime which prevents judicial intervention in commercial decisions, empowers the stakeholders and entrusts a duty upon the adjudicating authorities to uphold the spirit and procedural sanctity of the Code. The adjudicating authority is required to ensure that the Resolution Plan approved by the CoC is consistent with Section 30(2) of the Code. The Commercial Wisdom of the CoC is paramount in the CIRP. The judiciary itself has circumscribed its role in the CIRP and held that the CoC has the financial expertise to take financial decisions. However, it is the role of the adjudicating authority to ensure balance between stakeholders. The CoC, in exercise of its commercial wisdom, cannot waive off the obligations and statutory liabilities of the Corporate Debtor. In the case of Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation v. Dommeti Surya Rama Krishna Saibaba, (EPFO case) the Chennai Bench of NCLAT has set a dangerous precedent for the exercise of commercial wisdom of CoC. It refused to interfere with the approval of a Resolution Plan, which did not provide for the full payment of PF dues. This ruling failed to take note of the Jet Airways case and Rainbow Papers case. Through this article, the author intends to analyze the reasoning and impact of the recent ruling. Case Summary The Appellant was affected by the order of the Adjudicating Authority, wherein the Resolution Plan was approved on the grounds that the Resolution Plan is compliant with the procedure laid down under the Code and does not violate any provision. The Appellant challenged the order and contended that the Corporate Debtor failed to pay the ‘Employees’ Provident Fund’ (EPF) dues. The Adjudicating Authority had expressed satisfaction with the Resolution Plan. However, the exclusion of EPF dues is in contravention of Section 36 (4) (a) (iii) of the code, which prescribes that the sums owed to employee fund, including provident fund (PF) shall be excluded from the Liquidation Estate of the Corporate Debtor. Due to the approval of the Resolution Plan, the Corporate Debtor has got a waiver on the amount due to the Employees. The Appellate Authority dismissed the Appeal. It took note of the Apex Court ruling in Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel and Power Limited and Another and held that the fulfilment of the objectives of the Code requires that the intervention of judiciary is kept at the minimum level. The NCLAT took note of the ruling in Vallal RCK v. M/s. Siva Industries and Holdings Limited and Others, that the CoC has the expertise to take the decisions in the CIRP and hence, circumscribing the intervention by judiciary and the authorities is justified.  Since the Adjudicating Authority was satisfied that the Resolution Plan does not contravene any provision of the Code, the Appellate Authority will not interfere in the commercial wisdom of CoC. Unsettling the Jurisprudence The Appellate Authority, in its ruling, referred to previous ruling under the Code giving paramount status to the CoC. However, it failed to take note of rulings which dealt with the payment of PF dues by a Corporate Debtor undergoing CIRP. In Jet Aircraft Maintenance Engineers Welfare Association v. Ashish Chhawchharia Resolution Professional of Jet Airways (India) (Jet Airways case), the Appellant had approached the Appellate Authority on similar grounds. Although the Resolution Professional failed to make complete payment of the PF and gratuity dues, the Adjudicating Authority had approved the Resolution Plan. The rationale behind excluding the gratuity and PF dues from the liquidation estate of the Corporate Debtor is that even in case of the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor, the interests of the workmen shall be safeguarded. The CIRP cannot be a medium to escape the obligations under labour laws. Although the Respondent contended that the Commercial Wisdom of the CoC cannot be subjected to judicial review, the Appellate Authority set up a remarkable precedent by scrutinizing the Resolution Plan and ensuring that the same does not contravene the Code. In K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank, the Apex Court stressed upon the need to minimize judicial intervention to achieve a speedy resolution. Even in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited Through Authorised Signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta, the Apex Court had held circumscribing the role of Adjudicating Authority to be crucial for the Code. In Kalpraj Dharamrishi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd, it was held that although the role of the Adjudicating Authority is minimal, it is bound to ensure that the procedure and spirit of the Code is upheld. In Jet Airways Case, the Appellate Authority balanced the Commercial Wisdom with its function of ensuring procedural compliance. Regulation 38(1A) of CIRP Regulations and Section 30(2) of the Code cannot be compromised due to the decisions taken in exercise of Commercial Wisdom of the CoC. As there was a statutory obligation upon the Corporate Debtor, the claim of PF dues made by the workmen were to be accepted. The Successful Resolution Applicant is bound to make the payment of the balance amount of PF. As the PF is excluded from the Liquidation Estate, the workmen are entitled to full payment of the same. The Adjudicating Authority must fulfill its role in the CIRP. Anything more or less than that would throw a spanner in the CIRP. Another case with similar facts, Tourism Finance Corporation of India v. Rainbow Papers Ltd was not referred to in the present ruling. In the Rainbow

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