Author name: CBCL

India Rejects the Internationally Accepted Remedy of Emergency Arbitration: Reasons and Implications

[Nitya Jain]   The author is a 3rd year student of Nirma University. Introduction With growing transactions and declining approachability in trade and commerce, disputes inevitably arise. Today, irrespective of whether a dispute is domestic or international, parties prefer an unbiased forum for resolving their disputes. Effectively, Arbitration is the most suited method when it comes to sidestepping the lengthy procedures of court. The capability of parties to achieve a speedy relief is fundamental to any arbitration proceeding. In order to safeguard and further uphold party autonomy, major arbitration institutions develop mechanisms and procedures that eliminate judicial involvement in arbitration proceedings. When a party seeks an interim relief, they either resort to domestic courts or wait for the constitution of the tribunal. Resorting to courts undermined the very purpose of choosing arbitration over litigation and pendency of tribunal formation gravely hampers the expedite procedure.[i]In order to address the aforementioned fallacy international institutions and various countries have developed the concept of Emergency arbitrator. A party appoints an Emergency Arbitrator when it urgently requires a relief that if not granted, will lead to grave loss of asset or evidence. Proceedings of such an arbitration is governed by agreement and consensus of the parties. Emergency arbitrator is not a part of the tribunal in fact, his job ends with the granting of relief and he is not to decide the case on merits. The types of emergency reliefs sought  are broadly categorized in four broad headers- (i) anti-suit injunctions ; (ii) reliefs aimed at restoring status quo of the disputant ; (iii) measured intended at safeguarding enforcement of a future award and (iv) orders for interim payments. A good amount of time has passed since the concept of Emergency Arbitrator has been around. The institutions are continuously introducing provisions and rules as an attempt to improve the workability of the concept of emergency arbitrator. Various countries in their domestic laws have also adopted the concept.  Though the novel concept of emergency arbitrator is highly appreciated in the arbitration community globally, enforcement of the order passed by the arbitrator is still debatable. It eventually boils down to the subjectivity of various national courts and laws of the respective countries as to whether an order passed by an emergency arbitrator is enforceable or not.  Except Hong Kong and Singapore all other national laws are silent on the question of enforceability of emergency arbitrator’s decision. Provisions under Indian Law The Indian law does not expressly recognize the concept emergency arbitrator. In an attempt to abide by the global trend and also to provide statutory recognition to the awards passed under institutional rules like SIAC and ICC, the 246thLaw commission report did recommend the adoption of the concept of emergency arbitrator under sec 2(d) of the Act which stated “Arbitral tribunal” means a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators and, in the case of an arbitration conducted under the rules of an institution providing for appointment of an emergency arbitrator, includes such emergency arbitrator.” However the same was rejected by the legislature while amending the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and thereby the concept is not a part of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2015. There is also no express judicial recognition of the awards passed by emergency arbitrator or its enforcement. Till date the Indian courts, for that matter, had no opportunity to test the validity of the same.[ii]Due to the non- recognition of the concept of emergency arbitrator in India the trend has been such that parties after obtaining an emergency arbitrator award outside India, enforce the same in India via seeking interim order under Sec 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.[iii] The Indian legislature consciously omitted the inclusion of the provision of Emergency arbitration in the amended Indian Arbitration and conciliation Act. The non-acceptability of Emergency Arbitration in India has numerous probable reasons behind it. Firstly, Emergency arbitration fails to address the issues of third party i.e. an emergency arbitrator cannot grant measures against a third party. An emergency arbitrator’s jurisdiction is limited to the signatories and cannot be extended beyond. On the contrary, Indian courts, like courts of other jurisdictions, can grant interim relief against third parties under certain circumstances (for example, where such orders are necessary to protect the subject matter of the arbitration).  Secondly, unlike domestic courts, emergency arbitrators cannot pass ex-parteorders as this would go against the purpose of their constitution – both parties won’t be provided with an equal opportunity. Indian courts, like other jurisdictions, can grant ex parte orders in exceptional circumstances. Ex parte orders become necessary in some special circumstances where if the respondent comes to know about the order he might displace the assets or other similar grounds. Thirdly, an award passed by an emergency arbitrator is to be further scrutinized by the actual tribunal and can also be overturned, this however is not the case with the interim orders passed by the domestic courts. Lastly, enforceability of emergency arbitrator’s award is again a controversial question. The scant judgments passed by the Indian Judiciary only have dealt with the enforceability of the awards passed in Singapore or Hong Kong.[iv]India is yet to clarify its position regarding the enforceability of awards in other jurisdictions. Conclusion However, it is undeniable that Emergency arbitration ensures minimum court intervention which is the need of the hour in order to develop India as a pro-arbitration country. It would a progressive step towards making India a global hub for arbitration, like Hong Kong and Singapore. Often emergency arbitration proceedings are hassle free and ensure efficiency, which eventually develop a set standard of behavior for the parties. Experience also shows that parties are more likely to comply and abide by the orders passed by emergency arbitrators. An emergency award if recognized in India will definitely be beneficial for parties if the parties against whom the claim is made have their assets in a different jurisdiction which recognizes emergency awards. For India to become a pro-arbitration country, it is high time

India Rejects the Internationally Accepted Remedy of Emergency Arbitration: Reasons and Implications Read More »

Time to Allow SEBI to Wiretap?

