Contemporary Issues

Building a Case for Digital Financing in India

[By Shivam Tripathi] The author is a fourth year student of Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur. The global payments landscape is under fundamental transformation and India is no exception to this. The Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) notified the 2020 guidelines[i] governing Payment Aggregators (“PA”) and Payment Gateways (“PG”) (“Guidelines”). PA is a service provider through which merchants can process their payment transactions, and PG provides the technical support for securely transferring money from the customer bank account to the merchants’ payment portal. In the process, both PA and PG act as intermediaries facilitating online payment methods. Under the existing regime governed by Directions for Opening and Operation of Accounts and Settlement of Payments for Electronic Payment Transactions involving Intermediaries, 2009[ii] (“2009 Direction”) the intermediaries have to maintain a nodal account, in the form of an internal account, thus both PA and PG were not being directly governed by the RBI. The Guidelines recently issued by the RBI provide structure to regulate every activity of the PA, along with recommendations regarding the maintenance of online data security of the customers. Key Takeaways from the Guidelines The Guidelines adopt a licensing method, under which no PA will be allowed to operate without prior authorization by the RBI. The key takeaway of these Guidelines is that firstly it define PA[iii] and PG[iv] as the 2009 Directions only recognised the intermediary as a whole. Secondly any e-commerce marketplace providing services that are covered under the definition of PA are to be separated from the marketplace. Thirdly every PA seeking authorization under the Guidelines must be a registered company under the Companies Act 1956/2013. Fourthly banks providing PA services as a part of the normal banking services need not acquire separate authorization and lastly all the entities governed under the Guidelines are to be managed professionally and are required to maintain an escrow account with one of the scheduled commercial banks. Additionally, all the entities must maintain a customer grievance redressal and dispute management framework. The Guidelines do not regulate the functioning of PG, however, they do provide for the protection of consumer information. The Guidelines are a welcome step as they bring intermediary payment platforms under the direct control of RBI.[v] However certain steps taken under the Guidelines might act as roadblocks rather than furthering effective implementation. Regulating the Payment Gateway The Guidelines distinguish between PA and PG, which leaves a chunk of entities outside the ambit of the Guidelines. Instead, the Guidelines should incorporate a method under which payment services[vi] are regulated. A similar method is adopted by Singapore[vii] and the European Union.[viii] FAQ[ix] of the Payment Service Act, 2019 (Singapore) states that the scope of the Act also includes payment gateways. The European Union under the Payment Service Directive (“the EU Directives”) also adopts a similar approach[x]. Such an approach enables the government to adopt a more comprehensive regulatory mechanism. However, in both these cases, an exception is carved out for entities providing purely technical support, for instance, privacy protection services, data processing services, communication network services, etc. Whether registration under the Companies Act, 1956/2013 is necessary? The Guidelines require any entity applying for a license/authorization to operate as PA, to be a registered company under the Companies Act 1956/2013,[xi], and the MOA of such a company should specify the proposed activity of operating as a PA. Such an approach acts as an impediment in attracting international payment services providers in India. Looking at foreign jurisdictions, Singapore has a similar requirement under the Payment Services Act. However the FAQ’s released under the Payment Service Act, 2019 state that both local and foreign companies are permitted to apply for a licence under the legislative framework.[xii] On the other hand, the European Union Payment Services Directives do not contain any such requirement at all. Third-Party Payment Service providers The Guidelines leave a gap as to the regulations imposed on the third party payment service providers which included payment initiation and account information services. These services providers access the customer’s security details through online banking, but as there is no legal framework governing third-party service providers, issues like breach of privacy may arise. Under the EU Directives, third party payment services are also included. The Directives state that these providers will be governed by the same rules as the other online payment service provider, i.e. registration, licensing, and supervision by the competent authorities.[xiii] Furthermore the EU Directives also state that the banks have the duty to establish a safe and secure communication channel for transmission of data.[xiv] The Banks will also be liable for maintaining the accounts and ensuring that there is no delay or incorrect payments. Additionally, to prevent leakage of any sensitive data, the EU Directive mandates that the third-party service provider, should ensure that the information regarding the payment shall only be conveyed to the recipient and to no other party, furthermore no sensitive data can be stored. Approach for revised regulations With the ever-evolving technology, the traditional approach of “one size fits all” fails. Instead, the regulators should come up with a new innovative approach to regulate the payment service sector. For instance, the current regime focuses on the design of the entity, i.e. whether the entity is a payment aggregator or a payment gateway. To determine the applicability of the Guidelines, instead the regulators should focus on the performance standards. Performance standards specify an outcome, but leave the specific measures to achieve the outcome to the discretion of the regulated entity. Performance standards can better account for changes in the practices of regulated entities, empower innovation in compliance methods, and incentivize the developments that are occurring in the industry while ensuring that the regulatory goal is achieved. Traditionally, policymakers used to face certain issues while implementing performance standards, because earlier it was very difficult to test how the goal is met, owing to the information gap between the regulators and the industry. Additionally, regulators attempting to implement classical performance standards lacked the technical knowledge to be able to measure, monitor,

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FDI Policy Revision, 2020: A Dagger in the Arm of China or a Shot in the Dark?

