Mergers & Acquisitions

Locked-box Mechanism: A Seller Friendly Approach

[By Pranjal Kinjawadekar & Gunjan Hariramani ] The authors are students of Maharashtra National Law University Mumbai.   Introduction The significant component in any commercial contract is the pricing clause which states the pricing mechanisms which the parties would follow to complete the deal. A pricing mechanism is an important factor as it determines the amount of consideration to be paid by one party to another. In order to determine the purchase price of the target company, the parties involved in the transaction need to arrive at the value of the company. The value of the company is called the ‘base purchase price’ or ‘initial purchase price’ defined in the stock purchase agreement. In the past few decades, the widely used pricing models in mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) transactions are the locked-box mechanism and the closing accounts adjustment management. In this article, the authors have attempted to analyse the concept of the locked-box pricing mechanism used in private M&A deals in India. Further, an analysis of the order against Bharti Airtel Limited wherein the Competition Commission of India had imposed penalties on the acquirer for gun jumping due to the use of locked-box mechanism, has been provided. Locked-Box Mechanism and Closing Accounts Adjustments Mechanism The locked-box mechanism is defined as a pricing mechanism used by the parties in commercial contracts where they freeze the purchase price of a target company based on a historical balance sheet date. In this pricing mechanism, there are three important dates, first, the locked-box date, second, the signing date of the sale and purchase agreement (“SPA”) and third, the closing date. At the date of SPA signing, the parties agree to a fixed equity value of the target company. The historic balance sheet is used to calculate the equity value of the target company that is fixed at the locked-box date. Further, in the locked-box mechanism, the parties identify and agree to various factors like working capital, cash, and debt of the target company that could change the value of the company in the future. However, once the price has been fixed at the SPA signing date, the parties cannot adjust anything between the SPA signing date and the closing date. Additionally, the target company cannot take dividends, management fees, assets at an under-valued price, and bonuses out of its business. During this interim period, the target company is only allowed to make payments in its ordinary course of business. This approach is gaining popularity in M&A transactions as it enables both the buyer and seller to determine the price of the target company early at the signing stage, thereby reducing the risk of post-completion price adjustments. On the other hand, the closing accounts mechanism is considered a traditional approach for determining the purchase price of a target company in a commercial contract. In this mechanism, the parties at the signing stage agree on a tentative purchase price by calculating the actual value of the target company’s assets and liabilities as of the date of closing the transaction. This means that the purchase price is adjusted and determined after the closing date of the transaction based on the actual financial performance of the target company. This approach is known as a buyer-friendly approach because the target company is responsible for all the economic risks till the closing date. The buyer undertakes all the risks and liabilities after the closing date. The closing accounts mechanism is considered a time-consuming, expensive, and complex process because it involves negotiations between the parties. Why Locked-Box Mechanism should be preferred? The locked-box mechanism serves the buyers and sellers with huge benefits in commercial contracts. One of the primary benefits of this mechanism is that it provides price certainty. By establishing a purchase price based on a historical balance sheet date of the target company, the buyer and seller can avoid the uncertainty and risk associated with post-completion price adjustments. This approach could be used to tackle times like COVID-19, where the sellers’ faced a downturn in business. For buyers, this mechanism is generally used as a stopgap measure in M&A transactions, in order to avoid value leakage and to prevent the seller from extracting value from the target company after the locked-box date. This mechanism makes the pricing process simpler by reducing the need for complex calculations and negotiations that often occur in the traditional M&A deals. Further, it allows the seller to continue to keep the benefit of the company’s control and management until the purchaser acquires the target company. In a traditional M&A transaction, the seller is supposed to prepare an up-to-date completion balance sheet, which would include the company’s cash flows up to the completion date. However, in the locked-box mechanism, the seller is not supposed to provide an up-to-date completion balance sheet, and the buyer is assumed to take the risk and benefit of the company’s cash flows from the historical balance sheet date. Additionally, the locked-box mechanism can help to speed up the negotiation process and reduce the cost of transaction. By agreeing on a price early in the negotiation process, the parties can focus on other key deal terms, such as representations, warranties and closing conditions. Therefore, it can be inferred that this process helps to reduce the time and costs associated with negotiating these other terms. When should it be preferred? There are several key considerations when opting for a locked-box mechanism in M&A transactions. It is commonly preferred when the parties involved in the transaction can agree on a fixed acquisition price based on past financial records, given the target company has steady and consistent cash flows. Additionally, as the locked-box mechanism gives them assurance and lowers the possibility of post-closing adjustments, it is frequently preferred by sellers. This type of mechanism works best when the buyer has completed thorough due diligence before signing the agreement and is satisfied with the accuracy of all the financial statements that have been furnished by the seller. However, alternate mechanisms should be preferred if,

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Enhancing M&A Efficiency: India’s Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023