[Karan Yadav]   The author is a 4th year student of GNLU, Gandhinagar Introduction India is seeing a rise in the number of insider trading cases. Even the top blue chip firms are struggling with the leak of such sensitive information by some or the other source. This includes companies like ICICI Bank, Axis Bank, Videocon, Sun Pharma, Tata Motors and many more.  Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) was constituted in the wake of the Harshad Mehta Scam in 1992. The powers conferred to SEBI was a result of analysis of different Securities Market Watchdogs all over the world especially the US’s Security Exchange Commission (SEC). However, from the day of its inception, SEBI has been criticized for its failure to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of insider trading in India. If we look at the number, the convictions pronounced in such cases of Insider Trading are very low. This is because of a number of limitations that SEBI is facing in bringing such perpetrators to book. It is known that the white collar crimes often need a solid string of evidences which can prove intention of the wrongdoer. The best way that this can be proved in the cases of insider trading is if the sensitive information being passed on is itself intercepted by the authorities. This tool is a long shot for SEBI as for a number of years, it has been deprived of a number of investigative privileges. The malpractices of insider trading are not new to India, but still SEBI lacks basic powers like the power to call in for phone records. It took a USD 6 billion scam for legislators to realize this and bestow the power to SEBI. Hence, only after the aforementioned Saradha Scam of 2013, Parliament through an ordinance amended the Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014[i]and this certainly was a welcome move in order to bring SEBI’s power at par with other regulators all over the globe. As far as the concept of phone tapping is concerned, in India, as per the Indian Telegraphic Act, 1885, both the Central and State governments have the power to tap phones. When any authority of the governments seek to do so, Home Ministry’s or State Home Secretary’s prior approval is needed. This was challenged in the Apex Court of being violative of a number of fundamental rights, but the court still upheld the legislation citing nation’s security as one of the reasons why it cannot be scrapped off in entirety. Though the admissibility of such records in the courts is still unclear, the Courts have certainly asked the authorities to use the power as a last resort and sparingly. There are a number of authorities such as Crime Bureau of Investigation, Intelligence Bureau, etc. which have such powers in place to collect evidences, but SEBI is yet to be conferred with the same. SEBI has been requesting government to allow it to wiretap in order to improve the conviction rates, but time and again it has been denied to do so. In 2012, the then SEBI Chairman U.K. Sinha requested the government to grant them such powers, but they were denied and informed that SEBI has investigative powers of a civil court and hence does not possess power to wiretap[ii]. More recently in 2018, a SEBI committee headed by Dr. T.K Viswanathan suggested want of sweeping reforms to the watchdog which included powers to intercept calls in order to aid investigations.[iii]The committee has suggested for direct call interception powers akin to the Central Board of Direct Taxes. This will also help SEBI collect strong evidence against repetitive offenders in cases of insider trading, front running or market manipulation. While the committee has realized and mentioned the possibility of misuse of such power, it still asserts that call interception would be an improvement over the present case. We need to draw our attention on the world’s most active securities market regulator in order to better understand the robust approach which should be applied and hence the same has been discussed hereunder. The American Approach – Security Exchange Commission’s Powers The concept of “wiretapping” was discussed by the US Congress for the first time in 1934. Pursuant to this, they enacted the “Communications Act of 1934”. The statute categorically made the activity of wiretapping a federal offence and also inadmissible evidence in the court. But, by the next half of the century, the prosecutors were struggling in proving several offences and hence in 1968, the Congress passed the “Omnibus Crime Control Act”.  The Act deals with interception of communication and it states that for such an interception, an application shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the applicant’s authority to make such application and it also lays down the specific information that must be included in the application. Earlier, this statute was perceived to be covering certain blue collared crimes until the technology started taking over. As the use of non-interceptable phone calls, e-mails, etc. increased, the authorities concerning white collared crimes were also drawn towards the concept of “wiretapping”. The Securities Exchange Commission has made multiple insider trading crackdowns using this power which includes the high profile conviction of the Indian poster boy abroad- Rajat Gupta and one Rajaratnam. Here, Rajat Gupta was serving as a board member of corporations like Procter & Gamble and Goldman Sachs and he was accused to have passed sensitive information of these corporations to his business partner Rajaratnam who made illicit profits because of this. Though this method has received severe public flak, it still appears to be a necessary one since it aides in obtaining direct evidences in knowing the defendant’s intention to commit such act. The 1968 Act expressly lists out the nature of offences for which wiretapping can be used. This includes mail fraud, wire fraud, kidnapping, money laundering[iv]and a few other offences introduced later by amendments. However, this does not include securities fraud and this question

Time to Allow SEBI to Wiretap? Read More »

PIPE Transactions: A failure in the Indian Scenario?