[By Kartikey Sahai] The author is a fifth year student of Institute of Law, Nirma University. Introduction India and China, two of the top 10 economic superpowers of the world have, in a way, put to terms, their political debacle with India blowing a major cog in the wheel of China’s upper handedness, by putting restrictions on Chinese investment in India. On April 17, 2020, the Department for promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (“DIPP”) brought in an amendment to the extant Consolidated FDI Policy, 2017 (“Press Note 3”).[i] Consequent to this revision, an amendment was also brought about to the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 on April 22, 2020. Prior to the introduction of this amendment, investments by non-resident entities were allowed in those sectors which are not prohibited as per the extant FDI Policy, with the exceptions of entities based out of Bangladesh and Pakistan. Post the inception of this amendment, the Government of India has revised this policy to include the provision for investment by entities based out of countries sharing land borders with India (read: China) or where the beneficial owner of an investment into India is situated in or is a citizen of any such country, can now invest only after obtaining prior approval from the Government of India. The objective of the revised policy, as stated in the Press Note 3, is to curb opportunistic takeovers/acquisitions of Indian based companies during the subsistence of the Covid-19 pandemic, in lieu of the People’s Bank of China buying out 1.01% stake in HDFC bank, worth approximately 1.75 crores shares of the bank.[ii] However, this revision brings about a crucial question relating to the financial sector into beckoning. Is the Indian industrial contingent ready to exclude Chinese investment into Indian companies, at the behest of government approval? Increased reliance of Indian industries on Chinese investments As per the quarterly fact sheet on FDI released by the DIPP up to March 2019, China ranks 18th out of the 164 countries that have FDI equity inflows in India, amounting to a total of INR 13,954.82 crores.[iii] Sectors such as the automobile industry (60%), the metallurgical industry (14%) and the electric equipment industry (4%), amongst others, attract the maximum FDI equity inflows.[iv] Another startling fact that needs to be taken account while evaluating the recent policy revision is that before the current NDA government came into power in 2014, the FDI equity inflows from China never crossed the 1000 crore mark, but as soon as the new government came into power, for two years consecutively, the figures reached the staggering mark of INR 3066.24 crores in 2014 and INR 2196.11 crores respectively.[v] Furthermore, as per the Secretary-General of India-China Economic and Cultural (“ICEC”) Council, China invested an estimate of about INR 2000 crores in 2017, in comparison to INR 700 crores invested by China in Indian companies in 2016.[vi] Moreover, despite issues such as Doklam which are clouding the bilateral ties between the two countries, India-China bilateral trade have amassed a whooping USD 71.18 billion in 2016 and USD 84.44 billion in 2017.[vii] Additionally, with the changes in the extant FDI policy of India, investments through indirect route have to be taken into account as well, such as that of INR 3500 crores invested by the Singapore subsidiary of the techno-giant Xiaomi.[viii] Interpreting ‘Beneficial Ownership’ under the revised FDI Policy The revised FDI policy, as amended by the press note of April 2020 seeks to hinder non-approved foreign investments into India from countries where the beneficial owner of an investment into India is situated or resides. However, the term beneficial ownership has not been defined anywhere, neither in the extant FDI policy, nor the FEMA rules. To analyze the problem in an in-depth manner, a glance may be had at Section 90 of the Companies Act read with Companies (Significant Beneficial Owners) Rules, 2018 which define the term ‘significant beneficial owner’, which is analogous to beneficial ownership. The relevant rules have laid down certain criterion for determining beneficial owners, such as individuals, who either directly or indirectly, hold 10% of the shares or 10% of the voting shares or have a right to receive a minimum of 10% of the total distributable dividend or have a right of significant control in such company. These Rules provide further clarifications as to how to ascertain the significant beneficial owner. However, as per these rules, only an individual may be deemed to be a significant beneficial owner. On the other hand, the revised FDI policy merely refers to the term ‘beneficial owner’, without clarifying whether it applies to individuals or body corporates as well. The Prevention of Money Laundering Rules, 2005 prescribe that a beneficial owner is a natural person, who alone or jointly in conjunction with a natural or artificial person, holds above 15% or 25% control over capitals or profits of the relevant company.[ix] Moreover, SEBI has also reiterated that a similar definition be adopted for the determination of beneficial ownership for the purpose of KYC as well.[x] However, such definition cannot be used for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of beneficial ownership under the revised FDI policy, as these legislations were brought about mainly to nab the accused alleged to have been involved in laundering money and thus hold an altogether different connotation. International investment obligations envisioning the debacle The revised FDI policy has not put forth an enforceability date from which this revised policy will be brought into force. If India is intending to go big this time, it might as well grant retrospective effect to the tune of 5 to 10 years to strike a dagger in the heart of China’s involvement in the Indian market. This revision in the extant FDI policy of India has not brought about happy reactions with China terming this move as ‘discriminatory and against the general trend of liberalization of trade’.[xi] Even when it comes down to the bilateral obligations of India, it is not at the right side

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Privacy and Data Protection – Implications on Fintech in India

