Author name: CBCL

Addressing the Anomaly: Dishnet Case and Validity of Reassessment Notices predating the Resolution Plan after it’s approval

[By Chirag Motwani] The author is a student of Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur.   Introduction:  To enhance the corporate governance regime in India, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) was enacted. The primary purpose of the act was to look upon the financially distressing entities and their revival as a foremost objective. IBC is considered an evolving piece of legislation owing to the numerous development that occurred since its enactment. One of the peculiar features of IBC is its relation with other legislations. One such relation is the relation of IBC with the Income Tax Act.    Since the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), the conundrum surrounding the validity of reassessment notices under the Income Tax Act for a period preceding the approval of a resolution plan under the IBC reflects the intricate interplay between two distinct legal frameworks. The IBC aims to deal with the financially distressed entities in a way to revive them as the foremost objective.The IBC, designed to address corporate insolvency, aims to provide a streamlined mechanism for the revival and resolution of financially distressed entities. However, the Income Tax Act, which governs the taxation aspects, poses challenges when it comes to reconciling the timelines of insolvency proceedings and the tax assessment cycle. The question arises as to whether reassessment notices issued by tax authorities for a period predating the approval of the resolution plan are valid, considering that the financial landscape of the entity undergoes substantial changes during the insolvency process. The issue needs clarity for effective legal functioning as well as harmonizing both the legal frameworks. This piece aims to highlight the judicial trends in this regard and aims to provide a suitable position of law concerning the dilemma underlined above.  Judicial Trends:  The question concerning the validity of such notices for a period prior to the approval of resolution plan has been dealt in, Murli Industries Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & ors. The Bombay High Court herein took a view that, the revenue cannot issue notices against the corporate debtor for unpaid taxes after the adjudicating authority has approved the resolution plan. In the case, after the approval of the resolution plan took place in 2019 by NCLT and was upheld by NCLAT in 2020. The Revenue issued Reassessment Notices to the company for the assessment year 2014-15. Bombay HC considered the notices issued by the revenue invalid as the period pertaining to the notice was covered under the resolution plan. Similarly, in The Sirpur Paper Mills Limited and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. the Telangana High Court took a view of setting aside the notices issued by the Income Tax Department for a period dated prior to the resolution plan. The court in the judgment in paragraph 70 mentioned, “From the tone and tenor of the impugned notices what is evident is that respondents are seeking to pass assessment order under Section 143(3) of the Act since the case of petitioner No. 1 was selected for limited scrutiny under CASS. However, the period of the assessment order would be a period covered by the resolution plan.” Again in, Rishi Ganga Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax the Delhi High Court recently took a view that the notices issued by the Income Tax Department under Section 142(1) as invalid as the period for which the notices were issued were predating the period of resolution plan that was approved by the adjudicating authority. However a shift in the position of precedential values was observed in the approach of Madras High Court in, Dishnet Wireless Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax wherein, the income-tax authorities had initiated reassessment proceedings for AY 2011-12 and AY 2012-13, post admission of the CIRP application. The High Court passed interim orders in the matter, allowing the income-tax authorities to proceed with the reassessment.   This came as an anomaly to the prevailing practice of invalidating the notices for a period prior to the approval of the resolution plan. The rationale behind the allowance of reassessment notices was that the IBC although having an overriding effect cannot impinge upon the rights of any other law being in force at the time and thus IBC cannot dilute the rights of the Income Tax authorities to reassess the assesse for any unpaid tax amount. This judgment is particularly conflicting with the generally accepted position of law and also dampens the spirit of IBC.   Analysis:     It is important to understand the objectives of the IBC in order to analyze the anomaly in Dishnet. The primary objective of the IBC is to revitalize the financially distressed entities.One of the objectives of the code is to revive the corporate debtor. To ensure this it becomes necessary that after the approval of the resolution plan the corporate debtor is not faced by a situation wherein a payment has to be done to clear dues predating the resolution plan. The Supreme Court in, the Essar Steel Case emphasized upon the surprise claims that the corporate debtor should not face after the approval of the resolution plan. The court provided, “ A successful resolution applicant cannot suddenly be faced with “undecided claims” after the resolution plan submitted by him has been accepted as this would amount to hydra head popping up which would throw into uncertainty amounts payable by the prospective resolution applicant who would successfully take over the business of the corporate debtor.”  Furthermore, the over-riding effect of IBC helps in this regard. The over-riding effect has been upheld and provides for the supremacy of the code in case of conflict with other prevailing laws. The Madras High Court did not consider the line of reasoning as provided above and instead passed orders hampering the spirit of IBC. Furthermore the Apex Court in the Ghanshyam Case inter-alia dealt with the “mischief” conducted by authorities also comprising the tax authorities that continued with litigation even after the approval of the resolution plan and provided

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Empowering Investors: India’s Voluntary Trading Account Freeze Option