[By Aisha Singh] The author is a student of Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna.   Introduction The Indian President’s approval of the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, is set to bring significant changes to the merger review procedure employed by the Competition Commission of India (CCI). With amendments aimed at simplifying the notification process, establishing deal value thresholds, and shortening the review window, this new legislation promises to reshape the landscape of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the country. One of the ground-breaking features introduced by the Amendment Act is the concept of “deemed approval”. According to this provision, the acquisition would be deemed authorised if the CCI fails to reach a prima facie conclusion within 30 calendar days (as opposed to the prior 30 working days) about whether an M&A transaction is likely to raise competition issues in India. This means that parties involved in the transaction can proceed with closing it without waiting for a formal CCI approval order. Furthermore, the overall review period has been reduced from 210 calendar days to 150 calendar days, further streamlining the process. This move has been widely hailed as a positive step forward for M&As in India, addressing a long-standing gap in the Competition Act, 2002, which did not provide any implications or consequences if the CCI failed to provide its view within the prescribed timeline. With the introduction of the “deemed approval” provision, the Amendment Act seeks to fill this legal vacuum, bringing clarity and certainty to the merger review process. Benefit to Global Deals The adoption of a 30-calendar day review timeline aligns India’s merger review process with more mature jurisdictions, such as that of the European Union (EU), USA & Canada. This harmonization fosters a more efficient and consistent approach to M&A transactions. The streamlined timeline reduces uncertainty, enhances deal certainty, and expedites transaction closures. It creates a favourable investment environment, attracting foreign investors and stimulating economic growth. Additionally, the accelerated pace of transactions benefits global deals involving multiple jurisdictions, ensuring timely completion. Overall, this strategic alignment positions India as an attractive destination for domestic and international mergers and acquisitions. Thus, this strategic move is expected to yield substantial benefits for global deals, fostering a harmonized and efficient approach to M&A transactions. This progressive step demonstrates the Indian competition watchdog’s commitment to aligning its practices with those of mature jurisdictions such as the EU. In the European Union, the European Commission operates under a 25-working day timeline to conduct the Phase I review of a transaction and make a decision. Similarly, in both the United States and Canada, merger transactions typically undergo an initial waiting period of 30 calendar days. This waiting period serves as a crucial window for regulatory authorities to review proposed mergers and evaluate potential competition concerns. The streamlined review timeline holds particular significance for global deals, where coordination of approval timelines across borders and jurisdictions plays a crucial role. Failure to meet this timeline results in the transaction being deemed unconditionally approved. India’s adoption of similar timelines signifies its dedication to enhancing efficiency and aligning with global best practices. By aligning with international standards, India enhances its competitiveness and attractiveness as a destination for M&A activities, providing greater certainty and expediting the approval process for transacting parties. Comprehensive Notifications   With the introduction of the “deemed approval” provision, there is an increased expectation that transacting parties will file more comprehensive notifications, providing greater emphasis on the details and potential competition concerns. This change encourages parties to conduct a thorough assessment of potential anti-competitive effects before submitting their notifications, ensuring a more robust review process. Invalidation of Notices   The Amendment Act may also lead to an increase in the invalidation of notices filed by parties due to the absence of substantive pre-filing consultation (PFC) with the CCI. Parties are now required to engage in meaningful consultations with the CCI prior to filing, ensuring that the necessary information and details are provided. Failure to do so may result in notices being invalidated, leading to delays and potential disruptions in the transaction process. The reduction in timelines and the introduction of deemed approval in the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, bring welcomed changes. However, these adjustments also bring additional pressures on the CCI and M&A parties to expedite processes and provide necessary information promptly. As a consequence, there may be an increase in invalidated notices due to the absence of substantive pre-filing consultation (PFC) with the CCI. Furthermore, an increase in information requests from the CCI may disrupt the review timeline. Increase in Information Requests   To address the challenges posed by accelerated approval, stakeholders are likely to proactively engage in PFC meetings and collaborate with CCI case officers before formal filings. Another effect of these new deadlines might be an increase in the amount of information requests made by the CCI, which would halt the review timeline. These requests aim to gather additional data and insights to aid in the competition assessment. Parties’ response times to information requests made by the CCI are not included in (and may remain thus) the review deadlines that have been established. It is important to note that the implications discussed here are based on the anticipated effects of the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023. The true impact will only become clear as the new legislation is put into practice and the CCI adapts to the changes. As with any new legal framework, challenges and adjustments may arise, and stakeholders will need to closely monitor the implementation and enforcement of the Amendment Act. Potential Clock Stops The CCI’s merger control division will now need to keep a watchful eye on the review clock as M&A deals will be automatically cleared post 30 calendar days. The introduction of new regulations resulting from the amendments raises questions about potential “clock stops” during the review process. It remains to be seen if these regulations will permit additional grounds for halting the review timelines. Additionally, it is worth exploring whether the new regulations will allow for

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Recession Slows M&A: Prosus-BillDesk Deal and Long-Term Effects