[By Shubham Jain] The author is a fourth year student of National Law University, Jodhpur. Introduction The issue of privacy and data protection was thrown into the limelight after the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy Judgement which recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right enshrined under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.[i] Instances like the AADHAR data leak,[ii] Cambridge Analytica and Facebook data breach;[iii] etc. raised concerns about data protection, existing infrastructure, and the current state of affairs pertaining to cross-broader trading of data. While the concerns regarding privacy were grabbing headlines, FinTech industry in the country was booming because of demonetization, and government’s push towards boosting e-payments in the country. The term FinTech is often defined as the “technologically enabled financial innovation that could result in new business models, applications, processes, or products with an associated material effect on financial markets and institutions and the provision of financial services”.[iv] The FinTech industry is aimed at bringing technological innovations to the banking and financial sector.[v] According to estimates, the digital payments industry in India is projected to reach USD 700 billion by 2022 in terms of the value of transactions.[vi] FICCI projects the global FinTech sector’s value at $45 billion by 2020, growing at a compound annual growth rate of 7.1%.[vii] Needless to say, the concerns regarding data protection affect the FinTech industry as well. Therefore it is important to ensure that the data of the consumers provided to the FinTech entities protected, while ensuring the industries growth. Data Protection and Privacy The Srikrishna Committee noted that the conception of privacy is based on society and culture which determines what may be construed as violation of privacy.[viii] It further noted that the data protection principles are founded in the trust of citizens over the entities governing it.[ix] The entities could be either the regulatory authorities; or the private corporations. In the US, these relations are dictated by the capitalistic principle of lassiez-faire; however, the courts have recognized the Right to Privacy, as indicated in their constitution.[x] The US has sector specific laws with regards to privacy and use of data by private entities.[xi] The citizen and corporate relations are based on free markets and merely regulating the data handling process;[xii] whereas the state has to follow stricter laws stemming from the principles of liberty.[xiii] The EU is leading the world in terms of regulations regarding data protection; especially with EU-General Data Protection Regulation, 2018 (“GDPR”).[xiv] The EU Approach to data protection is based on upholding human dignity and protecting privacy.[xv] It was further noted that the Srikrishna Committee noted that the Indian citizen-state relationship does not coincide with either US or EU. The Indian Constitution envisions state as a (i) facilitator of human progress as indicated through the DPSPs, and (ii) checks and balances to prevent misuse of power by the state as enshrined in the federal structure and three organs of the government.[xvi] Therefore, the Indian conception of privacy as a right seems to be exercise of autonomy within a limited sphere as prescribed by the regulators. The decisions of the regulators can checked through the judicial review in case of excessive measures or encroachment on rights of citizens. Fintech – Regulatory Regime In India, the arena of FinTech is regulated by several regulators like the RBI and SEBI for intermediaries in securities market, IRDA for insurance related regulations and TRAI for regulatory mechanisms related to telecom.[xvii] The FinTech companies often find themselves being governed by overlapping jurisdictions. The Working Committee Report remarks that FinTech entities are regulated within the framework of ‘payment systems’[xviii] and need the authorization by the RBI.[xix] The RBI has the power to issue directions to payment systems and systems participants;[xx] which may be invoked by the RBI to issue directions. The RBI regulates payment space under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 and the Payment and Settlement System Regulations, 2008. Further, RBI Also governs the functioning of peer-to-peer lending through the P2P Master Directions (published in Oct., 2017) which requires P2P NBFCs to register with RBI. Further, RBI recently recognized the need to strengthen the consumer confidence in digital payments and thus launched Ombudsman Scheme for Digital Transactions (OSDT) as a complaint redressal mechanism.[xxi] Regulating Privacy and Data Protection in Fintech Industry Transfer of personal data categorized as sensitive personal data is currently governed by the SPD Rules issues under Section 43A of the IT Act. In case of any negligence in implementing, and maintaining reasonable security practices to ensure protection of the sensitive personal data, the body corporate are held responsible, and are required to compensate for leak/loss of data.[xxii] Furthermore, the disclosure of information, knowingly and intentionally, without the consent of the person concerned and in breach of the lawful contract is punishable with up to 3 years of imprisonment and fine.[xxiii] The data protection, as of now, is merely governed by a contractual relationship between the parties.[xxiv] Terms of the contract are dictated by the service provider, and the users have very little or no say in the same. The provisions of the IT Act are not sufficient to ensure protection of the sensitive information and data of the consumers. Concerned the sector’s recent boom, RBI issued notifications mandating data protection and localization. It has also showed concerns about the security standards/measures, and has assumed unfettered access to the data.[xxv] RBI also recommended the need for exhaustive stand-alone legislation on data protection in order to ensure customer faith in the FinTech Industry and protect the citizens from exploitation of personal information.[xxvi] The Sectoral Regulators are already taking initiative to protect the data of the consumers.[xxvii] The Working Committee has recommended that the data must be classified based on extent of their sensitivity and risk of exposure associated with the same.[xxviii] The FinTech entities were to ensure that the data does not suffer from any “loss of confidentiality, loss of integrity, and loss of availability”, by implementing the safe transaction principles.[xxix] The RBI also suggested requirement of establishing a Network

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The Culpability of Telecom Sector Crisis?

