Company Law

Disqualification of Directors under Section 164(2)(a) of The Companies Act, 2013: Madras High Court clears the Air

[Devina Srivasatava]   Devina is a 4th year BBA LL.B. (Hons.) student at Symbiosis Law School, Pune. Introduction In the recent case of Bhagavan Das Dhananjaya Das v. Union of India[1], decided on 3rd August, 2018, the Madras High Court has set a significant precedent for matters concerning disqualification of directors under Section 164(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”). Various petitions were clubbed by the Madras High Court in this matter and the facts in all pertained to disqualification of directors on the ground of failure of the company to file annual returns or financial statements for 3 consecutive financial years. For instance, in the petition filed by Mr. Bhagavan Das Dhananjaya Das, the director of a private company called Birdies and Eagles Sports Technology, the company had been unable to commence business activities and had not filed annual returns since 2011-12. Accordingly, the Registrar of Companies, Chennai (“ROC”), struck off the company’s name from the Register of Companies under Section 248 of the 2013 Act after giving due notice. Various other companies were also struck off as part of the nationwide crackdown of over 2 lakh shell companies and their directors disqualified from being appointed or re-appointed as directors for the next 5 years.[2] Grounds for Challenge The writ petitions challenged the disqualification on two major grounds: Firstly, the 3 year period for disqualification under Section 164(2)(a) can only commence for private companies post the enactment of the 2013 Act. Hence, the year 2013-14 cannot be included in the 3 year period of default. Secondly, the principles of natural justice were violated as no opportunity to be heard was provided to directors before their disqualification. Analysis of Issues Involved Since there was no alternative remedy for challenging the disqualification and a statutory body like the ROC had allegedly misconstrued provisions of law, infringing on the fundamental rights of the petitioners, the writ petition was held to be maintainable. In deliberating upon the first issue of scope of the period of 3 financial years under Section 164, the court considered that the 2013 Act came into force only on 1st April, 2014 and as per the definition of ‘Financial Year’ contained in Section 2(41) of the Act, the first financial year under the Act commences on 1st April, 2014. Hence, if the three year period is considered to commence from 1st April, 2013, as done by the ROC, it would be inconsistent with the 2013 Act. In addition to this, no provision for disqualification of directors for failing to file annual returns existed under the Companies Act, 1956 (“1956 Act”) for private companies. Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act, which provided for such disqualification applied only to public companies. Hence, to consider the year 2013-14 for disqualification of a director would be in contravention of law as the then applicable law did not attach any liability for default in filing annual returns or financial statements in case of a private company. This is also supported by the General Circular No. 08/14 by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs[3] which clearly states that financial statements in respect of periods prior to 1 April 2014 will be governed by the 1956 Act and that the provisions of the 2013 Act shall apply only thereafter. Moreover, the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 ought to be read prospectively and cannot relate to occasions prior to its coming into force, failing which the said provision would become unconstitutional under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. Thus, the court held the disqualification of directors to be invalid and bad in law. As far as the second issue was concerned, the court noted that though the ROC had called upon the companies to explain as to why they should not be struck off, no notice was given for disqualification of their directors. The Court opined that these were two distinct and independent actions and a fair opportunity to be heard should have been provided to the disqualified directors. Thus, the Court thus read down Section 164(2) of the Act to the extent that a fair opportunity to be heard must be given to directors of a company before disqualification. Resultantly, the challenged orders of disqualification were set aside. Conclusion Scholars are of the opinion that the principles laid down by the Court have somewhat narrow as well as broad application.[4] Narrow because the decision as to the 3 year period will apply only to the current batch of disqualified directors and broad because the decision on reading down of Section 164 will have sustained implications. This aptly demonstrates the impact of the judgment. However, a question that arises is that even if the ROC gives a notice of disqualification and an opportunity to be heard to a director, what will be the grounds which will be considered as sufficient justifications for non-compliance with the statutory mandate of filing annual returns or financial statements? Section 164 provides no proviso to disqualification of a director for such a default and hence, it will be worthwhile to see if a notice of disqualification will only prove to be a mere legal requirement or actually serve a useful purpose. In August this year, the Supreme Court stayed another order of the Bombay High Court granting relief to disqualified directors[5] on different grounds. If the present matter is appealed against, whether the Supreme Court will adopt a pro-director stance or support the government in its endeavours– time will only tell. In any case, the decision is a landmark one as it not only provides clarity about the calculation of period of default by directors, but also upholds the principles of natural justice.       [1] 1967 SCC OnLine Mad 307. [2] https://www.livemint.com/Companies/1Y2Eru7mxnNgHoKkqXicHP/Over-2-lakh-shell-companies-to-be-struck-off-from-records-in.html. [3] General Circular No. 08/ 2014 dated 4th April, 2014, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India. Available at: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/General_Circular_8_2014.pdf. [4] Umakanth Varottil, Madras High Court Grants Reprieve to Disqualified Directors, IndiaCorpLaw. Available at: https://indiacorplaw.in/2018/08/madras-high-court-grants-reprieve-disqualified-directors.html. [5] https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/supreme-court-stays-bombay-hc-order-granting-relief-to-disqualified-directors-2815121.html.  