[ByHarsh Mittal] The author is a student of Hidayatullah National Law University.   Introduction We see that recessionary fears have started impacting M&A deals and there has been a considerable slowdown in merger deals as a result of the same. There exists a huge gap between what private investors are willing to offer for different Merger deals now as compared to Pre- Recession period. The latest victim of this meltdown was the online payments gateway firm Bill Desk. On 31 August,2021 Prosus announced that an agreement has been reached between Bill Desk and Pay U, a subsidiary of Prosus to acquire Bill Desk for a staggering $4.7. However, Prosus terminated the contract one year later stating that certain conditions were not met. This sudden termination of the agreement was largely due to the huge ongoing correction in the global markets which has resulted into transactions being termed overpriced. There has been hesitation in the mind of investors before executing M&A deals after this recession. In this article, the author shall be analysing how recession has resulted in a slowdown in M&A deals. We would also try to understand whether this Recession would be having any long-term impact on the transactions or is a short-term hiccup with special reference to the Prosus and Bill desk deal. Impact of Recession on Mergers and Acquisitions While we do not have any Universal definition for Recession, we define it as “Negative Gross Domestic Product in two consecutive quarters”. Given that a significant portion of Indian IT revenue is derived from the US, worldwide recessions in general and recession in the US in particular, are a threat to India’s Merger deals in the current fiscal year. The majority of Fintech Startups operating in the US and other countries have seen their valuations decline by more than 50% in recent years.[1] Investors’ perspectives on value have even shifted as a result of the global market crash for freshly listed companies’ equities. Numerous M&A deals that were announced before the most recent market crisis are being rethought due to the disparity between what the public markets are ready to pay for the company and what private investors are paying. We see that the fear of recession is preventing people from executing M&A deals. Following the pattern of past Recessions, what one can predict is that there will be a huge downturn in mergers and acquisitions deals in this period.  But it’s clear that this recession differs from other ones. The 2008 Financial Crisis was primarily driven by debt-related excesses in the housing and internet infrastructure markets, whereas the current one is primarily driven by excess liquidity as a result of COVID-led fiscal and monetary stimulus that is fuelling inflation and encouraging speculation in financial assets . We do not need to worry about a complete collapse as it happened in previous cycles. Merger deals and the Economy does not have a tight connection due to multiple of factors existing in the market. As a consequence to which we won’t see a major impact on M&A activity even if economy has to go through long periods of Recession. Pay U and  Bill Desk Deal There have been numerous instances where the impact of the Recession is seen in Merger and Acquisition deals. We will try to analyse one such example where the acquisition was called off due to a steep fall in the valuation of the company. On 30th September when Prosus NV terminated the $4.7 billion agreement to purchase Bill Desk, every shareholder was in disbelief as no one could have dreamt this coming. M&A Agreement contains a set of conditions that   were required to be fulfilled before completion of the transaction such as regulatory approvals, business not suffering Material Adverse Effect and various Due Diligence Formalities. Prosus contended that Bill Desk was not able to satisfy some of these conditions which were precedent for execution of the contract. The deal which was announced more than a year ago had received the approval of the Competition Commission of India just days before the cancellation. Certain plausible reasons for the cancellation of the deal are- Steep fall in Valuation India markets are highly sensitive to the United States economy and they generally follow the trend of their system. Expecting a deal of this magnitude to be executed after such a huge contraction was very challenging. Though Bill Desk is one of rare profitable companies, the valuation of 4.7 Billion which is 19xof Bill desk revenue would have been a major hurdle in execution of this deal due to existing sentiments of investors for M&A deals. Approval time taken by CCI On 5th September, 2022, the wait was finally over for both the parties as the acquisition was approved by Competition Commission of India One of the reasons for the cancellation of the deal was the long period taken by CCI. Prosus was left frustrated due to the duration of time taken for the approval. Due to the time gap between the announcement and execution, we saw a dip in the valuation of Bill Desk which eventually led to the cooling-off of Pay U’s interest in executing this deal. Failure of New Age Companies To know the real reason behind the failure of such a deal, it is important to look at what is going on in the Indian Economy. Paytm’s big fall after its public listing is one event that has shaken the faith of global investors all around the world. Fintech Sector runs on very thin margins and is all about customer conversion but the Paytm debacle has led to a very conservative approach by investors. Implications of this deal – An analysis This deal was supposed to elevate the fintech sector to new heights. Prosus had already strengthened its position in the Indian payments industry through Pay-U  and the acquisition of Bill desk would have given Prosus access to a large customer base of small merchants in India. If we look at the implications of

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Squeeze-out Mergers in India: How are they different from Global Standards?

[By Ajith N Kale & Rupa Veena S] The authors are students of School of law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bangalore.   Introduction The common law rule of the majority, as laid down in the case of Foss v. Harbottle, has been widely followed in India. It empowers the majority shareholders to make decisions related to the management of affairs of the company which is not interfered with by courts generally. However, minority shareholders always have the right to approach the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”),and courts in case of fraud, mismanagement, oppression or breach of charter documents by the majority shareholders. As per the freeze-out or squeeze-out provisions under the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”) the majority shareholders can acquire the shares held by minority shareholders and, thereby, squeeze them out of the company, and resultantly can hold the entire shareholding in a company. In light of the same, this article focuses on the legal status of freeze-out mergers in India and further makes a comparative analysis with the laws of South Korea, the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia. Legal status of freeze-out mergers in India In early 2020, section 230 of the Act was amended to include sub-sections (11) and (12)(“2020 Amendment”). Moreover, Companies (Compromises, Arrangements, and Amalgamations) Amendment Rules, 2020 (“CAARules”) and the National Company Law Tribunal (Amendment) Rules, 2020(“NCLT Rules”) were also notified, which were collectively known as the “Takeover Notification” as the amendments primarily were in relation to the takeover of minority shareholding by the majority. Firstly, as per section 230(11) of the Act, any compromise or arrangement includes a takeover offer. Secondly, Rule 3(5) of the CAA Rules enables majority shareholders holding at least 75% of the equity shares carrying voting rights (including depository receipts with voting rights) to file an application with the NCLT to acquire the remaining minority shares subject to a fair price. Thirdly, NCLT Rules deal with procedures related to acquiring minority shares. If the NCLT approves the application, the majority shareholders can forcibly acquire the minority shares by creating an obligation on minority shareholders to sell their shares. Section 235 of the Act allows the compulsory acquisition of shares held by dissenting shareholders if such an acquisition by a scheme or contract is approved by 90% of the shareholders within two months of notice to such dissenting shareholders unless NCLT has ordered otherwise on an application made by the dissenting shareholders. Another option available for the acquirer to acquire the minority shares is stated under section 236. The said section allows majority shareholders holding at least 90% of the equity shares to acquire minority shares by virtue of an amalgamation, share exchange, conversion of securities or for any other reason by notifying the company about the same. However, the bare reading of the section does not expressly obligate the minority shareholders to sell their shares. Moreover, section 236(9) states that in the event of failure of acquisition of all of minority shares by the majority shareholders, the residual minority shareholders will still be regulated under the relevant provisions of the Act. While also ensuring the right of acquisition to the majority shareholders, the amendments provide effective safeguards for the minority shareholders. As per section 230(12) of the Act, aggrieved minority shareholders of unlisted companies can approach the NCLT in case of grievances related to takeover offer. Additionally, the majority shareholders must compulsorily deposit at least 50% of the consideration of the takeover offer in a separate bank account. In the case of S. Gopakumar Nair v. OBO Bettermann India Private Limited, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”)held that the 90% majority shareholders can acquire the minority shares only if any of the events stated in section 236(1) that is “amalgamation, share exchange, conversion of securities or for any other reason” has taken place. As per the rule of ejusdem generis, NCLAT held that “for any other reason” includes only events that are like amalgamation, share exchange, or conversion of securities. It also differentiated between section 235 and section 236 by stating that on one hand section 235 provides for the acquisition of shares from dissenting shareholders, on the other, section 236 allows the acquisition of shares from assenting shareholders only if any of the events mentioned in section 236(1) are triggered. Arguably, Indian laws have tried to strike a balance between rights of the majority and the interests of the minority shareholders, however, to determine whether they are as per the global standards, laws of other nations may be compared. Comparative jurisdictions South Korea Article 360-24 of the Korean Commercial Act, 2018 guarantees a majority shareholder holding at least 95% of the shares to buy out the shares held by minority shareholders. The minority shareholders must sell their shares within two months from the date of request. However, even after negotiation, if the minority shareholders are unsatisfied with the sale price, they can approach the court to determine a fair and reasonable sale price. This section can be compared to section 235 of the Act, wherein majority shareholders holding 90% of shares can acquire the shares held by dissenting shareholders within four months. Further, under Article 360-25, the minority shareholders have the right to sell their shares to the majority shareholder, and the court shall determine the sale price if the parties do not come to a consensus through negotiation. This is similar to section 236, wherein minority shareholders can sell their shares to the majority shareholder. However, while Korean law allows the minority shareholders to approach the court only to determine the reasonable sale price, Indian law empowers the minority shareholders to approach the NCLT in case of any grievances they face in relation to such an acquisition, in addition to making the submission of valuation report of the shares to NCLT mandatory. This indicates that the Indian laws emphasize more on minority shareholders’ protection than the Korean law. Furthermore, section 230 allows shareholders holding 75% of shares to acquire minority shares as opposed to the