[By Arpit Saini] The author is a third year student of National Law University, Jodhpur and can be reached at [email protected] The Crisis Vodafone Idea Ltd. and Bharti Airtel have sustained their position as top-ranked mobile service providers in the Telecom Industry for several years. Within the last 14 years in the industry, as many as 10 players have either closed down their business or have undergone insolvency proceedings but these two operators stood their ground against all adverse situations, noticeable from their reaction to the revolutionary introduction of Reliance Jio, increased price competition and decreasing tariffs on calls and data usage. However, the Supreme Court (“SC”) decision on 24th October 2019 concerning the definition of Adjusted Gross Revenue gave a crippling blow to these operators. Consequent to the decision, Vodafone and Airtel are supposed to pay Rs. 28,309 Cr. and Rs. 21,682 Cr. respectively to the Department of Telecommunications (“DoT”). These operators, now, face a threat of possible bankruptcy which will leave Reliance Jio as the only major private player in the market. The companies seek a remedy in the form of review petition to the SC.[i] However; the decision to file a review is only ‘evasive’. SC has made the decision after a long-standing dispute of 16 years and has manifestly pinpointed the reckless attitude of these operators which lead them to this situation. The disputed definition of AGR In the telecom sector, DoT issues a license to the operator in consideration of certain license fees and spectrum usage charges. Upon liberalization of the industry in 1994, DoT determined a fixed amount of money as consideration. The operators often defaulted in their payments since the fixed amount was highly burdensome. As a result, they made a representation to the Government of India (“GoI”) for a relief in the amount. GoI addressed the issue and formulated a new National Telecom Policy in 1999. The policy gave the operators an option to shift from the fixed license fee to a revenue-sharing model. Through the model, GoI became a partner of the operators and would share every operator’s gross revenues. It entered into a Draft License Agreement (“Agreement”) with the operators wherein it was to receive a certain percentage from the head of Adjusted Gross Revenues (“AGR”). Clause 18.2 of the Agreement specified that an annual license fee had to be paid as a percentage of AGR. However, DoT’s determination of quantum of fees caused several issues before long. The department included within the definition of the term “AGR” various other elements of income which did not accrue from operations under the license such as dividend, interest, discounts on calls, profits on sale of fixed assets, revenues from other activities separately licensed, etc. Conflictingly, operators opined that the definition only included revenue from operations related to telecom services. Thus, the Association of Basic Telecom Operators (known as Cellular Operators Association of India) and the respective operators filed a petition before the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (“TDSAT”) in 2003 asserting that DoT was supposed to follow the recommendations of Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (“TRAI”). TRAI had up till now only made recommendations concerning the terms and conditions under which new operators were to be given a license. Subsequently TDSAT, in 2006, referred to the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and ordered that the Government can take a percentage of the share of gross revenue of only those operations for which the license was given. Simultaneously, it urged the TRAI to specifically make recommendations on the definition of AGR and clarify which heads are to be included under it. DoT made an appeal against this order to SC, which dismissed the appeal stating that contentions must first be raised before the TDSAT. When raised before TDSAT, it observed that the matter was already decided upon and cannot be heard again. Eventually in 2011, SC clarified that TDSAT can look into the merits of the claim if appeal is made by the DoT (the licensee) to decide upon the terms and conditions of the agreement. Now, the DoT contended before the TDSAT that the Agreement was put in place before any recommendations were made by TRAI and, therefore, only the terms and conditions of the Agreement should be considered for the definition. Thus, it wanted to give effect to Clause 19 of the Agreement which specifically defined AGR. Meanwhile, TRAI sent its ‘Recommendations on Definition of Revenue Base (AGR) for the Reckoning of Licence Fee and Spectrum Usage Charges’. The Tribunal now had to decide upon the definition having regard to the operators’ claims, TRAI’s recommendations and DoT’s contentions. On April 23, 2015, TDSAT set aside DoT’s demands and decided in favour of the operators keeping in mind the recommendations by TRAI. DoT was resultantly directed to reconsider the license fees. DoT, however, moved the Supreme Court against the TDSAT order. Now, recently on 24th October 2019, the SC ruled in favour of the DoT and ordered the telecom sector operators to pay Rs. 92,641 Cr. for the disputed amount along with the penalty for default and interest on that penalty.[ii] The question which now arises is –‘Who is to be blamed for this crisis faced by the telecom operators?’ The operators have always criticized the telecom sector as unviable and unsustainable. According to their claim, the unsupportive regulatory environment of the sector is beneficial for anybody but the operators. Frankly, however, the operators have only themselves to blame for the present fiasco. Analysing ignorance on part of telecom operators The telecom operators were always legally responsible to follow the terms of the revenue-sharing model as part of their performance under the Agreement with the GoI. The Agreement derived the power to grant license from the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Telegraph Act and was in the nature of a contract between the GoI and these operators. DoT had drawn up the terms and conditions of the agreement after detailed deliberations and consultations with the stakeholders. It

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FDI E-Commerce Guidelines: A Reflection of Loopholes and Repercussions

