Competition Law

Desirable Revamp In The Punitive Mechanism Of India’s Competition Law

[By Vijpreet Pal]   The author is a student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal. Introducing The Subsisting Punitive Framework The primary goals of Competition Law are to abolish anticompetitive practices, encourage competition and to protect consumer interests. For the effective fulfillment of these goals, there are three broad frameworks adopted by various nations throughout the world i.e. (a) Civil Sanctions, (b) Criminal Sanctions, and (c) Mixed. India has adopted the enforcement based on fines and other similar civil remedies. It is always contended that the enforcement regime based on fines has less deterrent effect as compared to Criminal sanctions. Even the historical background of various nations shows the usage of Criminal sanctions to detect, prevent and punish the prevailing malpractices in the market. The author in the article will examine whether the Criminal sanctions are desirable in the Indian Competition Law regime by drawing comparative analysis of the nations that shifted from Civil sanctions to Criminal sanctions and even vice-versa. The author will further delineate the challenges on the path of implementing the Criminal sanctions and then put forth viable solutions to tackle those concerns. Insights From The Punitive Framework Of Other Jurisdictions Similar to India there are various other nations like China, Hungary, Ethiopia, Peru, etc. who have retained Civil punishments. There are other nations that initially adopted the Criminal framework but later switched to Civil enforcements mechanism like the Netherlands where the concerned authority can now only impose an administration fine or an order subject to penalty for non-compliance, in proportion to the infringement committed. Similarly, in Luxembourg, the original Criminal sanctions were replaced by Civil sanctions. Now, its Competition Act does not per se provide for Criminal penalties under Article 101/102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union(‘TFEU’) however, some infringements could subsequently lead to violation of Article 311 of the Luxembourg Penal Code. On the other hand, some nations have criminalized anti-competitive practices and imposed Criminal sanctions like the Antitrust Laws of USA: there are three antitrust laws in USA i.e. Clayton Act of 1914, Sherman Act of 1890 and Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 amongst which Sherman Act involves Criminal penalties against anti-competitive agreements. There can be imprisonment for the period of 3 to 10 years along with a fine of amount US$ 350,000 to US$ 1 million. The enforcement mechanism of New Zealand and Canada also developed imposing Criminal liability with imprisonment up to 7 years and 14 years respectively for serious anticompetitive practices like price-fixing, bid-rigging, market sharing, etc. Belgium’s Competition Act enforces Criminal sanctions for Cartel infringes whereas, in Germany, Criminal punishment is confined to Bid-rigging only. In several other nations like Armenia, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Thailand, Brazil, Australia, etc. criminal liability is imposed in cases of severely anti-competitive behavior. Exigency Of Criminal Punishment In India’s Competition Law Regime The deficiency of the Civil punishments in curbing the malpractices could easily be seen in the Indian Competition Law. There are instances that manifestly demonstrate that even if fines in the millions of rupees are levied still the offender would be unaffected because they are making significant profits out of their malpractices and often have large assets. Resultantly, in most situations, the offender is willing to pay this insignificant sum and continue with their anti-competitive practices. They make a prior estimation of the benefit which they will reap and also the penalty which could possibly be imposed if they are caught violating the Competition Laws. There are other more contentions and justifications in favour of the imposition of Criminal sanctions like the notion that Criminal sanctions have a greater deterrent effect because it incapacitates the violator from committing future crimes and also, as stated earlier, fines imposed on the violator are lesser in comparison to the profit they gained. Jerome Bentham and Stuart Mill propounded a political philosophy called ‘Utilitarianism’ i.e. ‘greatest number of goods for the greatest number of people in the 19th CE. It supports the Criminal sanctions by postulating that if imposing Criminal punishment does more good and less pain, then it is justified. Furthermore, the Retributive theory of punishment entails that the criminals should be met with an equal amount of pain. German Philosopher Immanuel Kant argues that “retribution is not just a necessary condition for punishment but also a sufficient one. Punishment is an end in itself. Retribution could also be said to be the ‘natural’ justification”, in a way that it is quite natural and just that a bad person ought to be punished and a good person rewarded. Consequences of the Criminal sanctions like the resultant impact on the family and hostile reaction of the society also stigmatizes the act which has a deterrent impact. Apart from the philosophical reasons, there are pragmatic reasons as well which legitimizes the Criminal punishments for example, liability in most of the cases are imposed only on the company and not on the directing minds, thereby fines levied from the company does not give assurance of the accountability of the Directors of the company and they are left scout free. Further, in the age of developments, there is no territorial limit of malpractices and thence, the competition law must accommodate the extra-territorial application of its provisions. However, Civil Competition Law cannot be applied in other nations as every nation is sovereign under International Law but there are multiple principles like active nationality, passive nationality, etc which legitimizes the extra-territorial application of the Criminal Competition Law. For instance, Section 3 and 4 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 provide for extra-territorial jurisdiction. Challenges To Enforce Criminal Sanctions The biggest challenge is the component of Mens-Rea along with Actus-Reus, which is required to be established beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal matters however, in Civil matters, there is a preponderance of probability. The second main challenge is accountability i.e. who should be made accountable for the act because the malpractices are carried out in the name of the corporation but the mind behind is of the

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The Whatsapp Case: Implications Of Behavioural Economics In Competition Law