[ Arushi Gupta & Durga Prasad Mohapatra ]   The authors are 3rd year students of NLU Odisha. Introduction The concept of PIPE(Private Investment in Public Equity), developed in the US with separate provisions regulating the same. However, Indian law has no such specific regulations which guide the PIPE deals .The PIPE deals in India are regulated by the preferential allotment rules elucidated by SEBI. Considering the fact that the PIPE deals in India are not really developed, the article attempts to draw a distinction between the take of the US and Indian laws by analyzing the relevant provisions. SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements), 2009 The SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements), 2009 (“ICDR”)deals with various modes of issuance of securities wherein Chapter VII of the ICDR Regulations lay down the provisions regarding preferential issue of securities. The main area of emphasis with regard to PIPE transactions will be upon Section 72(1)(a) and Section 78(2) of the ICDR Regulations. Section 72(1)(a)[i]lays down the conditions for preferential issue whereby a special resolution passed by the shareholders is a prerequisite in cases of preferential allotment. However, in the US, the shareholder approval[ii]is not mandatory and is guarded by threshold limits. With regards to the NASDAQ, the shareholder approval is not required in case of bonafide private financing. A bonafide private financing[iii]is a sale whereby the issuer sells the securities to multiple investors, provided, that no individual investor would have more than 5% of the shares of the common stock. This is an effective way to avoid dilution of control and may act as a safeguard for the shareholders in the cases where their approval is not taken. The NYSE rules, on the other hand, impose a threshold limit of 20%, whereby shareholder approval is required in cases where the issue would amount to more than 20% of the outstanding common stock. This rule is also shareholder centric as it aims at prevention of dilution of control unless otherwise approved by the shareholders. It can be inferred from the practices in the 2 jurisdictions that ‘control’ as a factor is relevant in case of PIPE transactions and an attempt is made to prevent the dilution of control in both the cases but by the usage of different mechanisms and techniques. Section 78(2)[iv]provides for a lock-in period of 1 year in case of preferential allotment of specified securities being made to persons other than the promoter. A lock in period[v]is basically a time frame within which an investor is forbidden from selling or redeeming shares.Under Section 144, Securities Act 1933,[vi]such securities are restricted in nature but can be resold on the trading market once a registration statement has been declared effective[vii]by the SEC. In case of US, the transaction provides a higher level of liquidity as the statement is declared effective within 45-90 days[viii]of closing of the deal. Liquidity is one of the key factors which make a PIPE deal suitable for investors. PIPE transactions are preferred over other alternatives due to the increased liquidity they offer to purchasers of registered security with the certainty and speed of a private placement.[ix]The problem of liquidity which the Indian law poses in this matter can be cited as one of the reasons for PIPE deals still being at a nascent stage. SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 An area of prime concern with regards to PIPE transactions is that it leaves room for insider trading. A due diligence test[x]i.e. a process by which the investor gathers all the necessary information in order to evaluate the potential risks involved  is conducted by the investor in order to better understand the potential pitfalls associated with the deal . Due diligence is not a concern in law, provided that the process does not lead to dissemination of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (“UPSI”). UPSI[xi]refers to all such information which is directly or indirectly related to the company and has the potential of affecting the prices of securities of the company. Regulation 6 of Schedule II[xii]deals with disclosure of Price Sensitive Information to institutional investors whereby only public information can be provided to investors by the listed companies. With the recent amendment to the Insider Trading Regulations, any person who while conducting due diligence comes across UPSI would be referred to as an insider[xiii]. Furthermore, such a person is not allowed to deal with the securities of the company even if a confidentiality /non-disclosure agreement has been signed[xiv]between the parties. On the other hand, in US, the disclosures are governed by the Regulation Fair Disclosure[xv]wherein the acquirer of UPSI is allowed to trade in the securities of the company, provided that a confidentiality agreement has been signed between the parties. The disclosure regulations in India are stringent and hence may pose a threat to the investors as they would always apprehend the possibility of a liability being imposed upon them while conducting due diligence and consequently refrain from investing in PIPE deals. Conclusion The aspect of control whereby under the ICDR Regulations, the PE firms willing to invest in public companies have to deal with a lock in period of one year and hence cannot exit the companies even when they face heavy losses. With regards to the questions of insider trading, SEBI has put forth certain conditions such as appropriate confidentiality and non­disclosure agreements which have to be signed before any due diligence process begins as provided under Regulation 3(4) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations. Further, promoters often do not expect to cede any sort of control to private investors as they do not consider them to be an added source of expertise, they only expect them to be passive investors instead of a genuine source for newer perspective who can provide business guidance. Even though PIPE investments are a quick fix to gain financing especially by smaller companies who want immediate capital for working, the market environment in the country has still to be made conducive to such financing methods as a

PIPE Transactions: A failure in the Indian Scenario? Read More »