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Funding Winter in the Startup Market: The Effects and Regulatory Reforms

[By Akshat Shukla and Tanvi Agrawal] The authors are students at the National Law Institute University, Bhopal. I. Funding Winter: Meaning and Overview Funding Winter is a phrase used to describe the phenomena of a downturn in the investor’s confidence in the start-ups leading to a more strategic and curtailed approach towards funding. It often leads to investors avoiding firms without a set path chalked out for profitability. This, in turn, prompts a need to correct the value of the start-up. Further, one of the prominent effects of funding winter is that it requires business owners to reset their priorities in terms of profit maximization. Funding winter is not a new concept but a cyclical effect that happens due to multiple factors which impact the free flow of investments in the market. These factors may either be generically applicable to the entire market such as geopolitical unrests in countries, monetary policies, financial irregularities etc. or may be centric to the relevant sectors. By the way of this article, the authors seek to address the reasons for the funding winter that has descended in the Indian market, its effects and the possible way out for the start-ups to withstand the funding crunch in the coming months. II. Reasons for the Downturn in Investor Confidence There are several reasons for funding winter as aforementioned. A. The Generic Factors Geopolitical situations such as the Russia – Ukraine conflict and other acts of hostilities lead to the stipulation of a slow market by the investors. The world is interconnected in more than one aspect. The reliance of countries on one another further augments in the context of development and sustenance of international trade, flow of investments and exchange of services, etc. For this very reason, the occurrence or non-occurrence of any significant geopolitical event in one part of the world has crucial ramifications on the other. For instance, the standard indices in Indian, South Korean, Japanese and several other Asian markets were disrupted as a direct consequence of the announcement of the military operation by Russia on Ukraine. Financial irregularities and unscrupulous practices by nascent companies shake investor confidence. The classic case of this would be when the closing date of Sequoia Capital’s $2.8 billion India and Southeast Asia (SEA) Fund was delayed as a result of suspected financial irregularities and corporate governance failures at some of its portfolio companies. Monetary policies of the Government and regulators also determine the level of investment inflow of the investors. For instance, the repo rate has been increased by 40 basis points in the latest meeting of the RBI, as it wanted to tighten the policies and curb the relaxations given during the COVID-19 times. It also suggested increments in the Cash Reserve Ratios (CRR) and Statutory Liquidity Ratios (SLR) so as to prevent the banks from lending to the start-ups. B. The Sectoral Factors The product efficiency and viability in the market have a significant impact on the trust of the investors. For instance, the electric vehicles market in India may suffer from a funding crunch owing to the recent explosions that happened in the e-scooters. Some sectors are in demand due to a particular event or cause and in case of a dynamic shift from that phase, the particular sector may face a funding winter. An example of this is the loss suffered by Softbank due to the tech sell-off that occurred after the shift from a virtual to a physical setting. These instances make investors cautious about investing heavily in a particular sector. The funding winter for some sectors may happen because of the different effects of the policies on that sector. For example, deflation may be a cause for funding winter as inflation may be helpful for mid-cap firms in the hospitality or other B2C sectors as these firms have the dominance to pass over the burden of increased pricing to their customers. In the shorter term, there can be an impact on the balance sheets of such firms but in the longer run, these firms benefit as the increased prices do not tend to go down even when prices of raw materials and primary commodities stabilise. Hindustan Lever, Asian Paints and Pidilite are some companies that have established how inflation proved to be helpful for them in maintaining margins. Such factors affect not only the expectations but also the decision of the investors altogether in choosing how and where to employ their funds. Thus, they play a significant role in determining investor confidence and investment growth prospects. III.      Effects of the Funding Winter With the funding winter in place, the start-ups resort to measures which help them save their working capital as the expectations of funding from the investors are minimal. The advertisement expenses, capital expenditure and expansion plans are put to a halt in order to increase the sustainability of the firm. Only the expenditure essential to the survival of the firm is undertaken and all possible steps are put in place to ensure unnecessary expenses. Lastly, the end goal remains to maximize profit harnessing which keeps the firm steady even without the investment inflow. For instance, the statement of the CEO of Unacademy, Gaurav Munjal, highlighted the need to focus on profitability along with the need to work under restricted resource supply. He urged his employees to, “learn to work under constraints and focus on profitability at all costs.” From the perspective of the investor, the funding winter does not mean a complete stoppage of investments by the investors. It infers that the investors become less interested in projects that have certain risk elements even though the same would have been pursued in a normal situation by the investor. IV. The Start-up Market and Need for Regulations Funding winter can have several effects on the economic enterprises and the economy but it essentially disrupts the start-up market. In the context of developmental reforms in India, it is necessary to have a framework which would help start-ups to overcome such downturns