[By Akanksha Agrahari & Arjun Nayyar] The authors are students at the NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad.  Introduction WhatsApp was heavily featured in the news recently when the Competition Commission of India took suo moto cognizance of the updated privacy policy and terms of service for its users. Due to its extremely large user base, as well as the network effects associated with it, the Commission held that users were left with no other option but to accept the updated conditions. Hence, Whatsapp’s actions were found to be in prima facie abuse of its dominant position, a view which was upheld by the Delhi High Court. It raises certain concerns regarding the dominant position held by companies by virtue of their ability to manipulate consumer behaviour. This isn’t a unique instance wherein WhatsApp was called into question for its ability to influence the market and its users. Previously, WhatsApp was fined 3 million Euros by the Italian Competition Authority for abusing its dominance. This post analyses various concepts of behavioural economics using which competitors can obtain a dominant position and influence their user base. Understanding Behavioral Economics The CCI has on many instances discussed factors that compound a firm’s dominance in the market and lead to an abuse of its dominant position. The order in the WhatsApp case follows an extensive analysis of network effects and how they have led to the app reaching a position where it is difficult for the users to switch to any substitutes. Such companies use certain tactics and human tendencies to build a user base and subsequently abuse it. This dependence of the consumers on one platform may lead to a denial of market access to competitors. Network Effects of Scale and Tipping The larger the consumer base of a platform, the more inclined a consumer would be to use it. Network effects relate to an increase in the desirability of a platform due to an increase in the number of users. The CCI has looked at network effects in the past to understand whether or not a competitor holds a dominant position, and subsequently, to determine whether this position has been abused. This concept is amplified in the relevant market of over-the-top (OTT) messaging apps, benefitting WhatsApp the most with 70 million users in the country, or a market share of 95%. Such a large user base allows WhatsApp to function mostly independently of market forces, due to the lack of feasible substitutes and the hesitation of users to switch. As the updated terms of use and privacy policy of WhatsApp does not allow for the user to opt-out, any individual who disagrees is left with the sole option of uninstalling the app. However, due to the nature of OTT messaging apps, it is not sufficient for users to simply delete WhatsApp and switch to other competing apps. It is also necessary to ensure that other users make the switch as well, to make the alternative a viable substitute. This creates a barrier to the efficient substitutability of the application, preventing the users from refusing to conform to the updated conditions and the alleged breach of their privacy. Such a barrier to entry is anti-competitive practice and is said to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition under Section 19(3) of the Competition Act. The EU has dealt with network effects as a reason for dominance on various occasions. In the Booking.com case, it was remarked that network effects may cause markets to tip towards a particular competitor. It was further stated that once a particular threshold is crossed, these network effects might lead to a major barrier to entry for competitors. This ties into the aspect of “tipping”, whereby the market tips in favour of a leading firm due to an increased market share. On reaching such a tipping point, firms can rely on their large user base to consolidate even more users. Large players are protected from competition and market forces due to their dominance and subsequent barriers to entry, allowing them to make decisions and impose policies that would otherwise cause a loss in business if the market was competitive.[i] The EU also extensively discusses the concept of tipping. It states that cases dealing with anti-competitive practices must be brought to the commission’s notice before companies can abuse such a dominant position. Consumer Inertia Consumers tend to opt for the default option or the option that is readily available. This aspect is abused by dominant firms by virtue of the ‘inertia’ of consumers.[ii]  Having used a platform for a considerable amount of time, consumers lack any incentive to switch to another option. Moreover, the habit formation of using a particular app over a period of time puts the average consumer in a state of inertia. Google reportedly pays USD 1 billion to Apple to be the default search engine on the iPhone. This illustrates the importance of default options and the inertia generated for them to the firms. Consumer inertia is also known as the status quo bias. The concept was extensively discussed in the EU in the Google Android Case, and has also been held by the CCI to be sufficient grounds to raise a prima facie case of abuse of dominance. It entails that those individuals who already have access to a particular platform or application on their mobile devices would have no incentive to switch to competing apps on the market. This concept is witnessed to an even greater extent in the WhatsApp case, as not only do the users already have the application on their smartphones; they also utilize it on a daily basis. It would be highly inconvenient for consumers to switch to another app if they disagree with the updated privacy policy and would be much more likely to accept the conditions despite having their differences. This is coupled with the network effects discussed earlier, as the status quo bias would only amplify when multiple users have to switch in order for any

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CCI’s Aftermarket Dilemma: Legacy of Shamsher Kataria and Future of Electronics Market