Kotak Committee: Separating the position of the CEO and the Chairman

[By Binit Agrawal] This Blog is part of a series of posts as a collaboration titled “KAIZEN” between the Centre for Business and Commercial Laws (CBCL), NLIU Bhopal and Law School Policy Review (LSPR). To view this blog on LSPR, please click here. Binit Agrawal is the Founder-Editor of LSPR and a 3rd Year B.A. LL.B. Student at  NLSIU, Bangalore. The Securities and Exchange Board of India has accepted most of the recommendations made by the Uday Kotak led committee on Corporate Governance Reforms. The Kotak Committee was set up as a response to the multiple board room struggles shaking up important corporate houses. These include the struggles within the Tata Group and Infosys. Both these companies saw their chairman being sacked, retired founders forcing their way through board decisions, independent directors being shown the door and allegations of shady dealings marring their reputations. Corporate governance measures were found wanting, leading to the setting up of the committee. One of the most important measures suggested by the committee has to do with the separation of the leader of the company management (CEO) from that of the board (Chairman). The final recommendation on this issue, which has now been accepted by SEBI, was that the posts of Chairperson and CEO/MD be separated for listed entities with more than 40% public shareholding. Further, it was recommended that from 2020 onwards all the listed entities be required to bifurcate the two posts. Quoting the Cadbury Committee on Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom, the Kotak committee wrote, “given the importance and the particular nature of the chairman’s role, it should in principle be separate from that of the chief executive. If the two roles are combined in one person, it represents a considerable concentration of power”. In this post, my aim will be to find out what the reasoning behind such a move is, what the counter arguments are, and what the practical reality is. I will leave the reader with a view that mandating of such separation may not be a prudent move. The controversy over CEOS simultaneously serving as Chairmen The debate on whether or not to separate the two key positions goes back to the very origins of the concept of corporate governance. Berle and Means, who are considered to be the earliest theorists on Corporate Governance, first depicted the phenomenon of large corporations having two different sets of interested parties, the shareholders and the executives. They found that the shareholders, who were the owners of the company, exercised near to no control over how it functioned. Rather it was the managers who exercised complete control over the workings of the company.[1] Instead, the managers had little, if any stake in the ownership of the company. Thus, the interests of the shareholders and managers often diverged, giving rise to the problems of corporate governance. This is theoretically referred to as the problem of agency. The problem of agency arises when the agent (in this case, the CEO) has certain goals which are contrary to those of the principal (in this case, the Board, representative of the shareholders). For example, a CEO who has no financial interest in the company will always be seen to be having goals which are significantly different from that of the shareholders, or entrepreneur CEOs. He will, prima facie, spend more time trying to expand his power and purse, as against rewarding shareholders. This hypothesis has also been found to be the reality in multiple studies.[2] This agency problem can be resolved if the position of CEO is separated from that of the Chairman. The CEO’s job will be to manage the company, while the Chairman and his board oversee the CEO and his team. Here one can clearly spot the benefits of having separate CEO and Chairman. Benefits Given the fact that the board is to oversee the management, a fusion of the leader of the board and the leader of the management presents a typical case of conflict of interest. If the CEO is also the Chairman, he will overlook failures on the part of the management and will be slow to take decisions which go against the interests of the company executives. Thus, he clearly cannot perform the essential functions of hiring, firing, assessing, and regulating remuneration, without keeping aside his personal interests.[3] Consequently, in theory, an independent chairman will give a fillip to the board’s ability to look after the management. By bifurcating the two posts, a corporation clearly delineates and distinguishes the responsibilities of the board and management. As a result, it gives one leader the sole authority of speaking on the board’s behalf and to oversee its meetings. The other leader is given the authority to speak on behalf of the management and be responsible for the operation and strategy of the company.[4] As a consequence of such separation, discords in the areas of performance appraisal, executive remuneration, succession designs, and director recruitment are eliminated. Furthermore, the CEO is also better enabled to concentrate exclusively on strategizing, overlooking operations, and resolving organizational issues.[5] Such separation is also important to avoid creation of all-powerful CEOs, as has been seen in many tech companies. If the CEO and the Chairman are one, such a leader will have immense power over who gets appointed to the board, and will thus be able to manufacture board loyalty.[6] Most of the executive directors in a board owe allegiance to the CEO. Non-executive directors too may feel a sense of gratitude to the CEO as he often plays an influential role in their election, more so when he is also the Chair. It has been found that even though directors may be legally independent, there are social ties and influence, leading to biases. Further, as the Chair, such CEO will have the ability to make committee assignments. This will lead to the creation of an all-powerful centre within the company, who may not act in the best interests of the company at large. Another argument in support of such bifurcation has to do with the flow of information. If the board has better

Kotak Committee: Separating the position of the CEO and the Chairman Read More »

Levy of Stamp Duty on Merger Schemes

[ Surbhi Jaju & Hansaja Pandya ]   Surbhi Jaju is an Associate at Lakshmikumaran & Sridharan and Hansaja Pandya is a 3rd year B.A LLB student at Gujarat National Law University. Introduction Mergers and acquisitions are manifestations of momentous growth and are critical tool of business strategy.[i] They are used as instruments to access the market through an established brand, to get market share, to eliminate competition, to reduce tax liabilities, to acquire competence or to set off accumulated losses of one entity against the profits of the other entity.[ii] Every scheme of restructuring a company requires approval from the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). Many states in India levy Stamp Duty on orders of the tribunal approving the merger scheme. This has made the cumbersome and court centric process of merger and acquisition more expensive. This article analysis the inconsistency in Stamp Duty Laws and reasons as to why the recent imposition of Stamp Duty laws on consent orders of the NCLT approving mergers scheme, imposed by Tamil Nadu is based on unsound premise and hence invalid. Stamp Duty is the subject matter jurisdiction of both the Centre and the State falling under Entry 91 of Union List and Entry 63 of State List in the Schedule VII respectively. As a result some of the States in India have enacted their own Stamp Acts whereas others have adopted the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 with their respective state amendments. This has resulted in inconsistency in stamp duty regimes of different states inhibiting the process of mergers and acquisitions. The lack of uniformity is largely seen in the definition of the term ‘conveyance’ which entails charge of Stamp Duty. The Indian Stamp Act defines conveyance as – “every instrument by which property, whether moveable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by Schedule I.” Points of Contention The primary point of contention in this regard is whether the scheme of merger sanctioned by NCLT is an ‘instrument’ within the meaning of section 2(14) read with section 2(10) and Article 23, Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. While several states such as Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Haryana etc. have specifically included a court order approving a scheme of merger and amalgamation under the definition of “conveyance”, imposition of Stamp Duty on orders of NCLT approving the scheme of merger of companies vide Circular No. 49282 P1 2018 dated November 20, 2018 (‘Circular’)[iii] by state of Tamil Nadu lies in a grey area as the Stamp Act for the state of Tamil Nadu is yet to receive the assent of the President. Unless the definition of the term ‘conveyance’ in the Tamil Nadu Stamp Act in not amended by the legislature, a Circular cannot by circumventing the act subject consent orders of NCLT approving schemes of mergers to levy of Stamp Duty. Hence the grounds on which the Circular has been introduced are invalid and do not hold any value as on today. The foundation of the levy of Stamp Duty in the Circular is based on the Supreme Court judgement of Hindustan Lever & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 9 SCC 438[iv] the court held that – “the order passed under Section 394 is founded on consent and this order is an instrument as defined under Section 2(1) of the Bombay Stamp Act. The State Legislature would have the jurisdiction to levy stamp duty under Entry 44 List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and prescribe rate of stamp duty under Entry 63 List II.” The same was reiterated in the case of Li Taka Pharmaceuticals v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 2 Mah LJ 156[v] and in Hero Motors Limited v. State of U.P. and Ors, AIR 2009 All 93[vi]. The meaning of the term ‘instrument’ was ambiguous and discussed in various judgments. The Bombay High Court in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Anr. v. M/s Reliance Industries Limited Mumbai and Anr, AIR 2016 Bom 108[vii], clarified that the term ‘instrument’ includes only the order of the approving authority and not the scheme itself. The court reasoned that a merger is only operative once the approval of the court has been granted without which the scheme would have no effect. Stamp Duty can thus be levied only on the instrument that gives effect to the transfer of assests. Similar reasoning was provided in the decision of Gemini Silk Mills Ltd. v. Gemini Overseas Ltd., (2003) 53 CLA 328[viii] to support the levy of stamp duty on High Court orders approving scheme of merger. However, in 2004, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court overruled the above judgment in the case of Madhu Intra Ltd. v. Registrar of Companies, (2004) 3 CHN 607[ix]. The Court held that the transfer of assets and liabilities of a transferor company to the transferee company takes place on an order being made under section 394(1) of the Companies Act without any further act or deed and hence the order of the court sanctioning the ‘scheme’ would not qualify to be an ‘instrument’ as the transfer is purely through operation of law. Madras High Court has also in the cases of, T.T.Krishnamachari & Co v. The Joint Sub-Registrar, (2009) 88 CLA 131[x] and Srinidhi Industries Ltd. v. Sub-Registrar, (2015) 1 CTC 530[xi] categorically held that order of mergers and amalgamations will not be liable to stamp duty. State of Tamil Nadu ought to respect and weigh in the reasoning of the Court while affecting the Stamp Duty laws of the state. Further, the orders of the High Court are binding on all the authorities of the state in absence of any legislative Act and no state authority can act contrary to it.[xii] The Circular effecting stamp duty issued in the state of Tamil Nadu defers with the Madras High Court decisions. The Director General of Registration is bound by High Court order until the Tamil Nadu Stamp Act of 2013, receives presidential assent. The Circular has also