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Companies (Significant Beneficial Ownership) Rules, 2018: An Overview

[Ishita Vyas and Akash Srivastava]   Ishita & Akash are 5th year students at HNLU, Raipur. Introduction The ‘White Paper on Black Money’ prepared by the Ministry of Finance in May 2012 categorically stated that black money has a “debilitating effect on the institutions of governance and conduct of public policy in the country”[1]. The Govt. of India has been persistently fighting against the menace of black money and corruption. In pursuance of that it had demonetized higher value currency in December 2016. The parliament also amended the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 in November 2016. Moreover the Securities and Exchange Board of India, via its circular no. CIR/IMD/FPIC/CIR/P/2018/64 dated 10th April 2018, came out with new KYC requirements for ‘foreign portfolio investments’ that ultimately seek to reveal the names of the actual beneficiaries behind a particular investment or security. This step has been taken to check prevention of money laundering and round-tripping[2] of unaccounted income. Misuse of corporate vehicles for the purpose of evading tax or laundering money for corrupt or illegal purposes, including for terrorist activities has been a concern worldwide[3]. Complex structures and chains of corporate vehicles are used to hide the real owner behind the transactions made using these structures.[4] On the same lines, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”) sought to amend the Companies Act in 2017. The Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017 has brought about some major changes to the law governing companies in India. It has introduced the concept of beneficial ownership along with an exhaustive compliance requirement with respect to reporting of the same. Section 89 and 90 deal with declaration of beneficial ownership and registration of significant beneficial owners in a company. In order to supplement the statutory provisions, the MCA has also notified the Companies (Significant Beneficial Ownership) Rules, 2018 on June 13, 2018. Important Definitions Firstly, beneficial interest (“BI”) refers to the right or entitlement of a person alone or together with any person, directly or indirectly, through contract, arrangement or otherwise, to exercise or cause to be exercised any or all of the rights attached to the share; or to receive or participate in any dividend or other distribution in respect of such share[5]. A significant beneficial owner (“SBO”)[6] is an individual who holds not less that 10%[7] of shares in a company or the actual exercising of significant influence or control, over the company, but whose name is not entered into the register of members of the company[8]. It has been further explained that depending on the form of business the method of identification of the Significant Beneficial Owner will vary[9]. In case of a the member being a company, the significant beneficial owner shall be the natural person, who holds not less than ten percent of the share capital of the company or who exercises significant influence or control in the company through other means. In case of the member being a partnership firm, the significant beneficial owner is the natural person who holds not less than ten percent of capital or has entitlement of not less than ten percent of profits of the partnership. Moreover, where there is no natural person identifiable then the person who holds the position of senior managing official will be the SBO.[10] In case of the member being a trust, the SBO would be the author, trustee and the beneficiaries with not less than ten percent interest in the trust and any other natural person exercising ultimate effective control over the trust through a certain chain of control or ownership. Whereas a ‘registered owner’ means a person whose name is entered in the register of members of a company as the holder of shares in that company but who does not hold beneficial interest in such shares[11]. Compliances The compliances can be categorized into three divisions on the basis of applicability. For a registered owner: A registered owner is supposed to make a declaration to the Company specifying the name and other particulars of the person who holds the beneficial interest in such shares, as specified[12]. The rules do not specify any particulars or any particular form which needs to be referred to for this declaration. For a person holding beneficial interest: Holder of beneficial interest must submit a declaration to the company specifying the nature of his interest and particulars of the corresponding registered owner in whose name the shares are held. However, a declaration form has been prescribed only for the declaration of significant beneficial ownership. Such a declaration needs to be made within 90 days[13] of the commencement of the SBO Rules and within 30 days[14] in case of any change is Significant Beneficial Ownership. Such declaration must be made in the prescribed format i.e. Form BEN- 1 For the Company: Whenever a declaration has been made under Section 89 to a company, the company is supposed to make note of those declarations in a separate register.[15] It is also supposed to file a return to the Registrar of Companies (“ROC”) regarding such declarations within 30 days of receiving these declarations. The return needs to be filed the format of Form BEN-2. The register of declarations needs to be prepared in the prescribed format i.e. Form BEN- 3. This register shall be open for inspection during business on every working day as decided by the Board of Directors of the Company. The inspection can only be open for members and for not less than two hours each day. The company can charge fees subject to a maximum of Rs 50.[16] A company shall also have to give notice to any person whom the company knows or has reason to believe to be a significant beneficial owner of the company, or to be having the knowledge of the identity of an SBO or another person likely to have such knowledge or to have been an SBO of the company at any time during the preceding three years from the date of issue of notice and who is not

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Determination of Jurisdiction in cases of Trans-boundary Trademark Violations in the Cyberspace, in light of the Civil Procedure Code