[By Vanshaj Dhiman and Palak Jagetia] The authors are students at the Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow. Relevant market delineation has become the most prominent determinant to ascertain the market power of enterprises and to analyze their ability to abuse their market power or to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in the market. Market practices like making warranty obligations contingent to use of its own aftermarket, lack of open market access to genuine spare parts, accessories, and associated technical know-how for the after-sales services of the product, higher aftermarket prices, etc, lead to consumer harm and foreclosure in the aftermarket and thus causing AAEC. Aftermarket is a type of derivative market consisting of spare parts, repair services, and consumable goods.[i]An in-depth analysis of Indian, European, and American case laws suggests that the following parameters need to be considered while determining whether an intertwined market of the primary product and its aftermarket shall be delineated into two separate relevant markets – a) Whether the consumer undertakes whole-life cost analysis at the time of purchasing the primary product; b) Is it possible for a consumer to switch to aftermarket of another manufacturer; and c)What is the cost of switching to another primary product relative to the cost of the spare parts? As far as the automobile sector is concerned, all the mature jurisdictions including India depict the need for delineation of a separate aftermarket rather than a single system’s market consisting of primary market and aftermarket. However, when it comes to the market for electronic appliances, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) seems to deviate from the separate aftermarket rule. The CCI did so as it believed that the availability and accessibility of information about the aftermarket products were sufficient enough to delineate a unified system’s market. This is evident from the cases of Trend Electronics v. Hewlett Packard and S.K. Mittal v. HP Inc., where the CCI denied recognizing the existence of a separate relevant aftermarket and held that Hewlett Packard (HP) was not dominant in the ‘market for laptops including its spares and after-sale services in India’. In this blog, the authors shall discuss the possibility and feasibility of the existence of a separate aftermarket in cases of laptops as well as mobile phones. Whole Life-Cycle Cost Analysis The concept refers to the consumer’s ability to compute the life-cycle cost of a product at the time of purchasing it and the customer’s anticipation of the future costs of ownership of the primary product by taking into account the probable expenditure on after-market products.  Engaging in this analysis is based on various factors, inter alia, availability, and accessibility of information in the public domain, and presence of required sophisticated analysis skills in the consumers. As far as printers and photocopiers are concerned, a unified system’s market encompassing of primary and aftermarket should be delineated. The consumables (toner cartridges) are indispensable for the proper functioning of printers or photocopiers and will be needed again and again depending upon the life-cycle of the primary product. Therefore, it can reasonably be presumed that a consumer will undertake the whole-life cost analysis at the time of purchasing the primary product. Now, this position needs to be distinguished while dealing with other aftermarket cases where instead of consumable products, spare parts and repair services are involved. Lack of sophisticated analysis skills, prevalent consumer myopia, and illiteracy make the Indian consumers more sensitive to upfront cost than running cost. Moreover, even if consumer undertakes life Cost Analysis at the time of purchase, then too does it really prevent them from getting locked-in?  The answer is “No”, as all the prominent manufacturers engage in similar anti-competitive practices leaving consumers with no alternative but to buy from one of them. Thus, even the prior knowledge about the lifetime cost of a product cannot be construed as the sole reason to delineate a unified system’s market. Non-Substitutability and Locked-in Effect An aftermarket may be broader than merely the secondary products of one brand of primary product where the secondary products of different brands of primary product or independent secondary product bands are readily substitutable. However, if the secondary products for different brands are not compatible or substitutable, and a consumer requires certain parts and accessories for his/her smartphone or laptop, in a sense, the consumer is ‘locked-in’ to use brand-specific parts. The CCI, in Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel, noted that since the spare parts of one automobile brand are not substitutable with spare parts of other brands, the consumers are ‘locked in’ and forced to purchase the brand-specific spare parts. If the manufacturers do not allow consumers to use the spare parts and repair services of other manufactures including independent service providers and even then, consumers choose to use the parts of other manufactures, those consumers will have to face a penalty in terms of revocation of the warranty obligations. Thus, such practices are not only anti-competitive in nature but also force the consumer to use the unlawfully tied aftermarket products even if they are provided at a higher cost. The Magnitude of Switching Cost Generally, the magnitude of switching cost is considered as the determinant factor while deciding the existence of a separate relevant market. That means, if it is possible to switch to another primary product to avoid higher costs in the aftermarket, there may be a unified system’s market encompassing the primary and secondary products. That said, just to avoid the increase in the cost of aftermarket, a consumer who already owns a primary product will not undertake the switching costs, which are as high as the cost of a new phone or laptop. Furthermore, even the second-hand product market could not decrease the switching costs to reasonable levels as the residual value of these products is very low owing to fast-changing technology and a high rate of obsoletion in the electronics market. Analysis – Antitrust Concerns at Play It is a settled position that in case the consumer finds

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Locating Data Protection and Privacy Concerns Within Antitrust Analysis