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Understanding the Mystification of Appointed Date versus Effective Date in a Scheme: Decoding the Impact of MCA’s Clarificatory Circular

[By Aastha Bhandari] The author is a student at the OP Jindal Global University. Introduction The conundrum between the two significant concepts of Appointed Date (“AD”) vis-a-vis the Effective Date (“ED”) within a scheme of amalgamation/merger or demerger filed before the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) has been a contested subject-matter. It was left obscure, with contrasting judgments from the NCLT, up until the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”) released its clarificatory circular on the matter in 2019. (“the Circular”) The two concepts form a substantial part of any scheme on account of the fact that section 232(6) of the Indian Companies Act of 2013 (“CA”) makes it mandatory for every scheme to “clearly indicate an appointed date from which it shall be effective and the scheme shall be deemed to be effective from such date and not at a date subsequent to the appointed date.” Put simply, the ED refers to the date when the scheme receives the sanction of approval from the NCLT and AD refers to the date when the parties record the financial values of all the assets, liabilities and other parameters that are to be transferred from the transferor company to the transferee company, as a part of the scheme. As such, the scheme is deemed to be effective on the AD.  In line with this, it is the aim of this article to map the impact and influence of the Circular on the decisions of the NCLT on the validity of an AD vis-à-vis the ED. In particular, this article will focus on the MCA’s clarification regarding the validity of an AD, being a calendar date, which is set at a date that precedes the date of filing of the Scheme before the NCLT beyond one year. Understanding the Background and Content of Clarifications Contained in MCA’s Circular The following clarification that is relevant to the scope of this article is reproduced below: When AD Precedes Date of Application of Filing the Scheme before NCLT: In its Circular, the MCA issued a significant clarification stating that where the AD is chosen as a specific calendar date, it may precede the date of filing of the application for the scheme of merger/amalgamation in NCLT. However, if the AD is significantly ante-dated beyond a year from the date of filing, the justification for the same would have to be specifically brought out in the scheme and it should not be against the public interest. Decoding the Impact of the Circular on Decisions of the NCLT vis-à-vis sanctioning Schemes In Avanthi Warehousing Services Private Limited v. Awaze Logistics Private Limited (2022), the Regional Director of the MCA (“RD”) made an observation to the effect that the Petitioner Companies had defined the AD in such a manner that it was approximately two years old from the date of filing of the Company Application (“CA”) for the scheme and thereby, the RD recommended a revision of the AD from 1.04.2020 to 1.04.2021. In line with the Circular, the Petitioner Companies justified the AD of this particular scheme by arguing that it had been approved by all the relevant stakeholders including the shareholders, secured creditors, and unsecured creditors. Further, the employees had also taken 1.04.2020 as the AD on record. Therefore, the Petitioners prayed for an acceptance of their AD by further relying on the Suo-moto order of the Supreme Court of India (“SC order”) dated 2021 on cognizance of the extension of limitation on account of the Covid-19 pandemic. In this case, the NCLT sanctioned the scheme on the grounds that it was not opposed to: i) public interest and ii) interests of the relevant stakeholders. In Re: Murli Industries Limited (2022), the RD objected to the AD set by the parties to the scheme on the ground that it was non-compliant with the Circular as it outdated the year of the filing of the CA by more than a year. However, this represents a case wherein the Petitioner’s justification relied on the fact that the AD was not outdated and well within the one-year time period permitted by the Circular. This was because the scheme was approved by the Board of Directors on 23.03.2021 shortly after which the CA was filed on 28.03.2021. This response was accepted by both the RD as well as the NCLT, the final implication being that the time taken to undertake the scheme was elongated sizably. This represents one of the numerous cases in which the RD has objected to the scheme on the grounds of the scheme being outdated for over a year when the same is not factually correct. This trend has especially seen an increase during the Covid-19 pandemic. In Vaiduriya Hotels Private Limited v. Ratnaa Lakshmi Hotels Private Limited (2022), the RD objected to the scheme on the ground that the AD was “non-acceptable” as it was ante-dated beyond a year from the date of filing of CA, thereby not being compliant with section 232(6) of the CA. In reply, the Petitioners argued that the date of filing was well within one year from the AD, with the AD being 1.03.2019 and the date of filing being 20.02.2020. It was only due to the peculiar and inevitable circumstances of the pandemic lockdown that all applications were numbered and listed for the first hearing on 14.20.2020. Therefore, the period from 15.3.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded on account of the SC order. Further, in the matter of Subhas Impex Private Limited and Others (2022), the RD objected to a particular AD in this case by stating that it lacked any relevance to the scheme because the AD had been set as 1.04.2019 however simultaneously the Petitioner Companies had submitted their financial statements to the NCLT up to the financial year ended 31.03.2021. In line with this, the RD found that the Petitioners had not adequately justified the setting of their AD through the production of relevant documents. The Petitioners justified the AD on two large grounds: i) that they had filed