[By Vidushi Dubey] The author is a student of Amity University.   Introduction  India’s stock broking landscape is on the cusp of a significant shift, empowered by the Securities Exchange Board of India’s (SEBI) recent circular. Announced on January 12, 2024 and set for implementation on July 1st, 2024, this initiative introduces a groundbreaking facility of voluntary online access freeze/block for trading accounts. This marks a crucial step towards promoting investor protection and fostering a more regulated securities market. Earlier, there was limited control over online trading accounts. This new facility empowers investors to take charge of enhanced security against suspicious activity or unauthorized transactions. The users can simply freeze their accounts, safeguarding the assets and reputation. They can also decide how long to restrict access, putting their online trading activity under your complete control. This move by SEBI tends to encourage continued participation in the online trading arena. Verification and validation of transactions will also became easier, potentially reducing conflicts and disputes between investors and trading members.  Legal Considerations for the Facility  SEBI’s landmark circular empowers investors with the legal right to freeze their online trading accounts, carries several legal implications to take in account. It is issued under Issued under SEBI Act, 1992 and SEBI (Stock Brokers) Regulations, 1992, which reflects SEBI’s commitment to investor protection and market regulation. It aligns with demat account regulations, SEBI (Depositories and Participants), 2018  ensuring consistency and familiarity for investors. The circular mandates clear communication and acknowledgement procedure for freeze/block requests. It also establishes new legal rights for investors to control their online access and imposes corresponding obligations on brokers to comply with ISF and SEBI guidelines. The update makes it clear that breach of the circular will attract penal provisions under SEBI regulations, triggering disciplinary actions. The redressal mechanism facilitates dispute resolution, enhancing legal recourse for investors. Overall, the update augments market stability through increased investor confidence and contributes to a more robust and transparent regulatory framework.  The Rationale Behind India’s Trading Account Freeze Facility  Prior to SEBI’s recent circular, Indian investors faced significant vulnerabilities in the online trading arena. The alarming prevalence of unauthorized activity, as evidenced by the 1,819 complaints to SEBI in 2019-20 (representing 12.5% of all complaints), exposed investors to financial losses and reputational damage. According to SEBI’s annual report for 2021-22, complaints related to unauthorized activity in online trading surged by 20% compared to the previous year, reaching a total of 2,235 complaints. This represents a 15% share of all complaints received by SEBI, highlighting the growing concern among investors. In 2022-2023, a concerning number of 1,481 complaints were registered with SEBI pertaining to unauthorized trading activity. Phishing scams, hacking incidents, and insider trading posed constant threats, highlighting the need for immediate action capabilities.  Further compounding the issue was the lack of control over online access. Unlike with demat accounts, investors had no option to directly freeze or block their trading accounts, leaving them reliant on brokers in case of suspicious activity. This dependence inevitably led to delays and inefficiencies in resolving concerns, leaving investors exposed during critical periods. The disparity in regulations between demat and trading accounts created additional challenges. The existing facility for freezing/blocking demat accounts demonstrated the feasibility and benefits of such a mechanism. The absence of a similar option for trading accounts not only caused confusion but also hindered investor confidence in the overall market structure.   Recognizing these critical issues, SEBI’s introduction of the voluntary trading account freeze/block facility aims to address them comprehensively. This initiative fosters a more secure and investor-centric environment by empowering individuals to take control of their online trading activity. The ability to immediately freeze accounts in case of suspected fraud or unauthorized transactions significantly enhances investor protection, while promoting increased confidence and participation in the market.   The new facility is recognized as a significant step in enhancing investor protection as it aligns with global best practices like The European Union’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II), which mandates investment firms to provide clients with tools to control online access and prevent unauthorized activity. Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States emphasizes investor education and encourages the use of strong authentication protocols to safeguard accounts. The framework established by the Brokers’ Industry Standards Forum (ISF) aligns with global efforts to standardize investor protection measures and ensure consistent practices across different markets.   Key Changes and Legal Implications  This legal and regulatory shift promises to transform online trading in India, fostering trust, stability, and growth for all stakeholders. While challenges remain, primarily for brokers in implementation, the long-term impact can be transformative, solidifying investor protection and establishing a robust regulatory framework for India’s online trading landscape. The circular enshrines the legal right for investors to voluntarily freeze or block their online access, empowering them to take control of their financial security. This aligns with principles of natural justice, granting individuals the legal authority to respond to suspected unauthorized activity or personal needs. The Brokers’ Industry Standards Forum (ISF), established as a pilot project by SEBI in collaboration with stock exchanges, will set up a clear framework. BISF will facilitate the formulation of clear guidelines to address the concerns of brokers as it was set up with the motive to empower brokers and investors to make informed decisions by establishing common standards for areas like risk management, client handling, and dispute resolution. Since its establishment, the Brokers’ Industry Standards Forum (ISF) has played a crucial role in shaping important SEBI circulars addressing concerns like upstreaming of client funds and the removal of duplicate submissions. The ISF will establish standardized communication templates for brokers to inform investors about their freeze/block options and the associated procedures. The forum can also develop uniform timelines for processing freeze/block requests, ensuring consistent investor experience across different brokers   SEBI oversight guarantees adherence to the framework, upholding accountability and legal compliance across market participants. This will be achieved by empowering investors to immediately freeze their accounts in case of any suspected unauthorized activity in their trading account, preventing further losses and allowing them to investigate the situation without relying solely on their broker. The regulations

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Navigating Pre-Deposit Requirements: Transition from Central Excise to GST Regime