[By Anam Chowdhary] The author is a student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore.  In today’s world of the digital economy, it would not be wrong to suggest that consumer data indeed holds a high position. We cannot ignore the fact that data indeed has gained much more important than ever before when it comes to online transactions with or on big firms like Facebook, Amazon, etc. Data accumulated by these companies helps them not only analyze consumer patterns but also create demands and enhances their business.. In such a scenario where data is becoming the ‘new currency’, it is inevitable that concerns regarding data protection will rise. While such concerns seem to be within the jurisdiction of data privacy regulations like only,  time and again links have been identified between privacy concerns and antitrust laws.  In simpler terms, unregulated flow and processing of consumer data by dominant data-driven firms are said to have huge implications on the competition in the digital economy, thus explaining the need for antitrust analysis of the same. The connection between these areas has been identified by various jurisdictions including India where the Competition Commission initiated a suo-moto proceeding against the change in the WhatsApp privacy policy of 2021 (WhatsApp case), based on the fact that in a data-driven economy, implications of data accumulation on thcompetition cannot be ignored. Exemplary fine levied by the Federal Trade Commission on tech-giant Facebook for violating consumers’ privacy, is another example of this connection. Thus, in today’s digital economy, data protection and privacy concerns cannot be left outside of the purview of competition analysis as that amounts to taking a very narrow approach towards the understanding of the implications that lack of data protection brings forth in the market.” Connecting Data Protection to Competition Law In most jurisdictions, competition law has some basic goals- enhancing consumer welfare, maintaining healthy competition in the market, and economic efficiency. Data protection can enter this realm if it impacts one or all of these aspects of antitrust law. It is argued that data protection impacts consumer welfare and has an adverse impact on non-dominant firms in the market. Impact on Consumer Welfare  It would not be wrong to state that consumers are now concerned about how much of their data is accessible to companies and how this data is being processed The uproar after WhatsApp updated its privacy policy in 2021, the reaction to the Cambridge Analytica scandal can be examples of it. Thus, it can be stated that privacy is the new determinant of consumer welfare. In the Google-Doubleclick merger case before the FTC, a link was established between data protection and quality of service. Lowering of data protection was seen as lowering of the quality of service. Thus, when a dominant firm like Google keeps acquiring data, in a scenario of no competition (which shall be explained below), it can lower privacy standards for this data which in turn can impact consumer welfare as this reduction in privacy can be construed as a reduction in quality of service even in the WhatsApp case, this degradation of quality was taken into account to initiate investigations in the aspect of data sharing between WhatsApp and Facebook. Now, of course the question arises that if consumers are so concerned about their privacy, then why do they not shift to other competitors? This query can be answered by analysing the impact that excess data collection has on competition in the market, especially on non-dominant firms or new entrants. Impact on Competition in the Market – Wiping out the Competition Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 states that no firm shall abuse its dominant position. It has to be understood that the majority of the cases assessed by antitrust authorities with respect to privacy and competition have involved firms which are dominant in their relevant markets. Such domination in the market means that the particular firm has a large consumer base and thus a large data set at its disposal. These firms can process this data and create better services attracting more consumers and thus more data. Therefore, there is a cycle at play in the process where consumers give you data, and this data gives you more consumers. This basically helps in generating a network effect which keeps the consumers stuck with a particular service provider as there would be higher switching costs or even worse, no worthwhile competitors. The dominant position of firms like Facebook gives them access to such data bases which help in targeted advertising and come across as good service providers. But, this also means that having set their foot in the market with huge data sets and the consequent network effects, they pose an obstruction to the entry of new comers in the market. Thus, competition is eventually wiped out. Network effect based on services provided by data accumulation, can lead to such a creation of domination in the market that dominant firms can put forth ‘take-it-or leave-it’ conditions on consumers where the consumers are compelled to compromise their data in return of the services provided. As an example, the terms and conditions in the Whatsapp privacy policy update of 2021 provided for a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ mechanism which the Competition Commission of India  construed as one of the grounds for initiation of ‘abuse of dominant position’ proceedings against the company.   It is worth mentioning here that privacy is now being put forth as a non-price competition. This was affirmed in the Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision and the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger decision by the EC. This position is also being accepted in India as is evident from the recent report of CCI on Telecom sector where reference has been made to privacy being a ‘non-price competition’. Thus, it can also be stated that dominance generated in the market on the basis of data accumulation can lead to a complete disregard of privacy as a non-price competition when there is no competition in the market (much like raising prices

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Fintech M&A – A New Challenge for Competition Authorities

[By Lavanya Gupta] The author is a student at the Symbiosis Law School, Pune. Background The financial services industry, with its innate technology, has been a significant sector of economies across the globe, and this fact is supported by the existence of payment processing mechanisms, ATMs, etc. However, of late, a separate industry that exclusively focuses on the development of newer technologies for the financial services sector has been rising, i.e., the fintech industry. In other words, while the financial services industry develops products for consumers, the fintech industry develops the technology that ensures extensive and widespread use of such products by leveraging the worldwide adoption of mobiles and smartphones, and the ubiquitous internet. The speed of M&A between the players of the financial services industry and the fintech industry has recently seen an upswing since mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) present an opportunity for fintech companies, which are mostly start-ups, to advance their capabilities and expand their reach. Additionally, the fintech industry is characterized by high growth and recurring revenue and is thus an attractive industry for private equity and venture capitalists alike. Concomitantly, as per a 2019 report, fintech M&A has seen a five-fold growth over the past decade. With such a growth profile, it is perhaps apparent that fintech M&A is moving from “too small to care” to “too big to ignore” and in the same line, it is attracting the interest of multiple stakeholders. Amidst the heightened attention, scrutiny by antitrust regulators was obviously to follow, and cases like Visa/Plaid and Mastercard/Nets are paving the way. This article looks at the approaches of various competition authorities across jurisdictions during their assessment of notable fintech M&A deals, and the probable course that fintech M&A is going to take in the near future. Fintech M&A’s Antitrust Scrutiny in the United Kingdom and the United States United Kingdom’s (“UK”) competition regulator, the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”), and the United States’ (“US”) Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have reviewed many fintech deals in the recent past. While the CMA has time and again asserted itself as the chief antitrust review agency for fintech deals, the DOJ has been vigilant of fintech M&A that may hurt the American market and consumers. A case in point is the Visa/Plaid merger: In January 2020, Visa decided to merge one of its subsidiaries with Plaid that would lead Visa to gain indirect control over Plaid. It is pertinent to mention that Visa is a well-established global player for electronic consumer-to-business (“C2B”) payments. On the other hand, Plaid (established in 2013) provides services like aggregation of consumers’ account information and signaling businesses about payments made by customers.  Hence, there is a notable overlap in the entities’ C2B payment services. In other words, Plaid is a new entrant in a market where Visa already enjoys significant market power. Since the pre-merger and post-merger shares of the two parties breached CMA’s “share of supply” threshold, the transaction attracted antitrust scrutiny by the CMA which concluded in August 2020 after a 2-month long inquiry by the regulator. Though the CMA observed that the merger would dilute competition in the market, the transaction was given a green signal by the CMA since it was also observed that multiple other PIS providers were existing in strong competition in the UK. On the other side of the globe, the reaction to the proposed transaction was quite the opposite. Unlike its English counterpart that cleared the deal, the DOJ filed a civil antitrust suit to stop the acquisition. The DOJ’s suit was based on the fact that the “strategic” acquisition of a nascent competitor by Visa is a sham to eliminate upcoming competition in the market that Visa operates in. Principally, DOJ objected to the “killer acquisition” being proposed by Visa. Following the DOJ’s suit that was pending trial, Visa terminated its acquisition plan in January 2021, which was welcomed by the DOJ. In the same month when DOJ sued Visa, the American competition regulator cleared Mastercard’s acquisition of Finicity (a start-up that provided an open-banking platform). Some have argued that with such contrasting decisions surrounding fintech M&A, the DOJ’s stance on the whole issue seems unclear. However, it must be noted that the DOJ blocked the Visa/Plaid transaction since the two parties were in competing business, but in Mastercard/Finicity the two parties had complementary technology, and hence, the deal was given clearance. Additionally, according to the DOJ, Visa’s acquisition of Plaid for $5.3 billion was 50x the market price, and thus Visa was essentially paying to preserve its dominance. On the other hand, since the price was deemed correctly calculated in the Mastercard/Finicity transaction by the DOJ, the deal was not stopped. Hence, within fintech M&A, while there has been an increased deal activity in the sub-sectors of point-of-sale services and merchant payments, competition watchdogs have been active and have modified their review processes to understand the typical workings of the dynamic fintech industry as a whole. From the numerous orders on various fintech M&A transactions, it can be understood that antitrust agencies are keen on exercising a fastidious assessment to capture and understand business strategies and identify “killer acquisitions” or “reverse killer acquisitions”. For instance, a primary consideration in antitrust scrutiny of fintech M&A is the valuation analysis. The identification of a deal premium, which is usually discussed and explained in the internal documents relating to the transaction, can be a potential red flag and could indicate a “killer acquisition” intention, as was the case in the Visa/Plaid transaction. The Indian Antitrust Approach to Fintech M&A India’s Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) had a chance to review a fintech M&A transaction when it was notified of Visa’s acquisition of 13% stake in IndiaIdeas. While assessing the merger, CCI noted Visa’s affiliation with various Indian banks for the issue of credit cards and debit cards. On the other hand, it was observed that IndiaIdeas provided a host of services like payment services, voucher distribution, biller network, authentication services, etc. to businesses.