Determination of Jurisdiction in cases of Trans-boundary Trademark Violations in the Cyberspace, in light of the Civil Procedure Code. [Anushka Sharma] The author is a 3rd year B.A.LLB.(Hons.) student of WBNUJS, Kolkata. Introduction The advent of internet has opened the doors for a wide range of inter-state and international transactions in the commercial setup. The content posted online can be accessed worldwide which opens up the possibility of it being contradictory to the laws of some faraway jurisdiction. Numerous companies have cited the risk of prosecution in distant jurisdictions as one of the most serious threats that they encounter. Thus, in order to ensure that the laws do not come in the way of economic development it is imperative to answer the question of jurisdiction with utmost diligence. This paper seeks to answer this question of jurisdiction with reference to trans-boundary trademark violations arising out of acts committed in the cyberspace, in context of The Civil Procedure Code (‘CPC’), while discussing some general principals which can be applied to other online torts as well. The General Principle The statutory provision that governs the jurisdictional questions pertaining to civil matters in India is the § 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and the same is applicable for determining jurisdiction pursuant to torts committed online. As per the section the plaintiff might bring an action against the defendant either at the place where the defendant resides or carries on business or at the place where the cause of action arises.[1] In addition to the above provision the Delhi High Court has evolved the following three fold test in the News Nation Networks Private Limited v. News Nation Gujarat & Ors[2] case relying on Cybersell v. Cybersell[3] to decide matters of jurisdiction pertaining to a non resident foreigner regarding the content displayed on a website. It confers jurisdiction on the forum court only when[4]- The acts of the defendant have sufficient proximity with the forum state. The resultant cause of action due to defendants acts falls in the forum state. The exercise of jurisdiction tends to be reasonable. Trademark Violations The technology today has made it possible for a person to create a website that can be used to conduct business across the globe. Now a company while offering its services on such a website might violate the trademark of another company in a faraway jurisdiction by virtue of the global accessibility of its website, which it neither targeted nor foresee. Can the courts exercise jurisdiction over such a company if it is not located within their territorial jurisdiction? Can the company said to be in the court’s jurisdiction by virtue of the accessibility of its website there? Earlier, there existed two contradictory opinions in this regard, each given by a single judge bench of the Delhi High Court. The first view which was given in the case of Casio India Co. Limited v. Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Limited[5] (‘Casio’) held that the mere likelihood of a person getting deceived in the forum state due to the accessibility of the defendant’s website there is sufficient to establish jurisdiction of the forum court. While the other view given in the case of India TV Independent News Service Pvt. Limited v. India Broadcast Live Llc And Ors[6] (‘India TV’) warranted for a higher standard to be adopted and said that mere accessibility of the website cannot grant jurisdiction to the court. Additionally it should be established that the website is highly interactive for the court to exercise jurisdiction.[7] The current governing precedent on this issue is Banyan Tree Holding Limited v. A Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr[8] (‘Banyan Tree’) which settled the position by overruling the Casio case and upholding the India TV case. This case was a passing off claim in which the court held that to establish jurisdiction in cases where the defendant does not reside/carry on business in the forum state but the website in question is ‘universally accessible,’ the plaintiff will have to show that “the defendant purposefully availed the jurisdiction of the forum court.”[9] This includes proving that (1) The website was used with an intention to effectuate a commercial transaction and (2) The defendant specifically targeted the forum state to injure the plaintiff.[10] While in cases where the website is ‘accessible in the forum state’ it needs to establish that (1) The website was not a passive but an interactive one (2) It was targeted towards the consumers of the forum state for commercial transactions (3) A commercial transaction was entered into by the defendant using such a website which resulted in injuring the plaintiff.[11] A defining judgement on this issue post Banyan Tree was of World Wrestling Entertainment Inc. v. M/s. Reshma Collection[12] (‘WWE’). This case dealt with infringement of trademark in which the court had to decide whether the accessibility of the website of the plaintiff which was used to sell goods in the court’s jurisdiction can be held to mean that the plaintiff ‘carried on business’ there as required by the §64 of the Trademark Act. [13] The court observed that “the availability of transactions through a website at a particular place is virtually the same thing as a seller having shops in that place in the physical world” and thus, held that it had the jurisdiction to entertain the present suit.[14] Contradictory or Not Some authors have pointed out that the decision in WWE is in contravention to Banyan Tree because while in Banyan Tree the court held that the mere presence of an interactive website in a particular forum is insufficient, it must also be shown that the defendant has targeted the forum state and the culmination of commercial transactions via that website has resulted in injuring the plaintiff. In WWE they said that the mere presence of the website of the plaintiff in a particular forum which is used to conduct commercial transactions is akin to having a physical shop there and will confer jurisdiction on the forum courts. This, in my opinion is an

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Regulatory challenges faced by Equity based Crowd-funding Platforms