[By Samanth Dushyanth and Yashaswi Rohra] The authors are final year students of Symbiosis Law School, Pune and can be reached at [email protected]. Introduction On 26th December 2018, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), released Press Note No. 2 of 2018 (“Pn2”) introducing certain key changes to the Consolidated FDI Policy, 2017 (“FDI Policy”) in the e-commerce sector. Pn2 amends paragraph 5.2.15.2 (E-commerce activities) of the consolidated FDI Policy of India providing for these changes to come into effect from February 1, 2019. The FDI Policy permits 100% FDI through the automatic route. However, FDI is not permitted in the inventory based model of e-commerce. A ‘marketplace based model’ refers to an e-commerce entity which provides the information technology platform and acts as an intermediary that facilitates trade between buyers and sellers.[i] An inventory based model on the other hand is defined to mean a model in which the e-commerce entity exercises ownership over the goods, and sells directly to the consumers (B2C).[ii] The subsequently mentioned changes were introduced as an initiative to bridge the gap, since the current FDI Policy being a widely worded legislation provides a window for the large market players to circumvent the provisions. Key changes Inventory Control Pursuant to the Pn2, ownership or control both shall be the determining factors to differentiate between marketplace and inventory based model. Any control or ownership over the inventory shall render the business of the marketplace entity as an inventory-based model of e-commerce. The control in the aforementioned change is further explained as the marketplace entity shall be ‘deemed’ to have control over the inventory of a seller , if more than 25% of the purchases of such seller are from the Marketplace Entity or its group companies. This statement leads to two possible interpretations: Interpretation 1 – Sales generated by the vendor through the marketplace and its group companies. Interpretation 2 – Purchases of the vendor through the marketplace and its group companies. These interpretations arise due to the different kind of business models that exist in the market to which the government has failed to provide any clarification. Similarly, the earlier restriction on 25% sales on an e-commerce platform not originating from a single seller has been largely ineffective. Large e-commerce entities simply created more affiliated sellers (and ensured that sales from each remain under 25%). Pn2 has removed this requirement. Equity Participation Pn2 dictates that a seller shall not be allowed to sell on the platform of the marketplace entity, if the marketplace entity or its group companies have any equity participation of the seller entity.[iii] The intent of the legislature with regards to this change is to prevent the e-commerce entities from exercising control over the pricing policy or inventory of the vendor. It does not explicitly state that both direct and indirect equity participation would count. With this requirement, the government has sought to restrict the ability of e-commerce entities to have a minority equity stake in entities that act as sellers on their platforms. However, the same is a blanket prohibition and may claim unintended victims. Level Playing Field E-commerce entities are required to provide the same suite of services or facilities to all sellers under “similar circumstances”. Like any other business, e-commerce entities may wish to reward or provide enhanced services to suppliers/ vendors who stand out. [iv] Interestingly, the Pn2 appears to recognize an existing practice of providing ‘cashbacks’, which is a system set out to selectively incentivise the customers to choose certain products and to reject other products leading to failure of smaller sellers and unfair competitive market. Pn2 considers this system as not being violative of the prohibition on e-commerce entities influencing the sale price of goods. Instead, only requires cashbacks to be given in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. Compliance Pn2 of 2018 requires an e-commerce entity to furnish an annual certificate, confirming compliance with these guidelines by September 1 of every year. This however does not explain whether they will be required to perform any diligence of their own, or can they rely on self-certification by vendors. Exclusivity Pn2 places a blanket restriction adversely impacting the exclusive arrangements between e-commerce marketplaces and manufacturing companies, to sell products exclusively on their online platforms. The ambiguity surrounding this restriction is regarding the question of how would the enforcement authorities determine if a seller has been “mandated” to sell its products exclusively on an e-commerce platform, or if the seller is choosing to do so voluntarily. Recent Developments Due to mass confusion amongst both e-commerce companies as well as parties interested in foreign investments, the DPIIT held a meeting with stakeholders including companies and groups that were affected by the said guidelines. On turning down demands of the deadline, the government convened the meeting to address the concerns of the e-commerce entities. As a consequence, the Union Minister of Commerce and Industry held a marathon meeting with online players on 26th June 2019. The meeting yielded a vague and ambiguous assurance that the institutional framework would be put in place only within a time frame of a year. However, the DPIIT clarified that the objective of conducting the meeting was not to bring about further changes to the existing FDI rules, but to assist with implementation of the guidelines laid down in Pn2. Amazon In compliance with the new guidelines, Amazon reduced its ownership stake in Cloudtail from 49% to 24% of total shareholding. With the compliance clock ticking over Amazon’s head, it is expected to similarly offload its stake in Appario. Amazon India’s Pantry service faced a temporary suspension following the release of the Pn2. NASDAQ-listed Amazon and NYSE-listed Walmart reported a combined loss of 50 billion dollars in the week following the implementation of the regulations. Over a dozen small scale vendors exited or suspended their accounts on Amazon in the month of June 2019, since they were unable to manage deliveries and logistics on their own after the new policy came into effect. Flipkart

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A primer on the transformations in the business of law for aspiring legal professionals

[By Ankur Gupta] The author is a law lecturer with Temasek Business School at Temasek Polytechnic in Singapore. Besides facilitating learning and conducting research in various areas of law, he has a keen interest in monitoring how the business of law may change bringing with it changing expectations of employers on Skills of lawyers and other professionals working in the legal services sector. He can be reached at [email protected] or on LinkedIn. Introduction The Business Standard recently carried a report[i] on the how certain law firms in India are at the cusp of engaging and experimenting with applications powered by transformative technology such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).   This ‘think anew, act anew’ mantra informing the business of law stems from global trends shaping the operating environment of law firms. The operating environment, globally, for businesses and in turn for law firms is being transformed on account of novel applications of transformative technologies like AI, Internet of Things (IoT) and Blockchain amongst others.  The chief catalyst for technological transformation impacting law firms are the consumers of legal services, especially multinationals and other heavyweight clients who themselves are in the process of digitization and revamping their own processes and products in a bid to remain competitive. Application of AI, IoT and Cloud Computing and other transformative technologies is playing a vital role. Arguably, these consumers are increasingly demanding that providers of legal services innovate the delivery of legal services, be it law firms or their own in-house legal counsels. This piece discusses broad trends associated with how law firms are positioning themselves in an increasingly crowded market where they must compete with a host of traditional and non-traditional rivals for the same pie of business. It is hoped that this will spur aspiring lawyers and other readers to engage with developments innovation in the business of law given the potential for new career opportunities for law graduates and experienced non law professionals as a by-product of such innovation. The article is jurisdiction agnostic, a reflection of the trend that the innovation and disruption in legal service delivery and legal business models is borderless. Legal Innovation: a demand for value innovation by law firm clients Technological change is not new, neither is disruption. Industries, jobs and economies have transformed on account of innovative technology since the Industrial Revolution, if not earlier. What is, perhaps, different is that change is multi-layered: a series of small and significant changes which add to the complexity.  Such change is charecterised by emergence of new products, new players and new processes which in turn impact and give rise to issues for legal practice, legal education as well as regulators.  This paper limits the discussion to legal innovation and its relevance for law firms. On the availability of new products, it worth noting that legal tech tools are available in almost every area of legal practice[ii].  What is also noteworthy about this proliferation is that several legal tech tools are designed not necessarily with the lawyers in mind but for mass consumption. One example is online dispute resolution and management platforms which are touted as ‘self-service sites and dialogue tools’ promising convenience, cost savings and accessibility to disputing parties[iii]. The efficacy and customizability of generic applications is progressively evolving with greater usage and user feedback flowing back to developers. Lawyers are professionals and law firms are businesses providing solutions to clients. Technology is a means to this end.  How law firms service their clients and continue to provide ‘value’ and ‘value innovation’ is mediated by technology. Clients in the B2B segment i.e. businesses which engage law firms are increasingly concerned about the efficiency of law firms in offering their services. This is perhaps a pressure point for law firms. Another trend forcing law firms to re-think their offerings to make them more appealing as many large clients seek ‘full service’ solutions rather than piecemeal legal advice which has been the case so far. One example of ‘Value Innovation’ is how the Big4 are offering legal services to their clients leveraging on in-house multi-disciplinary expertise delivered by teams of legal practitioners working alongside accountants, auditors, management consultants and other domain experts. This is where technology, process improvement, resourcing and project management are assuming importance in a law firm context[iv].  Established multinational law firms such as Clifford Chance, Linklaters, Dentons Rodyk as well as several national and regional law firms seem to be joining the legal innovation bandwagon, leveraging technology atop their brand, domain expertise and reach to in the face of competition from non-law firm service providers vying a slice of the lucrative pie for legal services markets across jurisdictions. Perhaps most notable about the ongoing transformation of the business of law is the proliferation of Alternate Legal Service Providers (ALSPs) often characterized as impinging on turf traditionally ‘belonging’ to law firms.  At the most basic level, some ALSPs are offering self-service apps for clients to create simple legal documents, thereby ‘commoditizing’ legal services and removing the lawyer from the picture[v]. A wider suite of products on offer includes access to platforms which enable consumers of legal services to resolve disputes online, access to subscription-based software to build contracts and consultancy on automation of workflows and processes, protracting the potential for distermediating[vi] law firms. Developments in legal innovation also catching attention of legal academics globally Legal Innovation and Academia Attempts to capture legal innovation, as an academic subject matter, are also on the rise. Stanford Law School’s Techindex is a unique compilation of legal innovation describes on the website as “a curated list of 1211 companies changing the way legal is done”[vii]. In Asia, the Singapore Academy of Law (SAL) teamed up with the Singapore Management University (SMU) publishing two editions of State of Legal Innovation Report aimed at covering developments in legal innovation and legal technology development in nations across the Asia Pacific.  Beyond reports and compilations, formation of multi-disciplinary, cross border groupings such as Asia-Pacific Legal Innovation and Technology Association (ALITA)[viii] aimed at foster collaboration around legal