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FTC v. Facebook: Lesson for the Indian Competition Regime

[By Rushil Anand] The author is an associate at ALA Legal. Introduction – In what can be the watershed moment for Anti-Trust Cases in 21st Century, the Federal Trade Commission of United States, on 9th December 2020, sued Facebook for maintaining its monopoly illegally. According to the complaint, Facebook over the years has abused its dominance by imposing anti-competitive conditions such as, regressive policies that allow third-party Application Programming Interface (APIs) access to Facebook Blue (platform is generally known as Facebook), only if they are not competing with Facebook. The investigation highlights how certain inherent structural features of the digital market itself make it prone to monopolization. These structural features can broadly be divided into concentration of users, revenue, and data. India in recent years has seen certain mergers and acquisitions, most notably the Jio-Facebook deal, capable of tipping the Indian digital markets towards monopolization. Scrutinizing the Jio-Facebook deal through this derived framework of structural features, the monopolization risk posed by it becomes evidently clear. Similar to how the concentration of users, data, and revenue with Facebook made the American digital markets prone to its abuse of dominance, the Jio-Facebook, including their stated purpose of combining JioMart and WhatsApp can have serious consequences for the comparatively nascent Indian digital markets. This calls for closer scrutiny of Jio and Facebook’s conduct and incorporating effects of these structural features in future CCI investigations. Inherent Structural Features – Concentration of Users Monopolization risk posed by concentration of users primarily surrounds two digital market phenomenon called Network Effects and High Switching Costs. Networks Effects is a phenomenon whereby monetary as well as the utility value, of a digital platform, increases, at an increasing rate, as more people join the platform. As the number of users increases, it leads to a gain for the existing users of the service, as interactions with more users are possible on the same platform. Furthermore, users will start becoming familiar with the digital platform’s interface, helping them navigate the platform with ease and invest personal time in it by building connections and sharing content (such as pictures and posts) that cannot be moved to other rival platforms. Shifting to another platform will be a loss of this valued personal investment. This cost associated with shifting to a new platform is called Switching Cost. Just like Network Effects, Switching Cost increases over time, to the benefit of the dominant player. Strong Network Effects and High Switching Cost locks-in the dominant position of a platform, especially for the first movers and creates a dependency once such position is locked-in. Gradually, the effect of these phenomena increases, making it difficult for new competitors to attract users. FTC in its complaint stated that strong Network Effects and High Switching Costs act as entry barriers that help Facebook maintain its monopoly – “65. Facebook’s dominant position in the U.S. market is durable, due to significant entry barriers, including direct network effects and high switching costs”. Concentration of Data Having a large number of users allows a platform to have access to large sets of data. It allows platforms to track broader user trends and any potential competitive threat that can either be copied, acquired or suppressed. Just like the concentration of users, the concentration of data is self-reinforcing as more data allows them to perfect their platforms, which attract users and hence attract more data. Aware of the competitive advantage of data, Facebook pervasively collects data and tracks competitive threats, according to the FTC complaint, to maintain its monopoly. Facebook in 2010 introduced Open Graph API, which allows third parties to add a Facebook interface to their website. Due to the popularity of the platform and familiarity with its interface, developers were quick to adopt the API. The API allows Facebook to track potential competitive threats by sharing with Facebook data of any user interacting with third-party platforms utilising the Facebook interface. By 2012, the API was estimated to be sharing one billion pieces of social data with Facebook per day. Mike Hoefflinger, former Head of Global Business Marketing of Facebook, in his book “Becoming Facebook” stated Open Graph API was used to track Instagram, as Instagram had enabled the Open Graph API on its platform before it was acquired by Facebook. Facebook also acquired a digital platform named Onavo, a Spyware VPN provider which unknown to its users, tracked their activity. Through Onavo, Facebook had access to data that helped them track and identify apps that posed a competitive threat before it was forced to shut down the app in 2019. The complaint quotes an internal Facebook document, showing how the acquisition helped them track competitive threats to buy or suppress them – “With our acquisition of Onavo, we now have insight into the most popular apps. We should use that to also help us make strategic acquisitions.” Concentration of Revenue Unlike traditional businesses, most digital platforms do not charge any monetary fee. Instead, they rely on user data which is monetized by being sold to advertisers. This is a very crucial part of their business as advertisement is the largest source of income for most digital platforms. Facebook, according to FTC, earned around $70 Billion from advertisement, 98% of their total revenue. Data sold to advertisers is utilized to personalize advertisements. This form of advertising is called social advertising. It allows advertisers to not only reach large numbers of audiences but also restrict it to likely interested parties. It is a data-reliant mode of advertisement which favours company that can persistently track users’ data. Advertising with Facebook, with over 2.7 billion users per month on Facebook Blue alone, has become necessity for any advertisers to effectively compete in their domain. David Heinemeier Hansson, Chief Technology Officer of Basecamp, in the hearing before the Subcommittee On Antitrust, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee laid out how refusing to advertise on Facebook is like “competing with one arm behind your back”, asserting that they were losing growth by not advertising on Facebook. This