Regulatory challenges faced by Equity based Crowd-funding Platforms.  [Amala George] The author is a 5th year student of B.A.LLB (Hons.) of ILS Law College, Pune. What is Crowdfunding? With the rise of the Internet, a new method of fund raising has emerged- Crowdfunding. Crowdfunding is the solicitation of funds from multiple investors through web-based platforms.[1] Different kinds of organisations including NGOs, small companies and business ventures use Crowdfunding to raise funds for different activities, expansion, diversification etc. Crowdfunding can be broadly classified into two kinds- donation based and reward based. Donation based crowdfunding involves grants and donations with no expectation or obligation of returns. Reward based crowdfunding can be further classified into- debt based or equity based. In debt based crowdfunding if it is in the form of loans, it is called peer to peer lending and should come under the banking regulator, whereas if it is debt securities based then it would come under the purview of the securities regulator. The subject matter of this article is equity based crowdfunding in which equity shares of the company are issued in lieu of funds raised from investors. It is a popular method of fund raising by start-ups. There are web based platforms which facilitate information exchange and advertising of companies as well as act as intermediaries for fund and equity share transfer. In web-based platforms for equity crowdfunding, investors and companies looking to raise capital through equity have to register with the platforms and pay a registration fee for the same. Start-ups advertise and solicit funding on these platforms and therefore the web-based platforms act as intermediaries or a marketplace for investors and start-ups.  Social media platforms are also often used by start-ups to solicit funds from multiple investors. The need for regulation Traditionally, start-ups raise funding through Venture Capital funds and Private Equity investors who have a high risk appetite. The funding is also at a later stage, after the product/ service becomes commercially viable. However with the advent of crowdfunding platforms, multiple investors with smaller individual investment are tapped into, usually at an early stage. The benefits of crowdfunding are that it is easier, faster and cheaper method of fund raising, requires no mandatory disclosures, and possesses easier and wider access to funding and investors. While the benefits of crowdfunding are manifold for the start-ups, the risk to the investors is high. There is an information asymmetry in the functioning of these crowdfunding platforms as there are no straight jacket regulations on mandatory disclosures which apply to them. These are also characterized as high risk investments and involve a high exposure to retail investors which makes the regulators uneasy. Start-up companies also offer less liquidity and therefore might not be viable for retail investors who do not have the required skills and assessment of risk to invest in such securities. There is a lack of regulatory certainty due to absence of regulations in which these crowdfunding platforms function. Current regulatory framework The applicable laws to Equity based crowdfunding are- 1) Companies Act, 2013- Any issue of securities by a company would come under the purview of the Companies Act, 2013. In relation to issue of securities, there are two recognised modes available to companies under Section 23 of the Companies Act, 2013- Public offer through prospectus and Private placement through an offer letter[2]. 2) Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, 1956, Securities and Exchange Board of India Act (SEBI Act) and Regulations- Under Section 24 of the Companies Act, 2013, Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) shall regulate the issue and transfer of securities of listed companies and those companies which intend to get their securities listed. A public offer requires a ‘prospectus’ and there is a list of matters to be disclosed in the prospectus. The prospectus also needs to be filed with the Registrar of Companies (RoC) and SEBI.[3] A private placement offer under Companies Act, 2013 cannot be made to more than 200 people in a financial year.[4] The newly amended Section 42 also stipulates that private placement shall be made only to persons identified by the Board and prohibits public advertisements or utilisation of any media, marketing or distribution channels or agents to inform the public at large about such an issue.[5] Explanation III to Section 42 dealing with offer or invitation for subscription of securities on private placement reads- “If a company, listed or unlisted, makes an offer to allot or invites subscription, or allots, or enters into an agreement to allot, securities to more than the prescribed number of persons, whether the payment for the securities has been received or not or whether the company intends to list its securities or not on any recognised stock exchange in or outside India, the same shall be deemed to be an offer to the public and shall accordingly be governed by the provisions of Part I of this Chapter”. Therefore the modus operandi of crowdfunding platforms[6] of raising funding through issue of equity shares through the medium of electronic platforms with a number of registered/ member investors would neither meet the stringent regulations for a public offer nor qualify as a private placement under the Companies Act, 2013. There is more similarity to a public offer than a private placement which is on a one-to-one basis. The decision of the Supreme Court in the Sahara judgment[7] concluded that an offer to 50 or more persons constitutes a public issue and will come under the regulatory oversight of SEBI even in case of unlisted companies. In case of crowdfunding, there is no filing of prospectus with the RoC and the disclosures to be made are not complied with, therefore there is a violation of public offer norms. Private Placement under Section 42 (7) specifically bars the utilisation of any media to market and distribute to the public at large about such an issue. The solicitation made to more than 50 persons also makes crowdfunding beyond the scope of private placement. In the opinion of the author equity based crowdfunding platforms are

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A Shot in the Arm or a Knee-Jerk Riposte? : Dissecting the Fugitive Economic Offenders Ordinance, 2018