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Reviewing Merger Control Regime and Analysing Competition in the Aviation Industry: Tata-Air India Case Study

[By Divya Khanwani and Suneel Kumar] The authors are students at the National Law School of India University, Bengaluru. Introduction On January 27, 2022, Talace acquired 100% equity share capital and sole control over the management and operations of Air India and AIXL, and 50% equity share capital and joint control over the management and operations of AISATS. The transaction meets the threshold for activating a requirement of notifying the CCI under s6(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 (‘The Act’) because two prerequisites are fulfilled. First, the notification (S.O. 988E), extended for 5 years on 16.03.2022, exempts any enterprise being acquired (target) having (i) assets less than INR 350 crore, or (ii) turnover less than INR 1000 crore, from notifying the CCI. The combined turnover of the target (Air India, AISATS and AIXL) far exceeds the required limits. Name of the Parties Assets (as of 31st March 2021) (INR crore) Turnover (for FY 2020-21) India (INR crore) Air India 63,317.23 8,224.19 AIXL 4,529.50 920.66 AISATS 213 730 Combined 68,059.73 9847.85   Therefore, the transaction cannot avail the benefit of the exemption. Second, if the transaction classifies as a combination under s5 of the Act, it needs to be notified to CCI under s6(2) of the Act. Name of the Parties Assets (as on 31st March 2021) (INR crore) Turnover (for FY 2020-21) India (INR crore) Talace 0.08 unavailable Tata Sons  102,969.01 9,460 Combined (Target) 68,059.73 9847.85 Combined 1,71,028.82 19,334.85 s5(a)(i)(A) In India, parties to jointly have  assets > 2000 INR crore Total assets =1,71,028.82 INR crore Condition fulfilled Effect: The transaction is a combination under s5(a)(i), and therefore, needs to be notified under s6(2) of the Act. s5(a)(i)(B) In India, parties to jointly have a turnover> 6000 INR crore Total turnover (India) = 19,334.85 INR crore Condition fulfilled   Consequently, the merger notification was filed by Talace on November 30, 2021,[i] which was approved by the CCI under s31(1) of the Act on December 20, 2021. This post argues that the acquisition of Air India by Tata Sons causes an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in the relevant market, and therefore, should not have been approved by CCI. Substantial Overlaps The transaction will result in significant overlaps in horizontal,[ii] and non-horizontal relevant markets. Vistara and AirAsia, subsidiaries of Tata Sons, operate in international and domestic passenger air transport on nine and ninety-one overlapping origin-destination routes respectively with the Target. After the fruition of the transaction, Vistara and AirAsia will also share business with the Target in international and domestic cargo services, charter flight services and ground and cargo handling services. With respect to vertical/complementary relationships, AISATS provides ground handling services to airlines at the Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Delhi, Thiruvananthapuram and Mangalore airports, while AirAsia India provides passenger air transport services in all these airports and Vistara provides passenger air transport services at all these airports except Mangalore airport. AISATS provides cargo handling services to airlines at the Bengaluru airport, while Vistara and AirAsia India provide passenger air transport services at the Bengaluru airport. Taj SATS and its wholly-owned subsidiary Taj Madras provide in-flight catering services to airlines in India, while Air India and AIXL provide passenger air transport services in India. Plummeting Competition in the Aviation Industry S20(4) lays down the factors, which the CCI shall have due regard while determining whether a combination would have an AAEC in the relevant market. This section seeks to analyse the Tata- Air India combination through the lens of the factors mentioned in s20(4) of the Act. Changing Market Composition in the domestic market In 2021, the domestic passenger air traffic market share for Air Asia and Vistara was 13.2% and for the Target was 12%. The total market share of Tata-Air India enterprise will be 25.2% [in reference to s20(4)(h)]. The combination along with the three major competitors [Indigo (54.8%), Spice Jet (10.5%) and Go Air (8.8%)] occupies more than 99% of the market share. The current composition indicates a highly concentrated market, which becomes more obvious in a comprehensive HHI analysis. HHI CALCULATION- DOMESTIC PASSENGER TRAFFIC- 2021 Market shares Square before merger Square after merger Acquirer (and its affiliates) (combined) 13.2 174.24 Target (combined) 12 144 Total Combined 25.2 635.04 Indigo 54.8 3003.04 3003.04 Spice Jet 10.5 110.25 110.25 Go Air 8.8 77.4 77.4 HHI (Total) 3,509.26 3,826.09   An HHI of 2500 or greater is indicative of highly concentrated market. In this market, even before acquisition, the HHI was of 3509, which implies very low competition. As a general rule, mergers or acquisitions that increase the HHI between 100- 200 points in highly concentrated markets raise antitrust concerns, as they are assumed to create barriers to entry for potential competitors [s20(4)(b)] and to increase the likelihood drive out the existing competitors [s20(4)(c)]. Hence, it goes without saying that this acquisition will exacerbate anti-competitiveness in the market and will drive the market towards a more oligopolistic structure. Explicating Ripple Effect The incident of Tata-Air India enterprise occupying a share of more than 25% in the domestic passenger traffic market, has consequences and ramifications beyond this market. A larger share enables the combination to exercise significant influence in other relevant markets. For instance, it enables Tata Sons to secure favourable ground handling and in-flight catering service contracts. Another relevant example is that the transaction will provide Tata Sons control over 22% share in the domestic cargo air transport market instead of the previous acquisition share of 13%. This will provide Tata Sons an upper-hand in the cargo handling services, thereby creating unfair hardships for existing enterprises providing similar services. Aggravating factors The dominance in market share will enable Tata Sons to acquire the benefits of economies of scale. However, the anti-competitive impact of the transaction does not stop at the effects of the increased market share. The peculiar features of the aviation industry enable the acquisition to be an extremely powerful tool for driving out potential competitors. Consequent to the transaction, Tata Sons will enjoy the benefits of ‘grandfathering rights’ in slot