Levy of Stamp Duty on Merger Schemes Read More »

A Critical Analysis of The Proposed Draft Model Law For Cross-Border Insolvency

[Jayesh Karnawat & Kritika Parakh]   The authors are 3rd year students at NLU, Jodhpur. Abstract The globalization of business enterprises has evolved with time, leading to businesses having assets and liabilities which are spread over the globe. This, in turn, has raised complex issues and intricacies pertaining to cross-border insolvencies in different situations. For these situations, ascertainment of the law to be applied, the jurisdiction where the proceedings are to be conducted and enforcement of the orders regarding the assets are crucial for the settlement of the dispute. A uniform cross-border insolvency law in different countries would enable a smooth resolution of these complexities. Therefore, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law adopted in 1997 a Model Law to assist states in framing their cross-border insolvency law. This article discusses the intended transformation of Indian Cross-Border in consonance with the Model Law.  Introduction To The Indian Cross-Border Insolvency Law The Indian cross-border insolvency matters, which are presently governed by Sections 234 & 235 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 [“IBC”] does not provide sufficient and comprehensive legal framework to deal with different types of matters.[i] In order to smoothen the process of cross-border insolvency by increasing the cooperation between the domestic and the foreign courts, and domestic and foreign insolvency professionals, the Insolvency Law Committee[ii] has proposed a draft law which is in consonance with UNCITRAL Model Law of Cross-Border Insolvency, 1997 [“Model Law”]. The adoption of the Model Law in India has been recommended in the past by the Eradi Committee[iii] and the N.L. Mitra[iv] Committee. However, the same has not yet taken the form of legislation. The authors seek to analyse the lacunae in the proposed draft with the hurdles faced by different countries in implementing the Model Law. Urge For A Comprehensive Framework The provisions of IBC regarding cross-border insolvency require bilateral agreements with other countries and issuance of request letters to foreign courts leading to delay and uncertainty. Uncertainty further lies with the implementation of bilateral treaties as well because of varying provisions with different nations, which escalates the burden of Judiciary. Till date neither India has any bilateral agreement with any country, nor there exists any specific provision under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for enforcing foreign insolvency orders (the extant general provisions to recognize and implement foreign judgments and orders on a reciprocal basis given in the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to insolvency proceedings as well in the interim). A robust framework to deal with cross-border insolvency will lead to ease in doing business resulting into increase in the entry of foreign companies and investment. Hurdles & Lacunae In The Proposed Draft The Model Law provides a framework only for individual companies and not for enterprise groups. With the increase in financial integration in the world and increasing multinational companies, the present model framework is expected to have limited applicability. It is pertinent to note that Part III of the IBC has not been yet notified. This restricts the application of Model Law to corporate debtors only and not to partnerships and individuals. Initially, Singapore had also followed a similar approach. However, in the UK and US, the application of the law is not restricted to corporate debtors. The proposed draft allows the authority to refuse to take action if it is of the opinion that it is manifestly contrary to public policy. A similar approach has been followed by all the other jurisdictions as well. The proposed draft uses the term ‘manifestly’ in order to narrow down the ambit of ‘public policy’. In the absence of any guidelines to exercise this discretion, the same becomes quite vague and gives a lot of discretion to the authority, which indicates a need to monitor its application by NCLT. Section 375(3) (b) of the Companies Act, 2012, deals with the insolvency of Unregistered Companies, which may include in its ambit foreign companies as well. According to this provision, an unregistered company may be wound up if it is unable to pay its debts. In the US, Section 220 of the Companies Act, 2006 (US), deals with the insolvency of all the types of enterprises. However, in the UK there is no such provision and insolvency of every type of enterprise is governed by the Insolvency Law only. This multiplicity of provisions leads to the duplicity of regimes and confusion reigns. There is a need to harmonize these sections by introducing necessary amendments to bring all the insolvency proceedings under a common Section 17 of the proposed draft allows the tribunal to declare moratorium (a legal authorization to debtors to postpone payment) in respect of foreign main proceedings. A foreign main proceeding means a foreign proceeding in the country where the debtor has the center of its main interests, such as its headquarters or its place of incorporation. A foreign proceeding is “non-main” proceeding if it is filed where the debtor has only an establishment or place of operation. The applicability of Section 17 of the proposed draft to foreign non-main proceedings is still a question. Moreover, if not, the committee has not given satisfactory reasoning for the same. The draft proposes to provide foreign representatives with direct access to domestic courts. Here one major issue is that India does not allow foreign lawyers and law firms to practice in India.[v] However, the Committee has proposed that foreign representatives similar in nature to insolvency professionals may form a separate class of professionals. The committee recommended the adoption of the Model Law on the principle of reciprocity. It means that Indian Courts will recognize and execute the foreign court’s judgment, only if that foreign country has adopted similar legislation or entered into a bilateral agreement. However, with subsequent economic development in future and the successful experience of the Model Law’s implementation, this requirement may be withdrawn. Furthermore, neither the US nor the UK has such a requirement of reciprocity. Such provision would limit the application of the Indian law on cross-border insolvency