Sandpapergate: ICC’s Failure to Save the Spirit of the Game from Orchestrated Cheating. [Harshit Anand] Mr. Harshit Anand works at Khaitan & Co, Kolkata and deals with Real Estate and Corporate matters. He may be reached at harshit.anand@khaitanco.com. Introduction In the annals of finance, the promulgation of the Fugitive Economic Offenders Bill, 2018 (“the Ordinance”) is being lauded as another bold step of the government after the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016. The intent behind the Ordinance is to target those economic offenders who flee the jurisdiction of India and evade the rigours of the legal process, and impending criminal prosecution. This Ordinance empowers the Government to seize the property of such economic offenders- Benami and otherwise- situated in India as well as in foreign jurisdictions. The Ordinance would, under its purview, deal with cases in which the total amount involved is INR 100 crores or more. As the instances of fraudulent conduct in corporate behaviour pile up day upon day, relevance of this Ordinance cannot be overemphasized. I shall briefly discuss the important provisions and procedures listed under the Ordinance and its potential impact on our economy. Offences under the Ordinance One singular feature of the Ordinance is that it defines significant terms and phrases such as ‘fugitive economic offender’, ‘schedule offence’ and ‘special courts’, amongst others. It makes provisions for presenting an application before such special courts for a juridical declaration that an individual is a fugitive economic offender. Attachment of the offender’s property- which would include their Benami property- situated in India or in some other country is an option explicitly available under the Ordinance. For management and disposal of such confiscated property, the Ordinance provides for the appointment of an Administrator. With the Ordinance in operation, offenders who fit the definition of a ‘fugitive economic offender’ would be tried for all offences listed under the schedule of the Ordinance The Ordinance defines a ‘fugitive economic offender’ as any individual against whom an arrest warrant concerning a scheduled offence has been issued by any Indian court, who has either left India so as to evade criminal prosecution or being abroad, has refused to return to India to face criminal prosecution.[i] In other words, all individuals who have left India in order to avoid criminal prosecution and refuse to return to the Indian jurisdiction would satisfy the text of § 2(1) (f). However, leaving the country to dodge the legal process does not automatically make a person a fugitive economic offender (“FEO”); what is of essential requirement is commission of a schedule offence under the Ordinance. The Ordinance lays down that a ‘Schedule Offence’ would mean an offence specified in the schedule, if the total amount involved in the commission such offence or offences is rupees one hundred crore or more.[ii]  This Section implies that every offence laid down under this schedule would come under the ambit of economic offence and any person indulging in this schedule offence would be tried in special courts established under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act of 2002. The schedule is quite comprehensive, in the sense that it lists offences under a plethora of existing laws such as the Indian Penal Code of 1860, the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1988, the Customs Act of 1962, the Companies Act of 2013, the SARFAESI Act of 2002, the Limited Liability Partnership Act of 2008, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act of 2002 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016. Authorities under the Ordinance The Ordinance defines certain authorities and accords them functions and some special powers. Three authorities who bear primary responsible for the operation of the Ordinance are: 1.Administrator: 2(a) describes an administrator as one who has been appointed under §15(1). §15 deals with management of the properties confiscated under the Ordinance, and under §15(1), the Central Government may, by notification in Official Gazette, appoint as many officers, as they may think fit not below the rank of Joint Secretary of the Government of India to perform the function of an administrator. An administrator is therefore a subordinate officer or officers of the Central Government, who perform(s) their function on the direction of Central Government. The administrator receives and manages the properties confiscated under the Ordinance. §12 of the Ordinance dictates the administrator to disposes of such property on the direction of the Central Government. Special Courts: A special court under §2(n) of the Ordinance refers to a court of session designated as a special court under §43(1) of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act of 2002. Under the Ordinance, a special court (“Court”) has the right to declare a person as an FEO under §12 of the Ordinance and issue a notice requiring appearance of such person. With the permission of the Court, a property may be attached under §5(1), if with regard to the referred property, there is a reason to believe that the property is a proceed of crime or is a property owned by an individual who is an FEO, and which is being or is likely to be dealt with in a manner which may result in the property being unavailable for confiscation. Director: A director in the Ordinance is one appointed under §49(1) of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act of 2002, which defines a director as a person deemed fit to be an authority for the purposes of the Act and appointed by the Central Government. Under the Ordinance, the director may file an application before the Court if he has reason to believe, or any other material in his possession indicates that an individual is an FEO under the Ordinance. §6 of the Ordinance states that the director shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of discovery and inspection. Powers of survey, as well as of search and seizure have been given to the Director under the Ordinance, provided he has reason to believe that

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Amendment to Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 – A Step towards Business Growth

Amendment to Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 – A Step towards Business Growth [Mr. Arjun Gopalakrishnan] The author is a Legal Manager at ICICI Bank Limited Introduction Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 imposes restrictions on a company in relation to advancement of loans to the directors or any other person in whom the director is interested and providing guarantees/securities in connection with the loans taken by the director or such other person. Subsequent to the Companies Amendment Act, 2017[1] and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”) notification dated May 7, 2018[2], Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Original S.185”) stands amended (“Amended S.185”). The amendment is intended to relax the restrictions that were originally imposed by the section, consequentially promoting operational convenience. Analysis of the Amendment In order to address the issues in Original S. 185 and to make the section less stringent, the entire section has been substituted by Amended S. 185. The below- mentioned are the important amendments that have been made to Original S.185: Deletion of the non-obstante clause: The text of Original S.185 started with “Save as otherwise provided in this Act” which meant that if there were other provisions in the Companies Act, 2013 that allowed lending, as covered under Original S.185, then such specific provision would prevail over the prohibition under Original S.185. This resulted in a lack of clarity as to whether the specific provision of Section 186 of the Companies Act, 2013 which starts with “Without prejudice to the other provisions” would exclude the prohibition imposed by Original S.185. To bring an end to the ambiguity, the words “Save as otherwise provided in this Act” have been omitted in the Amended S.185. Partly prohibitive and partly restrictive nature of Amended S.185: The restrictions that were placed by Original S.185 have been substantially relaxed vide the amendment. In a scenario where none of the exemptions to Original S.185 are applicable, the section places a blanket prohibition on a company (the “Lending Company“)[3] from providing a loan to or providing security/guarantee in relation to a loan (such loan, guarantee, or security will hereinafter be referred to as the “Assistance”) taken by, a director of the Lending Company or any other person the director is interested in. The expression “any other person the director is interested in” has been defined as: (a) any director of the Lending Company, or of its holding company, or any partner or relative of any such director; or (b) any firm in which such director or relative is a partner; or (c) any private company of which any such director is a director or member; or (d) any body corporate at a general meeting of which 25% or more of the voting power is exercised or controlled by any such director(s); or (e) any body corporate, of which the board, managing director or manager is accustomed to act with the directions or instructions of the board, or any of the director(s) of the Lending Company. The following exemptions are available under Original S.185: (i) The provisions of Original S. 185 do not apply to private companies that fulfil all of the following conditions: (a) no other body corporate has invested in the share capital of such private company, (b) the borrowings of such private company from banks and financial institutions or any body corporate is less than twice its share capital or 50 crores, whichever is lower, and (c) such private company has no default in the repayment of such borrowings subsisting at the time. (ii) The prohibition under Original S.185 will not apply if the Lending Company is providing Assistance to or in relation to a loan advanced to its wholly owned subsidiary (“WoS”) subject to the Assistance being in relation to an activity that forms a part of the principal business activities of the WoS. (iii)The prohibition under Original S.185 will not apply if the Lending Company is providing Assistance to its subsidiary which is not its WoS, in the form of security or guarantee for a loan provided to the subsidiary, subject to the Assistance being in relation to an activity that forms part of the principal business activities of the subsidiary. (iv) The prohibition under Original S.185 will not apply if the Lending Company is providing Assistance to its managing or whole-time director in the form of a loan, as a part of the conditions of service extended by the Lending Company to all its employees, or pursuant to any scheme approved by the members of the Lending Company by a special resolution. (v) The prohibition under Original S.185 will not apply if the Lending Company is one which in the ordinary course of its business provides Assistance, provided an interest is charged in respect of such loans, at a rate not less than the bank rate declared by the Reserve Bank of India (“Ordinary Course of Business Exemption”). Pursuant to the amendment, the definition of “any person in whom any of the directors of the company is interested in” has been modified and in a case where none of the exemptions apply, the prohibition under Amended S.185 would become applicable in the below-mentioned manner: (i) A blanket prohibition under Amended S.185 will apply in relation to an Assistance provided by the Lending Company, to, or in relation to a loan taken by: (a) any director of the Lending Company, or of its holding company, or any partner or relative of any such director (b) any firm in which any such director or relative is a partner (ii) In relation to an Assistance provided to, or in relation to a loan taken by “any person in whom any of the directors of the company is interested in”, the Lending Company is now permitted to do the same subject to the passing of a special resolution in a general meeting with the explanatory statement to the notice of the general meeting clearly disclosing the full particulars of the Assistance provided and the purpose