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CCI’s Market Study In Telecom Sector: Lessons From The Past And The Foreign

[By Raghav Harini N] The author is a student at ILS Law College, Pune. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) recently published a report on a market study on the telecom sector in India. The Report examined the mechanics and the economics of the sector to identify potential competition law concerns.  This post explores these concerns and analyses them from the lens of CCI and international jurisprudence to address them in an effective way. In light of the same, the article also proposes the introduction of market -structure-based assessment in lieu of dominance-based assessment under S.4 of the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act) and unified regulatory consultation between sectoral regulators and CCI.      I.   Key Takeaways from the Report The Indian Telecommunication sector is highly concentrated with 3 private sector Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) namely RJIo, Airtel and Vodafone-Idea controlling 88.4% of the market share. RJio with its initial launch offer caused a disruptive reduction of data prices; this was received by parallel pricing strategies by the competitors. While this seems to have placed India as the world’s cheapest telecom market, the TSPs have been earning negative profits consistently, indicating a sector-wide distress. According to the Report, consumers value network coverage, customer service, tariff packaging and lower tariffs in choosing their TSP. With greater parity among the products of the competitors, non-price attributes contribute significantly towards retaining customers and widening the clientele. The industry is also showing an accelerated interest in vertical integration with over-the-top (OTT) platforms. The recent examples include Reliance Jio’s acquisition of stake in both Eros and Balaji Telefilms, Airtel’s offer with Hotstar , Vodafone’s deal with Amazon, and Facebook’s investment in Reliance Jio. Two of the TSPs have also introduced their own content platforms namely Airtel’s Hike, Reliance’s Jio Cinema.    II.Analysis of Competition Concerns in the Telecom Sector The Report has highlighted that the vertical convergence in the sector has the potential to cause adverse effects on the competition. The current TRAI framework on net neutrality proscribes TSPs from engaging in differential treatment with any of its vertically integrated entities; the Report clarifies that if the dispute merits detailed competition law investigation, then CCI may take it up. It has also cautioned the potential data aggregation in the telecom sector and CCI may examine excessive data extraction by these digitally-enabled entities. Whether excessive data extraction constitutes a valid cause of action under competition law is controversial. Several antitrust agencies including CCI shy away from taking up excessive pricing cases, for reasons such as inability to define what constitutes excessive, presence of countervailing powers, self-correcting attributes of the free-market system, and perils of regulatory intervention; arguments of same fashion may be applicable to excessive data extraction as well. However, excessive data harvest by entities with significant market power may be construed as exploitative behaviour from consumer protection and privacy angles. The German antitrust authority in the case against Facebook explored the anti-competitive and welfare-reducing effects of excessive data extraction by digital platforms. The authority observed that violation of privacy laws can be read into abusive conduct by a dominant entity since the aim of the law was to prevent the dilution of the constitutional right to self-determination in business dealings, where one party is able to unilaterally command the terms. It remains to be seen how the CCI would read the intersection of competition law, data protection law, and our constitutional right to privacy into exploitative data harvest practices. Privacy has been recognised as a non-price parameter by both European Commission (EC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The Report, drawing inspiration from global jurisprudence, has clarified that such privacy concerns may be examined under the Indian competition law domain. It observed that privacy is central to consumer welfare, any dilution or violation of the data protection standard by a firm with significant market power can be examined by CCI. Earlier CCI had expressed a divergent view in the case Vinod Kumar Gupta v. WhatsApp Inc o by stating that “allegations of breach of the IT Act, 2000 do not fall within the purview of examination under the provisions of the (Competition) Act.” The Report’s observation in converging the two domains of law is welcome at a time when the industry is witnessing rapid vertical integration. CCI may also consider examining the privacy and data protection standards of the merging entities as a metric of consumer welfare at the merger approval stage. Digitally enabled markets are characterized by structural risks such as network effects and lock-in effects. The creation of walled gardens, as the Report describes, is a result of technological unification and vertical integration in the telecom sector; this tends to lock the consumers within the ecosystem, leaving no incentive for them to switch or cross-visit other TSPs. TSPs also perform platform roles between content providers and subscribers. A vertically integrated firm therefore can hinder competition and indulge in abusive conduct. However, none of the TSPs enjoys a dominant position in the market and therefore they cannot be brought under the purview of S.4 of the Act since it employs a dominance-based assessment. In consideration of the structural risks that sectors such as telecom may be exposed to, an alternative assessment may be considered on lines of Competition and Market Authority’s Market Investigation Regime. This regime employs a market-structure-based assessment in lieu of dominance-based assessment. This is effective for two reasons; firstly, it does not require the presence of a dominant firm in the relevant market. Secondly, this assessment is useful in markets where none of the players engage in anti-competitive behaviour but the market is not competitive; CMA cannot impose a penalty on the players but can merely propose structural remedies (such as divestments) and/or other behavioural remedies to correct market risks as long as it can justify the consumer welfare associated with the proposed remedies. Stakeholder engagement in the investigation process as opposed to adversarial inquiries aids the authority in addressing the concerns in the sector most effectively. Such sector overhauling remedies