[By Dhwanil Tandon] The author is a student of Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar.   Introduction  Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 mandates that the Tribunal or the Commissioner (Appeals), as applicable, shall not entertain any appeal under the act unless the required pre-deposit is made, terming its absence as a defect. With the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) on 01.07.2017, incorporating all indirect taxes including Central Excise, transitional provisions were enacted to utilize credits available during the transition from the erstwhile indirect taxes’ regime to GST. Section 41 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, stipulates that every registered person, subject to prescribed conditions and restrictions, is entitled to avail the credit of eligible input tax, as self-assessed in their return, credited to their Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL). The reversal of input tax credit for supplies where the supplier defaulted on tax payments, along with applicable interest, is mandated by the said person in the manner prescribed. Furthermore, GST laws necessitate pre-deposit before filing appeals to appellate authorities. The issue at hand pertains to whether pre-deposit for filing appeals under the erstwhile Central Excise Act, 1944, can be accomplished by reversing the ECL in the GST regime, drawing insights from established case laws.  Statutory Regime of Pre-deposit under Service Tax  Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, stands as a pivotal provision providing for the procedural requisites preceding the filing of an appeal. Under the ambit of the amended Section 35F, the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) is vested with the authority to enforce a mandatory pre-deposit, fixed at either 7.5% or 10% of the duty demand, pertaining to all appeals that were pending as of the seminal date of 06.08.2014.   It is noteworthy that subsequent to the amendment, the CESTAT’s discretion to assess and accommodate instances of financial hardship, thereby tailoring the pre-deposit amount commensurate with the appellant’s circumstances, has been unequivocally rescinded. However, amidst this procedural rigor, a recourse to the judiciary for such hardship remains, notably the Delhi High Court’s jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution.   This judicial authority, while sparingly exercised, retains the prerogative to intercede in matters concerning pre-deposit, albeit with a stringent caveat that such intervention should be relegated to rare and compelling instances, wherein a cogent justification unequivocally substantiates the necessity for such leniency. Thus, amidst the statutory rigidity of Section 35F and its amendments, the judicial echelons stand as custodians of equity and redressal, ensuring that the scales of justice weigh judiciously in matters of fiscal exigency and legal recourse.  Pre-GST Position  The statutory provision encapsulated within Section 35F of the Excise Act does not specify any method for making pre-deposit while filing appeals under the act. According to the circular issued by the CESTAT on 28th August 2014, subsequent to the amendment in the same year, it was stipulated that appeals could be registered under certain conditions. Among these conditions, it was specified that a mandatory pre-deposit could be made from the Central Value Added Tax (CENVAT) account, and supporting evidence must be furnished. In the case of Cadila Health Care Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, the Gujarat High Court delivered a significant directive regarding pre-deposits under Section 35F of the Excise Act. The court ruled that pre-deposits made by utilizing CENVAT credit should be duly accepted. It elucidated that the credit available in an assessee’s CENVAT account represents a duty already borne, which can be utilized for specified purposes, subject to the conditions prescribed under the Rules. The High Court underscored the absence of any prohibitive provisions within the Rules, affirming the legitimacy of availing CENVAT credit for the purpose of pre-deposits.  Post-GST Discussion  Under Section 49(4) of the CGST Act 2017, it is stipulated that the ECL is eligible for settling payments related to output tax liabilities governed by the Act or the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act. This provision underscores that the utilization of the ECL is contingent upon prescribed conditions, restrictions, and timelines. Notably, the term ‘may’ within Section 49(4) suggests that the usage of the ECL is not exclusively confined to the settlement of output tax liabilities.  While the CGST Rules 2017 may offer interpretations that appear to limit the scope of Section 49(4) of the CGST Act 2017, it is imperative to recognize that the CGST Rules, as subordinate legislation, cannot supersede the statutory provisions laid down in the CGST Act. Rule 85(3) emphasizes that the payment of any liability by a registered individual, as per their return, must be carried out by debiting either the electronic credit ledger maintained in accordance with Rule 86 or the electronic cash ledger as per Rule 87. This rule is subject to the provisions outlined in Section 49, Section 49A, and Section 49B. Additionally, Rule 86(2) specifies that the ECL should be debited to the extent necessary for discharging any liability as per the provisions of Section 49, Section 49A, or Section 49B of the CGST Act. Circular No. 172/04/2022-GST issued on 06.07.2022 delineates that the balance available within the ECL can be utilized for settling any payment of output tax arising from proceedings initiated under the provisions of the GST Law.Top of Form  There exists a divergence in judicial opinions regarding the permissibility of utilizing the Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) as a pre-deposit for filing appeals within the new GST regime. In the case of Jyoti Construction v. Dy. Commissioner of CT & GST, the Orissa High Court rendered a decision deeming appeals defective due to the pre-deposit of 10% of disputed IGST, CGST, and CGST payments being made through the ECL, rather than the electronic cash ledger. The High Court justified its stance by referencing Section 107(6) of the OGST Act, which mandates payments to be debited from the electronic cash ledger in accordance with Section 49(3) read with Rule 85(4) of the OGST Act. Moreover, it argued that ‘output tax’ cannot be equated to the pre-deposit required under

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Enhanced Authority of the Director General: Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023