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Strengthening of Foreign Investment in India owing to the Foreign Exchange Management (Cross Border Merger) Regulations, 2018

Strengthening of Foreign Investment in India owing to the Foreign Exchange Management (Cross Border Merger) Regulations, 2018 [Ayush Chowdhury and Rishika Raghuwanshi] The authors are third-year students at Symbiosis Law School, Pune. Until now, it was possible for a foreign company to merge with an Indian company, whereas the vice versa was a challenge within the scope of court-sanctioned merger framework set out under the Indian corporate law. This challenge was finally overcome in April 2017 when the company law provisions brought in regulations governing cross border mergers into force. Following this, the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) also issued draft regulations (“Draft RBI Regulations”) wherein it laid down standards of deemed approval from the RBI for mergers across the border. This enabled the companies to merge with foreign companies under specified jurisdictions. With the Draft RBI Regulations being at an elongated halt for nearly a year’s time, the RBI on March 20, 2018 notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Cross Border Merger) Regulation, 2018[1] vide notification No. FEMA 389/ 2018- RB (“Merger Regulations”). In this article, the authors would highlight how the Merger Regulations has brought about a change in the context of cross border mergers and how it would impact the economy by bringing foreign investments. The noteworthy changes brought about by the Merger Regulations are: Issue or Acquisition of Securities Inbound Mergers The Merger Regulations clarified that in cases of inbound mergers i.e. where the company is an overseas joint venture (“JV”) or a wholly owned subsidiary (“WOS”) of an Indian company, there arises a need for such company to comply with the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004 (“ODI Regulations”). This is an additional compliance with a pre-requisite compliance with applicable foreign exchange regulations. Moreover, the winding up related obligations in the ODI Regulations should be assessed by the JV/WOS. Subsequently, in cases of inbound mergers which lead to acquisition of a step down subsidiary of a JV/WOS, such acquisition must comply with the conditions relating to total financial commitment, method of funding etc. as set out in the ODI Regulations. Regulations 6 and 7 of the ODI Regulations are mandatory compliances if the merger with the JV/WOS results into an acquisition. Outbound Mergers The acquisition of securities could be made by a resident of India conforming to the existing regulations relating to investment in a JV/WOS or a liberalized remittance scheme (LRS). Transfer of Assets/ Securities Estopped to be Acquired Inbound Mergers The duration to sell the assets not permitted to be held or acquired under FEMA has been increased from 180 days to 2 years from the date of sanction of the scheme. However, it remains to be tested whether such an elongated duration would be optimum for the sale of foreign assets in light of compliances under foreign laws. The referred resultant Indian company would have to seriously evaluate the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management (Acquisition and Transfer of Immovable Property Outside India) Regulations, 2015 to hold immovable property outside India. The sale proceeds shall be transferred to India immediately through banking channels. Outbound Mergers In case of a company not permitted to acquire or hold any asset or securities in India which is part of an Indian Company under an outbound merger, the foreign company can transfer such assets or securities within a period of 2 years from the date of sanction of scheme and the sale proceeds shall be transferred outside India immediately through banking channels. Borrowings Inbound Mergers The Merger Regulations henceforth provide a period of 2 years from the date of sanction of the scheme to bring overseas borrowings availed by the resultant Indian company. The clarification expressly provides for non-applicability of end-use restrictions under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (“FEMA”) to such overseas borrowings. Prior to an inbound merger, if there happens to be any borrowing by the foreign company, it shall become the borrowing of the Indian company after the merger which should be in consonance with external commercial borrowing norms. Nevertheless, no remittance for repayment of such overseas borrowings can be made during the two-year period. Outbound Mergers Pursuant to outbound mergers, while the guarantees or outstanding borrowings of the Indian companies would become the liabilities of the resultant foreign company, the Merger Regulations put down that foreign companies shall not acquire liability in rupees payable to the Indian lenders non-compliant with FEMA; and with reference to this, a No Objection Certificate (NOC) must be availed from the Indian lenders. Acquisition of Assets Inbound Mergers After the inbound merger, the resultant Indian company may acquire or hold any assets or securities outside India which it is permitted to acquire under the RBI Act or the rules or regulations thereof. Outbound Mergers After the outbound mergers, the foreign company may acquire or hold any assets in India which it is permitted to acquire under the provisions of the RBI Act or the rules or regulations thereof. Location of the Office Inbound Mergers Under the Foreign Exchange Management (Foreign Currency Account by a Person Resident in India) Regulations, 2015, any office of the foreign company outside India shall be deemed as a branch or an office of the resultant Indian company, thereby implying that the resultant Indian company would be allowed to undertake any transaction as permitted to a branch or an office. Outbound Mergers According to the Foreign Exchange Management (Establishment in India of a Branch Office or a Liaison Office or a Project Office or Any Place of Business) Regulations 2016, a foreign company may undertake any transaction as permitted to a branch office as any office in India shall be deemed as a branch or an office of the resultant company in India. Other Consideration under the New Regulations In both inbound and outbound mergers, a bank account could be opened for a maximum period of two years, and the valuation parameter shall be applicable for both. Furthermore, in light of cross border mergers, it is deemed that prior approval has been taken and that no separate