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The Constitutional Validity of SEBI’s Search and Seizure in the ‘Whatsapp Leak Case’

[By Aditya Anand] The author is a Third Year student at NLU, Delhi. He can be reached at [email protected]   Towards the end of 2017, Reuters published a news report[i] in which it claimed that three days before Dr Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd announced quarterly results, a message was circulated on the popular social media platform, ‘WhatsApp’, stating that the company would be reporting a loss which in time proved to be true. In furtherance to the above-made claim, it named at least 12 more companies in which prescient numbers related to their financial results, and due for announcement were shared by the users on some of the WhatsApp groups. These 12 companies involved names like – HDFC Bank, Axis Bank, Tata Steel, Mahindra Holidays, to name a few[ii]. This lead to Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) conducting an investigation which led to a search being conducted on 31 brokers and analysts in Mumbai, Delhi and Bangalore, by a team of 70 SEBI officials and they ended up seizing devices such as mobiles, laptops, computers and other documents with the intention of accessing the WhatsApp and other social media accounts, as well as the data that was stored in these devices.[iii] This was done because the leakage of the figures which were not yet declared by the Company, fell under the category of ‘unpublished price sensitive information’ and was in contravention of Regulation 3 of the Prohibition of Insider Trading Regulations, 2015 which states that no insider shall communicate, provide or allow access to any unpublished price sensitive information, relating to a company or its securities unless it is in furtherance of legitimate purposes, performance of duties or for discharging of legal obligations.[iv] Further Section 12A (d) and (e) of the SEBI Act[v] bars any person from indulging in insider trading and dealing with securities while being in possession of material or non-public information and also bars the person from communicating such information. Thereby, SEBI conducted an inquiry in this matter and even asked WhatsApp to share the specific data[vi], which was required in order to trace the origin of such messages that allegedly contained the Unpublished Price Sensitive Information and was crucial for the market regulator, in order to further its investigation. To SEBI’s disappointment, WhatsApp declined the same, citing its privacy policy[vii]. This entire incident was labelled as the ‘WhatsApp Leak Case’, but the real question that arises is whether this seizure of smart-phones can be justified or not, especially with the emerging jurisprudence of data security and privacy. The seizure of smartphones can be termed as a violation of the Fundamental Rights granted under Part III of the Constitution. Many experts argue that there is an urgent need to ensure that the privacy of the citizens is accorded and respected especially in this new and ever-growing era of cyberspace. The same has been opined by the Supreme Court in the case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (retd) and Anr v Union of India[viii] where the court opined that, ‘The existence of zones of privacy is felt instinctively by all civilized people, without exception. The best evidence for this proposition lies in the panoply of activities through which we all express claims to privacy in our daily lives. We lock our doors, clothe our bodies and set passwords to our computers and phones to signal that we intend for our places, persons and virtual lives to be private.[ix]’ In the same case, the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21[x] and is guaranteed by the Part III of the Indian Constitution. Various legal systems around the world have prevented the attempt to extract such passwords or to gain access to the personal devices as an invasion of privacy and the United States Supreme Court in the case of Riley v California[xi] held that ‘a cell phone is unlike a physical lock box and is in a sense the extension of the person to whom it belongs as it is a vast repository of information pertaining to its owner.[xii]’ Therefore in the light of emerging jurisprudence relating to privacy, SEBI’s power to seize smart-phones and other electronic devices can be questioned. In addition to that, in the case of Indian Council of Investors v Union of India[xiii], SEBI had asked for the Call Data Records and the details related to the location of the towers from the telecom service providers in order to investigate a matter. The same was challenged but however, allowed by the Bombay High Court with a caveat that such a power should be used ‘carefully’[xiv] as it can lead to a situation wherein the privacy of a citizen can be compromised and stated that certain safeguards should be there in order to ensure the same. Talking about another Constitutional Law facet, Article 20 (3)[xv] guarantees protection against self-incrimination which basically means that no man, not even the accused can be compelled to answer any question, which may tend to prove him guilty of any crime, he is accused of. The concept of ‘personal knowledge’ was introduced in the case of State of Bombay v Kathi Kalu Oghad[xvi] and applying the same concept, it can be asserted that passwords, pass-codes etc. required in order to unlock such devices can be said to be a part of the personal knowledge of any given person, which he or she is not required to divulge during the course of investigation. But the real issue that exists is the absence of proper statutory framework, for the purpose of regulating the conduct of the social media platforms as observed by the Delhi High Court in the case of Karmanya Singh Sareen and Ors v Union of India[xvii]. Later the Supreme Court also constituted a committee of experts in the same case, under the leadership of Justice B.N. Srikrishna, to identify key data protection issues in India and to recommend methods for addressing the