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Capturing Data Privacy through the Lens of Competition Law

[By Taniya and Abhinav Singh Chauhan] The authors are students at the National Law University, Odisha. Amidst the informational age, companies, irrespective of their domains, have an eye on data and are investing significantly to get a hold of it. Therefore, data becomes an essential and scarce resource. Companies like Google and Facebook have a significant edge over their competitors due to their capacity to gather and process large amounts of data, enabling them to provide better facilities. The amount of innovation that a company can offer is directly proportional to the amount of data a company accumulates, as data empowers the company to analyse the consumer behaviour. Nevertheless, the more data a company possesses, the greater is the possibility of its abuse. It not only raises privacy concerns for the user but also antitrust concerns regarding the behaviour of such companies. It involves not just the data gathered by the companies but also the data gained by the companies during the merger and acquisition process of other companies. Thus it becomes imperative to ascertain how data can be regulated to mitigate any antitrust concerns regarding the considerable data accumulation by digital companies. Need for data regulation Data privacy concerns have always been there during data accumulation and transfer by large companies, but efforts have rarely been made to identify the anti-competitive consequences. New technologies and big data analytics have transformed the way data is processed and used. A company that collects data for a particular purpose may use the same data for some other purpose with the company’s changing needs. Thus, the future application of data cannot be decided when the consent of consumers for processing their data. The Indian Competition Act was enacted for the country’s economic development by preserving competition in the market and protecting the interests of consumers at the same time. The current antitrust regime concerns, in particular, predatory pricing, market denial, anti-competitive agreements, and other forms of abuse of dominant status that limit competition by driving away other firms. In digital business models, the primary goal is to expand the user base and encash the network effects that become a potential income source. Owing to the proliferation of data accumulation activities, large companies expand their customer base and earn income by leveraging that database to redirect ads to targeted groups of people, popularly called targeted advertising. Eventually, gaining a dominant position in the relevant market and keeping track of the industrial trend. This network control gives rise to anti-competitive practices like self-preferencing and other abusive practices. In one of its decisions, Germany’s competition regulation authority, Bundeskartellamt, prohibited the collection and processing of user data because Facebook was in a dominant position and could extensively manipulate user consent. It accredited the value to user consent for excluding them from Facebook services and its practice of gathering and combining data from different sources. Nevertheless, the decision prohibiting the data merger was based on the user’s privacy concerns, and neglected the antitrust regulations. Most data-driven companies remain non-profitable during the initial years of their operation, as they are focused on increasing the user base to exploit the network effects thereon. India’s overall legal system scrutinises mergers based on assets and turnover of companies involved or created. This system fails to include data-driven companies, even if they significantly impact the competition in the relevant market. Jurisdictions like Brazil and Ireland have exercised their residuary powers to scrutinise mergers falling below the threshold limits; however, the competition act does not provide any such residuary powers to CCI. The regulatory authorities in jurisdictions like Germany and Austria have tried to address the concerns raised by data accumulation through mergers and accusations by introducing deal value thresholds (DVT). DVTs empower authorities to assess data-driven companies’ mergers in which the monetary consideration surpasses the prescribed threshold limit. In India, the Competition Amendment Bill 2020 proposes to amend §5 of the act to enable the government to specify DVTs for mergers. Nevertheless, DVTs are a novel approach, and their effectiveness is yet to be determined. The introduction of DVTs in India must take a pragmatic approach to ascertain thresholds limit and nexus criteria to avoid unnecessary burden for the CCI and red-tapism for the parties. Though DVTs bring data-driven companies under the regulatory authorities for their probable anti-competitive practices, the data protection and privacy concerns remain as it is. How much data shall be regulated Companies like WhatsApp and Facebook do not charge their users monetary fees for their services; instead, they charge them in the form of their data. The imposition of stringent restrictions on the collection and processing of users’ data would limit the revenue of such companies. Moreover, it will also impede the creation of new services due to the unavailability of user data. While it can be claimed that data security and regulatory systems would benefit the consumers by preventing exploitation, but it can also reduce the competitive regime, as the innovation is mainly based on data. Potential competitors will first need to collect and analyse the data, which will increase the cost and required resources and ultimately dissuade new players from entering the market. Even if new players enter the market, they will not be able to compete with the already established players, since the new entrants with higher costs either have to offer services at a higher price or sustain losses. Since present laws are insufficient to seal the rift between the individual’s privacy and the anti-competitive behaviour of the firm, the same can be resolved on a case to case basis assessing the needs and demands of the economy and competition. For example, the concept of open banking allows third-party to access banking and other financial data of customers, for promoting new players to provide better services, eventually instilling competition in the field. Thus, privacy may have to part away to ensure healthy competition and consumer welfare. In India, the fundamental right to privacy is not absolute and can be restricted for greater social good.