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Strategies for Corporate Recovery through M&A during COVID-19

[By Nandini Shenai] The author is a student at the NMIMS School of Law, Mumbai. Countries around the world are imposing strict restrictions and social distancing norms as the Covid-19 outbreak worsens and the number of positive reports and casualties continues to rise. The catastrophe has transformed into a financial downturn plummeting the financial sector into an unprecedented recession, as the wheels of economic development come to a stop. The economic standstill in India comes as a consequence of the same. Changes in the market landscape, valuation problems, and a shortage of financial backing as a result of banks’ restricted lending and corresponding reallocation of excess funds are some of the primary factors of strategic planning. With regard to current negotiations, corporations must choose between bringing deals to a halt or accelerating the process. M&A transactions already in the planning phase or on the verge of being implemented would most probably be postponed until the economic downturn passes. Potential buyers are more likely to drop out of market bid systems. Multinational companies and Private Equity funds are expected to save capital in this volatile environment and move their focus to ventures that are domestic to their respective countries, which could have an impact on cross-border trade. Interpreting mergers and acquisitions in light of the existing conditions and circumstances would provide clarification when facing complexities.  Companies are resorting to a variety of unconventional corporate strategies, including emerging innovation technology acquisitions, risk mitigation, divestiture of secondary resources, collaborations with competitors, funding beyond venture capitals, diversified alliances with experts, and strategic associations with governments, in addition to rigid M&A. These incredibly turbulent times have given rise to a rare set of possibilities.   While some of the M&A transactions were due to companies restarting deals that had been placed on hold given the financial slump caused by the various national lockdowns, a large majority of it also demonstrated companies’ endeavors to undergo transformations and succeed in the post-pandemic setting. Transactions in the COVID Era: Various schemes and tax relaxations that were put forth by the Central Government in the 2020 budget including the inflow of cash that comes from sovereign wealth funds and the implementation of eased policies by the SEBI and the MCA have proved to act as a boost needed for M&A transactions in the times of the pandemic. Highlighted below are certain factors that may change the way M&A deals have traditionally been followed in India: Scope for investment: M&A deals completed during this span of time will need to account for the constraints imposed by the current situation and the strategy to decision-making will have to be rectified to meet the current challenges. Nevertheless, the downturn can provide some prospects for investors, who can take advantage of lower stock prices in the immediate future to gain a greater profit on investments once normalcy returns. Due Diligence:  A focused emphasis would be provided on clauses of contracts like indemnity clause, termination clause, risk of insolvency, ability to repay debts, medical insurance and benefits for employees, and regulatory compliance. Due to the evolution of the virtual corporate world in times of the pandemic, a stricter data protection and data privacy regime would be followed by companies. Pertaining to cross-country data transfers, stronger enforcement of international data protection rules like the GDPR needs to be done. Digitization of Regulatory Practices: Although the SEBI and the RBI have allowed stakeholders to file petitions digitally, the CCI allowed them to submit a tandem of applications digitally in March 2020, as well as pre-filing consulting via virtual conferencing in connection to, among other things, combinations that are in the ambit of the green channel path. Regulatory Interference: Opening up the possibility of delays in receiving clearance from statutory bodies, shareholders may opt for systems that do not have many regulatory configurations. As a result, a share purchase could be preferable to a downturn transaction under a corporate transfer arrangement. Indemnity: Potential buyers will need to determine the risks posed by the financial meltdown caused by Covid-19 to pursue detailed indemnity. Not only will the owners use information and subjectivity qualifiers to properly establish these indemnities, but they will also consider revealing any clear details pertinent to the Covid-19 situation in the form of a documented declaration.  Strategies for Corporate Recovery: The role of M&A will be reshaped in a post-Covid-19 setting as companies struggle to hold their standing in the market, accelerate the recovery process, and brace themselves to survive through a mix of offensive and defensive M&A strategies. Owing to the current pandemic, companies are resorting to either of the two processes of corporate revival. Defensive M&A: Defensive M&A strategies are the ones that are used to safeguard the functioning of the company. These strategies basically cater to hostile takeovers and are used to salvage the value of companies and safeguard markets to maintain competitive parity. To save capital from loss-making segments and maintain a stable primary sector, financially troubled businesses need to take drastic measures, such as the sale of assets that are distressed. The sale of distressed assets in crisis situations necessitates the quickest possible process to increase profits. Some defensive strategies that are could be followed by companies are mentioned below: Divestments: Due to the current economic strain, secondary assets that are and widely desirable after and do are not usually set for sale can be divested. In this type of situation, those who sell such assets must be fully cognizant that the number of prospective purchasers will be limited, and they must be mindful of how to handle asset fire-sales. Investor Activism: At the time of downturns, vigorously seeking value creation initiatives is critical to long-term success, as is knowing what investor activists or competitive bidders would seek. This may include rethinking shareholder returns, capital allocation, and trade finance, among other things. End-to-End M&A: Companies can aggressively reduce expenses and open up cash flow by taking pivotal steps to consolidate recent acquisitions. Private equity firms, institutional investors, distressed venture capitalists, and large corporations with solid investment portfolios are all in a hurry to act quickly and pursue potentially “predatory” M&A approaches.      