A Critical Analysis of The Proposed Draft Model Law For Cross-Border Insolvency Read More »

Supreme Court on Seat vs Venue: albeit Malaysia’s Arbitral Award, Indian Court’s Jurisdiction

[Mreganka Kukreja]   The author is a 4th year student of SLS, Pune.   Introduction The seat versus venue debate, owing to the simultaneous convergence and polarity of the two theories, has been a matter of long-standing deliberation before the courts. The Indian Judiciary in the case of Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc., [1] was once again required to substantiate the relationship between the two concepts. The author discusses the background of the case; the decision of the court and the implications of the pronouncement on the arbitration regime in India. Background The dispute between Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc. (hereinafter “Hardy”) and Union of India (hereinafter “India”) arose under the Production Sharing Contract concerning oil and gas exploration rights in India’s territorial waters. In 2006, Hardy claimed that it had discovered natural gas in India’s Southeastern coasts, which, under the contract, entitled it to a five-year appraisal period to ascertain the commercial viability of the extraction. India disagreed on the proposition, claiming that the discovery was of crude oil, which entitled Hardy to an appraisal period of two years. On expiry of the two-year time period, India relinquished Hardy’s rights to the block on the ground that Hardy has failed to submit the commercial viability in a timely manner. This prompted Hardy to initiate arbitration proceedings against India. On February 2, 2013, the arbitrators, sitting in Kuala Lumpur, issued an arbitral award in favour of Hardy. India knocked the doors of Delhi High Court to set aside the said award under S.34 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (hereinafter “the Act”). The Delhi High Court upheld Hardy’s preliminary objection that the court had no jurisdiction over the matter and Part I of the Act is inapplicable, thereby rejecting India’s argument that Kuala Lumpur was merely a physical venue where the arbitration between the parties was concluded. [2] India appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court referred the matter to a larger bench to determine the seat of arbitration and consequently, Indian Court’s jurisdiction in the present case. [3] Therefore, the present case came before a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court. Earlier in the month of June, the United States District Court for Columbia had not considered India’s request to stay the order for enforcement of arbitral award owing to pending proceedings in the Indian Court, however, the court ultimately refused to enforce the arbitral award. [4] Hence, the US District Court did not make any observations on the seat of arbitration or the competency of the Indian courts to hear the matter. Issue When the arbitration agreement specifies the ‘venue’ of arbitration, but does not specify the ‘seat’ of arbitration, then on what basis and principle is the ‘seat’ of arbitration proceedings determined? Judgment [A.] A reflection on the existing jurisprudence and non-application of Sumitomo case  The appellant had relied on the case of Sumitomo Heavy Industries Limited v. ONGC Limited & Ors [5] to argue that in the absence of an expressed seat of arbitration, the proper law of the contract (lex contractus), which in the present case was that of India, must govern the arbitration proceedings. The court observed that discussion in the Sumitomo case pertained to the Arbitration Act, 1940 and Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961. Further, the developments subsequent to the Bharat Aluminum Company v Kaiser Aluminum Technical Services Inc.[6] has rendered the Sumitomo case irrelevant and therefore, non-applicable in the present case. The court discussed a plethora of judicial pronouncements that had already discussed the relationship between the seat of and venue of arbitration [7] and explained the difference between the terms, pointing that while the former is concerned with the law of arbitration, the latter is merely restricted to a geographical location of the award. Thereafter, the Court reiterated that the arbitration clause of a contract has to be read in a holistic manner, and if there is a mention of venue and additional information pertaining to the venue, then depending upon the information appended, the court could conclude that there is an implied exclusion of Part I of the Act. The applications of these principles in the light of facts of the case were discussed as elaborated below. [B.] Approaches when the parties have not agreed to the juridical seat  The court discussed the course of action when the arbitration agreement does not provide for a seat of arbitration. First, the court said that the seat of arbitration could be inferred on the basis of the venue of the arbitration in conjunction with concomitant factors pointing towards the venue. [8] Second, on reading Art. 20 and Art. 31 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the court said that in the absence of an expressed seat of arbitration, the arbitral tribunal is competent to ‘determine’ the seat of arbitration. The court discussed the case of Imax Corporation v. E-City Entertainment (India) Pvt. Limited, wherein the arbitration agreement provided that as per the ICC Rules, the arbitral tribunal would decide the place of arbitration, and therefore, Arbitral tribunal’s decision to hold the seat as London was upheld, as opposed to party’s plea for Paris to be the seat. [9] [C.] The constructs of arbitral tribunal’s ‘determination’   The court held that determination by the arbitral tribunal requires a ‘positive act to be done’ and the same must be considered contextually. Reliance was placed on Ashok Leyland Limited and State of T.N. and anr. as per which, the test of determination was laid down as an expressive opinion. [10.] In the present case, there was no adjudication and expression of opinion of the arbitral tribunal and the only act that was done was that the award was given in Kuala Lumpur. The Court held that Indian Courts have jurisdiction and the order passed by the Delhi High Court must therefore be side aside. The court’s position could be summarized in the following words: “The word ‘place’ cannot