[By Mustafa Topiwala & Raima Singh] The authors are students of Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab.   Introduction The Competition Act, 2002 (hereinafter, “principal act”), was enacted to regulate major anti-competitive market practices as laid down in the case of CCI v. Bharti Airtel Ltd. On 11 April, 2023, the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 (hereinafter, “amendment”), was announced by the Competition Commission of India (hereinafter, “CCI”) in the Gazette of India. It has expanded the scope of anti-competitive agreements, introduced a Settlement and Commitment Framework for quick market connection, augmented the powers of the Director General (hereinafter, “DG”), etc. While the forthcoming changes are poised to bolster procedural efficiency and functioning of the CCI, it is imperative to acknowledge the adverse ramifications of the same. This article aims to address certain negative aspects of the amendment, while focusing on one key area – the powers of the DG and their subsequent impact. Further, the authors strive to suggest reformative measures by analyzing similar provisions in well-established antitrust regimes such as the United States’ (US), and the European Union’s (EU) antitrust laws. Amended Powers of the Director General The powers of the DG have always been under the government’s recurring scrutiny. Even in 2012, the Competition (Amendment) Bill was introduced to allow the DG to conduct search and seizure operations after directly obtaining the requisite permissions from the CCI, contrary to the requirement of an approval from the magistrate of the relevant jurisdiction; akin to the powers of an Inspector under Sections 240 and 240-A of the Companies Act, 1956. The 2023 amendment has entirely modified Section 41 of the principal act. The authority to appoint the DG, which was earlier vested with the Central Government, has now shifted to the CCI, which can select a DG through a search-cum-selection committee after obtaining prior approval of the Central Government. Furthermore, prior to the amendment, the DG’s investigatory authority was invoked under Companies Act, as stipulated under Section 41(3) of the principal act. Section 240 of Companies Act allows an inspector to furnish information (books, papers, etc.) from a corporate body, after prior approval from the Central Government. Similarly, before the amendment, the DG could only commence investigation and furnish relevant information upon the direction of the CCI. Under the Section 41(3) of the amendment, during an investigation, the DG or any party authorized by him can furnish any information it considers relevant from the investigated party without prior approval from the CCI. This stands in contrast to the previous relation with Section 240 wherein the investigating officer could do the same only after being permitted by the Central Government, as highlighted in the case of CCI v. JCB (India) Ltd. Additionally, the DG was mandated to obligatorily restrict their investigation solely to the allegation referred to them by the CCI. Efforts to delineate the scope of the DG by the judiciary were taken in the case of Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. CCI, wherein the Supreme Court had held that the paramount objective of the DG was to ensure fair and anti-competitive market, and thus allowed for the expansion of the DG’s power in that specific instance. The position was clarified later in cases such as CCI v. Grasim Industries Ltd.where the DG was allowed to investigate  newly discovered contraventions during the investigation and bring it to the notice of the CCI. The amendment, after augmenting the investigatory capacity of the DG, certainly endeavors to ensure a fair market, giving more autonomy to the DG to furnish reports and uncover new contraventions autonomously. Although, considering the departure from Section 240 of the Companies Act and the amplification of the DG’s powers, it might pave the way for abuse of such power in the future. It is noteworthy that there has been no incorporation of buffer provisions to safeguard any overriding act by the DG. Furthermore, vesting the authority to appoint the DG with the CCI could foster corrupt activities by the CCI, which is exacerbated by the fact that it can already launch an investigation based on mere “opinion” (Section 21(1) of the principal act), now compounded with its preferred DG with their additional expanded powers. US & EU Provisions The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, aims to advance India’s antitrust laws towards the standards set by nations such as the US. Consequently, it becomes imperative to analyze whether the current shortfalls in the amendment, particularly the legislation pertaining to the powers of the DG, can be addressed by examining analogous laws of the US and the EU. Position in USA The structure of the antitrust laws in the US is characterized by bifurcation of enforcement responsibilities between two agencies: the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter, “FTC”). Notably, the implementation of the law does not only depend upon an individual or body, but it also incorporates the perspective of economists, lawyers and judges at various stages. The FTC, headed by commissioners elected by the president, takes pivotal decisions working collectively with these renowned professionals. This is vital, for it ensures expert perspective in decision-making processes, and also reduces any potential misuse of the autonomy by the commissioners. Applying a similar concept to the enhanced powers of theDG may optimize the utilization of the expanded authority Position in EU The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union incorporates fundamental provisions of antitrust law (Articles 101 and 102). Within the EU, the powers vested with the Hearing Officer parallels those of the DG in India. Both the authorities have the right to conduct search-operations for important documents, books etc. when deemed necessary. The recent expansion of the powers of the DG could be made subject to supervision, akin to the role of the EU Ombudsman. The EU Ombudsman investigates administrative shortcomings of the EU institutions, which may be lodged by citizens or residents of EU countries or by EU-based organizations. Such a system upholds the non-arbitrariness of the hearing officer, and

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The Supreme Court Revisited the Conundrum of Insolvency Set-off 

[By Prathmesh Agrawal] The author is a student of WBNUJS, Kolkata.   Introduction A Set-off is a concept which basically refers to setting of monetary cross-claims between parties which produces a balance amount. It has wide application in different sections of law. In this article, we will deal with the concept of set-off in an insolvency proceeding and the legality of it, which was discussed by the Supreme Court in a recent case, Bharti Airtel v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer. The Apex Court has dealt with the post-IBC regime, where the courts have in numerous instances earlier, taken the position of disallowing set off in any Corporate Insolvency Resolution Proceedings (“CIRP”) considering section 14 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code (“Code”), which imposes the moratorium. There is an absence of any mandate which upholds the applicability of set-off in a CIRP. Generally, the set off can be given five different meanings, being – 1) statutory set off; 2) common law set off; 3) equitable set off; 4) contractual set off, and 5) insolvency set off. Insolvency Set-off The concept of insolvency set-off, particularly, stands on the premise of ‘mutual credits’ and ‘dealings’, which were undertaken prior to insolvency proceedings. This proposition has also been observed by the House of Lords in the case of Re.: Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No. 8)[1]. Let us take an example to understand, where a company A has a debt of Rs 100 towards company B along with list of other companies. And, company B also has a reciprocal (mutual) debt of Rs 50 which is payable to company A. So, applying setting off rules would mean that company A has a balance debt of Rs 50 towards company B. But the problem in case of insolvency arises because company A does not necessarily have the capacity to repay the whole debt to all the creditors (secured or unsecured). So, say company A only has a quantum of Rs 500 to repay all of its creditors, whereas it has a total debt of Rs 1000. Then executing a set-off with company B will imply a repayment to company B, atleast the set-off amount. And, this is being performed before the distribution of any amount to any other creditors, which triggers the contravention of Pari Passu principle. Succinctly, the insolvency set off will mitigate the Doctrine of Pari Passu, which the Indian courts are hesitant to uphold. Although, in a UK case, National Westminster Bank v. Halesowen Presswork & Assemblies[2], the court clearly underscored the mandatory nature of set-off and implicated that right to set-off co-exists with moratorium during administration. Previous and Current Insolvency Regime in India Before the introduction of the Code in 2016, there was an explicit provision for insolvency set-off under section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (“1920 Act”), which is now repealed. This specific provision was in consonance with a similar provision in the Insolvency Rules, 2016 of the United Kingdom, which is currently in effect. Additionally, the Apex Court in Official Liquidator of High Court of Karnataka v. Smt. V. Lakshmikutty had also permitted the insolvency set-off applying the aforementioned provision of the 1920 Act. In the present regime, section 36(4) of the Code deals with the exclusion of assets that do not form part of the liquidation estate, which delineates the apportion of assets which could be subject to set-off on account of mutual dealings. This provision is further supplemented by Regulation 29 of the IBBI (Liquidation Regulations), 2016, which provides for consideration of mutual credits and set-off. The problem with the aforestated present legislation is, it only applies to a liquidation proceeding, as under Chapter III Part II and not the CIRP process which is present in Chapter III Part II of the Code. Nevertheless, there is subsistence of a neutral and clear provision for set-off, which has to be provided in the written statement under Order VIII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC”). Ruling of the Case The Supreme court in the instant case categorically repudiated the presence of any legislative intent of including set-off in a CIRP, which was buttressed with the conjoint readings of section 30 and section 53 (which lays down the waterfall mechanism) of the Code. It rejected the applicability of section 36 of the Code or the Regulation 29 on a CIRP. It reasoned those to be solely concerned with the liquidation proceedings and devoid of any role in a CIRP, forcing which might lead to anomalies. Thereafter, it also discarded the ruling of the Supreme Court in Swiss Ribbon, which sustained the exercise of insolvency set-off in a resolution process. Airtel contended the subsistence of clause (ii) of section 30 (2) of the Code, which corresponds the process of distribution followed in a liquidation process to the resolution process. The court rejected this contention and refuses the applicability of Section 36(4) (supra) and Regulation 29 (supra) in a resolution process, which it observed will solely come into play in a liquidation proceeding. The court buttressed its observation by upholding the mandate of section 25, which stipulates the powers of the Resolution Professional to take control of the assets of the insolvent company. The court, although, failed to correctly contemplate, the essence of the Code, and the prejudice the decision will cause to the creditors in a CIRP. Since, a CIRP is conducted to restitute the business of a company, the court should rather promote the concept of setting-off to expedite the process and interest of the stakeholders. The court, has although, forged two exceptions to the norm of non-applicability of the insolvency-set off under aforesaid Regulation 29(supra) or statutory set-off under Order VIII Rule 9 (supra) of the CPC:- Contractual Set-off – It is only applicable where the parties are entitled to the contractual set-off, which is in effect before or on the date of the commencement of CIRP. Transactional Set-off- It is triggered when the claim and counter-claim in the fashion of set-off