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Is Corporate India Ready To Board The SPAC-Ship?

[By Mohammad Aqib Gulzari] The author is a student at the University School of Law and Legal Studies, GGSIPU, Delhi. Introduction The American phenomenon of ‘Special Purpose Acquisition Companies’ (SPAC), popularly known as ‘blank cheques companies’, has caught the eyes of investors around the world and taken the international capital market by storm. SPACs are primarily shell companies designed to take companies public without going through the traditional method of Initial Public Offering (IPO). According to a recent market statistics report by the ‘SPAC Tracker’ for April 2021, SPACs have managed to raise an all-time record-breaking USD 98 billion with a total of 308 listings on US stock exchanges in just the first four months of 2021. The modus operandi of a standard SPAC is simple. The SPAC, an already-listed company, targets an unlisted operational company and merges with it to form a single listed entity. This is referred to as a De-SPAC transaction — i.e., a reverse merger wherein the acquisition of a private company is executed by an existing public company so that the private company can bypass the extensive and complex process of going public. These De-SPAC transactions are often led by industry experts who leverage their expertise of the market to raise capital and create synergy for every stakeholder. Under American law, the transaction is required to be completed within a period of 2 years; if it is not completed, or if a target company is not identified by the management team of SPAC, the money is returned to the investors without any hassle. Under the laws of India and the UK, however, such redemption is not allowed. Nevertheless, SPACs are increasingly becoming popular in India (e.g. Flipkart and Grofers). This is so even though not a single SPAC has been listed on the Indian stock market to date, owing to legal impediments and an unfavourable regulatory regime. In this context, this article attempts to present a clear picture of SPACs in India from a legal standpoint considering the investors’ as well as the regulatory concerns and examines the feasibility of the SPACs structure and operation within the Indian domain. Unfavourable Regulatory Framework for SPACS in India  The Companies Act, 2013 (Act) is perhaps the biggest roadblock for SPACs in India. De-SPAC transactions stand in direct contravention of the Act as well as other Indian laws discussed below, such as SEBI Regulations, FEMA, RBI Master Directions, and the Income Tax Act, 1961 (ITA). As per Section 248 of the Act, the Registrar of Companies (ROC) is empowered to invalidate and strike off the names of the companies which do not commence operation within one year from the date of incorporation, unless they seek a dormant status under Section 455. In exercise of this power, the ROC, under the mandate of MCA, invalidated 2,26,166 shell companies in 2017-18, 2,25,910 in 2018-19, and 14,848 in 2019-20. [No company was invalidated in 2020-21 as more than 11,000 companies had applied for a “voluntary invalidation”—another avenue provided under Section 248(2).] Since a De-SPAC transaction requires two years to complete, it will inevitably be hit by Section 248 of the Act. Thus, the Act would require significant amendments for SPACs to establish a structure in India and meet their objectives such that SPACs can be allowed to remain in existence for a period of two years from the date of incorporation. Outbound Merger: Overseas Direct Investment Regulations In case of an outbound SPAC merger, i.e., where a foreign listed SPAC acquires an Indian target company, Indian shareholders are subject to Overseas Direct Investment regulations in the matter of holding shares in the listed merged entity post-De-SPAC, either as consideration for a merger or as a share swap. Such holdings by shareholders must comply with the RBI Master Direction on liberalized remittance which caps the Fair Market Value (FMV) of the security or holdings in an overseas entity at USD 250,000 annually. The value of the security is bound to exceed the FMV, resulting in contravention of laws at the hands of the Indian shareholders if they own a greater stake in the merged foreign entity. Thus, the issue calls for modifications in the said regulations to enable the Indian shareholders to own larger stakes in foreign entities through De-SPACing. Predicaments in Listing the SPAC on Indian Capital Market Due to non-compliance with SEBI norms, SPACs cannot be listed on the Indian capital market. SEBI has laid down eligibility criteria for an IPO under Regulation 6(1) of SEBI (Issue of Capital And Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018 which require companies to have net tangible assets of at least 3 crores INR in the preceding three years, minimum average consolidated pre-tax operating profits of 15 crores INR during any three of last five years, and net worth of at least 1 crore INR in each of the last three years. While SPACs may list themselves using an alternate route under Regulations 6(2) and 32(2) which allow companies to go public through a book-building process pursuant to which 75% of the IPO must be allotted to qualified institutional buyers. Thereby, curtailing investment opportunities for retail investors as they can only be allotted 10% of the IPO. Taxation Conundrum The De-SPAC transaction will be taxable under Section 45 of the ITA which states that any capital gain derived by a person, from the transfer of the capital asset, is taxable in India. The SPACs acquire the entire share capital of the target company via two methods either for cash consideration or in exchange for its shares. In both cases, capital gains will ensue in the hands of the shareholders. De-SPAC transaction is not tax neutral in India as it is not explicitly exempted from capital gains tax under Section 47 of ITA which provides for the exemption from capital gains tax for Indian amalgamating companies pursuant to a scheme of amalgamation. In order to complete such transactions without undue tax imposition, an enabling provision must be added in the ITA to accord more clarity and

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