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The curious cases of L&T, Jet and Renuka Sugars & Indian regulators’ overbearing interference

[By Rohan Kohli] The author is a 5th year student of NLIU Bhopal and the Co-convenor of CBCL. The Indian corporate story that took off in the 1991 liberalisation reforms to its success today has had a great part to thank the paradigm shift in the Indian regulatory behaviour. From the License-Raj era protectionist and red-tape bureaucracy to today’s times where the regulators actively engage in consultations with stakeholders, the Indian regulator has morphed into a modern beast that has by and large kept in-tune with the changing times, even if a little belatedly. However, a slew of recent examples in the past few months has threatened to undo these years of liberal outlook that the regulators have developed at great pains. I will analyse three such recent examples playing the devil’s advocate to the regulators. Larsen & Toubro (L&T), which is currently in news for a hostile takeover bid by one of its subsidiary L&T Infotech in IT company Mindtree, was earlier also in news for a stunning derailment of its ambitious buyback attempt. L&T Board on 23 August 2018 approved a buyback proposal of 4.29% of its shares amounting to INR 9000 crore, the first in the company history. [1] The draft letter of offer was submitted to SEBI, which inexplicably took 102 days to reject this buyback proposal with the reason that the post-buyback debt-equity ratio would exceed 2:1. [2] This decision has taken the corporate world by surprise and been widely criticized by foreign and Indian media alike, the unanimous opinion being that the regulator erred in its opinion. The reason why this is being questioned is because neither section 68, Companies Act, 2013 nor SEBI Buyback Regulations make any mention of whether the consolidated group financials or the standalone financials of the entity be taken to calculate the ratio of secured and unsecured debts vis-à-vis paid-up capital and free reserves (which both mandate it to be maximum 2:1). SEBI took the former approach – where L&T Financials (one of the group companies), which has a debt-equity ratio of 6:1, brings the group’s debt-equity ratio to above 2:1 both pre and post-buyback – which is a very strict and literal interpretation and contrary and singularly opposite to its past practice. L&T has accordingly filed for a review of the decision instead of approaching SAT. If this does not fall through, L&T may have to go ahead with a special dividend to return money to its shareholders, which attracts significantly higher tax implications. The troubled aviation giant Jet Airways recently saw a resolution plan under the 12 February RBI Circular [3] with equity infusion for the lenders and exit of its promoters and other management (nominee of Etihad Airways) from the Board. [4] While it promises to be a close-knit fight now for the company once the bidding deadline are invited on 9 April as banks exit the company, [5] this entire process could have been pre-empted if not for the regulators’ hawkish and unyielding stance. When the first reports of Jet’s troubles began to emerge, it was Etihad who was expected to step in and assume the majority of the equity in Jet by increasing its 24% (at that time) stake. But SEBI’s move to deny open offer exemptions changed the story and finally pulled the plug on Etihad’s plans. SEBI declared that any exemptions from applicability of conditions for preferential issue and making a mandatory open offer under Takeover Code for corporate debt restructuring made other than under IBC, will only be given to banks and financial institutions. [6] This effectively removed Etihad’s option of seeking an open offer exemption by referring to SEBI under Regulation 11 of the Takeover Code. Further, SEBI also removed any exemptions pursuant to scheme of arrangement pursuant to order of competent authorityunder any law, removing Etihad’s option of seeking open offer exemption under Regulation 10 (1) (d) (iii). The latter seems to be a belated admission of SEBI’s earlier mistake to SpiceJet’s open offer exemption done under similar circumstances in 2015 that brought Ajay Singh in majority of the company. [7] SEBI’s present move makes it difficult for Etihad to even make a future bid for Jet Airways, since the FDI Policy allows for a maximum of 49% FDI under automatic route [8]. This would mean that Etihad cannot make an open offer for singlehandedly replacing the lenders (since 26% offer beyond the threshold of 24% would breach the 49% mark), and thus Etihad would have to make a joint bid with another Indian entity to keep them with in the 49% mark. If Etihad would still want to make an individual bid without attracting open offer obligations, they would have to structure the transaction as an internal corporate restructuring under Section 230, Companies Act which would mean seeking approval of NCLT and fulfilling the condition of a scheme of arrangement pursuant to order of Tribunal under Regulation 10 (1) (d) (iii). [9] All this process could have been pre-empted if not for SEBI’s outdated approach in this regard. This entire process of lenders’ having to take up equity, then opening up bids would not have been needed to be done in the first place if Etihad would have been allowed to increase its stake, saving substantial amount of time and legal and economic costs. However, we will see in the example below that another regulator may make it even more difficult for Etihad to do this. Renuka Sugars is another classic ongoing case that continues in the same vein of regulatory overreach as above. Shree Renuka Sugars was a company undergoing debt restructuring in 2018, in Wilmar Sugar Holdings increased its stake from 27.24% to 38.57% as part of the restructuring process and finally to 58.34% through an open offer. [10] Interestingly, this restructuring was done after the 12 February 2018 RBI Circular came into force, which mandates all accounts above INR 2000 crore (the present case falls under this bracket) and where restructuring may have been initiated under