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Green Futures: Maximizing Virtual Power Deals in India

[By Ankur Singh] The author is a student of National Law University, Odisha.   INTRODUCTION  This article delves into the impact of Virtual Power Purchase Agreements (VPPAs) on the adoption of Renewable Energy (RE) and the dynamics of the Indian market. With a growing global emphasis on reducing carbon emissions and transitioning to renewable energy sources, the demand for RE is on the rise. VPPAs play a crucial role in facilitating energy transactions between producers and consumers, primarily businesses, without the need for actual electricity transmission. Unlike traditional contracts, VPPAs establish fixed prices, offering stability amidst market fluctuations. Oversight of VPPAs falls under the purview of both the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). However, India’s VPPA regulatory framework faces several challenges.  This article explores key questions surrounding VPPAs, including the collaboration between SEBI and CERC, the issuance of Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs), and the arbitration of disputes arising from RE-related transactions. It suggests strategic enhancements to regulatory frameworks, advocates for the streamlining of International Renewable Energy Certificate (I-REC) registration procedures, and proposes the integration of VPPA mechanisms under CERC authority with SEBI supervision. By addressing these issues, the article aims to advance international environmental objectives while improving the efficiency and competitiveness of India’s renewable energy sector. It particularly underscores the uncertainty surrounding regulatory jurisdiction between SEBI and CERC, providing insights into financial and physical aspects of VPPA collaboration, REC issuance protocols, and dispute resolution mechanisms. The article seeks to delineate collaboration between SEBI and CERC in VPPAs, encompassing both financial and physical dimensions, and addressing REC issuance processes and dispute resolution mechanisms for RE-related transactions involving both entities.  The Role of Virtual Power Purchase Agreements in Renewable Energy Adoption and Market Dynamics  The importance of renewable energy versus non-renewable sources is highlighted by rising energy demand and the need to reduce carbon emissions. On the other hand, switching to RE presents difficulties. The emphasis on environmental issues around the world forces nations to lower their carbon footprint, and one simple and efficient way to do this is through the use of renewable electricity. VPPAs facilitate the switch from conventional fossil fuels to renewable energy sources more quickly, despite certain obstacles.  A Virtual Power Purchase Agreement is a type of contract in which a generator and a client exchange energy. In essence, it’s a contract in which one party sells electricity to another together with RECs. A Commercial & Industrial (C&I) company interacts with the “seller,” usually the developer or project owner, in a VPPA arrangement, acting as the “buyer” or “off-taker.” PPAs for C&I renewable energy can be classified as either physical or financial, with the latter being referred to as “virtual.” VPPAs do not involve direct energy transfer, in contrast to physical PPAs. Rather, a predetermined price known as the strike price is agreed upon by the client and the electrical provider. The VPPA offers revenue certainty by insuring the power plant against market price fluctuations. If the market price exceeds the strike price, the generator compensates the off-taker for any negative surplus, and vice versa if the strike price surpasses the market price. Crucially, a VPPA doesn’t alter the buyer’s relationship with its utility at the retail level. It’s purely a financial arrangement, with the buyer still fulfilling its electricity load through standard methods. In the energy market, the generator sells brown power which is the energy produced by the fossil fuel industry, and the customer can choose to buy the energy either from the generator or another party in a separate transaction.  Instead of providing actual electricity, the generator offers Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) to customers as evidence of the extra energy produced. This energy industry mechanism seeks to promote the usage of renewable energy sources. Electricity and renewable energy assurance are purchased independently in REC transactions; this is referred to as the “Unbundled Approach.” Under Virtual Power Purchase Agreements (VPPAs), consumers purchase renewable energy certificates (RECs) from renewable energy generators while continuing to get conventional electricity from utility providers. Although the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) historically set floor and forbearance prices to safeguard stakeholders’ interests, the market ultimately determines the price of renewable energy certificates. On September 29, 2021, the Ministry of Power (MoP) declared, however, that floor and forbearance limits would no longer apply to REC pricing, which would now be exclusively based on market price. There is now a great deal more VPPAs in India than ever before. Cleantech Solar just signed one, promising to produce 187 GWh of green energy over the course of the project. With this capability, more than 171 kilotons of carbon emissions may be offset. These initiatives help India reach its targets of producing 500 GW of renewable energy by 2030 and reaching net-zero emissions by 2070.  Jurisdictional Ambiguities and Unresolved Issues in the Regulation of Virtual Power Purchase Agreements (VPPAs) in India  The conflict over the jurisdiction concerning the physical and financial contracts between the SEBI and CERC has been a long-term issue and was first dealt with in the Multi Commodity Exchange of India Limited & Another v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors., 2010, where  SEBI argued that it had the jurisdiction over forward and the future contracts of all types and thus it should have the jurisdiction over the contracts. Furthermore, they maintained that the forward and future contracts were not even alluded to in the Electricity Act of 2003. The argument suggested that only contracts with immediate delivery fell under the purview of CERC because forward and future contracts were exclusively pecuniary in character. It recommended that the relevant government regulate contracts that are solely financial in nature.  On the other hand, CERC contended that the Electricity Act sought to combine the laws that oversee the generation, transmission, distribution, trade, and use of electricity. As a result, CERC affirmed its right to pass laws promoting the expansion of the energy sector, including trade. Through a combined interpretation of Sections 66 and 178(2)(y) of the