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The Vague Concept of Public Interest as a Ground for Lifting the Corporate Veil

The Vague Concept of Public Interest as a Ground for Lifting the Corporate Veil. [Shivang Agarwal] The author is a third-year student at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. He may be reached at shivangagarwal1597@gmail.com. The post seeks to assess the application of the ground of public interest by the judiciary in India by commenting on the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Gotan Lime Stone Khanji Udyog Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., which was decided by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India on January 20, 2016. The primary question that would be addressed by this post through a comparative analysis of English and Indian jurisprudence on lifting the corporate veil is whether the bench was justified in invoking the ground of public interest in order to lift the corporate veil. Facts The Government of Rajasthan had granted a mining lease for extraction of lime stone to the Respondent, M/s. Gotan Lime Stone Khanji Udyog (GLKU), which was a partnership firm. The Respondents moved an application for transfer of the mining lease to a private limited company. The application was allowed as it was a mere change in the form of business of the Respondents and involved no premium, price etc.; further, the partners and the directors were the same. Subsequently, GLKU sold all of its shares to Ultra Tech Cement Limited and became a wholly owned subsidiary of the latter. It was alleged by the state government that the share price which came to be around Rs. 160 crores was nothing but a consideration for the sale of the mining lease. Judgement The bench quashed the impugned transfer of shareholdings. They disregarded the corporate veil by looking through the entire series of transactions. It was established that there were two transactions in the present case. When viewed in isolation, these transactions seemed perfectly legal. However, when viewed as a whole, the illegality became manifest. After a perusal of the “combined effects and real substance of two transactions,” the bench came to the conclusion that GLKU had successfully transferred the mining lease to UTCL by disguising the price charged for transfer of mining lease as the share price for the transaction. The transaction was void because it was in contravention to Rule 15 of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986, for the mining lease was transferred to UTCL without taking permission from the requisite government authorities. The Court also employed the ground of public interest to lift the corporate veil. The ownership mining rights, which constituted the subject matter of the lease in question, vested with the state and was to be regulated in pursuance of the public trust doctrine. Tracing the English and the Indian Jurisprudence In 2013, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom delivered a landmark judgement in Prest v. Petrodel.  Lord Sumption engaged in a masterful analysis of past cases wherein the doctrine was applied. He came to a conclusion that the doctrine had more often than not been applied for the wrong reasons by the judges. He established the principle of concealment and that of evasion and called for the corporate veil to be lifted in the latter case only. The opinion of Lord Munby in Ben Hashem v. Ali Shayif that the corporate veil need not be lifted unless its absolutely necessary to do so, because there are no public policy imperatives underlying the course, was affirmed. Moreover, it was also held by Lord Sumption and Lord Neuberger that courts should not take recourse to veil piercing even if the evasion principle applies as long as other remedies are available. Ultimately, Lord Sumption came to the conclusion that lifting of the corporate veil should be confined to situations where “a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his control.” Henceforth, public interest is not employed as an independent ground to lift the corporate veil in England. Courts have adopted a narrow approach wherein they have limited the application of doctrine to certain grounds only. The philosophical underpinning of this judicial stance is the sacrosance of the independent corporate personality and the treatment of incorporation as a business facilitating activity in England. The Indian position largely differs from the English position as the former is more concerned with balancing the interests of all the stakeholders including third parties which would be affected if the corporate veil is lifted to reveal the persons controlling the company. Thus, Indian courts have been more amenable to lifting the corporate veil and have invoked extensive grounds, one of which is public interest. Each case has evoked different grounds which would suit the peculiar facts which are at issue and cited English authorities without application of mind in order to the buttress their findings.[1]. The ground of public interest has been used here and there by the judiciary without any specific pronouncement as to what would constitute public interest. In many cases, the ground has been employed to lift the corporate veil despite the test for establishing a façade or a sham not being satisfied. Dubious Application of the Doctrine in the Present Case Herein, the bench categorically held that GLKU was formed with the intention of avoiding the statutory requirement of obtaining consent of the government for the transfer of the mining lease to a third party. The underlying motive was to accrue private benefit at the cost of public interest. After a perusal of the judgement, it becomes evident that the bench had lifted the corporate veil rather haphazardly. It is argued that the bench need not have gone into the question of public interest when there was a prima facie violation of the impugned rules. It is also argued that in the absence of any statutory definition of public interest or a judicial pronouncement on its scope and import could mean anything and the ground itself could be molded as per the whims and fancies of the judge. The invocation of the public interest doctrine also militates against the juridical observation