Supreme Court on Seat vs Venue: albeit Malaysia’s Arbitral Award, Indian Court’s Jurisdiction Read More »

Corporate Governance crisis in the Banking Sector: Role of the RBI

[By Ambarin Munir Khambati ] This Blog is part of a series of posts as a collaboration titled “KAIZEN” between the Centre for Business and Commercial Laws (CBCL), NLIU Bhopal and Law School Policy Review (LSPR). To view this blog on LSPR, please click here. Ambarin Munir Khambati is a 3rd-year student of NLSIU, Bangalore and an Editor at LSPR. The RBI crackdown on the top management of several banks, and most recently on YES Bank MD and CEO, Rana Kapoor, has opened a Pandora’s box in the banking industry. In this post I shall look at the corporate governance failures at major banks that have come to light in the recent months, and how the RBI must play an active role as a watchdog to ensure compliance. The starkest failure of most banks has been that of Loan Divergence. Banks have been under-reporting their Non-Performing Assets (“NPA”s) or failing to classify them as bad loans post-default. To tackle this, in April 2017, the RBI published a notification requiring banks to disclose their divergence in asset classification, if there was over 15% difference in the assessment made by the RBI and that of the Bank itself. As a result, banks revealed whopping figures of under-reported NPAs which forced the RBI to interfere with appointments and removal of top management in order to ensure compliance. YES Bank, for instance, reported a divergence of Rs.4176.70 crores in 2016, which was 558% higher than the figures they reported themselves. Consequently, the RBI refused to approve an extension of CEO and MD Rana Kapoor’s tenure at the Bank. The massive scale of loan divergence is problematic for several reasons. Primarily, it misleads shareholders and investors about the credit risk of the bank. It also raises suspicion about related party transactions, and corruption with loans being granted to individuals or companies without adequate collateral security, or background checks. This also puts under the lens auditing firms which allow companies to fudge figures on their annual reports, and fail to caution shareholders and the public. Unchecked loan divergence, on the part of huge banks like YES Bank, ICICI, and Axis Bank puts at risk the entire banking system. To enforce corporate governance norms, such as adequate disclosures by banks, the RBI must play a punctilious role, and make full use of its wide-ranging powers under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (“Act”). First, the RBI must require mandatory disclosures by banks; second, failures to comply must be made public, third, more reliance must be placed on the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC”), and fourth, there must be increased control over top management. Mandatory Disclosures Under Sec. 35 of the Act, the RBI has the power to inspect the affairs, and books of accounts of any banking company. Directors, officers, and employees of the company are also obligated to produce any document or statement as required. Moreover, it can also exercise its power to issue directions, and guidelines for disclosure, such as the Revised Framework on Resolution of Stressed Assets which requires lenders to classify loans as stressed, immediately on default. They are also mandatorily required to provide weekly credit information to a special body created for the purpose, the Central Repository of Information on Large Credits. Resolution of bad loans needs to be carried out by the banks under a specified timeline, failing which they must file an application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. Mandatory and periodical disclosures to the RBI, shareholders, investors, and general public will ensure much needed transparency. These would have a direct bearing on stock prices, and credit ratings which would incentivize banking companies to comply with governance norms. For example, the developments at YES Bank affected the ability of the bank to raise capital, and so credit ratings agencies such as Moody’s and ICRA have lowered their ratings, forcing the company to begin finding replacements for Kapoor. Publishing corporate governance failures The RBI, in a series of letter to YES Bank pointed out, “serious lapses in the functioning and governance of the bank”, and “highly irregular credit management practices, serious deficiencies in governance and a poor compliance culture”. Yet, the full text of these letters remains confidential. The only information available to potential investors comes from cryptic press statements made by the regulator and the Bank, and the inference drawn from the curtailment of Rana Kapoor’s term. In the interest of accountability, the RBI must invoke its power under Sec. 28 which gives it the power to publish, in public interest, any information obtained under the Act, and any credit information disclosed under the Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005. Increased reliance on the IBC The next step after disclosure of NPAs would be to recover the bad debts, and reliance must be placed on the newly amended Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code which is designed to tackle NPAs in the speediest manner possible. In just 2 years since it came into force, creditors have recovered close to 56% of admitted claims from stressed companies under the IBC. While the jurisprudence on the area is still emerging, the government has shown a keen interest in updating the Act to comply with decisions of the NCLAT, with an aim to promote resolution, as opposed to liquidation. Control over top management The massive amounts of divergence that has been reported would have been impossible without the knowledge of the top management. A means of enforcing corporate governance norms is to keep tenures of high-level officials such the CEO, Chairman and Board in check. The problem with having high-profile CEOs with exceedingly long tenures is concentration of power over time, and consequent paralysis of the Board. For example, at ICICI Bank, the Board overlooked deals concluded in conflict of interest by Chanda Kochhar, eventually leading to an RBI crackdown. Further, any misstep on a CEOs’ part, or a removal, in the worst case, would trigger a panic sale of stock, such as at YES Bank where the stock price halved as soon as Kapoor’s term was reduced. The “cult of the CEO”

Corporate Governance crisis in the Banking Sector: Role of the RBI Read More »

Exemption to Vessel Sharing Agreements From The Competition Act in India: Another Indian Provision Full of Ambiguities?