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Deregulatory Trust: Unraveling Corporate Autonomy in Whistleblower Policies

[By Neeraj Kumar] The author is a student of WBNUJS, Kolkata.   Introduction  The idea of blowing the whistle has its meaning on a spectrum, ranging from  hero to snitch to martyr to traitor. Assuming, it is noble to attempt save lives and livelihood, the illegal consequences must be eliminated. However, this comes with a need to balance interests within employment law. The same has always been stringent regarding maintenance of confidentiality of information obtained in the course of employment through duty of fidelity or express obligation in the employment contract. Over time, this obligation has developed a defense of public interest in jurisdictions such as United Kingdom (‘UK’), commonly referred to as ‘protected disclosures’ so as to create the required balance.  Whistleblowing is defined as the reporting by employees or former employees of illegal, irregular, dangerous or unethical practices by employers. The first Indian but ineffective attempt of the legislature narrowly defines it as any person to report an act of corruption, willful misuse of power or discretion, or a criminal offence by a public servant. Despite the already limited scope of this definition in the Whistleblower Protection Act, 2014 (‘the Act’), the same could not come into force due to national security concerns like sensitive military data leaks, and legislature sought to amend and expand the exceptions.   The history of whistleblower regulations and the initial efforts by the US prompted a remark that don’t put your head up, because it will get blown off. Foreign jurisdictions have sought to avoid this ethical fatality by navigating technicalities to achieve their goals. However, India lags behind despite several setbacks. One infamous instance is the murder of whistleblower Satyendra Dubey in the NHAI scam case. This murder, among others, brought the foreign debates of anonymity and protection from retaliation.   In light of this, this article analyses the current regime of whistleblower protection in India. The article then attempts to further the present regime in the Private Sector followed by a succinct discussion on plausibility of labour law to further and streamline the protection or employer retaliation.   Inroads in the corporate sector   After tacit public outcry, in conjunction with that of the Supreme Court ‘(SC)’ in the Satyendra Dubey case and several committees, the government established the Central Vigilance Commission ‘(CVC)’ to act upon complaints. This body exhibited numerous imperfections in its core structure and functioning, including an extremely narrow jurisdiction limited to PSUs and Central officials. However, these attempts failed to safeguard and thus promote whistleblowing, primarily due to opposition by large corporates in India.   Nevertheless, several attempts have been made to expand the scope of Whistleblower regime, i.e., the CVC, Companies Act, 2013 and the SEBI LODR, 2015. However, the scope of these stretches only to listed companies.   Even with regard to listed companies, this practice is mostly self-driven and has given leeway to companies to exclude vital features of any whistleblower policy. For instance, organizations like CPRI, Bangalore only allow permanent employees to raise complaints; thus, excluding most of their workforce.   Inclusion of Private Sector   It is argued that the private sector be included in whistleblower protection regime since unethical practices are beyond the listing agreement or public sector. As early as in 2007, the ARC recommendations boldly proposed inclusion of private sector in whistleblower protection regime. One bold move, borne out of lack of action to preclude banking related scams, was the issuance of a circular by RBI titled “Protected Disclosures Scheme for private and foreign banks operating India”. The same was formulated in effect of CVC as the authority to receive complaints. This was the first instance of coverage of any private sector organization even before the SEBI LODR brought listed companies within its ambit.  What then primarily guides the whistleblower regime in Indian corporate sector is LODR, 2015 read with Section 177 of the Companies Act. Initially, it was suggestive in nature, however, an amendment later on mandated the vigil mechanism to be set up by all the listed companies. The clause requires the mechanism to be effective but there exists no streamlined authority/body to ensure the same, thus allowing the companies to shape their whistleblower policies as it suits their interests. However, there is nothing to keep checks and balances on these internal policies except a requirement to report details of any disclosures in annual corporate governance report of the company.   Even internationally, G20 Anti-Corruption action plan, while citing the 2009 OECD recommendations, calls for ensuring protections in private sector. In its analysis of protections in G20 countries, it highlights the different paths taken for same end goal. For instance, as specified in the action plan, Canada does not make any distinction at all, covering both the sectors.1 Additionally, Germany has specifically used its labour law regime to further whistleblowing and crafted good faith as a protection from dismissal. With this, let us delve into interaction of Indian Labour law with the whistleblowing and retaliation associated with it.    Indian Labour Law: Navigating the Limits  The inadequacy evident in the preceding sections, prompts considerating whether the labor law regime provides any form of protection—albeit limited to livelihood if not life.  The current regime does not inherently safeguard whistleblowers. However, at its core, labor law is grounded in the protection of workers against unfair treatment. Otto Kahn Freund articulates that the primary goal of labor law is to rectify the inherent inequality of bargaining power within the employment relationship. This power imbalance permits employers to dictate the terms of employment contracts, offering jobs on a “take it or leave it” basis. Such an imbalance is a contractual flaw that overlooks the socio-economic realities of societal relations. Hugh Collins further asserts that acknowledging wealth inequalities necessitates sociological intervention in the traditional freedom of contract.  With this objective in mind, labor law legislations globally aim to shield workers from ‘victimization’ and ‘unfair dismissal.’ In India, the validity of dismissal is explored under Schedule V of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act). Clauses 5(a) and (b) of the