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Mitigating Liability of Directors and Officers

Mitigating Liability of Directors and Officers. [Mincy Mathew] The author is a third-year student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal. The board of directors is the primary management body of any company, and as such, it owes a fiduciary duty to the company and is expected to act in good faith and to promote the best interests of all the stakeholders. The directors are personally liable to pay losses suffered by the company following an act which is wrong, negligent, outside the company’s authority, beyond their power, or which evidences insufficient skill and care in managing the company’s affairs. The liability of the directors, in such cases, is joint and several. Along with the Companies Act, the directors must comply with income tax law, labor laws, and environmental laws, among others. With an increasing role of the directors in ensuring compliance with corporate governance norms, the directors may ask for protection against any future liability. The liability of an “officer in default” is unlimited and the directors would, therefore, seek to protect their personal assets. For mitigating the liability of a director, the Companies Act, 2013 provides certain safe harbor provisions. According to section 463 of the Act, if in any proceeding for negligence, default, breach of duty, misfeasance or breach of trust against an officer of a company, it appears to the court hearing the case that the officer has acted honestly and reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, he ought fairly to be excused, the court may relieve him, either wholly or in part, from his liability on such terms as it may think fit. In addition, for independent directors, the liability will be “only in respect of such acts of omission or commission by a company which had occurred with his knowledge, attributable through board processes, and with his consent or connivance or where he had not acted diligently.”[1] However, it is important to ensure that there is an additional protection given to the directors, because in certain cases, statutory protection may be inadequate. It may sometimes be difficult to ascertain whether an act was “within the knowledge” of a director or whether a director acted “diligently” and, therefore, such liabilities are difficult to foresee. Accordingly, a company may also provide certain indemnities to its directors for any liability arising out of any act done in his professional capacity, excluding intentional criminal conduct. The Companies Act, 1956 prohibited any indemnity to the director, but there is no corresponding provision in the 2013 Act. The 2013 Act, therefore, may allow greater flexibility to directors to ask for such indemnities from the company especially where no fault could be attributed to them. Such protection may be provided to them by incorporating an indemnity provision in the constituent documents, or by issuing a letter of indemnity to individual directors, as is the case with several companies in India. An indemnification agreement is entered into by a director with the company, which makes good any losses caused by the director to the company, during the performance of his duties. Even though indemnification may be provided in the charter documents, it is advisable that a separate indemnification agreement is entered into between the director and the company. A separate agreement provides the surety that the new management cannot amend the articles to the detriment of the directors and that its scope extends even after his resignation. In addition, a separate agreement, being a bilateral agreement, ensures a more detailed and a better negotiated deal. While negotiating the indemnities, care must be taken to draft it wide enough to cover any complicated corporate transaction, while still excluding dishonest or fraudulent conduct. The indemnification agreement should ideally also include a D&O insurance to provide security in case the company is financially unable to pay for the indemnification. The Companies Act, 2013 recognizes the right of the companies to purchase D&O insurance in section 197. The section provides that: Where any insurance is taken by a company on behalf of its managing director, whole-time director, manager, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer or Company Secretary for indemnifying any of them against any liability in respect of any negligence, default, misfeasance, breach of duty or breach of trust for which they may be guilty in relation to the company, the premium paid on such insurance shall not be treated as part of the remuneration payable to any such personnel. Provided that if such person is proved to be guilty, the premium paid on such insurance shall be treated as part of the remuneration. D&O insurance provides indemnity to the directors and the officers of the concerned company against costs incurred in defending proceedings instituted against and in respect of any damages awarded to the claimants against them, such as an out-of-court settlement. A typical D&O insurance policy may include three types of coverage: A-side coverage. This part covers directors, officers, and sometimes employees for defense costs, settlement fees, or judgments in situations when they are not indemnified by the company. B-side coverage. This covers the company for the losses incurred by its directors, officers, and employees when the company does indemnify them. C-side coverage. This financially protects the entire corporation, against any loss and is also known as ‘entity coverage’. The company has to have the consent of the board of directors in order to avail itself of a D&O policy. Further, while procuring such policies, it must be ensured that the sameprovide for certain exceptions especially as regards fraud or wilful misconduct. D&O insurance is essential to mitigate the liability of the director, as it ensures indemnification of any loss even if the company is unable to pay. A mitigation strategy adopted by the company cannot decrease the liability of a director acting in complete disregard of his duties and cannot act as a replacement for corporate governance mechanisms. However, it will ensure that the directors feel safeguarded against any unknown liability. Thus, quality personnel stay in the company and are best able to fulfill their professional duties. [1]Section 149(12).

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