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The Dichotomy Between Competition Law and IPR

[By Nipun Kumar] The author is a student at the ILS Law College, Pune. Competition law and Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter “IPR”) are two policies that have a common objective of ‘consumer welfare’ and ‘efficient allocation of resources’. Modern understanding of these two disciplines is that both the laws work in conformity to each other in order to ‘bring new and better technologies, products, and services to the consumers at lower prices’. However, a conflict appears to arise between the two policies given their contradictory methods of achieving the common objective. IPR grants a degree of exclusivity by limiting access, whereas competition policy seeks to promote competition and facilitate access to the market. The Raghvan Committee in its report on competition law had opined that there exists a dichotomy between IPR and competition policy where the former ‘endangers competition while the latter engenders competition’. Owing to the fact that intellectual property rights confer exclusive rights upon their owners on one hand, whereas competition law strives at keeping the markets open on the other, it is easy to assume that there is an inherent tension between these two areas of law and policy.[i] This conflict, sometimes, takes a toll on healthy competition in the market which eventually defeats the objective of either of the laws. This article discusses the various instances of conflict between the two policies and how IPR is used as a shield to stifle competition in the market. Intellectual property owners provide licenses to generic manufacturers in the market so that they can exploit the intellectual property and pay a royalty to the license providers. This licensing can be misused in various ways by the intellectual property owners, which has the potential to restrict competition in the market. Some of them are discussed below: Territorial Exclusivity Some patents require such high level of investment that it becomes significantly risky for a licensee establishment to use the patent for business unless the licensee is given immunity from any competition arising out of the use of that patent. To overcome such competition, the licensor grants an exclusive right to manufacture and sell goods in a particular territory and agrees to avoid granting similar rights to another in that territory.[ii] Such licenses make sure that there is only one entity in a territory authorised to use the patent, thereby providing such entity with a territorial exclusivity. These licenses have the potential to raise competition concerns because these are aimed at eliminating competition by restricting the use of patents by other firms, which prima facie qualifies as an anti-competitive act. In the case of Nungesser v. Commission (Maize Seeds case), the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter “the Court”) has given a robust interpretation of territorial exclusivity where it identified two types of exclusive licenses: ‘open exclusive license’ and ‘exclusive license’. In an open exclusive license, the exclusivity of the license relates solely to the contractual relationship between the owner of the right and the licensee, where the licensor agrees neither to license anyone else in the licensee’s territory nor to compete there itself. An exclusive license, on the contrary, aims at providing the licensee with absolute territorial protection so that all competition from the third parties, such as parallel importers and licenses for other territories, is eliminated. The Court concluded that the grant of an open exclusive license, that is to say, a license which does not affect the position of third parties as mentioned above is not anti-competitive. As regards the exclusive licensing, the Court reiterated its stance in Consten and Grundig v. Commission and held that absolute territorial protection granted to the licensee in order to enable parallel imports to be controlled and prevented results in the artificial maintenance of separate national markets, stands in contravention with the competition policy. The Maize Seeds case laid down that territorial exclusivity may not always be anti-competitive and it depends on whether the license is having any detrimental effect on competition in the market. After the case of Nungesser, the Court has adopted a somewhat liberal view regarding territorial exclusivity by holding that such licenses are not anti-competitive. In Coditel v. CinéVog Films, the Court has even stressed on the importance of the territorial exclusivity where it acknowledged that in certain cases the licensee may need absolute territorial protection. In Pronuptia de Paris v. Schillgalis, the Court held that where the licensee’s business name or symbol of the franchise is not well known, the grant of exclusive territorial protection may not infringe the competition policy. It can be concluded that territorial exclusivity may tend to raise competition issues in a market which has to be decided on factual points in a case; the only test is whether the license, by effect or by object, causes an appreciable adverse effect on the competition. Technology Pools The European Commission’s (hereinafter “the commission”) Technology Transfer Guidelines defines technology pools as arrangements whereby two or more parties assemble a package of technology which is licensed not only to contributors to the pool but also to third parties. Technology pools may be both pro-competitive as well as anti-competitive. Such pools are beneficial to competition because they allow for a one-stop licensing for the technologies required in the market, which reduces the transaction cost significantly whereas they may be detrimental to the competition when they establish a de facto industry standard which tends to reduce innovation by foreclosing alternative technologies from entering the market. The commission has determined the effects of pools in the case of substitute and complementary technologies. In the markets where the technologies pooled are substitutes, the royalties paid will be higher which may amount to price-fixing between the competitors. This makes pools of substitute technologies restrictive of competition, given that price-fixing is prima facie anti-competitive. In the case of complementary technologies, pooling amounts to lower royalties, and therefore, such pools are not restrictive of competition. The competition is affected in case of complementary technology pools when the licensee is forced to

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