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Right to claim set-off in CIRP: A Shift in the Landscape

[By Manisha Soni] The author is a student of Gujarat National Law University.   Introduction Recently, the Supreme Court of India, in the judgment of Bharti Airtel Ltd. vs Vijaykumar V. Iyer, solidified the position of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) that the arrears can not be set off when a Corporate Debtor is going through Corporate Insolvency Resolution Proceedings (CIRP), under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC).   This provided a crucial clarification of the prevailing legal intricacies and upheld the legislative purpose of the code. Through this article, the author aims to simplify the wisdom inherent in the judgment, considering the legislative intent and the potential ramifications of permitting set-offs in the CIRP. The author proposes that set-offs are not inherently contradictory to insolvency law and can be accommodated within the framework of the IBC.  Factual matrix  Airtel entities were engaged in spectrum trading agreements with Aircel entities to seek the right to use spectrum. Aircel entities faced demands from DoT for bank guarantees related to license and spectrum usage dues. Upon request, Airtel agreed to furnish these guarantees on Aircel’s behalf, deducting the same from consideration payable under spectrum transfer agreements. However, the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) declared DoT’s demand untenable; and the bank guarantees were asked to be returned.  In the meanwhile CIRP was initiated against Aircel entities. Airtel entities, having paid for Aircel entities, submitted a claim to set-off, asserting it as the net amount owed by Aircel entities for operational charges. Adjudication of such claims of Airtel for set-off during CIRP against Aircel created the challenge for insolvency legislation.   The Resolution Professional (RP) asked Airtel to pay Rs. 112 crores to Aircel, who was undergoing CIRP. This was objected to by Airtel entities in NCLT Mumbai.   The Adjudicating Authority in Mumbai initially allowed Airtel entities the right to set off. However, the NCLAT overturned this decision, contending that such a set-off is antithetical to the objective of insolvency legislation.   Analysis of the Judgment   In common language, the term ‘Set-off’ is an instrument that cancels mutual financial obligations between two parties by allowing one party to reduce the amount it owes to a second party by the amount the second party owes.   Arguments by Airtel  Since the United Kingdom’s Insolvency legislation has served as a model for IBC law in India, the Airtel representative relied on Insolvency set-off provisions in the UK. ‘Insolvency set-off’ applies when demands are between the same parties, even when several distinct transactions exist between them.  The pre-requisites of set-off u/s 323 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, to claim set-off is when mutual credit and debt arise from ‘mutual dealings’ between the parties prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy. Airtel relied on the UK legislation and the case of HC of Kerela, where the judges allowed set-off and held even different, independent, transactions between parties as ‘mutual dealings’ under the Kerela Insolvency Act, 1955.  Airtel argued that the concept of set-off was permissible in India pre-IBC. Section 529 of the Companies Act 1956 and section 325 (now omitted) of the Companies Act 2013 did allow for set-off. Section 44 of the Provincial Insolvency Act 1920, contingent on certain conditions, permitted creditors’ right against the corporate debtors to set-off.  Order VIII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, of India provides statutory set-off. To claim set-off under this rule, the amount should be ascertained.   After the advent of IBC in insolvency legislation, set-offs started to derive legitimacy under section 173 of IBC, where set-offs are allowed in partnership and individual bankruptcies. Apart from that, regulation 29 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulation, 2016 provides for set-off on account of mutual dealings.    SC Judgment  The SC held that the nature of corporate debtors changes after the commencement of CIRP. Hence, any claim for set-off cannot be raised after CIRP. The Hon’ble Court rejected the applicability of set-off provisions of CPC in CIRP due to the presence of section 238 of IBC, which states that provisions of IBC override all other laws.   Regulation 29 of the Liquidation Regulations provides for mutual dealing and set-off but does not apply to Part II of the IBC, which deals with CIRP.   The court, however, permitted contractual set-off if the date of such set-off was before the CIRP was initiated. A contractual set-off is a mutual agreement to permit set-off and adjustment. The CIRP does not preclude it.   Set-offs are contrary to the common law doctrine of pari passu and anti-deprivation. Though the doctrine of pari passu is not explicitly mentioned in the IBC, an interpretation of the existence of the doctrine can be drawn from section 53 r/w section 52 of the IBC, as these provisions provide for the hierarchy of creditors during the distribution of value arising out of liquidation. This arrangement gives primacy to an operational creditor over a financial creditor should the operational creditor’s claim of set-off be permitted.  Due to the set-off, the liquidation estate’s value gets depleted, consequently affecting the dividend distribution among the rest of the creditors. The doctrine of anti-deprivation discourages this. This doctrine enumerates that a creditor can not obtain a better position than the law explicitly provides during bankruptcy. SC applied the essence of both doctrines in this matter.   The provisions related to CIRP do not provide for insolvency set-off, and the court refuses to extend it through implication. Unlike contractual set-off, Insolvency set-off is not self-executing in nature.  The creditor who wants to exercise set-off can do so from the assets excluded from the liquidation estate to the extent of the set-off value, u/s 36(4) of IBC. Such creditors are often given preferred status in assets statutorily excluded from the liquidation estate.   No new rights are created due to the rejection of rights to claim set-off, and the moratorium will be operative on the corporate debtor’s assets.   Author’s remarks  Set-off is a globally recognised and widely practised concept. Set-off should not be