[Akash Anurag & Aman Gupta]   The authors are 4th and 3rd year students respectively of NLU, Jodhpur Introduction The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the MCA) through a notification dated July 4, 2018 has granted a 3 year extension to the already existing exemption to Vessel Sharing Agreements[i] (hereinafter referred to as VSA) from the purview of Section 3 of the Competition Act,2002[ii], which deals with anti-competitive agreements. Section 3 (2) of the Competition Act, 2002 declares any form of anti-competitive agreement to be void in law[iii]. The granting of the exemption to VSAs in India means that such agreements are not anti-competitive within the meaning of the Competition Act, 2002 and thus not void in law in India. However, the grant of the exemption to VSAs in India comes with shortcomings of its own, especially when compared to the exemption granted to Vessel Sharing Agreements or agreements of the same nature in different parts of the world. Meaning of a Vessel Sharing Agreement Before going into details of the exemptions granted to Vessel Sharing Agreements in India and in different jurisdictions of the world it is important to know as to what a Vessel Sharing agreement means. Vessel Sharing Agreements are not defined under the provisions of any law applicable in India. Vessel Sharing Agreements also known as Liner Shipping Agreements in certain jurisdictions can be defined as”an agreement between 2 or more vessel-operating carriers which provide liner shipping services pursuant to which the parties agree to co-operate in the provision of liner shipping services in respect of one or more of the following- technical, operational or commercial arrangements prices remuneration terms[iv]“. Exemption to Vessel Sharing Agreements From The Competition Act in India It was in the year 2013 that the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for the first time using the powers conferred upon it by Section 54 (a) of the Competition Act[v] exempted Vessel Sharing Agreements from the purview of Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 for the period of an year[vi]. The MCA notification exempted all Vessel Sharing Agreements in Liner Shipping with respect to carriers of all nationalities operating ships of any nationality from any Indian port. The exemption subsequently was thereafter given on a yearly extension at the end of every previous extension. However, the practice changed in 2018 when the extension so granted by the MCA was for the next 3 years[vii]. The 2018 notification for the extension of the exemption from Section 3 differs from the original notification for the exemption in an important sense (the basic difference between the two notifications being the time period of the exemption from the purview of Section 3) as the same provides for reasons due to which the Government may decide to rescind the exemption so granted under the notification. The Government may choose to rescind the exemption if any complaint for fixing of prices, limitation of capacity or sales and allocation of markets or customers comes into notice[viii]. The European Theatre with Respect to Competition Law Exemptions to Vessel Sharing Agreements. It is at this juncture that it becomes very important to analyze the European state of affairs with respect to the exemption of Vessel Sharing Agreements from Competition Law in the European Union. Under the legal regime in the European Union, all agreements that restrict competition in the market are banned under the provisions of Article 101 (1)[ix] and Article 101 (2)[x]of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( hereinafter referred to as the TFEU). However, the Consortia Block Exemption Regulation[xi] (hereinafter referred to as the CBER) allows shipping lines with a combined market share of below 30%[xii] to enter into cooperation agreements to provide joint cargo transport service (known as the consortia or the consortium), hence saving such agreements from the purview of anticompetitive agreements as contemplated under Article 101 (1) of the TFEU. Such an exemption to Article 101 (1) is provided under the CBER on the ground that the agreement between such shipping lines should contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits without the elimination of competition[xiii]. The Consortia Block Exemption Regulation (under which the exemption period is 5 years) will expire on 25 April 2020. Thus, it was in June, 2018 that the European Union launched a review of the five year container shipping block exemption that is due to expire in the year 2020. It is on the basis of this review by the European that it will decide in the year 2020 with respect to the extension of the exemption. Arguments in the Favour of Competition Law Exemptions to Vessel Sharing Agreements One of the most contemplated advantages of giving block exemption to the consortium shipping companies/ Vessel Sharing Agreements under the various legal regime is that the same would help in improving the productivity and quality of the available liner shipping services[xiv]. It is often contemplated that the Consortium of Liner Shipping Companies and Vessel Sharing Agreements will also bring about Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope in the operation of vessels and port utilization[xv]. They also help to promote technical and economic progress by facilitating and encouraging greater utilisation of containers and more efficient use of vessel capacity[xvi].Thus, its often argued vehemently by liner shipping companies operating in various jurisdictions of the world that Vessel Sharing Agreements. in the greater good of the economy and towards the furtherance of the objective of Public Welfare should be exempted from the purview of the respective competition acts operating in different countries. Arguments against Extension of Competition Law Exemptions to Vessel Sharing Agreements However, in a sharp contrast with the arguments of the Shipping Councils in defence of the extension of the Vessel Sharing Agreements, a number of groups of Shippers Association have raised very serious concerns with respect to the further extension of the exemption. For instance, in Europe.

Exemption to Vessel Sharing Agreements From The Competition Act in India: Another Indian Provision Full of Ambiguities? Read More »

Scroll to Top