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India’s New E-Commerce Policy: Leveling the Playing Field for Online Retailers

[ Himanshu Shembekar ] The author is a 2nd year student of NLU, Odisha Introduction The Department of Industrial Promotion & Policy (DIPP) on 26thDecember, 2018 released a notification revising the policy on the Foreign Direct Investment in e-commerce. The new notification has shocked the big e-retailers like Amazon, Flipkart, etc. This notification has affected the way B2B business activities take place in the e-commerce industry. The new notification has taken effect from 1stFebruary, 2019. Through this post, the author intends to analyze the impact of the new notification of DIPP on the e- commerce industry in India. Provisions of the notification The DIPP has retained the policy of allowing 100% FDI in the E-commerce sector but it imposed new conditions on foreign-owned market places. The following are certain new and important set of rules: “An e-commerce entity cannot have complete control or exercise over the ownership or the control over the inventory. A vendor’s inventory shall be treated to be controlled by an e-commerce marketplace if more than 25% of its purchases are from the marketplace entity or its related companies.” “An entity having equity participation by any e-commerce entity or any of its related company or having control over its inventory by e-commerce market entity or related company, then it shall be not permitted to sell its product on platform run by such marketplace entity.” “E-commerce entity providing marketplace will not be allowed to directly or indirectly influence the sale price of goods and services. Provision of any service to any vendor on certain terms which are not available to other vendors in certain circumstances will be deemed to be unfair and discriminatory.” “E-commerce marketplace entity shall not mandate any seller to sell any product to sell any product exclusively on its platform only.” “The e-commerce companies have to furnish a certificate along with the report of a statutory auditor to the Reserve Bank of India to confirm the compliance of guidelines, by 30thSeptember, every year for the preceding fiscal year.”[i] Necessity for the changes These regulations have come up after the complaints which have been made by the small and medium Indian retailers, accusing the giant e-commerce companies for creating unfair marketplace, as these companies keep control over the inventory through affiliates and exclusive agreements.[ii] In addition to these complaints, the All India Online Vendors Association (AIOVA) had filed a petition to the Competition Commission of India (CCI), accusing that Amazon favored merchants  it partially owns such as the Cloudtail and Appario.[iii] It is a fact that Cloudtail India Pvt Ltd is the biggest retailer of Amazon. Prione Business, which is a joint venture between Amazon Inc. (48% stake) and Infosys co-founder N R Narayana Murthy’s Catamaran Advisors (51% stake), holds 99.99% of the shares of Cloudtail India.[iv] The other retailer is Appario Retail, which is a subsidiary of the Frontizo Business Services. Frontizo Business Services is a joint venture between Amazon India Ltd and Ashok Patni, the co-founder of Patni Computer Systems.Thus, it can be seen that how the big e-commerce companies through their subsidiary companies enter into such agreements which results in their capturing majority of the market share and adversely affecting other businesses. How new rule has impacted the big E-commerce companies? It is not surprising that the new regulations have brought all the big rivals in the e-commerce industry like Flipkart and Amazon together to fight against these new regulations which have threatened their business strategies. Due to the new rules, the e-commerce companies can get impacted in the following way- The affiliate sellers of the big e-commerce companies have to shift 75% of their business to other retailers, to ensure that affiliate sellers are able to continue with their business activity to provide goods and services. The big e-commerce companies have to bring in major changes in their equity structure so as to ensure that they are able to continue business with the sellers. As the big e-commerce companies cannot get the benefit of bulk purchases and selling their goods and services at low prices, this shall result in an end of big discount sales. The new rules also put an end to the flash sales in which the e- commerce companies can exclusively promote or sell their products on their platform. As the e-commerce companies are no longer able to buy majority of inventory through their affiliates, their costs shall increase. History of cases challenging E-commerce companies There have been many cases in which e-commerce companies have been accused of practicing non-competitive market practices. Few of the cases are as follows: Ashish Ahuja v. Snapdeal.com In this case, the complainant had accused Snapdeal and SanDisk of colluding with each other. Snapdeal had imposed a condition that to sell SanDisk products through online platform one must be authorized dealers i.e. must be recognized as an authorized dealer by Snapdeal as well as SanDisk, thus violating section 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 which provide for anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position.[v] The Commission after enquiry held that the condition that SanDisk products sold through online portals must be bought through authorized dealers is no way an abusive conduct. This decision was within the scope of the company to protect its sanctity of its distributive channel.[vi]It was considered as a normal practice of business. M/s Mohit Manglani & Others Versus M/S Flipkart Pvt Ltd In this case, the publisher of Chetan Bhagat’s new book ‘Half Girlfriend’, Rupa publication had entered into an exclusive sale agreement with Flipkart, thus granting Flipkart exclusive right to sell the book. It was claimed by the competitors that this led to unfair trade practices as the consumer is given no choice. Flipkart had the 100% market share for the product for which it had exclusive dealing rights, therefore leading to dominance. In this matter CCI stated that an arrangement between manufacturer and an e-portal did not create any barrier for the new entries. Rather, it stated that with the emergence of the new e- commerce companies,

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