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Navigating Innovation and Compliance: Analysing RBI’s New Draft Regulations for Fintech’s

[By Siddh Sanghavi] The author is a student of National Law University Odisha.   Introduction On January 15, 2024, the Reserve Bank of India released the draft regulation outlining a framework for self-regulatory organisations in the fintech industry. These self-regulatory organisations have been named SRO-FT. As per the RBI’s outlined framework, a Self-Regulatory Organization for Fintech (SRO-FT) will be a non-profit entity established under section 8 of the Companies Act of 2013 and will have to fulfil certain requirements and comply with governance standards to gain recognition by the RBI.   This idea of having a self-regulatory organisation for the Fintech industry is not something that is new and can be traced back to the Report of the Working Group on Fintech and Digital Banking released by the RBI in 2018, where the idea of a self-regulatory organisation for the Fintech industry was first proposed.   This blog analyses the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) draft regulations on establishing Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) for the Fintech industry in India. It discusses the need for regulation, why self-regulation is currently the best approach, and how the RBI’s steps will bridge the gap between regulators and the industry. It also highlights potential issues with the draft regulations and suggests improvements.  Need for regulation  As per the Report of the Working Group on Digital Lending including Lending through Online Platforms and Mobile Apps fintech lending entities in India are of two types:   1) Those which the RBI regulates by granting them NBFC licenses. And 2) those that are currently unregulated. The new draft framework is aimed at regulating the second category of Fintechs.   One of the main functions of the Fintech sector is that it provides solutions to the already regulated entities in the form of an outsourced information technology provider as well as providing lending services such as KYC (Know Your Customer) tasks. This involves fintech’s amassing a large amount of sensitive financial data, and therefore ensuring robust cyber security measures becomes extremely important.   By the nature of its functions itself, it is understandable why it is important to regulate this sector. If not regulated, it may pose significant risks towards consumers’ data privacy and cyber-security in the banking system. It is proposed that these SRO-FTs will help develop codes of conduct, ensuring all the members follow the basic industry standards and meet the expectations of the RBI.   Why self-regulation will be the best route.  Section 45I(f)(iii) of the RBI Act 1934, allows the RBI with the approval of the Central Government to notify any class of companies as an NBFC (Non-banking financial company). Through this section, RBI has the power to notify fintech entities that are involved in the process of lending as NBFCs. Since NBFCs are already regulated by the RBI, this notification of classifying Fintech companies as NBFCs would have allowed RBI to bring them under the same regulation.    However, RBI has in its press release stated that it prefers the approach of self-regulation as it will help get a balanced approach between innovation and meeting regulatory requirements.   Further, the RBI in its draft omnibus stated that “Self-Regulatory Organisations (SROs) enhance the effectiveness of regulations by drawing upon the technical expertise of practitioners and also aid in framing/fine-tuning regulatory policies by providing inputs on technical & practical aspects, nuances and trade-offs involved.”  As stated by the RBI in its draft omnibus it may not be prudent to bring Fintech’s under the same regulation as an NBFC, there has to be industry-specific regulation and till the time RBI doesn’t come up with regulations specifically dealing with Fintech self-regulation will be the best route.    Further, this approach of self-regulation taken by the RBI is appropriate since the Fintech industry in India is poised for growth, innovation and investments and burdening it with mandatory and excessive regulations may not be the right move currently and is something that can be considered in the future.   Success of Self-Regulatory Organisations across sectors.  The concept of a self-regulatory body is not new in India; it has also been effectively used in the past to close the gap between the regulated and the regulators without requiring excessive regulation.   The most famous example is the Association of Mutual Funds India (AMFI). The AMFI has acted as a link between SEBI/ RBI and the Mutual fund ecosystem. AMFI has also worked to set standards for “best practices” which then become the status quo of the industry and is followed by all in the eco-system. The AMFI has also been recognised by the SEBI and now also acts as the licensing body for all Mutual funds in the industry.   Other examples of successful self-regulatory organisations include the Indian Bank’s Association (IBA), and the Foreign Exchange Dealers Association of India (FEDAI), they have also been successful in collaborating with regulators in the past and ensuring compliance and upholding ethical standards.  The RBI by providing a framework for Self- Regulatory organisations for the Fintech Industry aims to achieve a similar purpose. An SRO-FT will act as an interface between the industry and the RBI.   The Key ingredients of success: Recognition by the RBI and active participation.   According to the new draft guidelines for an entity to be recognised by the RBI it must receive a letter of recognition from the RBI. From the examples mentioned above, the system of self-regulatory organisations can only work smoothly and truly act as a representative of the industry it needs to gain recognition from the regulator. Since the SRO acts as a representative of the entire industry, recognition from the RBI will grant them legitimacy.   Further, recognition by the RBI will automatically increase participation and membership of an SRO. As mentioned above Fintech entities are usually service providers to the already regulated entities, therefore accreditation by an RBI recognised entity (SRO) will increase trust and marketability of the fintech entity. This is also one of the important reasons why a Fintech entity would be motivated to voluntarily subject itself to regulations and supervision by an SRO-FT. Therefore

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